The Role of the family in cases of disputed medical decision making by Hilder, Carolyn Hayley Jane
The Role of the family in cases of disputed medical decision making
Hilder, Carolyn Hayley Jane
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/474
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
 1 
 
 
The Role of the Family in 
Cases of  
Disputed Medical Decision 
Making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carolyn Hayley Jane Hilder 
August 2009 
Submitted for Ph.D. 
 
 
 2 
Abstract 
 
This doctoral thesis considers the family’s role in the process of making medical 
treatment decisions for one of its members. 
 
Chapter 1 explores the meaning of family in the context of illness and disability. 
It is suggested that membership is not defined by biological or marital status but 
by interdependence, which also provides the moral and logical claim for a role of 
influence in treatment decisions. 
 
Chapter 2 considers various ethical frameworks for development of an inclusive 
decision-making framework, using fictional case studies. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the historical development of the legal framework for the 
resolution of treatment disputes revealing the ‘invention’ of a common law 
jurisdiction in respect of adults lacking capacity in order to meet perceived social 
need.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the unifying concept of the various jurisdictions in respect of 
adults and children, namely the patient’s ‘best interests’. Decided cases are 
categorised by their principal issue to demonstrate that the judicial concept of 
best interests has been shaped by core values intrinsic to those issues, leaving 
consideration of the interdependence inherent in the family context side-lined. 
That such disregard is not a necessary corollary of the mechanisms adopted for 
decision-making is shown by comparison with later cases of paternity testing 
disputes. 
 
Chapter 5 traces the last throes of the inherent jurisdiction through political 
engagement and the Bournewood litigation.  
 
Finally chapter 6 assesses the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It is 
argued that, although the statutory test of ‘best interests’ is susceptible to family-
friendly considerations, the general authority limits involvement of families to 
trivial matters. 
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Introduction 
 
 
“Illness is the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship. 
 Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship,  
in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the sick.” 
Susan Sontag, New York Review of Books, 26th January 1978 
 
 
 
Illness and disability are facts of life. At some point in our lifetime, we will all 
need medical attention. The need may be simple and transitory, complex and 
chronic, or anywhere in between but however and whenever it arises, decisions 
have to be taken about treatment. Sometimes, the appropriate response to a 
medical need is obvious to all concerned, so that treatment decisions may be 
taken easily and without controversy. Often, however, the ‘most appropriate’ 
treatment is a matter of subjective judgment, and therefore open to dispute. It 
may then be asked how such disputes are to be resolved, and in particular what is 
the family’s role in reaching resolution? 
 
Medical treatment disputes usually involve doctors, whose decision-making will 
be governed by a professional code requiring compliance with a system of 
values, or ‘ethics’. A core value of medical ethics in Britain today is patient 
autonomy - the right of individuals to make decisions about their treatment being 
answerable only to themselves. According to this ethic, when treatment decisions 
have to be taken, doctors make informed recommendations but patients – and 
patients alone - choose whether to follow them or not.  
 
It was not always so. Historically, the prevailing ethic had been one of 
professional beneficence: “doctor knows best”. However the world wars of the 
twentieth century brought a shift in cultural expectations. Health-care institutions 
replaced community doctors, and patients began to approach health-care more as 
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customers, with legal rights of redress. Medical malpractice cases increased,1 and 
the courts affirmed the centrality of the patient in the language of rights of self-
determination.2 Autonomy came to be seen as an important break on the power 
of medics, and ultimately a bastion of liberty and democracy.3 Incidentally, it 
also came to operate as a restriction on the decision-making influence of patients’ 
families. 
 
Yet as a mechanism for making decisions and determining disputes, autonomy 
has its limitations. Most starkly, it does not assist where the patient in need of 
treatment is incapable of acting autonomously. Infants and children cannot make 
decisions on significant medical issues by reason of their immaturity, but adults 
too may never have developed autonomy because of innate disability, or they 
may lose the capacity they once had, temporarily or permanently, by reason of 
illness or accident.  
 
More subtly, there are limitations in the vision of autonomy even as it applies to 
those of us who retain full mental faculties. People do not live as autonomous 
beings in splendid isolation from others. Almost universally, individuals are 
enmeshed in a web of relationships, most conveniently called ‘family’. The legal 
concept of ‘family’ is undefined and loose, but the hallmark of family 
relationships – and what distinguishes ‘family’ members from ‘carers’ - is 
mutuality and interdependence. To be a member of a family is to be, at least to 
some extent, answerable to someone other than oneself.  
 
In the limitations of autonomy, the relevance of families to medical treatment 
decisions is made apparent. Autonomy’s dominance notwithstanding therefore 
the first question which this thesis seeks to answer is what should be the role of 
the family in the resolution of medical treatment disputes?  
                                                 
1  For a fascinating study of the shifting cultural expectations of doctors and medicine, see Nelson 
& Nelson, A Patient In The Family. Although the study is of American healthcare systems, it 
offers insight into the British experience too. 
2  See for example Cardozo J’s classic expression of the right of self-determination in 
Schloendorf v. Society of New York Hospital 105 NE 92; and in England, the affirmation of the 
need for consent in AG’s Ref (N0. 6) [1981] QB 715 
3 See Beauchamp & Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics, and the discussion of it in 
chapter 2 below; and the work of Ian Kennedy, including Treat Me Right. 
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To answer this question, chapter 1 explores how families both affect and are 
affected by medical treatment. Empirical evidence demonstrates that patients 
with good family support have better post-operative outcomes; and that one 
family member’s illness has an adverse impact on the wellbeing of others. In the 
medical context, therefore, ‘family’ implies both benefit and responsibility, a 
challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy of autonomy, and therefore, it will be 
argued, a moral claim to influence in the decision-making process.  
 
The importance of the family’s claim for influence in the medical decision-
making process is not, however, purely a moral one. There are significant 
practical implications to family support for medical treatment, which society 
cannot afford to jeopardise. Chapter 1 goes on to consider the statistics of health 
care economics, which make starkly obvious the dependence of the whole 
healthcare system on informal systems of patient support. Without family 
involvement in medical care, the NHS and social care budget would have to 
double. Any approach to decision-making which undermined the willingness of 
the family to continue current levels of patient support would have serious 
consequences for the taxation system, and so for us all – a very practical claim 
for family influence in the decision-making process.  
 
Moreover, dependence on informal care structures has social ramifications 
beyond the strictly monetary. The time and effort involved in supporting an ill 
relative curtails earning capacity and social standing. Since family support of its 
weakest members is often an exaggerated expression of ‘normal’ family 
functioning, the burden of caring – and therefore the curtailment of income and 
standing - falls disproportionately on women. As a result, the labour market is 
distorted and the chances of realising aspirations of gender equality are 
circumscribed. If modern sociological objectives are to be realised, a balance 
must be struck between the interests of the treatment receiver and the treatment 
supporter, the patient and the family. That balance is most tangibly expressed in 
the role afforded to families in treatment decision-making. How society 
articulates that balance is a measure of its understanding and appreciation of the 
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contributions families make to our individual and collective welfare – a 
sociological claim for family influence.  
 
Moral, practical and sociological claims may be compelling, but autonomy has a 
philosophical strength which also needs to be answered. Accordingly, this thesis 
goes on to ask what is the most appropriate ethical basis for medical decision-
making, and what role does it suggest for the family? 
 
Using fictional case studies, in chapter 2 the moral insights offered by various 
ethical codes4 are examined. Whilst it is recognised that each approach has its 
strengths, each also has its limitations. Ultimately it is concluded that the best 
prospect of securing optimal outcome for patients, families and society as a 
whole comes from a combination of approaches. The adoption of ethics of 
deontological constraint as a minimum standard, and care as an ideal, offers the 
possibility of medical decision-making informed from the perspectives of both 
patient and family. Such a combined approach does not offer simple answers to 
complex issues, but it allows a place for all interests, and makes clear the stakes 
at play. 
 
With aspiration and ethic identified, considerations can next turn to practical 
experience of treatment dispute resolution. What is the role historically afforded 
in law to the family of patients in respect of whom a decision has to be taken?  
 
To answer this question, recourse must be had to decided case law. Autonomy 
and confidentiality considerations combined ensure that treatment disputes are 
most visibly played out in the courts (and therefore available for present scrutiny) 
in the context of actual or anticipated patient incapacity. Chapter 3 therefore 
examines the historical development of a court jurisdiction to determine such 
cases and its incidental shaping of the family role. In respect of minors, the 
judicial approach to parental authority is analysed, from parens patriae to the 
Children Act 1989. In respect of adult patients, common law powers up to the 
enactment of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are examined. The inherent 
                                                 
4 Specifically, casuistry, consequentialism, deontology, virtue theory, care and principlism. 
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jurisdiction – a declaratory procedure of the High Court - is shown to be 
essentially an invention of the judges, created to fill an unintended lacuna in the 
law after successive Mental Health Acts, and then developed piecemeal, in 
response to the accidental demands of individual cases and without rigorous 
ethical foundation. 
 
How as it then that the family role was shaped? What considerations nudged 
family interests into their current position? Whatever their historical differences, 
the jurisdictions in respect of both children and adults are bound together by the 
common concept of the patient’s ‘best interest’. Grouping decided cases 
thematically offers insights into the judicial understanding of this concept and 
how it has shaped the decision-making role afforded to families. Chapter 4 
identifies key issues of sterilisation, life-saving treatment, borderline capacity 
and religion and argues that they illuminate certain core values by which judges 
navigate all disputes, leading to a systematised failure to recognise family 
interdependence. The role left to families in the determination of medical 
treatment disputes is shown to be marginal and unsatisfactory, both in ethics and 
in practice.     
 
However, the same thematic analysis of cases also reveals that the judicial 
approach to ‘best interests’ demonstrates inherent adaptability. It is pertinent to 
ask next if the medical decision-making role historically ascribed to the family in 
law could be brought more in line with our ideal within the established legal 
framework?  
 
Chapter 4 suggests that the broadening understanding of interests and the 
adoption of a ‘balancing exercise’ to guide judicial determinations make it 
possible to envisage for families a fairer and more influential role in the decision-
making process, without sacrificing any of the values central to judicial 
determinations. Recognition even of the family’s competing interests is not 
incompatible with the decision-making mechanism adopted under the inherent 
jurisdiction of the courts, and need not imply any loss of focus on the patient. By 
way of illustration, chapter 4 concludes by drawing comparison with the legal 
approach to paternity testing disputes. Originally itself a medical procedure, 
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experienced by the subject as very similar to immunisation, modern resolutions 
of paternity testing disputes offer a model of how the inherent jurisdiction could 
have continued to develop to meet our ethical ideal.  
 
However time, and the law, do not stand still. Common law has latterly been 
superceded by statute, namely the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Given the expense 
and effort involved in legislation, it is pertinent to ask how such change come 
about, and why? Chapter 5 explores the pressures leading to legal reform. Even 
as common law powers in respect of adults were discovered and developed, there 
were calls – led by the judiciary – for statutory reform; and social realities had 
already compelled political engagement when the protracted Bournewood 
litigation exposed the common law approach to a different jurisprudence. 
Subjection of the inherent jurisdiction to the rigours of European human rights 
legislation, Bournewood itself, and the judicial determinations made in its wake 
both foreshadowed the passing of legislation and informed many of its 
provisions.  
 
When the Mental Capacity Act 2005 came into force in April and October 2007, 
it did not extinguish the inherent jurisdiction, but supplanted it. Chapter 6 
considers how the Act develops the key concepts of the common law, and in 
particular how it conceives of families. Is the family role in medical decision-
making changed? Is it any closer to our ideal? Is there any hope for improvement 
in the future? 
 
Much hailed for its patient-focus, the statutory checklist of ‘best interests’ is 
nonetheless susceptible to family-friendly interpretation. In everyday matters 
where the family assumes the role of carer, the general authority operates to 
extend them an unprecedented warrant for decision-making. However, in more 
significant issues, that same general authority excludes the family from any 
decisive role. The overall effect of the legislation, it is concluded, will be to leave 
families in medical treatment disputes in much the same position as they were 
under the inherent jurisdiction, with too little recognition to meet our ethical 
benchmark. A long-awaited opportunity to reshape the role of the family in 
medical decision-making has been sadly missed.     
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Chapter 1 
 
 
The Concept of ‘Family’ and Why It Matters In Medical Decision-Making 
 
 
This chapter considers what is meant by ‘family’, and why families are relevant 
to medical treatment disputes. Family support improves the medical prognosis 
for patients; but a patient in the family can be a strain on family resources.  
Simple fairness requires that the family’s contribution towards better medical 
outcomes, and the penalties paid for caring, should afford families some 
recognition in the legal process of resolving treatment disputes. 
 
 
It is a notion both common place and poetic that people do not live in isolation: 
 
“No man is an Island, entire of it self; every man is a piece of the 
Continent, a part of the main; …”5 
  
Even whilst they are patients, people are also partners, parents, daughters and 
sons, neighbours and colleagues. We live our lives enmeshed in a network of 
social relationships, where burdens and benefits flow in both directions. The 
people who make up our primary social network, from whom we draw our 
greatest benefits and for whom we accept the heaviest obligations, we usually 
call our ‘family’. 
 
The Social Concept of ‘Family’ 
 
In British society at the beginning of the 21st century, ‘the family’ is a loose 
concept which eschews precision and repels attempts at definition. As the 
concise Oxford dictionary puts it:   
 
                                                 
5 John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions 
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family 1. a set of parents and children or of relations, living together 
or not. 2a the members of a household, esp. parents and their 
children. b a person’s children. C (attrib.) serving the needs of 
families (family butcher). 3a all the descendants of a common 
ancestor; a house, a lineage. b a race or group of peoples from a 
common stock. 4 all the languages ultimately derived from a 
particular early language, regarded as a group. 5 a group of persons 
or nations united by political or religious ties. 6 a group of objects 
distinguished by common features. 
 
In everyday conversation, we talk of ‘family’ in many different ways, drawing 
understanding from the context. In a given situation, most people are able to list 
the people who make up their ‘family’, even if they cannot identify a unifying 
characteristic which makes them so. So when a woman proposes ‘starting a 
family’, her partner thinks of children; when she proposes ‘having a family 
gathering’, he prepares himself for parents, siblings, cousins, Uncle Tom 
Cobbley and all; and when they draw up their ‘family tree’, he looks to ancestors 
and descendants, the longer dead and wider spread the better.  
 
Who do we mean when we talk of our ‘family’ in the context of medical 
decision-making? Those with a legal connection to us, such as marriage, civil 
partnership or adoption, may be one starting point, for anybody who has chosen 
to adopt such a legal status has a clear interest in the other’s well-being. 
Biological connection may be another for at some point in our lives we usually 
live most intimately with those who share our genes, Moreover anybody sharing 
genetic heritage has a clear interest in some types of medical condition such as 
haemophilia or certain types of cancer, where there may be an inherited defect or 
tendency. Yet neither biological nor legal connection is sufficient. Even added 
together, these relationships exclude those who may be closest, such as a 
cohabitant or friend; whilst those who share a gene pool or a certificate may now 
be distant, estranged or completely unknown. 
 
When illness clouds the horizon, a patient is most likely to ask for help from 
those who are most closely connected on an emotional level – the people she 
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cares about and who care about her - on an ongoing and voluntary basis, 
whatever their biological or legal status. Think of the family as a novel6 with the 
patient’s story as one chapter. It then becomes more apparent who are the 
significant characters. The caring and committed connection that comes with 
shared lives and mutual dependency is sufficient to bring anyone into the family 
fold as most people see it, irrespective of biological or legal status.7 For the 
purposes of this thesis then, that is the notion of ‘family’ which I adopt. 
 
At first consideration, this understanding of ‘family’ calls to mind the modern 
preoccupation with ‘carers’. Since feminist academics began to discuss an ethic 
of care in the early 1980s, carers’ pressure groups have been established and 
developed into vocal lobbyists; government policy depends on ‘carers’ meeting 
the needs of vulnerable people whom the state wishes not to place in institutions; 
and Jonathan Herring has recently begun the call of the legal academy for their 
recognition.8   
 
However, not all ‘caring’ is the same. The government definition refers, in broad 
terms, to people who “look after a relative or friend who needs support because 
of age, physical or learning disability or illness, including mental illness”9. 
However those who champion caring are usually10 careful to distinguish ‘carers’ 
from ‘paid carers’, in recognition of the reality that care which is given in a 
domestic setting of interdependence is somehow intrinsically different from care 
which is performed for a wage11. A neighbour who volunteers to collect 
                                                 
6 As suggested by Nelson & Nelson, A Patient In The Family at p107. The analogy of the novel 
also makes it clear that significant characters cannot be overlooked simply because others dislike 
them, disagree with them, or disapprove of them. 
7 Others have taken a similarly broad view. Buchanan and Brock consider that “family is 
whomever the individual is most closely associated with”: Deciding for Others: The Ethics of 
Surrogate Decision-Making, Cambridge University Press 1999. 
8 See ‘Where are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?’ [2007] Legal Studies 51, and ‘The 
Place of Carers’, a paper given at UCL Law & Bioethics Conference, soon to be published in 
book form (ed. Freeman). 
9 Department of Health, Caring About Carers (London: Dept. Of Health, 2005).  
10 For example the Carers UK definition in Facts About Carers and most relevant legislation. But 
it is not universal: see for example ‘Paid Emotional Care: Organizational Forms That encourage 
Nurturance’, Francesca M. Cancian in Care Work ed. Madonna Harrington Meyer at pp136 – 
149. 
11 I agree that it is different, but not simply by reason of receiving payment. Such an argument 
undermines the progress that has been made in provision by the welfare state for payments to 
family carers. 
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shopping for a sick neighbour is caring and is included in the consideration, even 
though the degree of commitment and involvement is quite small: a community 
nurse is not, even though she works eight hour shifts. Most significantly for 
present purposes, parents caring for able-bodied children12 in the ordinary way of 
childhood are not generally counted as ‘carers’.  
 
So, the understanding of ‘family’ on which I rely implies both more and less than 
caring. What unites the emotionally connected and the biologically connected as 
‘family’ in the context of medical decisions – and also what really distinguishes 
them from paid carers - is that when the decision has to be made, in some sense 
they are inextricably part of it. The decision will impact upon their lives too.13 
Whether an elderly Alzheimer’s patient receives Aricept or not impacts upon the 
nature and degree of care their spouse or adult child will need to provide14, and 
therefore the ability of the spouse or adult child to do other things like earn a 
living. In such a situation, it matters little whether we define the third party as a 
family member or as a carer – the impact is the same. However, for other 
medical issues, the trajectory of impact may be different. The diagnosis of a 
mutative gene, for example, impacts on the patient’s daughter and her life plans, 
whether she is local, loving and caring or distant, estranged and uncaring. 
 
                                                 
12 See for example the definition of carers in Carers UK Facts About Carers (London: Carers UK 
2005). Herring’s consideration adopts this protocol too – see ‘Where are the Carers in Healthcare 
Law and Ethics?’ 27 Legal Studies 51 at p52.  Herring also points out that, although a normal 
reading of the government’s definition would suggest that parents are included, this cannot have 
been the intention, as can be seen by the report’s citation of the number of carers as only 5.2 
million. That citation also gives a clue as to why parents of normal able-bodied children are not 
included: there are just too many of them. Normal parenthood is these days, in theory at least, 
both a matter of choice and an ordinary feature of adult life – not something to attract special 
policy consideration or benefit. 
13 This may be said of treatment decisions, whether they are disputed or not, but accord implies 
consent, whereas dispute suggests that a decision taken against family preference will be 
experienced as an imposition, and therefore require more careful justification – hence the focus of 
this work of the resolution of medical treatment disputes. 
14 The judgment of Dobbs J in the case of Eisai Ltd. v. The National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 refers at paragraph 123 to “some 4000 responses to 
Alzheimer’s Society and 7000 to NICE consultation” all giving evidence from carers about the 
beneficial effects of the drug for them. (The Alzheimer’s Society did not pursue intervention in 
the Court of Appeal but filed evidence making it clear that it supported the concerns successfully 
raised there by the Appellant: Eisai Ltd. v. The National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence [2008] EWCA 438 per Richards LJ at paragraph 3.)  
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It is true that medical decisions in respect of a particular patient may also have an 
impact on the lives of non-family members. The paid carer may be called upon to 
perform different physical tasks, or to call more or less frequently; and the 
neighbour may be asked more or less frequently to perform out-of-hours favours. 
But there is a difference of kind and degree. The paid carer can go home at the 
end of her shift, and the neighbour may close her front door. With the emotional 
connection of family caring or the biological connection of shared genetics, there 
is an additional burden of responsibility that comes simply by virtue of that 
connection15 and lasts twenty-four hours a day. 
 
So the terms ‘family’ and ‘carer’ are not co-extensive and interchangeable. For 
convenience, we may sometimes use ‘carer’ as a short-hand for one type of 
family member, but it is the interdependence – the connectedness - of family 
members which provides the distinguishing feature which is the basis for 
consideration of their role in medical decision-making, not simply the avenue of 
its expression.  
 
 
The Legal Concept of ‘Family’ 
 
The law adopts a similarly pragmatic approach. The legal concept of ‘family’ 
relies on the common understanding of everyday language. There are no 
statutory definitions for lawyers to pore over and deconstruct. ‘Family’ is not a 
legal term of art, but an ordinary word for communication. When used in a legal 
context, it is the judges who determine its meaning, according to their perception 
of prevailing social conditions.16 
                                                 
15 As Draper & Sorrell put it, “The nearest and dearest are under some sort of obligation to pick 
up the pieces if the mishaps are serious…because belonging to a family is often supposed to be a 
necessary last line of defence against a sometimes hostile world of strangers. …the devotion of 
friends and relations can be morally necessary, even if the people who depend on it do not always 
deserve it.”: ‘Patients’ Responsibilities in Medical Ethics’ (2002) Bioethics 335 at 348-9. 
16 MDA Freeman argues that the relationship between social conditions and legal recognition is 
not really so one-way. “There is clear evidence that not only does the law serve to reproduce 
social order, but it actually in part constitutes and defines that order…The legal form is one of the 
main modalities of social practice through which actual relationships embodying gender 
stratification have been expressed.” ‘Towards a Critical Theory of Family Law’ 1985 CLP 153 at 
158  
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Generally in law ‘family’ “connotes essentially some grouping, usually of 
persons, who are connected with each other by some particular kind of bond,”17 
but the kinds of bond which judges favour change with the times. What counts as 
‘family’ in law now, may not have done ten years ago and what does not count 
yet, may in time.  
 
Historically, the courts have recognized ‘family’ in bonds of marriage (including 
“in-law” and “step” relationships18) and consanguinity. The archetypal ‘family’ 
is a married couple and the children of their union. Modern social conditions 
have dissolved the necessity for either marriage or genetic descendancy,19 but 
they have not brought about their extinction. Where there is marriage and 
bloodline, the traditional recognition will be readily afforded.  
 
However, as we approach the end of the twenty-first century’s first decade, the 
law’s understanding of ‘family’ has developed, so that it is no longer constrained 
by such legal status and lineage. Other types of bond are accepted as having the 
potential to constitute a ‘family’. Marriage and adoption no longer carry the 
automatic privilege over cohabitation and parenthood that they once did and 
divorce, the breakdown of marriage, is no longer necessarily the end of family 
life.20 As Dewar puts it, “instead, the law now offers a variety of lenses through 
which family relations may be understood.”21  
 
Such development has been driven by general social reality. According to the 
2007 British Household Survey, 14% of men and 13 % of women aged between 
16 and 59 were cohabiting, and 44.3% of all live births were to unmarried 
                                                 
17 Per Lord Clyde in Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27 at p48. 
18 Jones v. Whitehill [1950] 2 KB 204: a niece-in-law was entitled to succeed to property as 
‘family’. 
19 In the sense that cohabiting adults with a baby created by anonymous gamete donors and 
surrogacy can function as, and look to the uninformed exactly the same as, the family archetype. 
20 “Separation and divorce was once the mark of the end of family life, and policy was to 
encourage the former partners to go on to make new families. It seems that now separation or 
divorce is seen, if not as a normal part of changing family life, at least as an unremarkable one.” 
Alison Diduck, ‘Shifting Familiarity’ 58 CLP 235 at 238  
21 John Dewar, ‘Family Law and its Discontents’, International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 14 (2000) 59-85 at p62. 
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mothers. Adult relationships outside marriage are now so common, and so 
uncontroversial to the majority populace, that a legal concept of ‘family’ which 
insisted on matrimony would fly in the face of wider social values, such as 
equality and equal treatment,22 and would simply look silly. 
 
A ‘conventional’ heterosexual cohabitating relationship - a lifestyle of marriage 
in all but the certificate - is now readily recognised in law as a ‘family’.23 Other 
types of adult relationship are increasingly accepted in wider society too and the 
courts are catching up. The House of Lords recognised that a partnership of two 
men amounted to ‘family’ in the landmark case of Fitzpatrick v. Sterling 
Housing Association Ltd.24 This was a major step forward in the development of 
the legal concept of ‘family’ but at the time it was actually the smaller of two 
possible steps. Homosexual partners were denied the status of ‘spouse’. With the 
passing of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, this rapidly became untenable,25 and a 
differently constituted House subsequently corrected it in the case of Ghaidan v. 
Godin-Mendoza.26 Other recent statutes, like the Human Tissue Act 2004,27 have 
been drafted to reflect the modern view from the outset. 
 
Having gone beyond those forms of relationship which provide the ready 
identification of a certificate of legal status, if ‘family’ is to retain any special 
significance at all, judges have had to find other ways to distinguish between 
those adult partnerships which fit the model, and those which do not. In so doing, 
judges have been compelled to formulate what constitutes the ‘essence’ of family 
                                                 
22 Since conjugality “is not an accurate marker of the qualitative attributes of personal adult 
relationships that are relevant to practical legislative [and policy] objectives”, per the Law 
Commission of Canada, in ‘Beyond Conjugality: Recognising and Supporting Close Personal 
Adult Relationships’ (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canade 2002).  
23 For example Hawes v. Evenden [1953] 1 WLR 1169, Dyson Holdings Ltd. v Fox [1976] QB 
503 
24 [2001] 1 AC 27 
25 When the state has afforded status recognition to a homosexual couple, the only distinction 
between them and a married heterosexual couple is the mechanics of intercourse, which is 
irrelevant to any common understanding of ‘family’.  
26 [2004] UKHL 30 
27 s 54(8): 'For the purposes of this Act, . . . a person is another's partner if the two of them 
(whether of different sexes or the same sex) live as partners in an enduring family relationship.' 
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in law.28 They found that essence in the substance of the relationship, extending 
recognition to partnerships of commitment, withholding it from the transient:  
 
“…there should be a degree of mutual interdependence, of the 
sharing of lives, of caring and love, of commitment and support.”29 
 
“Essentially the bond must be one of love and affection, not of a 
casual or transitory nature, but in a relationship which is permanent 
or at least intended to be so. As a result of that personal attachment to 
each other, other characteristics will follow, such as readiness to 
support each other emotionally and financially, to care for and look 
after the other in times of need, and to provide a companionship in 
which mutual interests and activities can be shared and enjoyed 
together.”30   
 
“..love, trust, confidence, mutual dependence and unconstrained 
social intercourse…are the essence of family life.”31 
 
Such descriptions read rather like a Mills and Boon plot synopsis, portraying an 
idealisation of relationships which most happy families would admit is not 
always attained. Reality creeps in with judicial recognition that not all these 
characteristics have to be present in every case. There must simply be enough of 
them to justify the application of the descriptive term ‘family’.32  
 
Widening the legal understanding of how a ‘family’ may be made up does not, 
however, imply automatic legal recognition of the new constructions. There is a 
privilege remaining to the legally married, in that their certificated status affords 
them the presumption of being ‘family’; whereas de facto partners must bring 
                                                 
28 In Fitzpatrick the House of Lords was concerned with the construction of a statute passed in 
1920. Instead of looking to what constituted ‘family’ when the Act was drafted, the majority 
decision looked to what characterised it. It was then possible to ask if the modern Plaintiff (whose 
domestic arrangements would certainly not have been recognised in 1920, indeed whose lifestyle 
would have been criminal then) fulfilled that essence in the social conditions of  1999. 
29 Per Lord Slynn of Hadley, in Fitzpatrick at p38. 
30 Per Lord  Clyde, in Fitzpatrick at p51.  
31 Per Lord Bingham in Secretary of State for Work & Pensions v. M [2006] UKHL 11 at p[11] 
32 Per Lord Hutton (dissenting)  in Fitzpatrick  at p73 
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evidence to establish that they qualify.33 A presumption may not sound like much 
recompense for the cost of a wedding ceremony, but in terms of convenience, it 
is priceless. When a recently bereaved partner is trying to claim a pension, it is 
much easier to produce a marriage certificate than to compile satisfactory 
evidence of shared living arrangements to satisfy a reluctant provider. Moreover, 
both domestic and European Court of Justice judgments suggest that this 
presumption is not easily rebutted – the status of family gained by marriage will 
not be lost simply by separation, but subsists at least until formal dissolution.34 
The feckless and unloving spouse is still ‘family’ when his cohabiting 
counterpart may not be. 
 
However, to date, judicial recognition of ‘the essence’ of family has been quasi-
marital. The courts have adopted a fairly narrow interpretation of cohabitation. 
Where it is claimed to be the basis of ‘family’ life, cohabitation has been 
narrowly interpreted. Defined in a decidedly contemporary context, cohabitation 
implies the need for a sexual element in the relationship. Merely living together 
on a domestically sharing but platonic basis misses the mark,35 as does the 
relationship between a grown-up ‘child’ and elderly parents.36  The law’s notion 
of ‘family’ between adults has not so much widened, as simply dropped the 
requirement of a marriage certificate for entry.    
 
The Context of Medical Decision-Making:  In the context of disputed medical 
treatment, a quasi-marital understanding of ‘family’ is inappropriately narrow. 
As we have seen, when people are ill or disabled, the quasi-marital social unit is 
important, but not sufficient. Today, the reality of an ageing population is that 
                                                 
33 Per Lord Slynn in Fitzpatrick at p38.  
34 Eg Diatta v. Land Berlin [1986] 2 CMLR 164 – a married couple who lived in separate houses 
pending finalisation of their divorce still qualified under the free movement provisions for as long 
as the legal marriage persisted. And R v. IAT and Singh ex p Sec St for the Home Dept [1992] 
ECR1 4265 – an Indian national had married a British citizen and travelled with her to work in 
Germany. Notwithstanding that the Decree Nisi of their divorce was already pronounced, he was 
able to benefit from Community Law protection until the marriage was finally dissolved. 
35 See the remarks of Russell LJ in Ross v. Collins [19645] 1 WLR 425, and the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Joram Developments Ltd. v. Sharratt [1979] 1 WLR 928, from which the 
House of Lords in Fitzpatrick in 2001 expressed no need to depart (see Lord Nicholls at p44). 
36 C v. UK Dec 3.7.92 DR 73, 27: where the European court rejected a claim to ‘family life’ 
encompassing a 26 year old daughter, married and employed, and her financially independent 
parents.  
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adult children are often shouldering responsibilities for increasingly dependent 
parents. Each of them – parent and child(ren) - may be fighting very hard to 
retain their independence of finance and housing, such as would preclude them 
from the legal concept of family expounded in the case law so far, but they are 
giving and receiving care and support, not because caring is a vocation of one 
and a purchase of the other, but because they are family.  
 
Moreover, it is not just an intergenerational concept of family that is needed. The 
grown-up children who shoulder the practical burdens of caring for parental 
infirmity rely on their siblings to take a turn; on their partners, and even on their 
former partners, to make it possible for them to give time to parental care by 
looking after the children. A whole network of familial relations is involved. 
Failure to recognize the ‘family’ here would leave the law out of step with 
common experience.   
 
There are signs that law and legal processes are both capable of encompassing a 
much wider concept of family – the concept which is central to present 
considerations - and are indeed moving that way. Since context is relevant to 
legal interpretation, just as it is in common usage of the term ‘family’, it is 
significant that the leading cases of judicial interpretation of ‘family’ have so far 
all been concerned with economic entitlements or liabilities,37 in respect of which 
there may be public policy reasons for a narrow interpretation. By contrast, in 
medical care, the public policy is to maximize informal, ‘family’-type, support 
systems. Therefore in the context of medical treatment decisions, the public 
policy pressure is towards an inclusive view of ‘family’. Helen Stalford has 
identified precisely such a divergence between the interpretation of the family 
adopted by the European Union, based on economic considerations, and that 
adopted by Strasbourg, based on humanitarian considerations.38 
 
                                                 
37 Fitzpatrick [2001] 1 AC 27 and Ghaidon [2004] UKHL 30 were concerned with succession to 
a tenancy; and M [2006] UKHL 11 was concerned with liability under the Child Support Act. 
38 ‘Concepts of Family under EU Law – lessons from the ECHR’ (2002) International Journal of 
Law, Policy & the Family 
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The mechanism by which UK domestic law has been able to develop its concept 
of ‘family’ so far is instructive here. In Fitzpatrick, the courts were able to apply 
a modern view of a family’s constituent persons to statutes drafted in very much 
more restricted social conditions by adopting the device of looking to the 
characteristic elements of ‘family’. This reasoning explains why the dissenters in 
Fitzpatrick were wrong to protest that if Parliament had intended to include 
homosexual partners the statutory amendments of 198839 would have been 
differently phrased. In 1988, social conditions had not yet extended to the 
recognition of homosexual partnerships as family units, whereas by 1999 they 
had. It also explains why M40 lost her claim in respect of discriminatory child 
support calculations. Although by 2006 the calculation differential would have 
been discriminatory, in the relevant period (ending in 2001) recognition of 
homosexual relationships was so new as to be within the permitted ‘margin of 
appreciation’.   
 
By the same mechanism, the concept of ‘family’ applied by the courts in cases of 
disputed medical decisions today should embrace an expansive view of  
constituent persons. Current methods of medical care delivery suggest that 
financial and housing independence are not relevant to the expectation of, or 
necessity for, family support; that social intercourse does not have to be 
unlimited, and sexual intimacy has nothing to do with it. If ‘care in the 
community’ in reality means ‘care by one’s family’ then that family deserves 
legal recognition, whether or not it is quasi-marital. 
 
If the legal concept of family were to acknowledge the wider network involved 
in medical care as suggested, consistency would require a reinterpretation of old 
decisions. If the 24 year old man and the 75 year old woman in Joram41 were 
living the essence of modern family life, why should they not be afforded 
recognition too? The possibility of reinterpretation as social conditions demand is 
a feature, indeed a strength, of the common law. Finding a ‘family’ relationship 
if there were to be a medical treatment dispute today involving the people of 
                                                 
39 Which effectively equated cohabiting heterosexual couples with spouses. 
40 Secretary of State for Work & Pensions v. M [2006] UKHL 11 
41 Joram Developments Ltd v. Sharratt [1979] 1 WLR 928.  
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Joram would be no more inconceivable than was Ghaidan’s extension of 
Fitzpatrick.   In the current social climate, where legal ties can be undone, and de 
facto relationships feature somewhere in everybody’s lives, most people would 
have no difficulty seeing the essence of ‘family’ there.   
 
Lord Hutton (one of the dissenting minority in Fitzpatrick) would protest that 
this goes too far; that if a marital or biological bond is not prerequisite, then why 
not extend the meaning of ‘family’ to include “two elderly spinsters who live 
together for mutual support and companionship in old age”?42 The only sensible 
response to that question is ‘why not indeed?’ If their relationship has enough of 
the characteristics previously identified as hallmarks of family life, the absence 
of sexual relations should be as irrelevant as the mechanics.  
 
Such an inclusive concept of ‘family’ would be consistent with other recent 
developments in the fields of family and medical law. Although the special status 
of grandparents was removed by the Children Act 1989, the government has 
since recognised anew the significant role grandparents often play in supporting 
younger generations, targeting them for specific initiatives, and even considering 
paying them to provide childcare.43 Similarly, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
specifies the need to take into account the views of carers and others with an 
interest in the welfare of an incapacitated adult for whom decisions, including 
medical ones, need to be taken.44 Furthermore, the parenthood provisions of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 allow the second legal parent to 
be anyone except those within the incest prohibitions.45 
                                                 
42 Fitzpatrick at p64 
43 See G. Douglas & N. Ferguson, ‘The role of grandparents in divorced families’ (2003) 17 
International Journal of Law, Policy & the Family 
44 For a full consideration of the implications of the Mental Capacity Act on the role of families 
where treatment disputes arise, see chapter 6 hereafter. 
45 The potential second parent is excluded if ‘within prohibited degrees of relationship’ by s37(1) 
if he is a man, and by s44(1)(e) if she is a woman. The ‘prohibited degrees of relationship’ are 
defined in s58(2) as parent, grandparent, sister, brother, uncle or aunt. Sally Sheldon (in an article 
awaiting publication) points out that this restriction perpetuates the limitation of parenthood to 
those for whom sexual relations are at least permissible. This is true, but it does not undermine 
the argument that the second parenthood provisions support a concept of ‘family’ wider than that 
based on sexual bonds. People within the prohibited degrees are not permitted a sexual 
relationship precisely because they are already ‘family’. The restriction is aimed at maintaining 
not just the prevention of undesirable genetic inheritances, but also the social taboos which 
underpin it.   
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The second parenthood provisions merit some reflection because they have, at a 
stroke, expanded non-genetic parenthood to include non-sexual bonds, including 
simple friendship. The intention of the Act was undoubtedly to put same sex 
couples and unmarried opposite sex couples in the same position as married 
couples,46 which suggests perpetuation of the old quasi-marital concept of 
families. However, in order to achieve its objective, the wording of the statute 
has opened the gates to a much wider basis for family relations. The parenthood 
provisions contain no requirement that parents should live together, or provide 
mutual support, financial or otherwise. 
 
If two friends may become the legal ‘parents’ of a child, the adult relationship 
forged around the child must fall into the legal concept of ‘family’, even if they 
maintain independent households and celibate lifestyles, otherwise the law would 
be granting recognition with one hand, only to take it away with the other.  
Parenting is the fons et origo of the very institution of matrimony, so it must 
contain the ‘essence’ of family life. 
 
Clearly, to the child whose parentage is determined pursuant to the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, both parents will be ‘family’: if the child has 
medical problems, both parents would have the power to consent to treatment. 
Could it nonetheless be argued that two co-parents whose relationship does not 
resemble the quasi-marital should nonetheless be outside the concept of ‘family’ 
vis-à-vis each other? If one of the parents has medical problems, should the co-
parent not form part of her ‘family’ if their relationship has never included 
physical intimacy?  
 
Quite apart from the inherent evidential difficulties, such a construction of 
‘family’ would be unacceptably strained. Even if the adults have co-parented at a 
distance, maintaining separate homes and finances, each is affected by the illness 
of the other, through their shared responsibility for the child. They are, at the 
                                                 
46 See the statute’s Explanatory Note, para 16. 
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very least, analogous to divorced parents – and we have seen already that divorce 
is no longer necessarily viewed as the end of family life.   
 
Affording recognition to families in this way does not undermine the archetypal 
family. Rather, it demonstrates the powerful hold of the essence of that 
archetype, even on people for whom achieving it would be impossible. As 
Fineman and Diduck both argue,47 the more that those outside the ambit of 
‘family’ want to be inside it, the greater the social hold of the institution – which 
should give the law the incentive to expand it.  Undoubtedly, a genetic or legal 
link is important to many people, but legal interpretation is not a competition: the 
challenge is not whether to prefer social development over traditional status, but 
how to frame laws which give adequate support to practical reality.48    
  
Recognition of the practical reality of family life in the context of disputed 
medical decisions does not seem too much to ask when it is remembered that 
other areas of law expect the family to influence the behaviour of its members. 
Statutes like the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 and the Antisocial Behaviour Act 
2002, which ascribe legal responsibility to parents for their children’s criminal 
behaviour, and provide for parenting orders and parenting contracts as part of a 
young person’s sentence, have extended responsibility for one person’s 
behaviour to other members of his family, but their significance is more than in 
the placing of blame. Such provisions indicate a subtle shift in the law’s 
perception of individuals and families: the criminal minor is 
 
“no longer an autonomous free agent who can be held individually 
accountable for his or her own actions. On the one hand children are 
deemed, for the purposes of founding criminal liability, to be legally 
competent as autonomous individuals, but on the other they are now 
familialised: their identity, their legal subjectivity, includes being part 
                                                 
47 MA Fineman, ‘The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency’ ; Alison Diduck, ‘Shifting 
Familiarities’ 58 CLP 235 
48 As Bainham puts it, ‘how to define laws which give adequate weight to biological truth 
alongside adequate support for those who are actually raising a child’ (2000) ‘Family Rights in 
the Next Millennium’ 53 CLP 471-503 at 486. 
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of a family which must therefore, accept some responsibility for their 
criminal behaviour.”49 
 
If the law is capable of demanding responsibility where there is family, surely it 
is capable of recognising family where there is already responsibility. 
  
 
 
Why The Family is Important In Medical Decision-Making 
 
Understanding the notion of ‘family’ is only relevant to medical decision-making 
if the family has an effect on medical considerations, or is itself affected by 
medical decisions. In reality, the family is relevant in both respects. 
 
The impact of the family:  From the connection previously identified as the 
hallmark of ‘family’ comes a unique familiarity with the patient and their 
experience of the medical condition. Medical experts and decision-makers would 
do well to plunder such knowledge in pursuit of the best possible outcome for the 
patient,50 but the impact of families on health care is not limited to the provision 
of information.  
 
For the individual patient, it is self-evident that the involvement of a supportive 
family ameliorates an otherwise undesirable experience: illness or disability is 
seldom any fun, but it is even less so if it has to be faced alone.  A study by 
Bothelho51 found that the majority of patients prefer to have a family member 
with them in the consulting room and it is standard practice to discharge 
                                                 
49 Alison Diduck, ‘Shifting Familiarity’ 58 CLP 235 at  243 
50 ‘Eight Hours a Day and Taken for Granted?’ , a report of  The Princess Royal Trust, cites at 
p23 the case study of “Margaret Seymour, 60..[who] cares for her son 15 hours a day. Colin, 26, 
is severely disabled…Having cared for her son all his life, Margaret is able to tell when he is 
unwell. Nine years ago she decided her son needed urgent medical attention. “I took him to 
hospital and told the doctors he was ill but no one would listen to me. When they finally did 
blood tests, the results were so extreme that they thought the samples had been switched.” 
Margaret now has a letter from her doctor stating that if she believes her son needs medical 
attention, hospital staff must listen to her….”   
51 R. Botelho et al ‘Family Involvement in Routine Health Care: A Survey of Patients’ 
Behaviours and Preferences’ (1996) 42 J Family Practice 572. 
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someone from hospital earlier if there is someone at home to care for them. The 
moral support and practical assistance which families offer makes it possible for 
patients to cope with the unaccustomed demands of illness or disability.  
 
Beyond moral support and practical assistance, families also serve to 
‘domesticate’ illness. As Nelson and Nelson52 point out, when illness and injury 
alienate us from ourselves, domestic intimates provide the fixed and familiar 
point of reference which enables us to preserve a sense of self. Moreover, there 
are indications that the support of a family network directly improves medical 
prognosis. Several studies53 across a range of medical conditions, from cancer to 
strokes, conclude that family social support is a significant factor in patient 
recovery.  
 
For society at large, there are also clear beneficial effects of family involvement 
with individuals. Politicians fall over themselves to extol the virtues of the family 
unit, because families are the primary building blocks of a stable society – the 
community’s nursery. Infants who are nurtured in a caring family learn habits of 
tolerance and active involvement which are the foundations for participation in 
democracy and public life. Families are where citizens are created, and the 
support they offer in times of sickness or disability is a clear example of 
citizenship training. 
 
The numbers of families involved in providing care for sick and disabled 
members are eye-watering. Statistics are not gathered for every act of supporting 
medical needs, but one circumstance in particular currently preoccupies policy 
makers: the care of the elderly and infirm. Adult children now provide a greater 
amount of care, and more difficult care, to their parents and parents-in-law and 
                                                 
52 The Patient In The Family at p 45-46 : “..when we can no longer take for granted the smooth 
functioning of our bodies…we can turn to our families for orientation to our new reality. … 
When the illness is chronic, family members do the same thing over time, quelling the effect of 
self-alienation by the very ordinariness of their personalities.” 
53 See for example J. Spiegel, ‘Psychosocial Intervention in Cancer’ [1993] Journal of the 
National Cancer Institute 85 1198, F. Fawzey, ‘Psychosocial Interventions for Patients With 
Cancer: What Works and What Doesn’t’ [1999] European Journal of Cancer vol 35 issue 11 page 
1559, and Tsouna-Hadjis et al ‘First-Stroke Recovery Process: The Role of Family Social 
Support’[2000] Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation vol 81, issue 7, page 881. 
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for far longer, than ever before in history.54 With an aging population, the burden 
of need is high already and set to rise inexorably. There are currently 400 000 
families providing intensive support to their disabled parents, with the need 
projected to rise to 600 000 by 2041.55 Such numbers give a clear impression of 
the scale of citizenship going on in families. 
 
Tronto points out56 that family interdependence has implications for society 
beyond the moulding of individual citizens. What starts as an aspect of intimate 
relationships has also an existence and a set of consequences at a macro-level. 
Family support structures prompt a response from the state in the shape of 
organisations, markets and government. When the welfare state responds to the 
needs associated with caring57, it thereby alters the division of labour, cost and 
responsibility within the state, market, not-for-profit sector and family providers. 
Relations of gender and generation are thus ‘engineered’ as by-products of public 
policy58 with profound social consequence. In particular, an age-old belief that 
caring is ‘women’s work’ is reinforced, and the quest for equality of opportunity 
for all is undermined.     
    
However society responds, it is not necessarily driven by altruistic motives. It is 
a matter of trite observation that the way in which any society cares for its weak 
and vulnerable members is a measure of its civilisation. It is less trite to observe 
that families make civilisation cheap. Without family care, many of the sick and 
disabled would be dependent on state provision. Figures quoted for the additional 
costs of such care vary, but whichever is preferred, the amounts involved are 
staggering: in 1998 the Institute of Actuaries estimated an additional cost of £34 
                                                 
54 See Daniel Callahan, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Ageing Society at p21; and Elaine M. 
Brody, Women in the Middle: Their Parent-Care Years at pp6-9.  
55 L Pickard, ‘Informal care for Older People Provided By Their Adult Children’ (2008) PSSRU 
Discussion paper 2515. 
56 JC Tronto, ‘Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care’ (1993) London: 
Routledge 
57 There are currently a number of state benefits and allowances available to both carers and the 
cared-for. A care recipient under retirement age may be entitled to claim Disability Living 
Allowance, and one over retirement age can claim Attendance Allowance. Carers who provide 
more than 35 hours care per week may be able to claim Carers’ Allowance. 
58 See Mary Daly, ‘Care as a Good for Social Policy’, Journal of Social Policy 31 2 251-270 
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billion every year59, and by 2005 Carers UK claimed it was £57.4 billion per year 
- or the entire NHS budget all over again.60 This level of economic burden 
simply could not be assumed by the state without such significant consequences 
for the taxation system as would be politically unacceptable, making the 10p tax 
rate debacle look petty in the extreme!   
 
In effect, the family is subsidising society’s responsibilities: the family provides 
the means which render ‘care in the community’ feasible. Superficial familiarity 
with the recent history of mental health care in England and Wales illustrates the 
point. The move to ‘care in the community’ for the mentally ill presupposed that 
informal networks of family care were both existing and willing. When it 
transpired that the supposition was wrong, the current crisis in institutional 
mental health care was precipitated. 
 
Once it is accepted that families are integral to both individual and collective 
healthcare, the role ascribed to families in determining healthcare issues can be 
seen as a measure of society’s understanding and appreciation of the contribution 
that families make.  Appreciation can play a vital role in oiling the mechanisms 
of family care, because appreciation always makes effort and self-sacrifice more 
bearable and support of a patient in the family does demand effort and self-
sacrifice on the part of the patient’s family.   
 
The impact on the family: People rarely choose to assume the burden of care for 
a sick or disabled person within the family. Fate deals her cards without 
consultation. Accidents happen; diseases develop; congenital defects go 
undetected. The family connection predates the medical condition and the 
responsibility is incurred in ignorance of the future.  
 
                                                 
59 Institute of Actuaries for The Princess Royal Trust for Carers, quoted in ‘Eight Hours a Day 
and Taken for Granted?’  (n8 above) at p1. The report defines a carer as “anybody who is helping 
to look after a partner, relative or friend….” and focuses on those for whom caring is a full-time 
concern of more than 8 hours a day.  The definition of family which I have offered includes all 
these people. 
60 Carers UK Facts About Carers (London: Carers UK 2005) p1, as quoted by Herring in ‘Where 
are the carers in healthcare law and ethics?’ at p53. 
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Where a medical condition is short-lived, an episode of acute care can be 
experienced simply as a period of exceptional demands but where the condition 
is chronic, the day-to-day requirements of dealing with illness or disability can 
take over the family’s previous life, and even the most mundane freedoms can 
become swamped. As the caring spouse of an Alzheimer’s patient put it: “I’m 
just a slave to her.”61 The degree to which one family member’s medical needs 
can take over a family is graphically illustrated by Nelson and Nelson62 in the 
description of Tony: 
 
‘Tony was 24 years old, suffered muscular dystrophy and had already 
outlived his life expectancy by six years. He was small and thin, but 
had an IQ of 142 and an excellent record as a graduate student. When 
his condition was first diagnosed, his parents were told that he would 
not live to adulthood and had made him the centre of family life, 
often sending his sisters away to stay with relatives so that they could 
cope. One of the sisters, Angela, married at 16 to escape this brother-
centred family, but then nursed her parents through terminal illness. 
Her mother’s last words to her were ‘look after Tony’. Angela took 
Tony into her home, supporting him financially and emotionally. 
Tony is now coming to the end of a stint at rehabilitation hospital 
teaching him independence skills but he plans to return to Angela’s 
home on discharge. Angela is feeling suicidal at the demands of her 
brother and two teenage children. The kids and her husband have had 
enough. The other sister, now 28 and married with three children, 
holds her parents’ premature deaths and her sister’s current state 
against Tony, and refuses to help. The Social Worker is worried 
about Tony’s rights to self-determination. He is dying after all, and 
he ought not to die among strangers.’ 
 
                                                 
61 In Brenda Gillies’ ‘Acting up: role ambiguity and the legal recognition of carers’ [2000] 
Ageing and Society 20 429-444 at p436. 
62 The Patient In The Family: An Ethic of Medicine and Families at p26-28, retelling a study from 
Janet Haas, Arthur Caplan & Daniel Callahan (eds.) Case Studies in Ethics and Medical 
Rehabilitation (The Hastings Center, Braircliff Manor NY 1988) 
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Family devotion can be strained to breaking point. Not surprisingly, family 
members can feel a great deal of resentment of their new role: 
 
“We didn’t apply for the job. Most of us don’t have a vocation for it. 
We’ve had no training. We’re certain we aren’t much good at it. Plus, 
and this is the nub of the matter, we’ve got our own life to lead. Are 
we expected to throw that away because of somebody else’s 
disability? We’ve got things to do, places to go. And now it looks as 
if we might not be able to.  
But aren’t we just as important as they are? Why are we expected to 
sacrifice ourselves for somebody else? And yes, I mean sacrifice. 
We’re not talking about giving up five minutes of time once or twice 
a week. Or putting off a holiday from this year to next. We’re talking 
about our entire way of life. The old one wasn’t perfect, but it was 
the best we could do. This new one isn’t even ours. It’s somebody 
else’s life. And it’s one that doesn’t suit us at all.”63 
 
 
It should come as no surprise then that research demonstrates a plethora of ill-
effects that having a patient in the family has on the wider family.  A wealth of 
studies shows that providing unpaid care for disabled and older people is 
associated with increased rates of anxiety, depression and psychiatric illness.64 
Families of patients receiving palliative care have been shown to suffer 
psychological effects65 which can be quite profound. Physical health suffers too. 
Family carers have been found to suffer maladies ranging from increased rates of 
hypertension,66 through lower immune response67 and altered response to 
                                                 
63 Hugh Marriott, ‘The Selfish Pig’s Guide to Caring’ at p9. For further discussion of this, see 
Herring’s ‘Where are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?’(2007) Legal Studies 27 51-73. 
64 For example, Schulz R, O’Brien A, Bookwala J & Fleissner k (1995) ‘Psychiatric and physical 
morbidity effects of dementia caregiving: prevalence, correlates and causes.’ The Gerontologist 
35, 771-791; Singleton N, Aye Maung N, Cowie A Sparks J Bumpstead R & Meltzer H (2002), 
Mental Health of Carers, London: The Stationery Office. 
65 Kristjanson LJ & Aoun S (2004) ‘Palliative care for families: remembering the hidden patients’ 
Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 49 359-365 
66 King AC, Oka RK & Young DR (1994) ‘Ambulatory blood pressure and heart rate responses 
to the stress of work and caregiving in older women’, Journal of Gerontology 49 239-245. 
67 Kiecolt-Glaser JK, Dura JR, Speicher CE et al (1991) ‘Spousal caregivers of dementia victims: 
longitudinal changes in immunity and health’, Psychosomatic Medicine 53 345-361 
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influenza vaccination,68 to slowed response to wound healing.69 A care burden of 
more than 9 hours a week is associated with twice the risk of coronary heart 
disease in female carers;70 and the life expectancy of an elderly person living 
with someone for whom they care is shortened.71 
 
These ill-effects are not isolated incidents of misfortune, but a broad social trend. 
The 2001 census indicated that about 6 million people in the UK considered 
themselves to have caring responsibilities for the sick and infirm.72 Michael 
Hurst recently analysed data from the British Household Panel Surveys between 
1991 and 2000 – and thereby gained a broadly representative snapshot of the 
nation’s non-institutional population over a decade – and concluded that family 
caregiving73  is an underlying social determinant in the creation of society’s 
health inequalities. 
 
Nor is it simply health that suffers. Above all else, caring takes time. Those who 
need to spend their time caring for sick relatives cannot spend it in economically 
productive activities. They cannot earn a living. Over three-quarters of those with 
caring responsibilities suffer financially and many end up in poverty during 
retirement as a result of not having been able to work.74 Such benefit provision as 
is available often goes unclaimed,75 either lost to unwarranted complexity of 
claim forms, or else sacrificed to preserve whatever dignity remains to those 
denied the opportunity of economic productivity and yet conscious of a stigma 
attached to reliance on state ‘handouts’.  And, as if to ice the cake, along with 
                                                 
68 Kiecolt-Glaser JK, Glaser R, Gravenstain S et al (1996) ‘Chronic stress alters the immune 
response to influenza virus vaccine in older adults’, Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of USA 93 3043-3047 
69 Kiecolt-Glaser JK, Marucha PT, Malarky WB et al (1995) ‘Slowing of wound healing by 
psychological stress’, Lancet 346 1194-1196 
70 Sunmin Lee SD, Golditz GA, Berkman LF et al (2003) ‘Care-giving and risk of coronary heart 
disease in US women; a prospective study’, American Journal of Preventative Medicine 24 113-
119  
71 Schulz R & Beach SR (1999) ‘Caregiving as a risk factor for mortality: the caregiver health 
effects study’ Journal of American Medical Association 282 2215-2219 
72 Carers UK Facts About Carers (London: Carers UK 2005) 
73 His definition excluded paid carers and unpaid carers who help clients of voluntary 
organisations, whom he regards as “distinct from…family carers” (p698). 
74 Carers UK, Carers UK Welcomes White Paper, (London: Carers UK 2006) 
75 At the rate of nearly £750 million per year according to Carers UK: ‘Carers Missing £750m 
benefits’ BBC Newsonline 2nd December 2005. 
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weakened health and finances and restricted time, go social isolation and 
exclusion.  
 
Since family care for its weakest members is often simply an exaggerated 
expression of ‘normal’ family functioning, the burden of caring falls 
disproportionately on the women in the family.76 Where a carer’s role is self-
identified, the proportion of carers who are female ranges from 5877 to 61%.78 
This figure, and the gender gap it implies, is only likely to increase when we 
remember that our definition of family, unlike the government’s definition of 
carers, includes the parenting of able-bodied children.79  
 
 
Treatment Decisions: Implications of the impact of and on families 
 
Evaluation of family involvement in patient care suggests that it brings benefit to 
both the patient and society, but at a cost to the family and to the women in the 
family in particular. Medical outcomes and family flourishing are mutually 
dependent. It seems a small step in logic to claim that this interdependence 
makes a just foundation for the family to play a role in the medical decision-
making process. Modern society no longer accepts that services can be extracted 
from whole swathes of society without consent or recompense. It would be 
unnecessarily limiting to assume that family support will not be made available 
to medical advantage but wholly unjust to take it for granted. Individuals and 
society may only take the fruits of other’s labours with consent, and 
respectfully80 and therefore whenever the medical treatment of one of its 
                                                 
76 See Bond J (1992) ‘The politics of caregiving: the professionalisation of informal care.’ 
Ageing & Society 12 5-21. 
77 2001 Census 
78 Singleton N, Maung NA, Cowie J et al (2002) Mental Health of Carers, London: Office of 
National Statistics 
79 Although there may be a small disparity the other way if we were to focus exclusively on care 
of elderly patients. According to the 2001 census, 14% of men - as opposed to 12% of women – 
aged 65-84 were carers. Women’s greater life expectancy and geriatric dementia may account for 
this. See Michael Fine & Caroline Glendinning, ‘Dependence, independence or interdependence? 
Revisiting the concepts of “care” and “dependency”.’ [2005] Ageing & Society 25 601-621.   
80 The Recommendations of The Princess Royal Trust report (above n7), begin with these 
two: 
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members is in issue, the family should in fairness play a contributory part in the 
decision-making process. The impact on the family of the range of options under 
consideration should be a legitimate consideration. 
 
The difficulty here is that the step of including the family as anything other than 
information providers in medical treatment decisions – however small in logic or 
social etiquette – would be taken against the flow of the prevailing view of 
patients as autonomous individuals. The dominant medical ethic insists on every 
patient’s right of self-determination. Recognising family interests as an element 
in the decision-making process would erode that principle, and ultimately run the 
risk of losing the individual to the collective. Abuse of family power is a real 
danger, from which individuals – particularly when made additionally vulnerable 
by illness or incapacity – need to be protected. In terms of current orthodoxy, 
therefore, the small step in logic is a step in the wrong direction.   
 
So, it would appear that the medical decision-making process has to take sides in 
a conflict of principle: the patient’s autonomy in one corner, and fairness and 
justice to caring families in the other. The prospects of amicable resolution do 
not look good when the dilemma is expressed in such oppositional terms.  
 
However, the assumption that excluding consideration of others is the best way 
to protect the individual is questionable. If familial motives and concerns are 
openly aired, they can be assessed for what they are, and weighed accordingly. If 
instead they are excluded from open consideration, they will not disappear, but 
will simply be driven underground, “apt to come out subtly, in the form of covert 
pressure, that won’t be acknowledged by anyone and so pose a far greater threat 
to the patient.”81 
 
It may be countered that assuming a default position of mistrust of all families is 
safer than trying to assess individual families. Individual assessments are fallible, 
                                                                                                                                    
(a) “Statutory authorities should not assume that a relative will automatically be able to put their 
life on hold in order to become a carer.” 
(b) “Carers should be involved in decision-making about the future care of the person they are 
looking after.”  
81 Nelson & Nelson, A Patient In The Family at p115. 
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but a general mistrust protects against abusive tendencies where such exists, and 
harms nobody where they do not. However, such an argument is delusional. A 
general assumption of mistrust does harm non-abusive families. It undermines 
faith and confidence in relationships, in a context and on occasions where they 
are most needed. As Nelson & Nelson put it, “systematically treating people as if 
they were adversaries is likely to make them so. At the very least, the default 
assumption of mistrust sets up emotional barriers among family members at the 
precise moment when they need all the comfort intimacy can give them.”82  
 
Moreover, if the fear is that admitting family considerations risks admitting 
family abuse, we must also acknowledge its mirror image: if the family is not 
allowed to contribute to the process or to have its interests considered, 
particularly when illness may make patients additionally selfish or self-absorbed, 
there is a risk of endorsing unreasonable demands on the family. Furthermore, 
since much of the practical caring aspect of family interdependence is undertaken 
by the women of the family, such an approach also risks entrenching gender 
inequality. Strictly autonomous decision-making comes at a cost to others and to 
society at large.  
 
The considerations of autonomy, fairness and justice which appear to put 
families and individuals into opposition are abstract terms but medical decisions 
are taken in the real world. In reality, the patient’s interests and the family 
interests are not so oppositional, precisely because of the interdependence which 
has marked out the family for special consideration in the first place. Juggling 
different interests is what families are all about.83  
 
In reality, most families want what is best for their patient, which is why they are 
prepared to make the sacrifices involved in caring. Most patients do not want to 
be any more of a burden on their families than is unavoidable. Even where 
patients are not capable of such altruistic appreciation of their situation, it is 
                                                 
82 A Patient In The Family, p 115-116 
83 “It is the business of families to maintain a continued tension between the fusion of the one and 
individuation of the other. If the tension isn’t present, the family disintegrates: either it collapses 
under unrealistic demands for emotional fulfilment, or its members drift off to pursue their 
personal projects in splendid isolation.” : Nelson & Nelson, A Patient In the Family at p 34. 
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demonstrably not going to advance their cause to make treatment choices which 
leave their family support systems so embattled and exhausted as to render them 
useless. Moreover, family life has a fluid dynamic, and “one man in his time 
plays many parts.”84 Individuals will move in and out of the patient role over 
their lifetime. The adult caring children were once cared for by their now ailing 
parent, and so the benefits and burdens are shared around with rough equity. That 
is the point of interdependence. 
 
In the real world of court decisions, the quest must be to find a way to take that 
small logical step of admitting a role for families in the decision-making process, 
and the interests of families as part of the considerations, without endangering 
the personal liberties of either patient or family. In other words, to balance 
competing interests. It matters that the law finds and articulates that balance, 
because medical treatment decisions impact on the lives of so many people, and 
ultimately on the whole of society. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In twenty-first century Britain, the social meaning of ‘family’ is fluid and 
context-dependent. In considerations of medical treatment decisions, ‘family’ is 
understood more broadly than ties of genetics or terms of legal status can define, 
focussing instead on relationships of shared history, present connection, and 
ongoing interdependence. 
 
The legal concept of ‘family’ rests on common understanding, and shifts with 
prevailing social conditions. To date, development of the judicial understanding 
of ‘family’ has followed a quasi-marital model, but statutory developments 
encompass wider possibilities, and the mechanism of judicial development 
allows the prospect of further reinterpretation, in line with social understanding 
in the medical context, when the opportunity arises. 
 
                                                 
84 William Shakespeare, ‘As You Like It’, Act 2 sc. 7, 1.139. 
 39 
It is important that the law recognises the full constituency of the ‘family’ when 
resolving medical treatment disputes because the people and the context have 
such mutual impact. A supportive family improves both the experience and the 
prognosis of the patient, and makes possible the health policies of successive, 
current and future governments. Conversely, fulfilling the supportive role makes 
heavy demands on families, which cry out for recognition and justify a family’s 
claim to be heard. 
 
Admitting the family into the process and considerations of medical decision-
making would challenge the prevailing orthodoxy of patient autonomy. A 
balance will need to be struck between the interests of individuals and the 
interests of a collective. Finding and articulating such a balance in law will have 
important implications for countless individuals and for wider society. The role 
which courts ascribe to families in cases of disputed medical treatment does 
nothing less than encapsulate a vision of the kind of society we want to be. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review: An Ethical Framework 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the different ethical frameworks which 
may be applied to the research question, using the device of fictional case 
studies. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The relationship between law and ethics is a reciprocal one. An ethical 
framework is an essential practical guide to the determination of disputes, and a 
useful tool for the critical assessment of legal frameworks.1 If we can identify an 
acceptable moral framework from which to consider the role of the family in the 
determination of disputed treatment issues, then we can claim authority to 
evaluate the approach taken by the courts. 
 
There is a range of theories available for adoption. I shall consider in turn 
theoretical approaches which emphasise procedure, outcome, action, agent and 
relationship. I shall then explore the work of Beauchamp and Childress, which 
formulates the dominant medical ethic of our time in four practical principles, 
appropriating the strongest parts of each theoretical approach, but at the expense 
of philosophical unity. I shall test each approach through the prism of three 
fictional case studies, to assess their merits specifically in the context of the 
family’s role in medical decision-making disputes.  
 
                                                 
1 Such is the relationship between legal and moral values that many commentators would 
consider any attempt to disengage them as ‘pointless’, because ‘when we talk about legal rules, 
we are inevitably drawn into a discussion of moral rules.’  See for example A. Sommerville, 
quoting Mason, McColl Smith & Laurie, in ‘Juggling Law, Ethics, and Intuition: Practical 
Answers to Awkward Questions’ (2003) Journal of Medical Ethics 281 at p282.  
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The case studies 
 
Case 1: Annie 
 
Annie is 8 years old and lives at home with her parents and sister. She was born 
with severe mental retardation. She has no motor control, and requires physical 
manipulation of her limbs for exercise. She has no recognised form of 
communication, but she recognises family members and responds to loving 
relationships with smiles and gurgles. She enjoys music and tactile stimulations, 
and shows fear and anxiety with changes of environment. 
 
Physically she is developing normally. Her family is concerned that she will soon 
be too large and heavy for them to carry around. If they cannot carry her, their 
ability to move her, to take her out of the house and involve her in everyday 
activities will be significantly reduced and her quality of life will diminish. They 
seek medical intervention to stop her growth and physical development.     
 
 
Case 2: Bella 
 
Bella is 15. She has shown significant weight loss in the last 4 months, since 
formulating an ambition to become a model. She draws inspiration from a 
website featuring information about modelling, agencies, salaries etc. She is 
insistent that she wants to reduce her body to a size 0, to secure lucrative 
contracts and the lifestyle to which she aspires. 
 
Bella’s parents are dismayed at her ambitions and deeply concerned about her 
health. They have taken her to doctors who have advised on the damage being 
done to Bella’s body by her near-starvation diet. The medical recommendation is 
for a sustained period of enhanced nutrition, which Bella resists.  
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Case 3: Cecil 
 
Cecil is 93 years old, and his physical health is degenerating with old age. He has 
the opportunity of a hip replacement operation, which has the prospect of 
improving his mobility. He is cantankerous and imperious in making demands on 
his septuagenarian daughters, who provide the practical support which enables 
him to live independently at the moment.  
 
An ethical framework 
 
The study of ethics, or moral philosophy, is an investigation of the underlying 
reasons or justifications for specific beliefs or codes of practice, with an implicit 
search for what is the best, the most right, way of doing things.  Medical 
decisions are taken in times of stress, and often at considerable speed. The 
process and the conclusions are likely to affect more lives than the patient’s 
alone, and all parties have interests and fears of their own. An ethical framework 
is an essential practical guide if dialogue between the parties is to be achieved in 
the dispassionate, impartial way most likely to optimise outcome.2      
 
Whilst this is not a piece of research in philosophy, considerations of ethics are 
fundamental to a critical examination of the law. Many legal principles purport to 
be based upon, and in some sense derive their authority from, ethical foundations 
- like the legal requirement of consent to medical treatment, which has its roots 
in the ethical emphasis on autonomy. Where, as in medical decision making, the 
issues which fall to be determined are concerned with both rapidly advancing 
science and the infinite variety of people, it is inevitable that black letter law 
alone will often be insufficiently developed to provide practical guidance, and a 
deeper wealth of legitimacy will need to be plundered. Just as importantly, there 
may be ethical reasons for limiting how far the law is allowed to extend, as is 
demonstrated in the battles about regulation of the conduct of pregnant women. 
                                                 
2 I suggest that an outcome is optimised if the decision reached meets the needs of all the people 
involved in the process and/or affected by its outcome, and if the process of reaching it is 
experienced by all of them as fair. Therefore an optimal outcome will only be achieved if the 
decision-making process is unprejudiced, and gives all participants the potential to express their 
views fairly and openly. 
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Furthermore, the critical discipline of ethics provides a useful tool for attempting 
to answer the big, open questions which preface individual cases. Moral 
philosophy demands clarity in the use of key terms; it requires consistency in 
practical application; and it clamours for coherence. A defensible moral approach 
to the individual medical decision must conform to other beliefs which are 
generally held to be true for different medical decisions; which in turn leads to 
the formulation of systematic explanation of how the general approach to issues 
of medical decision making can be resolved. 
 
The study of ethics does not, however, provide a simple answer. Philosophers 
can disagree at least as much as lay people over which theories are most 
appropriate in any given situation. There is a range of competing theories, each 
with its own shades of opinion, and a fully inclusive survey would be a lifetime’s 
work. For our purposes, the general approaches which offer the most potential 
for enlightenment may be categorised according to the locus of their central 
emphasis. Casuists emphasise the procedure for determining right and wrong. 
Consequentialist theories, of which the most significant brand is utilitarianism, 
judge the rightfulness of actions in terms of their overall outcome. Deontological 
theories, which began with Kant and include rights-based systems, decree 
actions to be intrinsically right or wrong, whatever the consequences. According 
to virtue ethics, the morality of the decision is determined by the character of the 
agent making it. The ethics of care focus on the imperative of maintaining 
connection in a web of compassionate relationships. Principlism tries to take the 
best bits of all these approaches, and offers an approach tailor-made to medical 
ethics, based on four principles said to encapsulate common morality. 
 
On any given issue adherents to different theories may reach radically different 
conclusions; or they may reach the same conclusions, on differing grounds. It 
may seem therefore that consideration of the range of philosophical approaches 
would yield little to guide the courts in medical decision making. However, a 
critical assessment of the concepts underlying the theories can help demonstrate 
their strengths and weaknesses in a given area. Seeking consistency in judgments 
across different issues can force us to admit when a judgment is one of 
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instinctive reaction, rather than general moral belief; and the demand for 
justification engenders understanding. As we appreciate the reasons behind 
conclusions which differ from our own, we may even shift our point of view.3  
 
Since we are looking for a theoretical framework which can be applied by judges 
to determine medical issues on which patients, families and doctors take different 
views, it is reasonable to begin with a consideration of the ethical approach 
which is closest in methodology to traditional legal reasoning. 
 
 
Procedure based theory 
 
Casuistry is a method of reaching moral conclusions by examining how similar 
issues have been determined in the past and proceeding by way of analogy, much 
in the same way as the common lawyer looks to case precedents. It originated in 
medieval thinking, but modern proponents, like Jonsen and Toulmin,4 contend 
that its methodology is particularly adept at offering guidance in ethical issues of 
rapid, and sometimes unpredictable, scientific progress. It works from the 
bottom, up; from cases to principles, and not vice versa. A deep knowledge of 
relevant historical situations, how they occurred and were resolved, with what 
implications, enables the casuist to construct a spectrum of paradigmatically right 
and wrong actions, into which the current problem is positioned by way of direct 
comparison. Overarching principle may emerge, but it is not necessary or even 
particularly desirable. The common philosophical aim of a single unified theory 
is simply inappropriate. Instead casuistry prides itself on its practicality, its 
ability to offer concrete advice in real situations.5 
 
                                                 
3 Broadly, these are the justifications which Beauchamp and Childress offer for their selection of 
four principles as the basis for a bioethical approach. 
4 See for example Albert Jonsen ‘Casuistry and Clinical Ethics’(1986) Theoretical Medicine 65, 
and ‘Casuistry as Methodology in Clinical Ethics’ (1991) Theoretical Medicine 295;  Jonsen A & 
Toulmin S The Abuse of Casuistry (1988); and Toulmin S. ‘The Tyranny of Principles’ (Hastings 
Center Report 11, 31-39).  
5 See John Arras ‘Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics’ (1991) Journal 
of Medicine & Philosophy 29 
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This approach has its attractions. It is a methodology readily understood by 
lawyers, and it is not fixed to the mores of any particular epoch. By its very 
process, the spectrum of known examples is amplified over time as and when 
each novel situation occurs, each one taking its place because of its new features. 
In this way ethical reasoning is able to keep pace exactly with the developments 
in medical science. 
 
However, the approach also has its limits. As Arras, and Beauchamp and 
Childress, point out,6 for the casuist to move constructively from case to case, 
there must be some recognised rule of moral relevance connecting them. There 
has to be something which makes the bridge between two cases. The creation or 
discovery of linking moral norms cannot be achieved by analogy itself.   
 
Casuists stress that scenarios resonate beyond themselves and evolve into 
generalisations which form the connecting links. If that is so, then the validity of 
the links depends on cases having been interpreted correctly in the first place. It 
is possible for generalisations to evolve in the wrong direction if they were 
improperly resolved from the outset. There is nothing intrinsic to the approach 
which safeguards against a biased development of cases, or a neglect of relevant 
features. As a result “casuistry lacks critical distance from cultural blindness, 
rash analogy, and mere popular opinion. … In the end, casuistry is a method 
without content.”7  
 
On this view, casuistry has little to offer a system of judicial dispute resolution. 
The best of the methodology we have already in the common law system of 
precedents, but with the added corrective of a system of appeals. An ethical 
content is what we are lacking, and for that we must look elsewhere.   
 
The deficiencies of casuistry are illustrated by a consideration of our case 
studies. The medical possibilities available to Annie are innovative and untested; 
                                                 
6 Arras ‘Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics’ (1991) Journal of 
Medicine & Philosophy 29; T.L. Beauchamp & J.F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics  
394 
7 T.L. Beauchamp & J.F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics  394 
 46 
and her care needs are as individual as her fingerprints. There can be no direct 
analogy from earlier cases. Finding a moral link via indirect analogy, such as 
non-therapeutic sterilisation, suggests an inadequate grasp of the true complexity 
of the situation.  
 
In contrast, there have been numerous cases concerning anorexics and 
forcefeeding, which may offer analogies to Bella’s situation. However, as we 
learn more about the mental aspect of food disorders, it may become apparent 
that what has been an acceptable approach in the past is in fact wrong. 
Proceeding by analogy may simply perpetuate poor treatment.  
 
Cecil’s reluctance to undergo hip replacement would go unquestioned, as the 
weight of authority emphasises his individual physical integrity, and the 
necessity for his consent to medical intervention. The true effect of not 
undergoing surgery, and all that implies both in terms of his own deteriorating 
mobility and therefore ‘independence’, and the increased burden on his elderly 
daughters, does not even enter into consideration.   
 
Casuistry seems to offer little insight into any of our fictional scenarios. The best 
of its methodology may be shared anyway in the legal processes which determine 
medical treatment disputes; for moral guidance, we need to look elsewhere. 
 
 
Outcome based theory 
 
Consequentialist theories hold that actions are good or bad according to the 
balance of their end results. In any particular circumstances, the right action is 
that which produces the best overall outcome, when judged from an impersonal 
perspective giving equal weight to the interests of all affected parties. 
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The most significant consequentialist theory is utilitarianism, which is rooted in 
the thinking of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill,8 and advances a single 
principle of ethics, namely utility. According to this principle, we should always 
produce the maximal balance of positive value over disvalue (“the greatest good 
for the greatest number”), or if only undesirable results are possible, then the 
least possible disvalue. 
 
Within consequentialist approaches, there is disagreement and debate about 
which values are to be maximised. Earlier theorists elevate intrinsic, agent-
neutral goods, which are valuable in and for themselves, such as happiness, 
freedom or health. More recent theorists have a wider concept of intrinsic good, 
including agent-relative values such as friendship or personal autonomy. 
Whichever good is advanced, these theorists have in common the intention of 
producing the most of it possible, wherever it falls. Preference utilitarians differ 
in that for them, utility refers not to intrinsic goods, but to personal preferences. 
They aim to maximise the overall satisfaction of the personal preferences of the 
greatest number of individuals.  
 
Whilst the emphasis on intrinsic “goods” gives the impression of aiming for 
positive beneficial ends, the choice of intrinsic good, at least for more recent 
utilitarians, is inherently subjective. Equally, even if we could all agree on the 
value to be maximised, the means of achieving it may be questionable: some 
people experience pleasure only at the pain of others. As Rosalind Hursthouse 
points out, “there is no room in utilitarianism, with its ‘realistic’ eschewal of 
ideals, for the idea that some sorts of pleasure or enjoyment are wrong in 
themselves.”9 
 
The emphasis on net aggregate satisfaction can also lead to problems of unjust 
distribution. The theory has no mechanism for disavowal of unequal social 
contribution, and can therefore lead to conclusions which offend the common 
                                                 
8 See Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation; and JS 
Mill’s Utilitarianism and A System of Logic. 
9 Rosalind Hursthouse, Beginning Lives (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 154. 
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understanding of social justice, like Weinstein and Stason’s hypertension study.10 
Their research demonstrated the unsurprising fact that people lacking healthcare 
insurance were less likely than those with such benefits to follow the long-term 
treatment regime which would improve their health, leading them to conclude 
that overall welfare would be maximized by targeting additional resources at 
those already provided for, at the expense of the poorest, and most needy, section 
of the community. 
 
The interests of the majority can override the rights of the minority all the more 
easily if we are concerned not with intrinsic goods but personal preferences, as 
Rosalind Hursthouse illustrates in the context of euthanasia: the preference of the 
victim for continued life could be outweighed by the combined preferences of his 
family that the old man should die so that they can have his money.11 Such an 
outcome would be contrary to conventional morality, but if we seek to exclude it 
by formulating a range of acceptable preferences or means of achieving intrinsic 
goods, we act inconsistently with the principle of utility12 where the ends justify 
the means.     
 
Controversy also arises over whether the principle of utility pertains to individual 
acts in particular circumstances, or instead to rules of general application. Act 
utilitarians, such as Peter Singer,13, look directly to the principle of utility to 
determine the right action in any given situation; rules may be useful action 
                                                 
10 Two medical researchers wanted to find the most cost-effective way of controlling 
hypertension in the American population. They found that one of the most important antecedent 
conditions for serious hypertension-related medical problems was non-adherence to treatment 
programmes. Non-adherence is much higher in patients who are screened and treated in the 
emergency room, than for those treated by primary care doctors. Therefore it was most cost-
effective to target patients already being treated in primary care, than to identify new cases 
among those without regular medical care. It is disproportionately lower income people who do 
not have primary medical care. Therefore the researcher’s conclusion had the effect of excluding 
the poorest sector of society, with the most pressing need for medical attention, from the benefits 
of high blood pressure education and management. The researchers were not comfortable about 
this, and expressly referred to utilitarian principles for legitimacy. (Milton Weinstein and William 
B Stason, Hypertension (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); ‘Public Health 
Rounds at the Harvard School of Public Health: Allocating of Resources to Manage 
Hypertension’, (1977) New England Journal of Medicine 296, 732-39; ‘Allocation Resources: 
The Case of Hypertension’, Hastings Center Report 7 (October 1977) 24-29.   
11 Beginning Lives at p146 
12 See Madison Powers, ‘Repugnant Desires and the Two-Tier Conception of Utility’, (1994) 
Utilitas 6  171-176. 
13 Practical Ethics (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
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guides, but they are expendable in any instance where they do not promote 
utility. The making of exceptions, it is argued, is consistent with ordinary moral 
belief; and when the breaking of rules itself offends our moral convictions, it is 
those convictions which need to be revised, not the principle of utility.   
 
In contrast rule utilitarians, such as R.M. Hare,14 abide by certain rules, which 
are justified as advancing utility in the generality of life, even though following 
them in a particular isolated situation would fail to maximise utility. This 
reasoning was used by Worthington Hooker, a prominent figure in nineteenth 
century medicine and medical ethics,15 in defence of the prohibition against 
deception in medicine. He conceded that deception can sometimes best advance 
an individual patient’s health, but argued that widespread deception would have 
an increasingly negative effect over time and would eventually produce more 
harm that good, undermining the trust which could be placed in physicians. The 
general benefit to society of observance of the rule against deception outweighs 
the benefit of deception in the individual case; abandonment of the rule for the 
individual threatens the integrity of the particular rule and the whole system.  
 
Hooker’s absolute insistence on rules may be criticised as unfaithful to the 
principle of utility. Seeking to keep the faith, JJC Smart16 proposes a middle way 
of selective obedience to rules. He denies that either moral rules or general 
morality are eroded by individual breaches as long as, in the particular 
circumstances, breach of the rule is better for all concerned than observance, and 
general conformity to moral rules is not undermined.  Hooker would doubtless 
berate the convenient relativism of this view, but it offers a realistic applicability 
which retains consistency with the principle of utility, whether a rule is to be 
breached or observed.   
 
                                                 
14 See for example, ‘Methods of Bioethics: some defective proposals’ (1994) Monash Bioethics 
Review 34-47 
15 Cited by Beaucamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics at p344. 
16 An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, (Melbourne: University Press, 1961), and 
‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’ in Michael Bayles (ed) Contemporary Utilitarianism, 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co, 1968). 
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Even for rule utilitarians, the principle of utility is exclusively absolute. Any 
derivative rules are of a lesser status, and may be revised as social conditions 
require. This gives the theory constructive adaptability, but also leaves it 
vulnerable to the criticism of failing to prevent immoral actions. Without any 
fixed concept of “acceptability”, it is conceivable to utilitarians that social 
circumstances may exist where immoral acts (as judged by common standards) 
may be not just permitted but obligatory.  Consider the possibility of ending a 
devastating war by torturing children to reveal the whereabouts of their soldier 
fathers.17 Utilitarianism requires torture, without offering any compensatory and 
particularised justification for surrendering restraints. It is forced to do so 
because, as Rosalind Hursthouse18 points out, it grossly underestimates the range 
of considerations which are relevant to the morality of an action.  
 
In its requirement always of the highest value, utilitarianism is a very demanding 
ethic, so far removed from our common expectations that it has been called 
“ethics of fantasy.”19 It requires people to set aside personal goals and ambitions, 
in order to maximise outcomes for others, and has the surprising effect of making 
it impossible to recognise any act as going “beyond the call of duty”, because 
there is no room for distinction between obligatory actions and supererogatory 
actions.20  This is clearly alien to common experience. We hail living donors of 
body parts for transplantation as heroes; we do not expect that a kidney should be 
donated, even to save a life. Utilitarianism entails just such an expectation, and in 
doing so it expects too much.   
 
Yet if there are weaknesses in consequentialist theories, there are strengths too. 
At least on a superficial level, utilitarianism is easy to grasp and easy to recite as 
a working guide in real life, which makes it attractive and practicable. 
Utilitarians can and do claim that their theory simply makes explicit and 
systematic what is already happening in everyday deliberations all the time. 
Looking to the results of one’s actions seems to encourage social responsibility, 
                                                 
17 As do Beauchamp & Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics at p346 
18 Beginning Lives at p178 
19 John Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 1977) 129 
20 See Alan Donagan, ‘Is there a credible form of utilitarianism?’, n8 above 187-202 
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which is to be welcomed;21 and seeing morality in terms of promoting general 
welfare is a beneficent and optimistic approach. The emphasis on overall social 
welfare may be a refreshing and useful counterweight to the claims of traditional 
conviction.22 Taking into account all interests, and judging impartially, make a 
sound and generally acceptable basis for the formulation of public policy. The 
impetus of the theory is egalitarian, because everyone’s welfare is equally 
important.  
 
If a utilitarian approach is taken to our case studies, the enormity of the surgical 
intervention fades in comparison to the preservation of quality of life for Annie, 
our profoundly handicapped eight year old.  The normal privileges of physical 
development to adulthood would be for Annie only more intimate physical 
dependency, and the risk of abusive relationships. Further restricted in mobility, 
her opportunities for those experiences which currently give her the limited 
pleasure she is capable of experiencing would be reduced. Her parents would see 
their ability to lead a normal life still further curtailed, or have to accept that 
living a normal life could only be achieved by surrendering the care of their 
daughter to others, with all the guilt that would entail. For act utilitarians, the 
balance of good seems tilted in favour of intervention.    
 
However it may be that, for rule utilitarians, the calculation would work 
differently. If we have a rule that, in order to promote and safeguard open 
democratic society, we do not allow non-therapeutic medical intervention on 
individuals with mental disability – as indeed we may, after the eugenic 
experiments of the early twentieth century, and its ultimate realisation in the 
holocaust of World War II – then the rule directs us against the proposed 
treatment for Annie. Rule utilitarians would therefore deny Annie the 
maintenance of her quality of life, because a general prohibition against non-
therapeutic surgery on mental defectives is better for society as a whole. 
                                                 
21 “Consequentialist reasoning may be fruitfully used even when consequentialism as such is not 
accepted. To ignore consequences is to leave an ethical story half told.” Amartya Sen, On Ethics 
and Economics, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) p75. 
22 We have discussed above the dangers of tyrannous majorities, but what we first viewed as a 
weakness may also be a strength. For example, if almost everyone’s interests can be promoted by 
overriding some property or autonomy rights, it may not be wrong to pursue social utility.   
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However, such a rule may simply beg the question of what is meant by therapy.  
The sustained quality of life which growth retardation apparently offers Annie 
may satisfy the utilitarian understanding of therapeutic benefit. If instead the rule 
is rephrased to one forbidding eugenics, a similar difficulty manifests itself. 
Eugenic medicine aims to control breeding, but the medical motivation behind 
the treatment proposed for Annie is maintenance of her quality of life; the 
sterilising effect of the treatment is merely incidental. Formulating a workable 
rule is apparently very difficult. 
 
Even if an acceptable rule can be formulated, it offers uncertain protection of a 
general good when in opposition to an individual good. Selective rule utilitarians 
would almost certainly find the quality of life argument, the understanding of 
therapy and the motivation for treatment sufficient to simply disapply the rule in 
Annie’s case. Even strict rule utilitarians may falter, since any rule is always 
subject to the absolute principle of utility. There are more lives than Annie’s 
whose quality may be affected by this medical decision, and all of them suggest 
that allowing the surgery would maximise utility. A moral stance for the wider 
good of the community becomes impossible to sustain. 
 
Recall that Bella has expressed a preference to eat only minimally: the size of her 
body is of greater importance to her than its health. It is a dubious preference 
from many angles, but Bella’s refusal to eat ‘properly’ is rationally decided, and 
part of a self-selected life-plan; acceptability is not part of the consideration. 
However Bella is still a minor, and she has two parents and a team of medics, no 
doubt all of whom would prefer that she is adequately fed. The combined weight 
of their preferences would overrule Bella’s, and a compulsory feeding 
programme would begin. 
 
Force-feeding is physically invasive, and psychologically damaging. It may 
improve Bella’s physical health, but at what cost to her mental well being? And 
if she resists the procedure, what is the cost to our moral sense of ourselves if we 
physically force it on her? Yet, if we disregard preferences and look simply to 
the balance of positive outcomes, any psychological and potential career 
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detriment to Bella has to be weighed against the physical gain to her, potentially 
saving her very existence. In sum total, the damage caused by compulsory 
feeding will struggle to tip the scales against the benefits, at least in an objective 
consideration of the balancing exercise, whatever Bella herself might feel. Strict 
utility too demands that we treat Bella against her will. An attempt to overcome 
any discomfort we may have with non-consensual treatment by making a rule 
against it is unlikely to succeed because, as Annie’s case has already shown us, 
even if rules are not selectively disapplied, they are always subject to the ultimate 
principle of utility. 
 
On the other hand, Cecil’s daughters are afforded some comfort from the 
utilitarian approach. Cecil’s physical abilities and therefore his independence will 
be improved by hip replacement, and the burden he represents to his daughters 
thereby eased. Cecil’s preference to keep his old hip may be reasonable (a 
calculation of his prospects of surviving surgery, or a sincere commitment to 
homeopathic treatment only) or selfish (he may rather have his daughters at his 
beck and call, than the responsibilities of independence), but either way it will be 
outweighed by the preferences of his two daughters for a lighter burden of care.  
 
Both strict and preference utility would require Cecil to put aside his reluctance 
to undergo surgery. This may be a comfort to his daughters, but it is a high 
demand on Cecil. It may be wondered whether the daughters would welcome this 
moral approach quite so eagerly if the risks of the proposed treatment were 
viewed differently. If the surgery carried a high risk to Cecil (he is 93 after all!), 
so that the balance of likely benefit was against it, utilitarianism would expect 
the daughters to set aside their own hopes of reduced burdens and gentle 
retirement, and to soldier on for the sake of their father.       
 
Annie, Bella and Cecil show us that outcome-based theories lead us to individual 
treatment decisions which carry a significant cost to our wider moral vision of 
ourselves. If we accept that limiting Annie’s growth offers her and her family the 
best quality of life, we admit qualification to our moral taboo against medical 
social engineering. If we accept that the balance of good is in favour of Bella’s 
survival, we must also accept that patients may be treated against their will. And 
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if we accept that the needs of Cecil’s daughters weigh in the balance of good and 
bad outcomes, we acknowledge that patients owe obligations to people other than 
themselves, even to the point of submitting to invasive surgery. Securing the 
optimal outcome in individual cases cannot be achieved without compromise of 
our broader moral assumptions. 
 
Action based theory 
 
Action based theories are founded in the thought of Immanuel Kant (1724 – 
1804).23 His work is complex, but its distinctive contribution is an emphasis on 
morality grounded in reason. He viewed human beings as creatures with unique 
powers of rationality, and therefore the ability to act according to reason rather 
than desire. For Kant, the moral worth of an act depends exclusively on the moral 
acceptability of the rule of obligation which engenders it. This type of approach 
may be called ‘deontic.’24  
 
The moral value of an act is not, however, determined simply by its compliance 
with a moral obligation. There has to be a rational element to it. The act must 
also be motivated by the moral obligation: the agent must intend what she knows 
to be morally required. This is what Kant means when he refers to moral 
autonomy. Compliance with obligation by accident, or through fear, ambition, or 
some other extraneous motivation, is not sufficient to give the act moral validity; 
in fact, it is morally indistinguishable from acting under coercion of others. Kant 
calls this “heteronomy”, and it is very much a lesser state. For Kant, moral 
autonomy is the mark of human dignity. 
 
To be morally acceptable, the rule of obligation – sometimes called the maxim – 
must pass a test, or tests, which Kant calls the categorical imperative. The test 
itself adds nothing to the content of the particular maxim under consideration. 
Instead it functions as a benchmark, against which the validity of the rule can be 
                                                 
23 In particular, The Critique of Pure Reason (1871), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 
(1785), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and Metaphysics of Morals (1797). 
24 From the Greek deont- , stem of dei ‘it is right’. As used by D. Statman in Virtue and Ethics: A 
Critical Reader. 
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measured. It seems that the categorical imperative is not singular, because his 
two major formulations of it are very differently worded, and equally influential.  
 
In its first formulation, Kant states the categorical imperative as follows: “I ought 
never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim become a 
universal law.” This requires that rules of conduct are generalisable – that I 
would be as happy for everyone else to use it as a guide of their conduct, as I am 
to follow it in my actions. It also tests their “consistency”: a maxim must be 
capable of being conceived and willed without contradiction. Imagine a medical 
student desperate to pass his exams and qualify, even though he has not learned 
his material. He will cheat to ensure that his answers achieve the required 
passmark. Kant directs us to examine his maxim: “When I want to demonstrate 
knowledge, I will cheat”. This maxim will not pass the categorical imperative: 
exams only operate as evidence of knowledge if the person looking for the 
qualification expects that they were sat honestly. In a world where everyone 
cheated at exams, the passing of them would not demonstrate knowledge and 
their certificates would be useless. 
 
The second formulation of the categorical imperative is that “one must act to 
treat every person as an end and never as a means only”. If an action is to be 
morally right, it must accord any and every human being with respect and 
dignity. This is an egalitarian requirement. It prohibits the privileging of any 
special group, such as those for whom the agent has a particular affinity or 
responsibility; and it precludes exempting any particular group, even in the 
interests of wider advantage. However it is not an absolute embargo. It is a bar to 
treating others only as a means to our own ends. As long as due respect and 
dignity is afforded, the coincidental assistance to our ends does not breach the 
categorical imperative. So as long as medical research subjects are properly 
informed and give valid consent, the advancement of the researcher’s ends which 
their bodies provide does not breach Kantian ethics. 
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From the second formulation of the categorical imperative, later philosophers 
such as Robert Nozick,25 Bernard Williams26 and Thomas Nagel27 have 
developed a doctrine of “deontological constraints”, which maintains that certain 
actions are impermissible regardless of the consequences.  
 
One expression of deontological constraint28 is the ethical concept of ‘rights’. 
The language of rights is much more familiar to us than pure Kantian theory, 
because ‘rights’ are both a feature of and particularly congenial to the liberal 
individualism pervasive in our society. However that very familiarity makes it 
necessary to distinguish here the legal ‘rights’ with which we are familiar, and 
the older ethical concept of ‘natural’ rights with which we are presently 
concerned.   
 
There can be no doubt that legal rights exist. Those which most clamour for 
public attention in current legal debate are the ones set out in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and incorporated into domestic law by the Human 
Rights Act 1998, but there are others, such as the ‘right’ to be treated under the 
NHS without direct payment. The common characteristic of legal rights is that 
they can be created and removed by decisions made by the appropriate body, 
such as parliament. Many philosophers, such as Jeremy Bentham,29 would say 
that these are the only kind of rights; that it is nonsense to talk of anything 
deeper. In fact there was no attempt to consider any other kind of right until at 
least the late Middle Ages; the ancient Greek philosophers simply had no 
linguistic expression for a deeper kind of right.30  
 
                                                 
25 Philosophical Explanations (Boston, Harvard University Press 1981); The Nature of 
Rationality (Princeton University Press 1993); Anarchy, State & Utopia (New York, 1974); The 
Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (Simon & Schuster 1990); Coercion (1969). 
26 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985);   Problems of the Self (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 1973) 
27 The View From Nowhere (New York, OUP 1986); Mortal Questions (Cambridge, CUP 1991)  
28 Although ‘rights’ may also be a rallying cry of rule utilitarians, because the rule imports 
obligation. However since, for rule utilitarians, rights are justified only because of their 
contribution to utility (which is how John Stuart Mill defended autonomy and liberty), they are 
only secondary to their approach.  
29 ‘Anarchical Fallacies’, reprinted in Melden Al (ed) Human Rights. 
30 See MP Golding’s ‘The Concept of Rights – An Historical Sketch’ in Brandman EL and 
Brandman B Bioethics and Human Rights.  
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However, there is also a “powerful and widespread moral intuition”31 that people 
simply do have certain basic and inalienable moral rights – in other words, a 
claim that individuals or groups can make on others or society, which is justified 
not by man-made law, but by moral principle. John Locke defended rights to 
“life, liberty and estate” as being God-given moral rights.32 Various national and 
international constitutions, including the French and the American Constitutions, 
claim moral rights; and a surprising rainbow of moral positions incorporate them, 
including  
 
“the pro-life campaigner, who believes in the right to life of fetuses 
or severely defective neonates, or both; the person who is against 
apartheid, believing that South African apartheid laws violate[d] the 
equal moral rights to liberty of blacks; the libertarian capitalist, who 
believes that taxation violates the right to ‘keep the fruit of one’s own 
labour’; and the Marxist, who believes that capitalism infringes the 
right not to be exploited by others.’33 
 
The ability of so wide of spectrum of moral positions to adopt the discourse of 
rights demonstrates that the precise content of moral rights is of course open to 
debate. They are, however, broadly divisible into two categories: the universal 
and the special.  
 
Universal moral rights are attributable to all people. HLA Hart considered that all 
the possible manifestations of universal moral rights boiled down to one 
fundamental right, namely “the equal right of all men to be free.”34 He meant by 
this, freedom to exercise individual autonomy so far as is consistent with 
everyone’s else’s freedom to do the same thing. It is important to note that Hart’s 
fundamental right itself generates an equally fundamental obligation to respect 
                                                 
31 R. Gillon, ‘Rights’ (1985) British Medical Journal 290 1890 at p1890. 
32 ‘Of Civil Government, Two Treatises’ reprinted in Carpenter WS (ed.) Of Civil Government by 
John Locke Vol II. 
33 R Gillon, ‘Rights’ (1985) British Medical Journal 290 1890 at 1890. 
34 ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ reprinted in Melden Al (ed.) Human Rights. 
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the autonomy of others, and therefore to accept restrictions on our own. As 
Gillon35 points out, this is a Kantian position. 
 
‘Special’ moral rights are possessed by some people, but not by others. They 
may arise from social relationships, such as parent and child, or from prior 
actions, such as a promise. The beneficiary of the promise has a special moral 
right to receive from the promisor the benefit of the promise: if X has promised 
to pay Y £10, Y can claim the money from him. Fortunately for X, not 
everybody will be able to claim him, but the right is nonetheless morally 
universalisable in that everyone to whom he makes the promise may claim.  
 
Whenever Y has a right to claim a against X, it may be said that X has an 
obligation to do a. The relationship between rights and obligations is therefore 
correlative36. It is not however parallel: the right imposes obligation on someone 
else, but not on the right holder,37 on X not Y. The extent of the obligation is a 
matter of debate. Generally, as in Locke’s conception of moral right, constraints 
operate to impose an obligation to refrain from action. It does not necessarily 
follow that they impose any obligation to act positively. So, Y’s right to life 
imposes on X a moral obligation not to kill him, but will not generally impose on 
X an obligation positively to keep him alive. 
 
Deontological constraints are therefore essentially negative duties – they specify 
what we cannot justifiably do to others, even in the pursuit of worthy goals. We 
may not perform non-therapeutic medical interventions on people without their 
consent, even if it does hold out the possibility of averting global catastrophe. 
They do not, however, specify any positive actions that should be taken for the 
sake of others. Therefore, they operate as guarantors of minimum standards. They 
                                                 
35 R Gillon, ‘Rights’ (1985) British Medical Journal 290 1890 at 1891. 
36 Although, not every obligation carries a correlative right. Charity, for example, does not. John 
Stuart Mill distinguished duties of perfect and imperfect obligation. Duties of perfect obligation 
are those in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person, and duties of imperfect 
obligation are those which do not give rise to any correlative right. For present purposes it is not 
necessary to take a stand on whether obligation precedes right, or vice versa. 
37 Although there may be an obligation on himself which corresponds to the right.  JS Mill would 
say that the right not to be enslaved co-existed with a duty not to sell oneself into slavery: ‘On 
Liberty’ in Warnock M (ed) Utilitarianism.  
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set out not necessarily what we might aspire to, but what we may legitimately 
expect. 
 
The operation of deontological constraints demonstrates a key difference 
between utilitarianism and action-based theory. Whereas the former demands an 
impartial view, weighing each person’s interests equally to reach the maximal 
outcome, the latter affords moral weight to the agent’s role, and is agent-relative. 
The perspective and sense of integrity of the agent are important in moral 
deliberations. It is part of the moral autonomy, and central to the emphasis on 
rationality. 
 
There are problems with a Kantian approach, not least in the absolute view of 
obligation.  Moral rules are categorical; they must be complied with. When two 
obligations conflict, there is no strategy by which the dilemma can be resolved. 
Each obligation remains good, and we are simply expected to do the impossible. 
Suppose I have promised to do X on Monday, and now discover that my project 
at work has overrun and needs to be completed. The obligation of promise-
keeping is in conflict with an obligation of responsibility, yet I cannot do both 
things at once. Even more starkly, maybe I have promised to do X on Monday 
and Y when necessary; and Y becomes necessary on Monday, although I could 
not have foreseen that it would. The same obligation pulls me in two different 
directions. The Kantian approach offers me no way out. Absolute obligations are 
very difficult to accommodate with real life. 
 
In its emphasis on rationality and obligations it is a very cold ethic. There is no 
space for emotion, caring and vulnerability. By privileging the rational 
autonomous independent actor, Kantian theory speaks to a very narrow section of 
society.  Its vision of humanity is one which few of us recognise on a day to day 
basis, as we juggle our obligations to partners, dependants and friends. Periods of 
dependency and incapacity characterise human existence at least as much as 
periods of rational autonomy; and the state of illness or disability in which 
treatment disputes generally arise is an archetypal instance of this. A Kantian 
approach sits more comfortably with contractual arrangements between strangers 
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than it does with everyday decisions of family life, and particularly decisions of 
medical intervention.  
 
On a Kantian view of the issues, the doctors treating Annie find themselves in a 
difficult position. Annie has never been an autonomous agent. Her family are 
asking the doctors to perform major surgical interventions when there is no 
physiological need. Annie is unable to have or express any views herself, but her 
interests require that she is able to continue in the care of her family, with as high 
a quality of life as can be achieved for her, and surgery would seem to help that. 
Nonetheless, the doctors may feel that their role as a physician, and their own 
moral integrity, prevents them from performing drastic and invasive surgery in 
the absence of physiological need. 
 
Those that care for Bella are in no better a position. They must accord their 
patients dignity and respect. There is no dignity in forcefeeding, and the very 
idea of it is disrespectful of Bella’s wishes, which may well be fully autonomous. 
Her right to life does not carry any correlative duty of positive action to preserve 
it. The urge to provide nutrition may be motivated by care, compassion and a 
wish to protect her from herself, but these are heteronomous compulsions, 
lacking moral worth. Force-feeding Bella would fail both formulations of the 
categorical imperative. 
 
The reality that Cecil’s long-term care depends on his daughters’ continued 
ability to cope cannot inform the considerations of surgery. Allowing for an 
obligation of care, the maxim which allowed recognition of the demands of 
caring would be “when I need to care for someone, they must be treated 
according to my needs”. It would fail the categorical imperative for lack of 
consistency. If Cecil is reluctant to undergo the hip transplant operation, all the 
doctors and daughters can do is try to persuade him to change his mind. There is 
a deontological constraint against medical treatment without consent, and no 
corresponding positive direction.       
 
Annie, Bella and Cecil reveal the cold intellectualism of a deontic approach to 
medical treatment disputes. We may or may not like the outcomes, but we feel 
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the absence of any ‘bedside manner’ in the process of working out the dilemma. 
When there is no place for considering the practical effect of our refusal to 
intervene, no concession for misguided youth, and no recognition of the burdens 
we expect others to bear, our very humanity feels disregarded. When moral 
obligation requires us to overlook infinite individuality, it seems particularly ill-
fitted to determine the kind of disputes with which we are concerned.    
 
Agent based theory 
 
Recently there has developed a resurgent interest in an old philosophy – that of 
the virtues. Proponents of virtue ethics emphasise the character of the actor; and 
“goodness” comes before rightness. An action is right if and only if it is what an 
agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances. Such 
philosophical approaches may be called ‘areteic.’38 
 
There are different varieties of virtue ethics, but Justin Oakley39 has identified six 
positive features which unite them in distinction to other ethical approaches. The 
first of these is insistence on the primacy of character;40 and the second, the pre-
eminence of goodness. No account can be given of what makes an action right 
until it is established what is valuable, or good.41  Any monistic conception of 
good is rejected: virtues are irreducibly plural.42 Any tie to desires is rejected: 
virtues are objectively good, irrespective of whether we wish to have them or 
                                                 
38 From the Greek arete – the goodness or excellence of a thing. As used by D. Statman, in Virtue 
and Ethics: A Critical Reader. 
39 ‘Varieties of Virtue Ethics’, (1996) Ratio 9  128-152. 
40 So persuasive has this insistence been that it is adopted into more recent forms of utilitarianism 
and Kantianism. For example Barbara Herman argues that the categorical imperative is best 
understood as a normative disposition in the character of a good agent to rule out certain courses 
of conduct as impermissible: ‘The Practice of Moral Judgment’, (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993).  
41 Virtue ethics, when properly understood, thereby avoids the objection of circular logic (as 
advanced, for example by Edmund Pellegrino). “It does not specify right action in terms of the 
virtuous agent and then immediately specify the virtuous agent in terms of right action. Rather it 
specifies her in terms of the virtues, and then specifies those, not merely as dispositions to right 
action, but as the character traits…required for eudaimonia”  Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Virtue 
Theory and Abortion’ (1991) 20 Philosophy and Public Affairs p 226. 
42 Oakley’s fourth claim, clearly distinguishing virtue ethics from the older forms of 
utilitarianism. 
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not.43 Some virtues are agent-neutral, like justice, but others are agent-relative, 
like friendship.44 Finally, acting rightly does not require that we maximise the 
good. 
 
Virtue ethics is a broad church. There are different interpretations of the nature of 
virtue, the ethic’s key element, even among proponents of the theory.45 The most 
prominent approach adopts an Aristotelian view, whereby virtues are those 
character traits which mankind needs to develop if we are to flourish and prosper 
in life,46 but eudaimonia is an obscure concept, seldom discussed in the queue for 
the Clapham omnibus. Others advance distinctly different but equally complex 
foundations: Alasdair MacIntyre’s historicised view looks for dispositions 
necessary to maintain communal practices, like trustworthiness. Michael Slote 
takes the most practicable approach, looking simply for those character traits 
which we typically find admirable, like kindness, but even this admits subjective 
confusions.  
 
However obscurity and complexity are not exclusive to virtue ethics. Competing 
theories suffer the same limitation. Both happiness and rationality, as they figure 
in utilitarianism and Kantianism, are rich and difficult concepts47 – hence all the 
disputes about their meaning. The distinction is really in the plurality, which 
appears to leave virtue ethics vulnerable to subjectivism and emotism. In an age 
of moral diversity there is an enormous range of virtues48 from which to choose. 
                                                 
43 Oakley’s fifth claim, which distinguishes virtue ethics from some forms of utilitarianism. 
44 Oakley’s sixth claim, which distinguishes virtue ethics from most forms of consequentialism. 
45 But this is not a problem unique to virtue ethics. Proponents of rival theories have equivalent 
disagreements too, as we have already seen. 
46 “Eudaimonia” is the Aristotelian term for it, the meaning of which is best conveyed by 
flourishing/being happy/successful. The necessary virtues include honesty, integrity, courage, 
justice, benevolence, compassion and the like. Rosalind Hursthouse takes this approach; Phillipa 
Foot develops it to a functionalist level, identifying virtue not so much in the idea of a good 
human being as in what is good for human beings. 
47 As is pointed out by Rosalind Hursthouse in her vigorous defence of virtue ethics, ‘Virtue 
Theory and Abortion’. 
48 P. Gardiner neatly encapsulates the diversity on offer with a thumbnail sketch of differing 
selections f virtue: Ancient Greek philosophers expounded virtues of courage, prudence, 
temperance and justice; Christian theology focuses on virtues of faith, hope and charity; 
Beauchamp and Childress consider that the five virtues applicable to the medical practitioner are 
trustworthiness, integrity, discernment, compassion and conscientiousness. (‘A Virtue Ethics 
approach to Moral Dilemmas in Medicine’ (2003) J Med Ethics 297 at 298. 
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Finding a match in the understanding of virtue between the subject and the object 
of any given action becomes a matter merely of happenchance.  
 
Moreover, areteic approaches have to struggle with “a major problem of cultural 
relativism.”49 Perception of virtue can change over time and across cultures: the 
heroic virtues of Homer are very different to the gentler virtues of Christianity. 
Even within a given context (say the practice of medicine), the necessary virtue 
set is not fixed. Robert Veatch thinks it is not going too far to say that “one could 
have virtually any set of virtues one wanted…simply by picking the cultural 
tradition and time period properly.” 50  
 
On the other hand, as long as there is sufficient clarity in any particular time, 
adaptability over time may be a strength as well as a weakness. Medical 
decisions have to be taken over very short time frames, not millennia; and 
scientific developments need to be accommodated rapidly. If we try to determine 
the virtues relevant to Britain at the beginning of the twenty-first century, using 
any of the modern approaches of virtue ethics, it is possible to draw up a lengthy 
list. Whilst not every virtue appears on every list, there is presently a substantial 
degree of convergence, such that Gert felt confident to declare in 1985 that 
“when the terminology is adequately explained, there is virtually complete 
agreement on the nature of virtues and vices.”51  
 
More interesting is the criticism that, however the list is fixed, virtue will never 
be an adequate guide to action, because it answers the question “what sort of 
person should I be?”, rather than the question “what should I do?” Virtue ethics 
cannot therefore be a normative rival to deontology or utilitarianism. There are 
implicit in this criticism two issues: whether the primacy of character precludes 
formulation of behaviour guides, and the nature of the connection between 
virtuous character and right action.  
                                                 
49 AV Campbell ‘The Virtues (and Vices) of the Four Principles’ (2003) J Med Ethics 292 at 292 
50 ‘Against Virtue: a Deontological Critique of Virtue Theory in Medical Ethics’, in Earl E. Shelp 
(ed), Virtue and Medicine, at page 334. He is not alone in this type of criticism. Specifically in 
the medical context, Pellegrino and Thomasma pursue similar arguments in The Virtues in 
Medical Practice. 
51 Bernard Gert, ‘Virtue and Vice’, in Earl E. Shelp (ed) Virtue and Medicine, at page 95. 
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Rosalind Hursthouse answers the first issue, almost dismissively:52 every virtue 
generates a positive instruction (act justly, kindly etc.) and every vice a 
prohibition (do not act unjustly, cruelly etc.). She calls them the V Rules. The 
criticism then becomes, not that there is a lack of action guides, but an excess. 
Different virtues can point in different directions. Honesty prompts me to give a 
negative opinion; kindness quells it. Where the virtues are in conflict, how can 
virtue ethics guide decision-makers to right judgments? 
 
It may be argued that the conflict is merely apparent, and would disappear with a 
fuller moral understanding of, for example, what is involved in acting kindly, but 
Hursthouse has a more compelling response, which also answers the second 
aspect of the initial criticism. Put simply, she asserts that virtue ethics does not 
contend for singular right answers - and neither does it deliver simplistic wrong 
ones. It allows the possibility of competing virtues,53 and that different actions in 
the same circumstances may be equally right. Two people may both behave well 
when resolving the same situation in different ways. “Whether one does what a 
kind person would have done, or what an honest person would have done, one 
would still have acted rightly.”54 To seek the virtue is not necessarily to seek to 
exemplify it in every situation; sometimes it may be preferable to exemplify a 
different virtue.  
 
In this way, virtue ethics rejects the modelling of philosophy on scientific 
theory,55 and allows the possibility of moral dilemmas.56 The real-world 
applicability and attraction of this, as seen in the case of Re A 
                                                 
52 Normative Virtue Ethics in Roger Crisp (ed) How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues at 
p25.  
53 As is sought by Stanley M. Hauerwas, ‘On Medicine and Virtues: A Response’,  Earl E. Shelp 
(ed) Virtue and Medicine, ibid n24 pp347-355 at 353: “too often the problem is not that we are 
doing the morally wrong thing in medicine, but that we are not allowing for the possibility of 
other competing virtues. What is required is the development of an ethos sufficient to support the 
often conflicting virtues inherent in the practice of medicine.” 
54 Beginning Lives ( Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p34 
55 In science, the purpose of decent theory is to enable us to answer questions that we could not 
answer before we had it. The representatives of “anti-theory” in ethics reject the idea of 
normative ethical theory. Proponents include Baier, McDowell, MacIntyre and Nussbaum, but 
not actually Hursthouse herself.  
56 Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Normative Virtue Ethics’, in Roger Crisp (ed) How Should One Live? 
Essays on the Virtues.  
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(Children)(Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment)(No. 1),57 is obvious. Ward LJ 
took care to point out, despite his judgment that separation surgery should go 
ahead, if the hospital had bowed to the parents’ wishes and not sought a court 
order, that also would have been acceptable.58 In such cases, only a fool looks for 
simple answers; wisdom acknowledges difficulty. Virtue ethicists recognise that 
tragic dilemmas can rarely be resolved to the complete satisfaction of all parties, 
and that “any conclusion is likely to leave some remainder of pain and regret.”59 
 
Equally, the same action may be right on some occasions, but wrong on others – 
not because its morality varies according to the consequences, but because the 
fully virtuous agent acts differently according to the circumstances. 
 
And yet, a distinction may be drawn between right action and proper motive. As 
Aristotle himself acknowledged, an action can be right without being virtuous, 
and an action can only be virtuous if performed from the right state of mind. 
Motivation of the agent is of crucial importance. That being so, can people of 
great virtue be misled into wrong action? Veatch60 would say so, and worse. He 
contends that virtue ethics is actually dangerous, because selection of the wrong 
virtue in the absence of an ethical principle or moral rules or institutional checks 
to govern one’s acts tends to induce wrong action, freeing up agents to “sin 
bravely”, on the conviction that their motives are good. So, Eichmann may well 
have been sincere, persevering and even courageous in his determination to 
ensure the gassing of his Jewish victims, but he was certainly not virtuous.61 
Moreover naked virtue leads to other detrimental effects as well, such as over 
confidence, disinclination to submit to peer or public monitoring and, if others 
are convinced of the virtue, lax regulation of conduct.   
                                                 
57 [2001] 2 WLR 480 
58 “Just as the parents hold firm views worthy of respect, so every instinct of the medical team 
has been to save life where it can be saved. Despite such a professional judgment it would, 
nevertheless, have been a perfectly acceptable response for the hospital to bow to the weight of 
the parental wish however fundamentally the medical team disagreed with it. Other medical 
teams may well have accepted the parents’ decision. Had St. Mary’s done so, there could not 
have been the slightest criticism of them for letting nature take its course in accordance with the 
parents’ wishes.”, per Ward LJ at page 173 
59 P. Gardiner ‘ A Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Dilemmas in Medicine’ (2003) J Med Ethics 
297 at 301. 
60 Robert M. Veatch, ibid n 24 at p329-345. He poses the “naked virtue problem”, p335.  
61 AV Campbell ‘The Virtues and Vices of the Four Principles’ (2003) J Med Ethics 292 at 293.  
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Slote would question whether a genuinely virtuous act could indeed be “wrong”, 
but other theorists argue the point from the other end, and question whether 
virtue can really be said to be present. Justin Oakley denies the sufficiency of 
virtuous motivation, contending that virtue has a practical component, which 
involves ensuring that one’s action succeeds in bringing about what the virtue 
dictates. In this way, virtue ethics does not condone moral ineptitude. “There is 
more to having a virtue than meaning well.”62   
 
That being so, knowing what it is that having a virtue entails is a difficult thing, 
but it is critical to the practicability of virtue ethics. In any discussion of real 
moral issues, the virtue ethicist is obliged to judge: to say whether a certain act is 
honest, dishonest, or neither; charitable, uncharitable or neither.63 Life being 
what it is, such judgments are not always easy. Difficulty in application limits the 
attraction and adoption of a theory, but says nothing of its sufficiency, unless we 
expect moral theory to make hard things easy – an implausible test. As Aristotle 
recognised and Hursthouse calls in support,64 moral knowledge, unlike 
mathematical knowledge, cannot be acquired by attending lectures and is not 
characteristically to be found in people too young to have had much experience 
of life.  
 
This raises the practical question of how, if we are to adopt virtue ethics as a 
normative guide beyond the private sphere, the virtuous character of public 
servants – like doctors and judges - can be assured. As Meno asked Socrates, is 
virtue something that can be taught? Does it come by practice? Pellegrino and 
Thomasma suggest that the teaching of ethics “does sensitise students to what 
constitutes an ethical issue or problem…..it forces self-criticism and examination 
of one’s own values. It demands that reasons be given for moral choices, that 
                                                 
62 Jennifer Jackson, Ethics in Medicine (Malden MA: Polity Press, 2006) at p11. 
63 As Bernard Gert points out, it is not necessarily the case that everyone either has the virtue or 
the vice and that no one has neither. Many people are neither courageous nor cowardly, neither 
truthful nor deceitful (ibid n25 at p97). 
64 Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Normative Virtue Ethics’, in Roger Crisp (ed) How Should One Live? 
Essays on the Virtues at p 230. 
 67 
opposing viewpoints be given an adequate response….”65 History, in the shape 
of the Nazi doctors, shows that ethical training offers no guarantees. For that 
reason, however desirable virtue as a personal trait, it makes an unsafe basis for 
the formulation of public policy. 
 
Returning to our case studies, Annie needs to be treated with kindness and 
compassion. Acting virtuously, her doctors would approach the issue of surgery 
with a humble regard for the practical issues of severe disability, and a 
willingness to accept that these issues may point them in a different direction to 
straightforward clinical considerations.  
 
Bella’s doctors need practical wisdom to guide their actions in the light of all the 
circumstances of her case, assessing her physical needs in the light of her age and 
maturity, her considered ambition and her understanding of its consequences. 
What may have been the right thing to do for their last patient with eating issues, 
may not be the right thing in Bella’s case. Putting their conclusions into action 
may require patience and courage, either to administer nutrition when there is 
resistance, or to watch her physical condition deteriorate.  
 
It is more difficult to see the requirements of virtue in Cecil’s situation. It would 
be kind to Cecil and his daughters to act so as to maximise mobility and 
minimise dependence. If Cecil does not consent to the operation, the virtuous 
doctor would therefore try to persuade him to change his mind. If that did not 
succeed, the virtuous doctor would be torn between wanting to act kindly, and 
wanting to act respectfully of his wishes.  
 
Annie, Bella and Cecil show us that virtue ethics soothes our moral conscience 
more effectively than it guides our practical actions. In difficult situations, it is 
reassuring, and confidence-inspiring, to know that those who hold our health in 
their hands will act well; but it does not tell us with any certainty what they will 
do. Trusting ourselves to their virtue also leaves us vulnerable to those who 
abuse our trust. The termination of the reproductive potential of a severely 
                                                 
65 The Virtues in Medical Practice at p 179. 
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disabled girl in the interest of continuing her loving care, is surely morally 
distinguishable from the sterilisation of mental defectives to avoid the repetition 
of their genes, but it may not always be easy to prove on which side of the line 
any given case falls. Motivation is subjective and may be dissembled. Virtue is 
indispensable as a private ethic, but insufficient as a public one.     
 
 
Relationship based theory 
 
The ethics of care take a different approach to life. Whereas as the other theories 
we have considered, whatever their central focus, tackle moral issues within the 
province of individuals, the ethics of care emphasise relationships and locate 
moral issues in the context of interdependency. 
 
The intellectual roots of the ethics of care are in psychology, rather than 
philosophy, and feminist psychology in particular. In 1982, Carol Gilligan 
published her ground-breaking work, In a Different Voice. Previously 
mainstream psychology had chosen, like Virgil, to “sing of arms and the man”, 
and philosophical development of the subject, such as the work of Lawrence 
Kohlberg,66 had reflected that. Insofar as any psychological studies had included 
women at all, the different data they produced was generally dismissed as a 
deviation from the norm, an aberration. Gilligan set about redressing the balance 
by looking specifically at the psychological development of women, to call 
attention to what was missing in the generally accepted account. Seen in this 
light, the discrepant data on women’s experience “provided the basis from which 
to generate new theory, potentially yielding a more encompassing view of the 
lives of both sexes.”67     
 
                                                 
66 Lawrence Kohlberg developed a theory about how people reason and develop morally. He 
posited that people applied principles to particular cases, to come up with moral judgments: The 
Philosophy of Moral Development (1981) 
67 ‘In a Different Voice’ (Cambridge MA; Harvard University Press, 1982) p4 
 69 
Jean Baker Miller68 had already suggested that psychological development 
followed a different path for men and women. She noted that women’s sense of 
self was organised around being able to make and then maintain affiliations and 
relationships. Conventionally dismissed in terms of inequality and oppression, 
Miller saw instead a development which did not displace the value of ongoing 
attachment. In continuing care and connection she saw the potential for more 
advanced, more affiliative ways of living, but she found no language in 
psychology to describe it. Gilligan filled the void. She reinterpreted women’s 
experience in terms of their own imagery and described, instead of a hierarchy, a 
web of relationships, as a metaphor for interdependence and connectedness. 
 
Gilligan illustrates her findings and how they differ from Kohlberg’s approach 
by asking two 11 year olds, Jake and Amy, to resolve Heinz’s dilemma. Heinz’s 
wife needs a drug, but Heinz cannot afford to buy it and the pharmacist will not 
give it to him. Should Heinz steal it? Jake quickly answers that he should, 
justifying his response by appeal to the relative importance of life over property. 
Amy begins equivocally. She points out that if Heinz steals it, life could get 
worse – he could be imprisoned, leaving his wife without a carer. She suggests 
that Heinz and the pharmacist should sit down and work out a mutually 
satisfactory solution. For Jake, the problem is cognitive: he reasons about the 
situation, and acts accordingly, just as Kohlberg posits. For Amy, the only real 
solution involved a growth in moral sensitivity and commitment. Gilligan saw 
these as different moral orientations, and she called them the voices of justice 
and of care.       
 
This vision gave rise to an ethic predicated on care and concern, rather than 
rights and fairness. Manning has identified five central ideas.69 Firstly, a care 
approach requires moral attention – a willingness to attend to the full complexity 
of any particular situation. Secondly it requires sympathetic understanding – an 
openness to empathy and identification with others, and a willingness to see what 
others would want. Thirdly, it is aware of relationships – specifically the 
                                                 
68 ‘Toward a New Psychology of Women’, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976) 
69 Rita C. Manning, ‘A Care Approach’ in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer 9eds), A Companion to 
Bioethics (Oxford; Blackwell Publishers, 1998) p98-99 
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relationship with the moral decision maker, be that from a particular role (doctor, 
judge) or simply as a fellow member of the human race; but also the wider 
network of relationships within which the other operates. It sees moral agents as 
embedded in particular social contexts and personal narratives. Fourthly, it 
makes accommodations. It is not always possible or wise to do what everyone 
thinks they need, but often it is possible, whilst doing what one thinks best, to 
give everyone concerned a sense of being properly considered in the process. 
Finally, it requires response: the approach must be made concrete by 
corresponding action.    
 
Put together in a holistic approach, these ideas amount to a view of humanity 
which stands in clear contrast to established philosophical approaches. By 
overemphasising detached fairness traditional approaches, it says, have lost sight 
of reality and what matters to us most. We are born utterly dependent on others; 
and many of us will return to that condition before we die. In between, “whether 
or not we like it and regardless of how we regard it, caregiving labor….is the 
work we do that creates the relationships, families, and communities within 
which our lives are made pleasurable and connected to something larger than 
ourselves.”70 Care is to be valued, and interdependency is inevitable.  Within 
caring relationships, our visions of ourselves must be fluid:71 “we” cannot easily 
break down into “you” and “I”. As Claire, one of the college students in 
Gilligan’s study72 put it, “By yourself, there is little sense to things. It is like the 
sound of one hand clapping.” 
 
Tackling moral issues, the ethics of care therefore takes a relational approach. 
The key question is not whether it is my right to do X, but what is my proper 
obligation within the context of this relationship? The skill is not to balance 
competing claims, but to determine responsibilities within mutually supporting 
relations. “An ethic of care focuses on attentiveness, trust, responsiveness to 
need, narrative nuance, and cultivating caring relations. Whereas an ethic of 
                                                 
70 Robin West, ‘The Right to Care’, in E. Kittay and E. Feder (Eds.), The Subject of Care: 
Feminist Perspectives on Dependency, p89.  
71 Jonathan Herring, ‘Where are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?’ (2007) 27 Legal 
Studies 66. 
72 ‘In a Different Voice’ p160. 
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justice seeks a fair solution between competing individual interests and rights, an 
ethic of care sees the interests of carers and cared-for as importantly intertwined 
rather than as simply competing.”73  
 
Agent relativism is therefore inherent in the ethics of care. It agrees that all 
persons are valuable, but it recognises special obligations: those imposed by 
actual or potential relationships and roles. Since it understands communities as 
more than mere aggregates of individuals, and relationships as more than 
properties of individual persons, it is committed to saying that communities and 
relationships have moral standing. So, obligations to family and friends are 
stronger than obligations to strangers. It may therefore be of particular pertinence 
to issues of health and medical decision-making. It both recognises and guides 
the relationship between patient and decision-maker. Moreover, in requiring 
responsiveness to another’s needs as that other sees them, it provides a counter-
balance to the assumption that a narrow medical good will always best meet 
those needs.    
 
From a traditional perspective, the insistent contextual relativism of the care 
approach appears inconclusive and diffuse. It has been dismissed as inherently 
vague and capable of justifying almost any plausible moral argument,74 but 
Herring75 points out that the same could be said of other respected approaches 
and concepts. Moreover emphasis on the emotional dimension of moral life does 
not reduce moral response to emotional response. Caring also has a cognitive 
dimension: it involves insight into and understanding of another’s circumstances, 
needs and feelings, and it is this which directs us in choosing how to act.  
Herring compares an ethic of care with the concept of rights: both provide ethical 
tools with which to analyse a situation, but neither provides an answer. We have 
already seen that this is not fatal to the adequacy of a moral approach: the ethic 
of care can simply align itself with virtue ethics, warning against anything which 
purports to offer simple answers to complex issues.    
 
                                                 
73 Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) p15 
74 Emily Jackson, Medical Law, p22 
75 ‘Where are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 66 at p69. 
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More stringent has been the concern of feminists that an ethic of care perpetuates 
gender inequality. The criticism stems from its origin in psychology: care, rather 
than a moral ethic, is an approach forced upon women by generations of social 
oppression. Susan Sherwin explains that: 
 
“Because gender differences are central to the structures that support 
dominance relations, it is likely that women’s proficiency at caring is 
somehow related to women’s subordinated status. Within dominance 
relations, those who are assigned the subordinate positions, that is 
those with less power, have special reason to be sensitive to the 
emotional pulse of others, to see things in relational terms, and to be 
pleasing and compliant. Thus the nurturing and caring at which 
women excel are, among other things, the survival skills of an 
oppressed group that lives in close contact with its oppressors.”76  
 
Hence feminists caution against valorising the traits that replicate, maintain and 
reinforce patterns of domination and subordination.  
 
Perhaps for this reason, those proponents of the ethic of care who have led its 
more recent development tend to refute any suggestion of gender dependency. 
Manning, for example, baldly asserts that “we all have an obligation to be caring 
persons, not in virtue of our gender or our job description, but because we are 
human beings”.77 At the same time, repeats of Gilligan’s (North American) 
experiments in European countries have not replicated the link she found 
between gender and differing ethical response.78 There is good reason to assert, 
in liberation of Gilligan’s theory and women in general, that an ethic of care can 
and should be adopted universally.  
 
                                                 
76 S. Sherwin, ‘Ethics, Feminine Ethics and Feminist Ethics’ in D. Shogan (ed.), A Reader in 
Feminist Ethics. 
77 ‘A Care Approach’ in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds), A Companion to Bioethics at p103. 
It is regrettable that she somewhat undermines this by choosing, unnecessarily, to call the 
requirement of sympathetic understanding “maternalism”.   
78 A. Vikan, C. Camino & A. Biaggio, ‘Note on a Cross-Cultural Test of Gilligan’s Ethic of 
Care’, (2005) 34 Journal of Moral Education 107. 
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Furthermore, there is no reliance on a sharp distinction between justice and care 
in a care approach. Gilligan herself saw the two voices of justice and care as 
complementary, rather than mutually exclusive:  
 
“to understand how the tension between responsibilities and rights 
sustains the dialectic of human development is to see the integrity of 
two disparate modes of experience that are in the end connected. 
While an ethic of justice proceeds from the premise of equality – that 
everyone should be treated the same – an ethic of care rests on the 
principle of non-violence – that no one should be hurt. In the 
representation of maturity, both perspectives converge in the 
realisation that just as inequality adversely affects both parties in an 
unequal relationship, so too violence is destructive for everyone 
involved. This dialogue between fairness and care not only provides 
a better understanding of relations between the sexes but also gives 
rise to a more comprehensive portrayal of adult work and family 
relationships.”79  
 
It is therefore perfectly plausible for an ethic of care to promote not relationships 
indiscriminately, but only relationships which are just.   
 
Rather than taking fright from the psychological origins of the ethic of care, 
feminist critics could instead have emphasised how Gilligan’s analysis includes 
responsibility to self as well as others.  She traced how the concept of rights 
became absorbed into the thinking of college students in the 1970s, expanding 
the notion of care “from a paralyzing injunction not to hurt others to an 
injunction to act responsively toward self and others and thus to sustain 
connection”.80 Consideration of relationships necessarily implies viewing them 
from both sides. What emerges is an ethic of care with justice: the vision that self 
and other will be treated as of equal worth; that despite differences in power 
                                                 
79 ‘In a Different Voice’ p 173 
80 ‘In a Different Voice’ p 149 
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things will be fair; that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one 
will be left out or hurt.   
 
A more modern concern is that an ethic of care can valorise caring.81 In the real 
world, it is all too easy for abuse to be perpetrated on vulnerable people under the 
guise of care: our “care homes” for the elderly, the mentally ill, and the 
unparented probably earn more column inches of publicity for abuse than for any 
positive achievements. Focus on relationships should not allow us to ignore the 
impact relationships have on the individuals party to them; nor to overlook the 
need to guard against unjust relationships. 
 
Returning to our case studies, for Annie the need to maintain the relationship 
with her parents is crucial. She is absolutely dependent on them; and their 
response to her so far has been devoted and caring. Their ability to continue to 
offer her the best care depends on them being able to manoeuvre her physically. 
The proposed medical intervention would help to sustain the relationship.  
 
The nature of the relationship between Bella and her parents may be instrumental 
to her attitude to food. The ethic of care demands that doctors attend to the full 
complexity of it: is there a psychological issue of power that needs to be 
accommodated? It will be particularly important to ensure that Bella feels 
properly considered in the process of determining how the eating issue is to be 
tackled, even if the conclusion does not support her declared ambitions. The way 
in which the medical issue is approached could be destructive, or restorative, of 
the family relationships, and in that way even tackle the underlying issues behind 
the need for medical treatment. 
 
Cecil’s much-vaunted “independence” would be short-lived without the support 
of his daughters. They are unlikely to withdraw their support lightly, because of 
the long family narrative, but equally they cannot be expected to shoulder 
unlimited burdens. The consideration of their needs is legitimate, such that Cecil 
has a responsibility to do all that he can to ensure that the relationship remains 
                                                 
81 See Herring ‘Where are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 66.  
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just and non-abusive, and that may include overcoming reluctance for surgery. If 
the network of relationships is taken seriously, any right to refuse consent to 
treatment may yield to responsibilities towards others, especially where the 
stakes for the patient are relatively low and the cost of the alternative to others is 
relatively high.82  
 
Annie, Bella and Cecil show us that an ethic of care can point to practical 
solutions, but we have been able to see that only because our case studies are 
fictional, and it is therefore open to us to infer background details beyond the 
known facts of the case. We can infer that Annie’s parents have cared for her 
devotedly and will continue to do so as long as they are physically able; that 
Bella is struggling for control of some aspect of her life; and that Cecil will 
accept the responsibilities of justice in relationships. For doctors and courts 
making real treatment decisions, divining the true merit of the web of 
interdependence, so that support will be engendered but abuse not perpetuated, 
may not be so easy. 
 
Principle based theory 
 
The dominant model of medical ethics for the last 30 years or so has been 
principlism, as laid out in the seminal text of Beauchamp and Childress, 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics, now in its fifth edition. Principlism is 
constructed on an analytical framework which is said to express the underlying 
rules of commonly accepted morality83 in four clusters of principles, which then 
                                                 
82 Nelson & Nelson give an example, set in a financial context unfamiliar to UK healthcare, but 
illustrative nonetheless: “If..a kidney stone can be removed by catheterisation for a fraction of 
what it costs to have it pulverised by lithotripsy, and if the family is uninsured for lithotripsy, the 
patient may be justly censured for insisting that the family’s savings be wiped out simply so that 
he may refuse catheterisation.” (A Patient In The family, p113). John Hardwig goes further: “In 
many cases family members have a greater interest than the patient in what treatment option is 
exercised. In such cases, the interests of family members ought to override those of the 
patient….To be part of a family is to be morally required to make decisions on the basis of 
thinking about what is best for all concerned, not simply what is best for yourself.” (What About 
the Family? Hastings Center Report 20 (1990) p5-10. 
83 Whether this is in fact true is a matter of debate. For instance H Tristram Engelhart Jr. and 
Kevin William Wildes argue that there is no such set of commonly held norms in modern, 
pluralist societies. Our world, they say, is composed of “moral strangers” who do not share a 
moral vision.  
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serve as guidelines for ethical conduct in the medical setting. The four clusters 
are respect for autonomy (a norm of respecting the decision-making capacities of 
autonomous persons); nonmaleficence (a norm of avoiding the causation of 
harm); beneficence (a group of norms for providing benefits and balancing 
benefits against risks and cost); and justice (a group of norms for distributing 
benefits, risks and costs fairly). Either alone or in combination, it is said84 that 
these four principles can explain and justify all the substantive and 
universalisable claims of medical ethics. 
 
Principlism established itself as the standard medical ethic so universally and so 
quickly because it is tailor-made for the context and for minimum controversy. 
Apparently reducible to four easily memorised “soundbites”, it is broadly 
compatible with almost any of the great intellectual theories whilst avoiding their 
less palatable implications; and two of them are identical to the obligations of the 
Hippocratic Oath.85 It is specific enough to reduce the subjectivity of ethical 
debate, and to indicate paths of action. It offers a moral methodology readily 
accessible to health professionals, analogous to a clinical workup of a diagnostic 
or therapeutic problem. And it avoids direct confrontation with the divisive 
issues of abortion, euthanasia and reproductive technologies.86    
 
However, there is vigorous dispute as to the philosophical credentials of 
principlism. The general thrust of the criticism is that principlism is mistaken 
about the nature of morality and misleading as to the foundations of ethics. K. 
Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert,87 for example, contend that the principles 
function neither as adequate surrogates for moral theories nor as directives for 
determining morally correct action. They do not function (as do the principles of 
                                                 
84 By R Gillon: ‘Ethics Needs Principles – Four Cane Encompass the Rest – And Respect for 
Autonomy Shall Be First Among Equals’ (2003) J Med Ethics 307 at 307. He makes a plea for 
this to be not denigrated as ethical imperialism, but celebrated as ethical ecumenism. 
85 Beneficence and nonmaleficence mirror the Oath’s requirements to act in the best interests of 
the patient and to avoid doing harm. 
86 See Pellegrino and Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice, p187. More scathingly, Harris 
describes the four principles as ‘a useful checklist approach to bioethics for those new to the 
field, and possibly for ethics committees without substantial ethical expertise’ : ‘In Praise of 
Unprincipled Ethics’ (2003) J Med Ethics 303 at 303. 
87 ‘A Critique of Principlism’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15 (1990) 217-236. There are 
others, such as Barush Brody and Ronald Green, who voice similar concerns 
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Rawls and Mills88), as summaries of the theories that generated them. Rather 
they are “primarily chapter headings for a discussion of some concepts which are 
often only superficially related to each other.”89 
 
The “chapter headings” do owe much to ethical theories, and in particular those 
parts of the theories which are most widely supported: beneficence incorporates 
Mill; autonomy, Kant; justice, Rawls; and nonmaleficence, Gert.90 Presenting 
them as a cluster of principles suggests however that these great philosophies 
have been integrated into a unified theory, whereas in fact the opposite is true. 
There is no attempt to show how the different theories can be reconciled or 
blended together into a single adequate theory. Instead a pluralist approach is 
taken: rival theories are reduced to a checklist of considerations, with no moral 
theory to tie them together. As a result there is no unified guide to action which 
can generate rules, and therefore no justification for any rules. The agent is left to 
pick and choose from the checklist as she sees fit. 
 
The problem with this approach is the false sense of moral security which it 
engenders. A “principle” is assumed to be firmly established and justified, and 
therefore authoritative. The agent is therefore likely to believe that she is 
applying a well-developed, unified theory, when in fact she is unwittingly 
drawing on several diverse and conflicting accounts. She is thereby deprived of 
any secure moral ground for her action. She will not know what fundamental 
assumptions and ideals are inherent in her approach; she will therefore not be 
able to tell which are the relevant facts, or how to apply the correct approach to 
them. In its apparent simplicity, it creates a false confidence in ethical decision 
making abilities.    
 
(i) Autonomy: Against this background falls to be assessed principlism’s most 
significant contribution to the ethics of medical decision-making: the emphasis 
                                                 
88 For Rawls, see  A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993) and The Law of Peoples 
(1999). For JS Mill, see Utilitarianism (1861), A System of Logic (1843) and ‘On Liberty’ (1859).  
89 Danner Clouser & Gert, ‘A Critique of Principlism’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15 
(1990) 217 at p221. 
90 Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge this: “Our goal is to eliminate what is unacceptable in 
each type of theory, and to appropriate what is relevant and acceptable.”   
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on autonomy. The term “autonomy” derives from ancient Greek: ‘autos’ 
meaning self, and ‘nomos’ denoting rule, governance or law. It was applied by 
the ancient Greeks to city-states that were politically independent; so its modern 
application to individuals relies on a metaphor.  
 
Jennifer Jackson has identified three senses in which individuals can be 
autonomous.91 On one level, being autonomous is equivalent to being free, 
unconstrained by others (“the liberty sense”). Alternatively, being autonomous is 
equivalent to being in control of oneself, able to make decisions and act in line 
with them (“the self command sense”). Finally, autonomy is about independence, 
making decisions on one’s own, not on the advice or direction of others (“the 
self-reliance sense”). 
 
Beauchamp and Childress refer to the last, self-reliance sense. They analyse 
autonomous action in terms of normal choosers who act intentionally, with 
understanding, and without controlling influences that determine their action.92 
While intention is an absolute requirement, reality dictates a concession that 
perfect understanding and freedom from constraint are rarely achieved; so all that 
principlism requires is “a substantial degree” of autonomy, assessed in the light 
of specific objectives.93  
 
The philosophical origins of respect for autonomy span both deontology and 
utilitarianism. Kant’s principle of humanity insists that people are morally 
different to things because they have rational capacity, which allows them to be 
self-determining, and gives them intrinsic value. Therefore people should be 
treated as an ends in themselves, not merely as a means to someone else’s ends, 
and accorded respect and dignity. John Stuart Mill’s principle of liberty states 
that the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over another 
against his will is to prevent harm to others. His concern with “individuality” 
demands that society permit persons to develop according to their convictions, as 
long as they do not interfere with the like expression of freedom by others.  
                                                 
91 Ethics In Medicine at p66.  
92 Principles p59. 
93 Principles p59. 
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Despite its philosophical pedigree, the notion of self-determination for patients 
was historically rather a pale one. The gift of principlism has been to build for 
autonomy a dominance which it previously lacked. Even accepting Jeremy 
Bentham’s contention that doctors must historically have acted within a legal 
framework which required consent,94 the recent notion of partnership in 
healthcare is in stark contrast to the traditional authoritarianism and paternalism 
of the medical profession.  Doctors hitherto have always held a social position 
which left most people in awe. As Herring points out, there was nowhere for 
medical law or ethics to go until there was a serious challenge to medical 
paternalism.95 The focus on the rights of autonomy and bodily integrity96 was 
essential if there was to be a challenge to the supremacy of medical opinion. 
 
The principle of autonomy does indeed operate to restrict healthcare 
interventions: only those that respect the decision-making capacities of 
competent patients are allowed. Deception, emotional manipulation, and physical 
force are clearly prohibited. Paternalism is discredited. Patients make their own 
decisions, even contrary to medical advice, and physicians’ ability to act is 
limited accordingly. It is not just a respectful attitude which is required, but its 
practical application in action too. It includes the obligation to build up and 
maintain, and to remove obstacles to, the autonomy of others.  
 
The principle of autonomy may be heralded for what it achieved in challenging  
medical paternalism, but latterly it has attracted significant criticism for being 
elevated out of proportion to its contribution. Although Beauchamp and 
Childress insist that the autonomy principle is just one in a framework of prima 
                                                 
94 The alternative hypothesis, that doctors were wont to impose treatment forcibly on their 
patients (even on adults of sound mind) is incredible. “Distrust and terror would watch by the 
sick man’s bed”: Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, p269. Beauchamp and Childress 
dismiss the absence from the Hippocratic Oath of any mention of consent or respect for self-
determination as immaterial: the duty to obtain consent relates to a general duty in law, and is not 
exclusive to medical law or ethics. “There is, then, no particular reason why it should be included 
in the Hippocratic Oath, anymore than this Oath should make mention of the general duty not to 
steal.” (Principle of Biomedical Ethics, p59)   
95 ‘Where are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?’ (2007) Legal Studies 66 
96 Of which Ian Kennedy’s Reith lectures and the book which came out of them, Treat Me Right, 
were in the vanguard in the UK. 
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facie principles, without any priority over the others97, later disciples openly 
celebrate it as “first among equals,”98 while critics claim that it is too often 
assumed to trump the others, so that competing considerations are overlooked.  
 
The corollary of elevating the individual is devaluation of the collective. The 
family, and wider society, are diminished as institutions of importance. Willard 
Gaylin and Bruce Jennings99 therefore criticise the culture of autonomy as 
destructive of the foundations of social order, and lacking any conception of 
responsibility to others.100 Public health legislation permits the detention of 
critically infectious individuals suffering from diseases specified diseases, such 
as tuberculosis. Yet, once immured in hospital, those same individuals may 
refuse treatment to reduce their contagion.101   
 
Beauchamp and Childress purport to recognise this in their emphasis on the 
prima facie status of the principle, meaning that it can sometimes be overridden 
by competing moral considerations. They see the principle of autonomy both as 
an important moral limit and as itself limited; and one of the limitations on it 
would be when healthcare decisions “enter the realm of other-regarding 
behaviour, causing or risking harm to others or to the community.”102 This 
defence is not compelling: there is nothing inherent in the principle which 
requires such limitation. As a tactic, it simply illustrates the arguments of K. 
Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert discussed above.  
 
Donchin goes further, asserting that principlism sets bare autonomy and 
interpersonal connection as mutually exclusive ways of operating.103 The 
portrayal of the individual in the culture of autonomy relies on an idealised 
                                                 
97 Principles p104 
98 Even, by R Gillon, in an article which bears that boast in its title: ‘Ethics Needs Principles – 
Four Can Encompass the Rest – and Respect for Autonomy Should be “First Among Equals”’ 
(2003) J Med Ethics 307: “Autonomy as primus inter pares…is what makes morality – any sort 
of morality – possible.” (p310)  
99 See The Perversion of Autonomy (1996).  
100 See also Draper & Sorell’s ‘Patients’ Responsibilities in Medical Ethics’ [2002] Bioethics 335. 
101 See Margaret Brazier, ‘Do No Harm – Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too?’ [2006] 
Cambridge Law Journal 397  
102 Principles p65, p274 
103 Anne Donchin, ‘Understanding Autonomy Relationally: Toward a Reconfiguration of 
Bioethical Principles’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2001, 26 no. 4. p 368 at p375 
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image of the rational patient, calculating from a list of social goods and freely 
choosing among them. The model patient is typically a male in the prime of life 
who meets the physician as his intellectual and moral equal; and the physician is 
free to act without external constraint. It implies a model of physician-patient 
encounter most likely to arise in acute illness: they meet episodically, and their 
relationship is structured around the need to decide on a course of treatment. 
Once the decision is made and implemented and the patient is restored to health, 
they go their independent ways again.  
 
Such an image of self-containment is a bleak one, where all social ties have come 
undone, in stark contrast to an ethic of care. It is also divorced from reality. Real 
patients do not match the idealised image, for the context of illness has been lost. 
There is no acknowledgment of the destabilising effect of illness on personality: 
confidence, judgment and assertiveness desert most of us (even those who start 
closest to the image) as pain and fear take hold. In illness, it becomes apparent 
that individuation is a fragile achievement, always at risk of unravelling. We turn 
to others more, not less. So the separateness demanded by the bare autonomy 
model is impossible to achieve – and it is not clear why patients should even try, 
unless interdependence is seen as a condition to be overcome.    
 
The autonomy model fails to acknowledge that illness is disruptive of life, not 
just for the patient but also for her family, who are expected to provide care until 
health is restored and the threads of life can be picked up again. The impact on 
their lives is simply overlooked, even though (as we have seen in chapter 1) 
empirical evidence demonstrates both that patients with good family support 
have better post-operative outcomes104 and that one family member’s illness has 
an adverse effect on the wellbeing of others.105 Excluding any recognition of 
responsibility to others sets autonomy against justice, at least to those others.               
 
                                                 
104 H Lindemann Nelson and J Lindemann Nelson, The Patient In The Family 
105 C. Teri, ‘Behavioural problems in patients with Alzheimer disease and its associations with 
caregiver distress’ (1997) Supp4 Alzheimer’s Disease and Associated Disorders 35; RG 
Longsdon et all, ‘Wandering: a significant problem among community-residing individuals with 
Alzheimer’s disease’ (1998) B53(5) J Gerontology 294 
 82 
Beauchamp and Childress reject these criticisms as misguided. Their concept of 
autonomy is, they say, “not excessively individualistic (neglecting the social 
nature of individuals and the impact of individual choices and actions on others), 
not excessively focussed on reason (neglecting the emotions), and not unduly 
legalistic (highlighting legal rights and downplaying social practises).”106 By 
way of proof, they point to their concession that understanding and freedom from 
constraint are spectrum conditions. Going further, they also accept that capacity 
for autonomy, and exercise of autonomy are not necessarily co-existent; that 
even persons capable of self-governance may sometimes fail to act that way 
because of temporary constraints, of which the stress and fear induced by 
significant illness must be an instance.107 
 
 Beauchamp and Childress cater for this by concentrating on the decision-making 
and “autonomous choice” (rather than – as some theories do – the traits of 
autonomous persons), and balancing the principle of respect for autonomy with a 
correlative right, not duty, to choose. Defensively they say, “far from abandoning 
or supplanting the commitment to respect individual autonomy, this 
recommendation accepts its central condition that the choice is rightly the 
patient’s.”108 Gillon goes further, insisting that since people’s cultural 
environments influence their autonomous beliefs, respect for autonomy 
contingently builds in a moral requirement to respect both individual and cultural 
variability.109 Therein lies the fault: ultimately, the defence does not meet the 
criticism. Although it appears to accept that individuals operate only within a 
context, it sees that as a matter of choice, not as an inescapable – and valuable – 
part of being human. 
 
A proper answer to the criticism demands a much broader understanding of 
autonomy that strikes a balance between the individual and the community. As a 
                                                 
106 Principles p57.  Beauchamp and Childress are free to maintain this, because there is nothing 
inherent in the principle to define our approach to autonomy -  K. Danner Clouser and Bernard 
Gert’s argument again.  
107 Principles, p58 
108 Principles  p62 
109 ‘Ethics Needs Principles – Four Can Encompass the Rest – and Respect for Autonomy Should 
be “First Among Equals”’ (2003) J Med Ethics 307 at 311. 
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communitarian110 Charles Taylor,111 for example, argues that the type of 
autonomy valued by liberals cannot be developed in the absence of family and 
community structures. John Hardwig112 argues that autonomy should be seen as 
the responsible use of freedom, which is diminished whenever one ignores, 
evades or slights one’s responsibilities. Candace Cummins Gauthier113 proposes 
the virtue of moral responsibility in the exercise of self-determination. Jennifer 
Nedelsky114 reconfigures autonomy to reflect not just the individual, but also the 
social nature of human beings. All of these interpretations of autonomy 
incorporate expectations on the part of the patient. Principlism does not rule that 
out, but it does not espouse it either. 
 
Instead Beauchamp and Childress expand their ability to be caring by limiting 
the application of the principle. Intervention need not require the consent of the 
non-autonomous person. The specification of “normal choosers” allows them to 
exempt persons who cannot act in a sufficiently autonomous manner because 
they are “immature, incapacitated, ignorant, coerced or exploited”115. The 
intention may be protective, but each of these terms is subjective and amorphous; 
their margins are blurred. When does rational choice of authority tip over into 
coercion?116 How do we know when a patient still lacks maturity?117 A 
philosophical – and practical - understanding of competence is required. 
                                                 
110 Communitarianism lacks a systematic account, but the emphasis is generally on the influence 
of society on individuals and the rooting of values in communal history, traditions and practices. 
What an individual should do is determined by the social role assigned to/acquired by her as a 
member of the community. Understanding a particular set of moral rules depends on 
understanding the community’s history, co-operative life and conception of social welfare. 
111 Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (1989) 
112 ‘What about the family?’ Hastings Center Report 1990; 20(2):5-10; ‘SUPPORT and the 
invisible family’, Hastings Center Report 1995; 25(6):S23-5; ‘Is there a duty to die?’ Hastings 
Center Report 1997; 27(2): 34-42 
113 ‘The virtue of moral responsibility in healthcare decisionmaking’, (2002) 11 Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 273-281 
114 ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities’ [1989] Yale Journal of Law 
and Feminism 7: “The autonomy I am talking about does remain an individual value, a value that 
takes its meaning from the recognition of (and respect for) the inherent individuality of each 
person. But it takes its meaning no less from the recognition that individuality cannot be 
conceived of in isolation from the social context in which that individuality comes into being”, 
p35. 
115 Principles p65 
116 Beauchamp and Childress accept that individuals can exercise their autonomy in choosing to 
accept an institution, tradition or community as a legitimate source of direction: Principles p60. 
This is relevant for example in the many cases of Jehovah’s Witnesses refusing blood transfusion.   
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(ii) Competence: The simple meaning of competence is the ability to perform a 
task. The nature of the task determines the skills required to achieve it. For 
example, competence to make a cup of tea is quite different to competence to 
build a nuclear bomb. If we were to list the skills required (the “criteria” for 
competence) to do both tasks, the lists would not be the same. Competence is 
therefore relative to a particular task. In the context of medical decision-making, 
competence centres upon the ability to understand a therapeutic procedure, to 
weigh up its relative risks and benefits, and make a decision in the light of those 
considerations.         
 
The assessment of competence becomes controversial when risk is thrown into 
the equation. Some medical decisions, for example having a strained wrist 
bandaged, carry little risk whichever way the decision is taken. Others, like open 
heart surgery, carry considerable risk. The higher the risk, the greater the impulse 
to protect the vulnerable from themselves, and hence the more likely it is that  
competence will be questioned if anyone who makes a decision contrary to the 
objectively expected ‘norm’. 
 
It is possible to devise strategies to connect standards of competence to real 
levels of experience, maturity, responsibility and welfare. Grisso and 
Applebaum’s competence balance scale,118 for example, adjusts the level of 
competence required according to the consequences of acting according to the 
decision: the greater the risk relative to other alternatives, the greater the level of 
communication, understanding, and reasoning skills required for competence to 
take that decision. So a young person may be competent to decide whether to 
                                                                                                                                    
117 Maturity is loosely connected to age. Most people are keen to protect the young and 
inexperienced from risk. The protective urge to ensure good outcomes for them becomes 
expressed in the use of age as a criterion for judging competence to make decisions. It is a 
criterion with which the law is familiar, but it is depersonalised and cannot escape the absurdity 
of being considered incompetent one day and competent the next simply according to the turn of 
a calendar. 
 
118 Scales are set up around a fulcrum. An autonomy cup is suspended from one arm of the scale, 
and a protection cup on the other. The fulcrum is set so as to give more weight to the autonomy 
cup. The balancing judgment depends on (1) the patients’ abilities in the face of decisional 
demands, weighed against (2) the probable gain-risk status of the patient’s treatment choice. 
 85 
have her sprained wrist bandaged, but not whether to undergo open heart surgery. 
However, there is a conceptual problem with this type of strategy. It conflates 
level of competence to decide with level of risk of outcome, when there is 
nothing to suggest that risky decisions require more ability at decision-making 
than non-risky ones. It confuses the process with the end result.  
 
Beauchamp and Childress permit the protective agenda without the conceptual 
sacrifice by instead suggesting that the level of evidence for determining 
competence should vary according to risk, while the competence itself varies 
only along a scale of difficulty in decision-making. This is a distinction which 
the court is adept at making, as it did in Re H (Minors)(Sexual Abuse: Standard 
of Proof)119 when the majority of the House of Lords accepted Lord Nicholls’ 
suggestion that in child protection cases, the burden of proof remains the lower 
civil one; it is just that the more serious the allegation the greater the evidential 
burden in establishing it.  
 
However the margins are determined, allowing that some groups fall outside the 
principle of autonomy requires that an alternative decision-making authority be 
recognised. If integrity of approach is to be preserved, the model for surrogate 
decision-making must be as close to the autonomy model as possible. 
Beauchamp & Childress therefore propose surrogate decision-making by 
aptitude.120 The ability to make reasoned judgments (ie competency), and 
adequate knowledge and information are uncontroversial. Emotional stability is 
arguably a feature of competency. The “commitment to the incompetent patient’s 
interests that is free of conflicts of interest and free of controlling influence by 
those who may not act in the patient’s best interests” is more debateable. It is a 
requirement for partiality in favour of the patient, and expressly excludes 
consideration of the interests of all affected parties.  
 
                                                 
119 [1996] AC 563. Lord Lloyd dissented, and Lord Nicholls’ dicta were not mentioned in the 
later case of Re M and R (Child Abuse: Evidence) [1996] 2 FLR 195, but in Re U (A 
Child)(Serious Injury: Standard of Proof) [2004] 2 FCR 257 the Court of Appeal confirmed them 
as correctly stating current law.  
120 Principles, p 154 
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Beauchamp and Childress’ primary presumption is that the family is the 
surrogate authority. There are practical reasons for this: the family is assumed to 
know and care about the patient more than anyone else. It is also claimed to be a 
recognition of the family’s “traditional role in society.”121 If it is, then a very 
narrow view of the family is taken. The best interests of the family as a 
collective, or of other individuals within the family, are ruled out of 
consideration by the requirement of partiality on behalf of the patient. Moreover 
the presumption in favour of the family is easily displaced: if they fail to meet 
the aptitude criteria Beauchamp & Childress urge that recourse must be had to 
the cool reasoning of strangers – in preference order, healthcare professionals, 
institutional committees and courts. 
 
Whoever the surrogate, there must be a standard against which they make 
decisions. Substituted judgment is closer to the autonomy ideal, because it 
requires the surrogate to make the decision the patient would have made if she 
could, but there is a practical difficulty in knowing what the patient would have 
chosen. If there is an advance directive, there is no need for surrogate decision-
making; without one, the surrogate is dependent on having a deep understanding 
of the patients own beliefs and values, and how they change over time. This is 
clearly impossible where the patient has never had autonomy, and susceptible to 
misinterpretation elsewhere. If the surrogate can really answer “what would the 
patient want?” then substituted judgment is acceptable.122 If she can only answer 
“what would I want for her?” then all connection with autonomy is extinguished 
and the standard is inappropriate.   
 
Beauchamp and Childress take instead the “best interests” test, which requires 
the surrogate to “determine the highest benefit among the available options, 
assigning different weights to interest the patient has in each option, and 
discounting or subtracting inherent risks or costs”. It is undoubtedly a demanding 
task, but again it is limited in the sense that it permits consideration only of the 
                                                 
121 Principles p156. Beauchamp and Childress are almost eager to continue with the comment 
that “the patient’s closest family members are demonstrably unsatisfactory in some cases, and the 
authority of the family is not final or ultimate.” 
122 This “economy of standards” essentially sees pure autonomy and acceptable substituted 
judgment as one and the same. They are both justified by the same principle. 
 87 
patient’s interests. Only indirectly can the wider context inform the decision. A 
patient’s interests may not be best served by making a medical decision which so 
exhausts the family that they are driven to withdraw support altogether, but that 
is a different judgment to one which includes consideration of the family’s 
overlapping interests on their own merits.123  
 
The best interests test brings into issue Beauchamp and Childress’s third 
principle. Historically the dominant medical ethic, beneficence aims to promote 
patients’ interests. However, with an inherent assumption of superiority of 
medical knowledge, it can easily slide into paternalism, which is the antithesis of 
autonomy. Beauchamp and Childress reconcile the potential conflict with a 
balancing exercise. Benefit must be placed on a scale with autonomy interests. 
As a patient’s interests in autonomy increase and the benefits for that person 
decrease, the justification for paternalistic action becomes less cogent; 
conversely, as the benefits increase and the interests in autonomy decrease, the 
justification for paternalistic action becomes more plausible. Thus preventing 
minor harms while deeply disrespecting autonomy is unjustified; but actions that 
prevent major harms and only minimally disrespect autonomy have a highly 
plausible rationale.   
 
Annie is not, and never has been, capable of autonomy. Her parents would be the 
first choice as surrogate decision makers, as long as they have the aptitude, 
which is called into doubt by the nature of their commitment to Annie and the 
requirement for impartiality. The imposition on their lives which such severe 
disability represents must be very great. It is asking a lot of them to consider 
medical options for Annie without also taking into account the impact of those 
options on their already compromised lives. Annie’s growth and development 
impact more directly on their lifestyle than hers. There is a conflict of interest 
here which may disqualify them as surrogate decision-makers. Principlism would 
then have recourse to institutional committees and courts. Annie and her family 
                                                 
123 See ‘Conceptions of family-centred medical decision-making and their difficulties’, Insoo 
Hyun [2003] 12 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics  196. 
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would be dependent on a stranger’s view of Annie’s ‘best interests’, 
individualistically viewed. 
 
Bella is at the margins of autonomy. At fifteen, she has opinions and convictions 
of her own; but she has little experience of life to inform her understanding of 
beauty, media manipulation and capitalism. Does she simply have different 
priorities to her parents, or is she immature, ignorant and exploited? Her decision 
not to eat has inherent risks of long-term health damage and ultimately death. If 
it is to be respected, there must be compelling evidence that she can balance her 
dream of beauty, fame and fortune against the context of distorted media and its 
physical consequences. 
 
Cecil may feel some constraint on his freedom of decision from his age and 
physical limitations; and he may not fully understand the ramifications of either 
hip replacement surgery or the prognosis without it. There will be an obligation 
on doctors to explain his options in a way that he can understand. If properly 
discharged, it is likely that Cecil could be rendered sufficiently autonomous to 
make his own decision; and even if he decides contrary to medical 
recommendation, the doctors and the daughters must respect his decision.    
 
Annie, Bella and Cecil show us the kinds of issues on which a principlist 
approach would focus. It is no coincidence that these concerns mirror the issues 
which, as we shall see, occupy the courts more closely than any of the other 
philosophical approaches. They do not, however, give us any certainty of 
outcome, not least because of the subjectivism inherent in assessments of both 
competence and ‘best interests’, and the compromise with philosophical 
coherence which both those concepts represent.    
 
Conclusions 
 
All ethical theories have their defects and their excesses. All of them have a 
context in which they operate best. In real life, none of them offer simple 
answers. In our case studies we have seen how different factors seemingly point 
us to different courses of action, even whilst we view the possibilities through 
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the same ethical lens.124 The debate may be over which benefit is to be 
maximised, which obligation fulfilled, which virtue exemplified, which 
relationship enhanced, or which principle applied, but even coherent theories 
offer only guidance and reasoning, rather than solutions. In the end, they all call 
for individual judgment on particular facts.  
 
Medical decision making needs an ethic which can be applied at many levels: by 
the patient themselves, by those who care for her, by the doctors and nurses who 
treat her, and by the committees and judges who have to determine disputes. It 
needs to speak across many and diverse issues, from acute to chronic illness, 
from life to death and all stages in between. It needs to offer guidance where 
there is doubt, justification where there is dispute, and comfort where there is 
loss. To meet such demands, it will need to be sensitive, inclusive and fair. 
 
Consequences must play a part. Without some regard to what happens as a result 
of decisions made, any medical ethic would lack credibility in real life. If people 
are to be expected to support public policies and live with individual choices, 
they need to be able to accept their consequences. But acceptance does not imply 
that the consequence has to be the determining factor in the decision making 
process. Sometimes it is very difficult to know what would be the best outcome: 
prognoses can be uncertain, even speculative, and progress comes at the price of 
some degree of experimentation. The impartiality which a consequence-driven 
ethic demands may be welcomed in the formulation of broad public policy, but 
overlooks important considerations when issues have to be decided at the 
individual level. 
 
Obligations offer the security of minimum expectations. Constraints against 
action protect individuals against majorities, and decision makers against 
institutional pressure. However, universal rules of obligation rest on fine, but 
inchoate, notions like rationality and rights. In the particularities of everyday 
issues, they can often conflict. It is in conflict that we most need guidance, but 
                                                 
124 These contradictions are most clearly illustrated by Annie for deontologists, by Bella for 
utilitarians, and by Cecil for virtue ethicists. 
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the absolution of obligations offers none. A balancing device is required, but 
must be found elsewhere. 
 
Virtue is always admirable. There can be no reasonable argument but that virtue 
is a characteristic to be strived for by our decision-makers. In the hands of 
virtuous power-holders, there is hope; without it, we are at the mercy of personal 
whim and ambition. Yet the acquisition of virtue is a personal responsibility, not 
an enforceable obligation. We can attempt to teach it, but we cannot guarantee or 
measure our success. At best, we can require our professional decision makers to 
subscribe to a virtuous code of conduct, regulated by their professional body. Yet 
even if the decision maker has virtues in abundance, whether she will decide to 
act upon the same virtue as we would wish her to is only a matter of chance or 
accidental hegemony. It may be a brave and noble realism for virtue ethics to 
accept the possibility of dilemma, but accepting that a decision contrary to the 
one I seek is equally “right”, is often a hard concept to swallow. The subjectivity 
of choosing between appropriate but competing virtues makes them a weak basis 
for public policy. Virtue is indispensable as a private ethic, but insufficient for a 
public one. 
 
Care is a feature of life which most of us recognise. We give it and receive it in 
different measures throughout our lives. The relationships we are born to and 
choose for ourselves have a significant impact on all of us, for better and for 
worse. When medical decisions have to be taken, those caring relationships often 
assume unforeseen importance: our illness impacts upon those for whom we 
care, and they have an effect on our prognosis. So there is an attractive realism in 
an ethical approach which recognises the interconnectedness of life, although in 
fact the ethic of care is idealised, because it requires us to extend a caring 
approach even to those who are strangers.  
 
Each of these ethical approaches is self-contained and distinct. In contrast, 
principlism attempts to choose the best parts of each, and hold them together in a 
bundle of guidelines to action. It has been successful and influential, but it is 
vulnerable to the criticism of incoherence, because only parts of theories are 
espoused. Because it is the strongest parts of theories which are adapted into a 
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principle, each principle is a powerful guide. When these principles conflict with 
each other, there is a vigorous collision, with nothing but individual judgment to 
choose between them. Cherry picking has its downsides.    
 
But different ethical approaches are not always in conflict with each other. It is 
possible125 – maybe even desirable126 - that two or more approaches can run in 
tandem, the one operating to check the excesses or fill the gaps of the other. 
Dominance of a single theory entrenches weaknesses, and stifles creativity; 
diversity of approach balances limitations, and fosters ingenuity. Medical 
treatment disputes are always controversial, often complex, and sometimes at the 
cutting edge of scientific progress. Ethical guidance needs to be soundly based, 
but not straitjacketing; maintaining integrity, but open to development. 
 
In the search for an ethical framework by which to evaluate the role of the family 
in medical treatment disputes, it is important to protect an individual at a time of 
vulnerability, but also to treat fairly the family which has created and fostered 
that very individuality. Combining ethical approaches offers us the possibility of 
judgment informed from both perspectives. Thus, we may espouse obligations 
as a minimum standard below which we ought not to fall, ensuring that all 
patients are valued for themselves; and an ethic of care, as the ideal, ensuring 
that sympathetic understanding is brought to bear on the full circumstances of 
their case. What we are looking for is “individual autonomy in the context of 
collectivity.”127    
 
There is of course inherent and inescapable tension between the individual and 
the collective focuses of the obligation and care approaches. They are both 
crucial, but they are not fully compatible. The challenge is not to blend two 
                                                 
125 For example Rita Manning thinks that a patient’s rights model and a care model “can often 
work in tandem and…ought to be so wedded.” : ‘A Care Approach’ in Helga Kuhse and Peter 
Singer (eds), A Companion to Bioethics at p103. 
126 Both Harris (‘In Praise of Unprincipled Ethics’ (2003) J Med Ethics 303) and AV Campbell  
(‘The Virtues & Vices of the Four Principles’ (2003) J Med Ethics 292 at 296) criticize the 
dominance of principlism because of its straitjacketing effect on ethical considerations: “We need 
a diversity of approach in these complex human scenarios, and no theory should be seen as 
dominant.”  
127 Jennifer Nedelsky ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” [1989] 
Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 7 at p19.   
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opposing focus points into a single picture, but to insist on the tension produced 
by holding them both in the mind’s eye at once. A combined ethic is no more or 
less likely to offer easy answers than adoption of a single philosophical 
approach. Rather than despairing the impossibility of reconciliation, we should 
celebrate the reality this brings to our framework. The tension between individual 
and collective focuses mirrors perfectly the tension inherent in families whenever 
medical issues arise. The optimal outcome will be a balance - a compromise - 
between the interests of the individual patient in need of family support, and the 
family collective in support of their individual member.   
 
Applying the combined ethical approaches of obligations and care to the fictional 
case studies demonstrates the balancing that is required. The constraint which 
protects Annie against surgical intervention without physiological needs is 
measured against the benefit to her of maintaining family care. The maxim of 
respecting Bella’s personhood, even when it may be self-destructive, is mitigated 
by a requirement to consider that personhood fully in context. The constraint 
which allows Cecil to refuse treatment is balanced against an obligation on him 
to consider the impact of refusal on others. The combined ethical approach does 
not throw out easy answers, but it lays bare the stakes; and it acknowledges a 
place for judgment.   
 
Selecting a combination of just two ethical approaches for the legal framework in 
which to determine medical treatment disputes does not mean that we reject the 
others. We all hope for virtuous doctors, judges and even families; but regulation 
of their virtue is more practically left to their professional bodies and their 
consciences than imported into decision-making frameworks. Similarly, whilst 
consequences are of course that part of decision-making with which we all have 
to live, if the method and the content of the decision-making process is right and 
fair to all affected, it follows that the outcome should be acceptable to us, even if 
we do not agree with it. Formulating our ethical framework without direct 
reference to virtue and consequence does not mean that either is abandoned.      
 
The role we ascribe to families in the determination of medical treatment 
disputes is a question which affects countless people every day. We all need an 
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approach that values patients, surely, but also the context in which their existence 
is made possible. Nothing less should be expected of those who assume 
responsibility for our health and wellbeing, and ultimately our lives. An ethical 
approach which combines deontological constraint as a minimum standard and 
care as an ideal offers the best prospect of optimal outcome. It is the benchmark 
by which I shall assess the role which the courts allow the family in medical 
decision making, and against which I shall measure my conclusions. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Medical Treatment Disputes: The Legal Jurisdiction 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the historical development of the courts’ common law 
jurisdiction to determine disputes about medical treatment.  
 
Competent adults hold a determinative power to give or withhold consent to 
treatment, but persons lacking capacity to decide for themselves require a 
different legal approach. In respect of children, the ancient parens patriae 
jurisdiction continues alongside modern statutory provision, giving the courts 
wide powers to determine issues according to the child’s best interests. In 
respect of incompetent adults, the incidental death of parens patriae left the 
courts with no equivalent jurisdiction. Perceiving this as a dangerous failure of 
society to protect its most vulnerable members, whilst calling for statutory 
intervention the courts developed a declaratory procedure under inherent 
jurisdiction.  
 
The extent and merits of the declaratory procedure are considered, and the role 
implicitly ascribed to the family identified, with a view to informing assessment 
(in later chapters) of the statutory intervention which ultimately superseded it. 
 
 
 
 
Medicine, like any other social activity in an open and democratic society, is 
subject to the rule of law. It is an axiom of English law that any intentional 
touching of the person without consent amounts to trespass and battery, which is 
answerable in both criminal prosecution and civil suit.  
 
 95 
However, in the ordinary course of life, complete freedom from physical contact 
by others is unattainable. Every time we get on a crowded commuter train we are 
subject to jostles and pokes, but we accept them simply as the unpleasant side-
effects of participating in an over-crowded world. If it were possible to prosecute 
or sue for each jostle and poke, we would all soon drown in litigation. 
Accordingly, exceptions to the general principle of physical inviolability have 
developed, and the reasonable exigencies of everyday life is one of them.1 It can 
be rationalised as derived from implicit consent, inherent in the very act of 
participating in society, but from the first judicial exposition,2 such 
rationalisation has been rejected as artificial.  It is generally accepted, as the case 
of Wilson v. Pringle3 demonstrates, simply that the general rule is subject to an 
exception “embracing all physical contact generally acceptable in the ordinary 
conduct of everyday life.”4  
 
Medical treatment is not part of the ordinary conduct of everyday life.5 Illness is 
regarded as an aberration from the norm, not something that we willingly accept, 
but something of which we would like to be cured. Therefore, insofar as medical 
treatment involves interference with physical integrity – which most of it does – 
if it is to be lawful, prima facie it must be done with consent.6 
 
                                                 
1 Recognised as long ago as the seventeenth century in Tuberville v. Savage (1669) 1 Mod 3 
2 By Goff LJ in Collins v. Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 at 1177, by which time the general 
exception was long-established and widely accepted. When giving this exposition, Goff LJ could 
not have known that it would later feature significantly in the seminal case of Re F [1990] 2 AC 
1, in which he also gave the leading judgment. 
3 [1987] QB 237 
4 Goff LJ in Collins v. Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 at 1177.   
5 Croome-Johnson LJ in Wilson v. Pringle [1987] QB 237 at p252 apparently suggests that even 
‘a casualty surgeon…perform[ing] an urgent operation on an unconscious patient who is brought 
to hospital’ can be seen as a feature of everyday life, and therefore within the exception to the 
general principle. However his comment was obiter and unreasoned. It should not be considered 
a good statement of the law. Lord Donaldson in Re F [1990] AC 1at p16 specifically denies that 
such physical intervention comes within an exception of ‘vicissitudes of everyday life’- which is 
why he is forced to find another basis for decision in the seminal case (see below). 
6 “In the absence of consent all, or almost all, medical treatment and all surgical treatment of an 
adult is unlawful, however beneficial such treatment might be. This is incontestable.”: per Lord 
Donaldson in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1 at p11. (On the other hand, 
consent alone is not sufficient to make surgery lawful. It was established in R v. Brown [1993] 2 
All ER 75 that consent is not a defence to criminal charges of causing actual or grievous bodily 
harm. The cutting involved in surgery would prima facie amount to actual or grievous harm. It is 
generally accepted that reasonable surgery is in a category of exceptions which ‘stand outside 
criminal law’.)  
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Medical expertise is hard won: doctors study for many years, and have to pass 
many exams before they are qualified to treat patients. Patients, on the other 
hand, become ill or disabled merely at the whim of fortune. It is easy to see the 
temptation to fall into an attitude of ‘doctor knows best’. The axiom of law 
operates to block any such approach to treatment. In the medical context, the 
principle of physical integrity and the need for consent to any interference with it 
means that doctors must have the permission of the competent patient before 
they embark upon any medical examination or course of treatment, no matter 
how obviously beneficial it would be to the patient’s physical well-being. The 
patient may refuse her consent, for any reason, wise or foolish, or indeed for no 
reason at all, and however deleterious the consequences to her health.7 The 
doctor is bound by such refusal; and any treatment in disregard of it leaves the 
physician vulnerable to prosecution and civil action.8 
 
The principle behind the requirement for consent to any interference with 
physical integrity is the liberal and laudable one of protecting individual 
freedom. However, where a patient is not capable of giving consent, by reason 
of illness or disability, strict application of the principle could, particularly in the 
medical context, have quite the opposite effect. Infringements of their physical 
integrity which would be beneficial to them, would be denied to them. Yet no 
one would want to see an Alzheimer’s patient deprived of treatment for her leg 
ulcers because she could not give valid consent to the nurse touching her. It 
would offend our civilised sense of a basic duty to protect the most vulnerable 
members of society. In such circumstances, fear of personal liability on the part 
of a treating physician should not be a barrier to care. So, the general principle of 
physical inviolability requires modification where the capacity to consent is 
lacking. 
 
                                                 
7 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] A.C. 871. “The right to 
refuse exists even where there are overwhelming medical reasons in favour of the treatment and 
probably even where if the treatment is not carried out the patient's life will be at risk.”: per Neill 
LJ in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at p29. 
8 The classic expression of this is Cardozo J’s in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital 
105 NE 92 (NY, 1914): “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without the patient’s consent commits an assault.” The leading English authority of the same 
principle is A-G’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715.  
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The law has always recognised two distinct branches of incapacity. Minors are 
deemed to lack capacity unless the contrary is shown, by the unarguable fact of 
their age.9 The assumption is that they will acquire capacity in due course, 
simply by growing up, but until then they are denied capacity by operation of 
law.  In contrast, adults are assumed to be competent unless the contrary is 
shown; and adult incapacity may be permanent or fleeting. Adults may never 
have acquired competence, or they may lose what they once had; they may lose 
it permanently, or it may later be restored. 
 
Having conceived of incompetence in these two distinct branches, development 
of the law modifying the requirement for consent to medical treatment has also 
followed different lines for children and adults:   
 
 
Jurisdiction in respect of children 
 
A new born baby is capable of very little, and certainly not of deciding whether 
or not to allow medical intervention. It is therefore obvious and right that, 
amongst the bundle of parental rights and responsibilities which the law gives to 
parents10 from the moment of birth, is the ability to give a valid consent to 
medical treatment of the child.  
 
(As the child grows and matures, the obviousness and rightness of this becomes 
less clear. By the time a child reaches 16 years old there is statutory recognition 
of her ability to consent,11 and she may have developed capacity at common law 
before then. The interesting legal issue here however is not one of jurisdiction 
but of capacity, which will be considered in chapter four. For the purposes of 
                                                 
9 The legal age of majority is 18, but pursuant to section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, 
the age of legal capacity to give a valid consent to medical treatment is 16. Minors may be 
credited with capacity to consent to treatment before that age IF they satisfy their doctor of 
appropriate understanding: see Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112 and 
chapter 4 below. 
10 For these purpose, unmarried fathers are included only if they jointly registered the birth of a 
child after 1st December 2003, or else hold a parental responsibility agreement or order. 
11 Family Law Act 1969 s8 
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examining jurisdiction, it is apposite to focus on the relatively simple situation of 
a young child, clearly dependent on others in matters of judgment.) 
 
In most everyday situations, if a parent gives consent for their child to receive 
medical treatment, the legal considerations are satisfied, the physician is 
confident of her ability to act, and the treatment is given. Equally if the parents 
refuse to consent, the treatment cannot be given and that is the end of the matter. 
There is no requirement that, in either giving or refusing consent, the parents 
make what would generally be regarded as the correct decision.12 Hence, where 
parents agree that their child should not receive the standard childhood 
inoculations which the medical establishment considers appropriate;13 or where 
parents agree that their son should undergo the surgically intrusive and painful 
procedure of circumcision, without medical justification but for cultural 
reasons,14 their decisions are lawful. 
 
It is only where there happens to be disagreement between the parents and 
someone else involved in the care of the child (most often, but not always, the 
medics themselves) that the right of the parents to decide whether or not to allow 
medical treatment comes under scrutiny. At that point, it is possible to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court to determine the dispute. The only question is, how? 
 
As a matter of ancient legal history the Crown, as father of the nation, had the 
prerogative of caring for those of its subjects who could not look after 
themselves: the doctrine of parens patriae. It was most regularly exercised in the 
context of orphaned young nobles, allowing the monarch to control the handling 
of their valuable estates. In time, this jurisdiction was delegated, first to the 
Court of Chancery and thence to the Family Division, and became exercisable as 
“inherent jurisdiction” (although such a phrase was not in common use until the 
Children Act debate of the 1980s). It is a concept similar to the rules of equity, 
                                                 
12 As long as they are within a range of reasonableness, as the reference to ‘most everyday 
situations’ implies. Parental pursuit of medically inappropriate treatments, or parental failures to 
pursue medical necessities, may both fall foul of criminal law and incur civil law interventions, 
such as applications for care or supervision orders.   
13 See Re C (Child)(Immunisation: Parental Rights) [2003] 2 FLR 1054 and chapter 4 hereafter. 
14 See Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child’s religious upbringing and circumcision) [2000] 1 FLR 
571 at 689 and chapter 4 hereafter. 
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enabling whatever is right to be done, even in the absence of statutory powers; 
and it is in theory unlimited.15 
 
In respect of minors, the inherent jurisdiction was mostly exercised by making 
the child a ward of court. There had been some acknowledgment of a wider 
parens patriae power16 but it was undeveloped because of wardship’s dominant 
flexibility. Wardship is a status; and its unique import is that no important step 
can be taken without the court’s consent for as long as the wardship continues, 
thereby affording a very high degree of protection for the child. Moreover it has 
procedural features which make it very attractive to litigants: the case is handled 
by a senior judge, and the determination is dictated not by any rigid criteria, but 
simply by reference to the child’s best interests. Consequently, the range of 
possible orders is theoretically limitless, and each determination can be as 
individual as the child’s own fingerprints. Such scope and flexibility ensured for 
wardship powerful popularity and support in the legal establishment.  
 
By comparison, the range of statutory jurisdictions historically available in 
respect of children was chaotic, incoherent and widely deplored by those who 
operated and depended on it. Inevitably, legal practitioners therefore bypassed 
the statutory jurisdiction wherever possible, and the wardship procedure became 
overused, particularly by Local Authorities,17 putting great strain on court 
resources. A practical need to rationalise the court’s jurisdiction in relation to 
children built up, and it culminated in the passing of the Children Act 1989. 
 
The Children Act 1989 provides the courts with statutory authority to make a 
range of orders in respect of children, including the power to determine a 
‘specific question which has arisen, or which may arise, in connection with any 
                                                 
15 As Lord Donaldson noted in Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) 
[1992] 4 All ER 627 at 637. (Although in reality the courts accept that the jurisdiction may not 
be used so as to compel a doctor to act contrary to his clinical judgment.) 
16 For example, Re N (Infants) [1967] Ch 512, and Re L (An Infant) [1968] P119 CA. 
17 By 1989 62% of cases involved the Local Authority, compared to just 3% in 1971. 
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aspect of parental responsibility for a child’.18 In resolving such a question, the 
court is to have the child’s welfare as its paramount consideration.19  
 
The Children Act was initially intended to be a comprehensive codification of 
court powers, such as would leave no room for inherent jurisdiction. In their 
early working paper “Wards of Court”,20 No. 101 1987, the Law Commission 
canvassed abolishing the wardship jurisdiction altogether. However in their final 
report, “Guardianship and Custody Guardianship”,21 substantive 
recommendations for reform of wardship were expressly postponed, on the 
grounds that not every contingency may have been foreseen, and its retention 
would cater for exceptional cases which would otherwise slip through the 
statutory net.22  
 
As the debate progressed, in the light of the Law Commission’s stance, and keen 
to limit extra-statutory recourse to courts, Government lawyers drafting the Act 
emphasised anew the almost forgotten fact that wardship was simply a part 
(albeit a large one) of the ancient non-statutory (ie inherent) jurisdiction.23 The 
corollary of this was that a child could be the subject of High Court intervention 
without actually being made a ward of court. Single issue court determinations, 
without wardship’s element of continuing supervisory function, were thereby 
endorsed.  
 
This interpretation of inherent jurisdiction neatly met the government’s twin 
objectives of reducing the court burden, and not offending Law Commission 
recommendations. It suited the courts too, for they have been able to keep their 
                                                 
18 Children Act 1989 s 8(1) 
19 Children Act 1989 s1(1) 
20 1987, no. 101 
21 1988, no. 172 at para 14  
22 It is easy to infer that this cautionary approach was inspired by the experience of abolishing 
parens patriae in respect of adults (see discussion, at pp8-10 below). Re F (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation) 2AC 1 and the cases leading up to it, which revealed significant problems in the 
wake of abolition of parens patriae for adults,  were going through the courts at the same times as 
these consultations were being aired.   
23 “In the government view wardship is only one use of the High Court’s inherent parens patriae 
jurisdiction. We believe, therefore, that it is open to the High Court to make orders under its 
inherent jurisdiction in respect of children other than through wardship.”, Lord Mackay LC, 
Joseph Jackson Memorial Lecture (1989) 139 NLJ 505 at 507 (italics added). And a new phrase 
was born!  
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jurisdiction cake and eat it. With no statutory limitation of access to the inherent 
jurisdiction in private law proceedings, the courts are able to respect the 
underlying notion of wardship as a fallback device,24 and still determine 
appropriate cases simply according to the best interests of the child.  
 
Firmer statutory control was deemed necessary, however, for the Local 
Authorities who had previously most overused non-statutory power. On the 
Government’s own initiative and without widespread consultation,25 section 100 
was inserted into the draft statute, providing that wherever a statutory procedure 
is available, the Local Authority must use it. The Authority may only be granted 
leave to invoke inherent jurisdiction where there is reasonable cause to believe 
that, without it, a child is likely to suffer significant harm.26  
 
Limitation is, however, crucially short of exclusion, and the courts have shown 
themselves willing to capitalize on the distinction wherever necessary. In South 
Glamorgan CC v. W & B27 Douglas Brown J robustly asserted that “in an 
appropriate case, when other remedies of the Children Act have been used and 
exhausted and found not to bring about the desired result, [the court] can resort 
to other remedies…”28 Section 100 may have closed to the door to the Local 
                                                 
24 Per Waite LJ in Re T [1994] Fam 49 at p60: “The court’s undoubted discretion to allow 
wardship proceedings to go forward in a suitable case is subject to their clear duty, in loyalty to 
the scheme and purpose of the Children Act legislation, to permit recourse to wardship only 
when it becomes apparent to the judge in any particular case that the question which the court is 
determining in regard to the minor’s upbringing or property cannot be resolved under the 
statutory procedures in Part II of the Act in a way which secures the best interests of he child; or 
when the minor’s person is in a state of jeopardy from which he can only be protected by giving 
him the status of a ward of court; or where the court’s functions need to be secured from the 
effects, potentially injurious to the child, or external influences (intrusive publicity for example) 
and it is decided that conferring on the child the status of a ward will prove more effective 
deterrent than the ordinary sanctions of contempt of court which already protect all family 
proceedings.” 
25  See Lord Mackay’s Joseph Jackson Memorial Lecture (1989) 139 NLJ 505. 
26 S100(4) 
27 [1993] 1 FLR 574: A fifteen year old girl was beyond parental control and had barricaded 
herself into her bedroom for the last eleven months. Protracted proceedings under the Children 
Act culminated in an interim care order and directions under s38(6) that the child receive 
psychiatric assessment and, if necessary, treatment at an adolescent unit. The court gave the 
Local Authority permission under s100(3) to invoke the inherent jurisdiction if the teenager 
refused the necessary consent. She did refuse, and the Local Authority did invoke the inherent 
jurisdiction, effectively asking for judicial approval of assessment and treatment. The court 
exercised it’s inherent jurisdiction as the LA asked. 
28 At p584. 
 102 
Authority’s access to the inherent jurisdiction, but the courts have shown 
themselves willing to open it.  
 
So, the combined effect of the Children Act and the court’s inherent jurisdiction 
is that when, by chance, others involved in the medical care of a child disagree 
with the parents’ treatment decision, the dispute can be put to a judge.  
 
Once the issue is referred to a court, the judge assumes decisive power. If the 
matter is determined under the statutory jurisdiction, the court must have regard 
to the child’s own wishes and feelings,29 but is under no compulsion to regard 
the parents’ wishes and feelings. The only requirement in respect of the parents 
is to consider how capable each of them is of meeting the child’s perceived 
needs.30 If the matter is determined under the inherent jurisdiction, “the decision 
… lies with the court”;31 and the sole criteria for the deciding is the best interest 
of the child.  
 
Whatever the legal basis for court authority, the court’s assessment is sovereign. 
Judicial assessment is emphatically not a test of parental reasonableness.32 The 
views of the parents simply inform the court’s decision, in the same way as do 
the views of other parties to the case:  
 
“When it comes to an assessment of the demands of the child’s 
welfare, the starting point – and the finishing point too - must always 
be the judge’s own independent assessment of the balance of 
advantage and disadvantage of the particular medical step under 
consideration.”33  
 
So, when capacity is lacking due to simple minority, the general principle of 
physical inviolability is modified in two distinct ways. Prima facie, the power to 
                                                 
29 Considered in the light of his age and understanding: Children Act 1989 s1(3)(a). 
30 Chi1dren Act 1989 s(3)(f). 
31 Per Templeman LJ in Re B (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
32 Parents can be caring and reasonable but still ‘wrong’: see Re B [1981]1 WLR 1421 and 
chapter 4. 
33 Per Waite LJ in Re T (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 All ER 906 at 254. 
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consent is simply shifted wholesale to parents. However, if others disagree with 
the parental position, Parliament and the courts have modified the principle 
instead to allow judges to determine what is in the minor’s best interest, and then 
grant or withhold authority to medical treatment accordingly. As soon as court 
jurisdiction is invoked, the family role is reduced to merely providing 
information – and living with the consequences of the judicial decision.  
 
The twin modifications of the general principle of physical integrity in respect of 
children echo both the practicality of the approach to ‘everyday exigencies’ and 
the historical origins of the inherent jurisdiction, reflecting at once both 
questionable complacency and excessive suspicion. For the most part, parents 
will be left free to pursue the life pattern they choose for their children. 
However, if a third party objects sufficiently to take the matter to court, parental 
authority is not simply questioned, but totally removed. As soon as court 
jurisdiction is invoked, state authorities assume a right of determination, just as if 
the minors in question today are as bereft of parental influence as were the 
minors when parens patriae was first delegated. 
 
Jurisdiction in respect of Adults 
 
Historically, the parens patriae jurisdiction in respect of adults followed a 
different course. Following the Restoration, the Crown’s power in relation to 
“lunatics” was assigned by letters patent under the Great Seal, and latterly by 
warrant under the Sign Manual, to specific individuals rather than to a court. 
Initially the Lord Chancellor held the power; then from 1851, the Lord 
Chancellor and the Lords Justices of Appeal; and finally by warrant dated 10th 
April 1956 the Lord Chancellor and the judges for the time being of the 
Chancery Division (who also exercised statutory jurisdiction under the Lunacy 
Acts of 1852-1890).   
 
However, when the statutory provisions were updated, the combined effect of s1 
of the Mental Health Act 1959 and a Warrant of Revocation under the Sign 
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Manual (dated 1st November 1960) was to revoke the 1956 warrant,34 and 
thereby end the  parens patriae jurisdiction in respect of adults. A reading of the 
Warrant of Revocation makes plain “that such jurisdiction as the High Court 
previously had was extinguished…”.35 
 
Why should such a useful jurisdiction, exercised for the benefit of those who are 
most vulnerable, be removed? Much later, Lord Goff was driven to say that he 
had “never heard a rational, or indeed any, explanation for this step.”36 It seems 
likely that it was simply a matter of procedural zealotry in the passing of the new 
legislation, as the intention behind the Mental Health Act 1959 was codification 
of the law.37 After declaring the extinction of the previous High Court 
jurisdiction, the Warrant of Revocation continues: “…it being envisaged that the 
situation would thereafter be governed by the Mental Health Act 1959”.38  
 
The new Act created statutory guardianship, which gave a Guardian the same 
powers as a father would have in respect of a child under the age of 1439 - and 
therefore provided for consent to medical treatment. So for a while, there was no 
difficulty: cases were simply resolved by the appointment of a statutory 
guardian.  
 
However, during the late 1970s and early 1980s it became government policy to 
reduce the role of the state in the lives of the mentally incapacitated, and the 
mental health legislation was reformed to reflect that policy. In particular, the 
scope of guardianship was drastically reduced by the Mental Health 
                                                 
34 With effect from 1st November 1960, when the new act came into force. 
35 Per Scott-Baker J in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) at first instance (unreported, but 
transcribed. A copy of the transcription is held in the judicial papers collection of Lincoln’s Inn 
library). 
36  Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 at p875. 
37 “The care and commitment of the custody of the persons and estate of mentally disordered 
persons, which belong to the Crown at common law from very early times, and was invariably 
delegated to the Lord Chancellor by warrant under the sign manual, is now entirely governed by 
statute.” (italics added), Halsbury’s Laws of England vol.8 p588, as quoted by Lord Hailsham in 
Re B (A Minor)(Wardship:Sterilisation) [1987] 2 WLR 1213. 
38 Continuing the quotation from Scott-Baker J in footnote 35 above. 
39 S34(1) Mental Health Act 1959 and reg 6(2) Mental Health (Hospital and Guardianship) 
Regulations 1960 
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(Amendments) Act 1982, the relevant provisions of which were subsequently 
carried over into the Mental Health Act 1983. 
 
One result of these amendments was that a much narrower group of mentally 
incapacitated people fell within the criteria of guardianship, because the mental 
impairment now had to be associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously 
irresponsible conduct. And in addition, the powers of the Guardian were 
curtailed: the Guardian could now only require the patient to live at a specified 
place, or to attend specified places for treatment, and ensure that a doctor, social 
worker or other specified person could see the patient at home. Crucially, this 
curtailment excluded the power to give consent to medical treatment.  
 
So there arose a gap in the law.40 Nobody had the power to give consent to the 
medical treatment of patients unable to decide the matter for themselves. Not 
unreasonably, doctors became very concerned for their own position. Should 
anybody choose to challenge their treatment of a mentally incapacitated patient, 
criminal prosecution or civil suit was a very real possibility. Where the proposed 
treatment was in any way controversial, such as abortion or sterilisation, doctors 
became unwilling to operate without the prior protection of the court.  
 
The difficulty for the court was how to provide that protection, and thereby 
enable the patient to be treated. In this context, another of the modifications to 
the general principle of inviolability requires consideration. 
 
The defence of ‘necessity’: Leading reference books on the law of Torts41 relate 
that there is a recognised defence to accusations of touching without consent, 
namely ‘necessity’. The test of the defence is said to be that the act in question is 
“reasonably necessary to prevent harm”,42 which is generally understood to 
                                                 
40 In May 1989, “the startling fact” was “that there is no English authority on the question 
whether as a matter of common law (and if so in what circumstances) medical treatment can 
lawfully be given to a person who is disabled by mental incapacity from consenting to it.” Per 
Lord Goff in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.  
41 For example, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts in chapters 3 (particularly 3-114 and following) and 
15. Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law asserts unequivocally at p458 that “it is well-established 
that necessity may be a defence in the context of an emergency that compels a rescuer to act”.  
42 Clerk & Lindesll on Torts at 3-116.  
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mean that actions covered by this exception are limited to those which are 
necessary to meet the emergency.43 
 
The principle behind the defence of necessity remains “somewhat vague.”44 
Certainly there is judicial authority which justifies trespass to property by the 
necessity of saving life;45 but it is less clear that preventing harm – even 
preventing death – justifies violating the physical integrity of persons. On the 
contrary, it is certain that such necessity cannot override either a competent 
person’s refusal to consent to violation of their physical integrity,46 or the 
competent prior refusal of a now incompetent person.47  
 
Notwithstanding the vagueness of the defence, ‘necessity’ of some sort has 
become central to the justification of violations of physical integrity of persons 
for whom giving consent is impossible because of incapacity.  
 
The First Attempt to Find a Jurisdiction: There were three cases which tackled 
the problem of medical reluctance to treat incompetent adult patients at first 
instance before it reached the authoritative consideration of the appeal courts. Re 
T was decided by Latey J on 14th May 1987. The decision was not reported or 
transcribed, and the tapes have now been destroyed, so analysis of the decision is 
not possible. Quickly afterwards, the decision of Reeve J in the case of Re X48 
was briefly reported in the Times newspaper on 4th June 1987. And then the case 
of T v. T49 was decided by Wood J. On each occasion the court made a 
declaration under Order 15, Rule 16 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, that the 
proposed treatment would be in the patient’s best interests and therefore not 
unlawful. 
  
                                                 
43 As repeated by Neill LJ in Re F. [1990] AC 1 at p30. 
44 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts at 3-114. For instance, there is no citation of any clear authority 
before Re F in which ‘necessity’ formed the ratio decidendi. 
45 Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Company [1954] 2 QB 182, Devlin J. 
46 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [2002] 2 FCR 1. See chapter 4. 
47 Mental Capacity Act 2005 ss24-26.  See chapter 6. 
48 X was an adult with Down’s Syndrome, who became pregnant. The medical intervention in 
question was abortion. The application to court was brought by X’s carer. 
49 [1988] Fam 52. T was a severely mentally handicapped woman of 19, found to be pregnant. 
Her mother sought declarations in respect of abortion and sterilisation. 
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The problem with this approach is that Order 15 Rule 16 is a rule of procedure, 
not a source of jurisdiction. It simply provides that: 
 
“No action or other proceedings shall be open to objection on the 
ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought 
thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of right 
whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed.” 
 
This rule allows courts to entertain proceedings for a declaration of rights 
without an associated claim for rectification or damages; it does not itself create 
any rights. 
   
The judges in Re T, Re X and T v. T therefore had to find a legal basis – “any 
basis”50 - on which to rest the procedure. Wood J considered three. He rejected 
the notion of implied consent as “wholly unrealistic”51 to a situation where a 
patient has never had capacity. He found “necessity” too imprecise a test of what 
a court would consider justification for the operative procedures in question. He 
asked instead what medical practice demanded, expressly limiting himself to 
non-contentious situations.52  
 
The answer Wood J found to his question was that a decision should be reached 
in the best interests of the patient. Examining the scope of, and exceptions to, the 
tort of trespass, he felt constrained by authority to conclude that such treatment 
would be “hostile” as the word applied to the tort of trespass, but able to say it 
would be justified. In effect, he invented a new exception to the principle of 
inviolability, based upon best medical practice in the exceptional circumstances 
where there is no provision in law for consent to be given. 
 
These three cases are examples of courts “making it up as they go along” in 
order to meet a very real need. Filling-in gaps is a long tradition of the common 
                                                 
50 As Wood J described it at p62. The search was desperate!  
51 p67 
52 At p63, “I use the word ‘demand’ because I envisage a situation where based upon good 
medical practice there are really no two views of what course is for the best.’ 
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law,53 but everybody concerned must have realised that the validity of the 
declarations was highly questionable. If they did, it did not matter only because 
the declarations served their purpose: they had a court seal, however novel the 
jurisprudence, and that gave the physicians sufficient confidence to carry out the 
procedures in question. Nobody challenged it because everybody (or at least 
everybody who was capable of forming a judgment) wanted the same thing.    
 
 The Seminal Case: The next case was different, because it did not quite fall 
within Wood J’s non-contentious view of medical demand. The case was Re F 
(Mental Patient: Sterilisation):54 
 
A 36 year old mentally handicapped woman formed a sexual 
relationship with a fellow resident at her mental hospital. An 
application was made to the court55 for a declaration that it would be 
lawful for F to be sterilised notwithstanding that she was incapable 
of consenting to the operation. There was general medical agreement 
that a pregnancy would have catastrophic consequences on F’s 
psychiatric wellbeing, and that less draconian forms of contraception 
were impracticable. However, the Official Solicitor appeared as 
amicus curiae, and he relied on the evidence of an independent 
medical expert, one Dr. Campbell, who preferred to protect F from 
the risks of pregnancy by terminating sexual contact rather than 
imposing surgery. 
 
Scott Baker J found as a fact that terminating all sexual contact in the future 
would require serious restrictions of F’s freedom, with extremely detrimental 
                                                 
53 Per Lord Scarman in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 
A.C. 871 at p884: “This remains the approach of the judges to new or as yet unconsidered 
situations. Unless statute has intervened to restrict the range of judge-made law, the common law 
enables the judges, when faced with a situation where a right recognised by law is not adequately 
protected, either to extend existing principles to cover the situation or to apply an existing 
remedy to redress the injustice. There is here no novelty: but merely the application of the 
principle ubi jus ibi remedium.” 
54 [1990] 2 AC 1 
55 The proceedings were issued in the name of F, rather than her mother, because F was eligible 
for Legal Aid and her mother was not (see Lord Donaldson at p8). This affected the procedure, 
but not the substantive decision, of the proceedings. 
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effect.  His conclusions as to the law then followed the reasoning of Wood J in T 
v. T, to which he had been referred. He declared pursuant to Order 15 Rule 16 
that sterilisation was in F’s best interests, and therefore a medical adviser acting 
in good faith would be justified in law in performing the operation. 
 
The Official Solicitor did not agree.56 It is his job to safeguard the interest of 
those who are incapable by reason of mental disorder of managing their own 
affairs; and he sought leave to intervene and to appeal. His argument, as framed 
by James Munby QC,57 was that the declaratory powers of RSC Ord 15 r16 
permitted only declarations of rights or interests recognised in law; and that what 
had in fact been declared was merely an absence of right (to sue) in the event of 
future act by the health authority (performing an operation without consent), 
involving the court in the forbidden territory of advisory opinion.  
 
Before the Court of Appeal, lawyers for all parties agreed that parens patriae 
jurisdiction was no longer available to solve the problem. The Court of Appeal 
was therefore deprived of the opportunity to consider the point directly.58 The 
House of Lords refused to be so deprived and positively requested that the 
Official Solicitor advance such arguments as could be advanced that the 
jurisdiction had not been abolished.59 James Munby QC rose to the challenge 
“with great ability”, but nonetheless their Lordships “came reluctantly to the 
conclusion”60 that “the concessions made below...were rightly made.”61 Their 
Lordships had tried hard to retain parens patriae, but had to admit defeat. 
 
                                                 
56 His disagreement was what distinguishes Re F from the three cases which went before it, and 
what explains why Re F went on to higher judicial consideration. It was based on the expert 
report of Dr. Campbell. 
57 Who did not appear below. At first instance, the Official Solicitor had been represented by 
junior Counsel, Alan Levy, who continued in his role as amicus curiae. The complexities of the 
parties and representation in this case were an incidental reflection of the fact that the initial 
application had been brought by F herself, for reasons of legal funding (see footnote 55). 
58 Neill LJ however offered a preliminary view that “the power remains though it is dormant and 
incapable at present of being exercised. It seems to me that it would require clear statutory words 
to remove from the Crown a prerogative power which has vested in the Crown since at least 
1325.” [1990] 2 AC p26 
59 As was later recounted by Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 at 
862. 
60 Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 at 862 
61 Per Lord Goff, at p 71; Lord Brandon at p58; and Lords Bridge, Griffiths and Jauncey in their 
agreement with their conclusions.  
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The loss of the jurisdiction caused “dismay”.62 The instinctive reaction of the 
Court of Appeal was to search for another way of achieving the same ends:63 
 
Lord Donaldson makes clear in the opening paragraphs of his 
judgment that he sees the practical issues around treatment of 
children and incompetent adults as analogous,64 a clear hint of the 
interpretation of law to come. He qualifies the requirement for 
consent, both by context and by exceptions. The context is co-
existence with a baldly stated, unreasoned ‘right to skilled 
treatment’;65 the exceptions are ‘emergency medical treatment’ and 
‘vicissitudes of everyday life’. 
 
Of the two exceptions, the former is the defence of necessity,66 and 
the latter is expressly said to exclude medical treatment,67 but Lord 
Donaldson finds a  common thread between them in a “general 
rubric of ‘generally acceptable standards’.”68 Since even Mr. Munby 
accepted that some forms of treatment of incapacitated adults were 
generally acceptable, the law in relation to the treatment in issue, 
namely sterilisation, must depend on the same principle as renders 
                                                 
62 Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 at 862 
63 As is hinted by Lord Goff at p863, when considering their objections to the declaratory 
procedure. Lord Donaldson rationalised it as common law filling the gaps, echoing Lord 
Scarman in Sidaway (see footnote 53): “This process of using the common law to fill gaps is one 
of the most important duties of judges…It is an essentially judicial process...” per Lord 
Donaldson at p13. 
64 At p6-7 “This is the tale of 2 women, F and B. Their circumstances are strikingly similar with 
one exception. F is aged 36 and B was aged 17.” And at p11: “Put more graphically, but wholly 
accurately, Re F is Re B four weeks later, when B would have had a chronological age of 18.” 
For consideration of Re B, see chapter 4.   
65 p13 
66 At page 13: “It is well settled that a doctor who is faced with an unconscious patient…is 
lawfully entitled to carry out such treatment as is necessary to safeguard the life and health of 
that patient, notwithstanding that the patient is in no position to consent or to refuse consent.” 
(italics added) Lord Donaldson continues with a concession that “the juridical basis of this 
exception does not appear to have been considered by the English courts until the judgment of 
Robert Goff in… Collins v. Wilcock”. 
67 At p 16: “I have some difficulty in accepting that…emergency medical treatment of an 
unconscious patient [was] subsumed under the one umbrella of actions ‘acceptable in the 
ordinary conduct of everyday life.’” Non-emergency treatment would be even harder to see so 
subsumed. 
68 p17. “That is not to say that they are lawful because they accord with generally acceptable 
conduct – only that for this reason it is not surprising that the common law regards them as 
lawful…” 
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that more minor treatment lawful. Acknowledging – but rejecting – 
the possibility that the general acceptance of less serious treatment 
without consent could be “a case of communis error facit jus on the 
grandest possible scale,”69 he notes that “it would not be surprising if 
the common law rule were subject to a further qualification in 
relation to those who by reason of disability are unable to consent.” 
And he then proceeds as if the unsurprising qualification did indeed 
exist. 
 
Lord Donaldson then found the criteria by which “doctors and others 
who have a caring responsibility”70 should apply this exception by 
analogy with the guardianship of minors jurisdiction, namely acting 
in the patient’s best interests71 - as the opening paragraphs of his 
judgment had foretold. The only thing distinguishing sterilisation 
from less invasive treatments is the difficulty involved in discharging 
the duty. Sterilisation (together with abortion and living organ 
donation), he said, is in a special category which requires court 
approval in advance. 
 
Neill LJ looked at circumstances where the defence of consent had 
clearly failed in law – where two men had inflicted injuries on each 
other in the course of a fight to which they both agreed72 - and 
concluded that consent gave way to public policy. Public policy, he 
said, was also the justification for the “well recognised” (but again 
uncredited) exception of medical emergency; and the determination 
of what else may offend public policy was a matter for the courts.73  
 
                                                 
69 At p17 
70 At p18. 
71 At p17: “I see nothing incongruous in doctors and others who have a caring responsibility 
being required to act in relation to an adult who is incompetent to exercise a right of choice in 
exactly the same way as would the court or reasonable parents in relation to a child… and I am 
satisfied that that is what the law does require.”   
72 AG Ref (No6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715 
73 p29 
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He found no distinction between sterilisation and any other operation 
of major impact, such as removal of non malignant tumour or hip 
replacement.74 He considered that if any such operation was 
“necessary”, public interest would justify what otherwise would be a 
trespass. Crucially, he defined ‘necessary’ as meaning “that which 
the general body of medical opinion in the particular speciality 
would consider to be in the best interests of the patient in order to 
maintain the health and secure the wellbeing of the patient.”75 
 
Neill LJ envisaged that in the vast majority of cases, those who cared 
for the incapacitated person would be able to reach a clear 
conclusion as to whether proposed treatment was ‘necessary’, but 
sterilisation and organ donation fell into a category for which 
“outside scrutiny”76 by the courts was essential.  
 
Butler-Sloss LJ on the other hand found no principle, but only a 
pragmatic approach in the common law. In like manner she found 
her answer in the realm of public interest, namely that those suffering 
disability should not be further disadvantaged by being denied 
treatment.77 She considered that sterilisation was in a special, but not 
unique, category of treatment, which should require court approval. 
   
As to procedure, the Court of Appeal was unanimous that a mere declaration of 
lawfulness was inappropriate. A declaration changes nothing – it merely states 
that, had a course of action been taken, it would or would not have been lawful. 
It has no independent authority. There being no existing procedure for obtaining 
court approval, Lord Donaldson called upon the Lord Chancellor and the 
                                                 
74 p31 
75 p32 
76 At p33. 
77 At p38: “It must be matter of public interest that the same standard of physical and 
psychological care should be provided to those under a disability as to the general public. I 
cannot believe that a doctor is to be precluded from exercising his normal duty of care towards 
such patients, nor do I believe that the equivalent right of the patient to be offered treatment is to 
be denied to those under a disability.”  
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Supreme Court Rule Committee urgently to create a new one.78 In the meantime 
he used the court’s inherent jurisdiction to regulate its own proceedings to give 
directions as to how to conduct approval proceedings,79 and the other two judges 
adopted his proposals.  
 
This was all highly creative legal thinking, but it was essentially obiter. In fact, 
the Court of Appeal unanimously80 dismissed the Official Solicitor’s appeal as 
Scott Baker J had followed the procedure thought to be appropriate at the time, 
had investigated the matter fully, and had reached a decision, the wisdom of 
which no one sought to challenge.81  Nonetheless, the woeful state of the law had 
been exposed, and appeal to the House of Lords was inevitable. 
 
The role of the highest court in the land is to clarify the law.  Whether the House 
of Lords achieved that in Re F is a moot point. The two leading speeches reached 
the same conclusion, but they did so by different paths of law: 
 
Lord Goff led the legal analysis. His recognition of the need of 
incapacitated patients to receive treatment, led him to consider the 
legal justification of necessity.82 Looking at the assistance cases, he 
concluded that emergency is simply a frequent origin of necessity, 
not a criterion or pre-requisite.83 The basic requirements of the legal 
exception are simply a need to act when it is not possible to 
communicate with the assisted person, and that action taken must be 
such as a reasonable person would take acting in the best interests of 
the assisted person.84 Consequently, where incapacity is enduring, 
                                                 
78 Under the authority of RSC Ord 80: p21 
79 p21 
80 Per Lord Donaldson at p21. Neill J expressly approved the conclusion as to best interests, at p 
34. Butler-Sloss J endorsed the declaration, at p43. 
81 By the time the case reached the Court of Appeal, Dr. Campbell was prepared to accept Scott-
Baker J’s findings that preventing all sexual contact would necessitate such restriction of F’s 
freedom as to be detrimental to her mental health. 
82 p74, and p77 
83 p75 
84 p76 
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necessary treatment may transcend emergency procedure and extend 
even to humdrum matters of simple care.85  
 
Lord Brandon agreed that the common law would be defective86 if 
it did not provide an answer to the need for medical care of persons 
incapable of consenting, but did not find it wanting. With no detailed 
analysis, he simply asserted that treatment of incompetent patients 
will be lawful provided that it is in their best interests, which he 
defined as “carried out in order either to save their lives, or to ensure 
improvement or prevent deterioration in their physical or mental 
health.”87 Public interest is the broad proposition, but necessity88 is 
the justifying principle. He acknowledges that the application of this 
principle means that the lawfulness of treatment is independent of 
any involvement of the court.89  
 
The others all agreed.  
 
Lord Bridge noted the “paucity of clearly defined principles” in this 
area, but considered it “axiomatic that treatment which is necessary 
to preserve life, health or well-being of the patient may lawfully be 
given without consent.” A rigid criterion of necessity in this context 
would deprive the incapacitated of treatment which would be entirely 
beneficial.90  
 
Lord Griffiths considered the conclusion justified by an inextricable 
interrelation of necessity and public interest.91  
                                                 
85 p76. This view seems to foretell the approach later taken in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 – 
see chapter 6  
86 p55 
87 p55 
88 “Otherwise [incapacitated patients] would be deprived of medical care which they need and to 
which they are entitled.”: p55 
89 p56 
90 pp51, 52 
91 At p69: “Why is it necessary that the mentally incompetent should be given treatment to which 
they lack capacity to consent? The answer must surely be because it is in the public interest that 
it should be so.”  
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Lord Jauncey added nothing substantive. 
 
So, the House of Lords circumvented the basic legal need for consent where 
consent was not possible on the basis of an exception of ‘necessity’ – but whose 
necessity was the exception meeting? Their Lordships’ vision of the range of 
treatment authorised by ‘necessity’ was very broad: ‘best interests’ incorporate 
simple “care”, “improvement of...health”, and “preserv[ation of ]… well being”. 
Such treatments are not necessary in the sense of life-preserving; they are merely 
desirable in a civilised world. Yet doctors were showing themselves reluctant to 
behave in the way desired for fear of legal repercussions. The ‘necessity’ was to 
provide a legal basis to allow doctors to behave again as we would want. In 
truth, the ‘necessity’ at the heart of Re F is not the patient’s, but the law’s.      
 
The House of Lords construction of a basis for lawful treatment of patients 
unable to give consent turned out to operate independently of court approval.92 
The assessment of where the best interests of any given patient lay was to be 
determined by those responsible for the treatment.93 This rather begged the 
question of why the court should be involved at all. What exactly is the court’s 
jurisdiction?  
 
The key to the court’s approach lies in the facts of Re F. The treatment in 
question was sterilisation. Both the higher courts were acutely aware that non-
therapeutic sterilisation of the mentally impaired is a procedure with emotive 
implications and vulnerable to misuse,94 and the judges all saw the desirability of 
some restraining check on physicians.  All three judges of the Court of Appeal 
                                                 
92 Per Lord Brandon at p 56: “It will…be the duty of the doctors concerned to use their best 
endeavours to do….that which is in the best interests of such patients. …The application of the 
principle which I have described means that the lawfulness of a doctor operating on, or giving 
other treatment to, an adult patient disabled from giving consent, will depend not on any 
approval or sanction of a court, but on the question whether the operation or other treatment is in 
the best interests of the patient concerned. ”  
93 And so the role to be played by the patient’s family would be determined, not by law, but by 
medical ethics. 
94 In Lord Bridge’s view, at p53, special considerations apply to sterilisation or organ donation, 
only because such treatment “cannot be considered either curative or prophylactic”. For further 
discussion, see chapter 4 hereafter. 
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and Lord Griffiths95 considered that a common law rule requiring approval of the 
court should be developed. For the majority in the House of Lords this was a step 
too far, but, echoing Wood J’s resort to medical ethics, they determined that 
reference to court for independent scrutiny was at least a matter of good practice. 
 
With a need for court involvement perceived, the problem of finding a legal 
foundation from which it could be exercised remained. Lords Brandon and 
Goff frankly observed that the Court of Appeal’s proposal of a new rule under 
Order 80 would lack any jurisdictional basis, because lawfulness of treatment is 
independent of judicial approval. Rules can only prescribe the procedure for a 
jurisdiction which already exists. They cannot confer jurisdiction.96 The 
creativity of the Court of Appeal would be ultra vires. Declarations were the only 
option left, and the House of Lords adopted them almost in a spirit of 
desperation.97 Lord Brandon took the lead. He asserted that there is a 
jurisdiction to make declarations. It does not come from RSC either Ord 15 r 16 
or Ord 80, which are just procedural rules. Rather it is part of the inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court. 
 
Yet three judges of the Court of Appeal had dismissed declarations as 
insufficient. Their objections had to be answered:98 
 
(a) The fear that a declaration changes nothing, is effectively toothless, 
was dismissed as irrelevant. Because lawfulness is independent of 
court approval, it is not a change that is required. It is rather an order 
which establishes by judicial process (the “third opinion” which Lord 
Donaldson sought) whether or not treatment is in the patient’s best 
interests – exactly the purpose of a declaration.99  
                                                 
95 By analogy with the limited effect of consent in the fighting and sexual perversion cases, he 
considered (like the Court of Appeal) that a common law rule could be developed to that effect 
96 Lord Brandon p63; Lord Goff p81 
97 As Lord Goff later described it, “dismayed by the possibility that the courts might be 
powerless to provide the necessary guidance to the medical profession, this House had recourse 
to declaratory relief for that purpose.” (Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 at 862)  
98 p64 
99 p64 
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(b) Although all three judges of the Court of Appeal considered that the 
public interest dictated a requirement that court should give express 
approval, which a declaration does not,100 Lord Brandon dismissed 
this as semantic. The nature of the enquiry and of the reasoned 
decision, he said, would be the same.  
(c) Where Neill J101 was concerned that an application may be 
unopposed, and it is not normal practice to grant declarations by 
consent, the House of Lords relied on the judge to fill the void. There 
would always be a summons for directions, when the judge could 
ensure that all necessary evidence was adduced.102  
(d) The concern of Butler-Sloss LJ that a declaration would be of limited 
efficacy in subsequent litigation103 was over-anxious: binding only 
the parties to the action, as a declaration does, would be sufficient 
protection. 
More telling is Lord Goff’s analysis: 
 
“In truth, the objection of the members of the Court of Appeal to the 
declaratory remedy was that it was not so appropriate as the exercise 
by the court of the parens patriae jurisdiction, had that still been 
available, by which the court would have considered whether or not 
to grant approval to the proposed treatment…..If, however, it became 
the invariable practice of the medical profession not to sterilise an 
adult woman who is incapacitated from giving her consent unless a 
declaration that the proposed course of action is lawful is first sought 
from the court, I can see little, if any, practical difference between 
seeking the court’s approval under the parens patriae jurisdiction and 
seeking a declaration as to the lawfulness of the operation.”104 
 
                                                 
100 Donaldson p20, Neill p33, Butler-Sloss p42 
101 p33D-E 
102 p64 
103 p42 
104 p83 
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In respect of Re F then, the technical solution of the House of Lords was to adapt 
Lord Donaldson’s proposed directions to reflect the inherent jurisdiction origins 
of the declaratory procedure, and dismiss the appeal. More widely, the decision 
amounted to the invention of a means of court supervision of medical treatment 
of incapacitated patients. The requirement for court supervision is not one of 
law, but one of practical reality.  
 
The courts wanted to protect vulnerable patients, from both non-treatment and 
inappropriate treatment. The medical profession wanted to be protected from 
hostile legal proceedings. The former was made possible by the latter. A 
jurisdictional lacuna was overcome by benign collusion between the legal and 
medical professions: in return for doctors accepting “good practice” 
requirements which submitted their professional decisions to outside scrutiny, 
the courts would extend them the protection of its sanction, and simultaneously 
secure the opportunity to protect patients.  
 
So, at least in its origins, the motivation behind court intervention in medical 
disputes is one of protection, of patients and doctors – arguably a virtue. The 
legal reasoning, typical of the common law jurisdiction, is close to casuistry. The 
formulation of the principle of best interests is consequentialist, from the narrow 
viewpoint of the patient. The principle is then elevated to a deontological status. 
Where does all this leave the family – for most patients, those who know her best 
and care for her, and whose own lives will be affected by the need for treatment? 
Is there any space for an ethic of care? 
 
The common law jurisdiction was built on the duty of the medical profession; 
that duty is focused on the patient and her best interests. Inevitably, therefore, 
from its conception, the court jurisdiction was also focused on the patient, and a 
narrow, individualistic conception of the patient at that. The interests of the 
family are mentioned by one judge, but only in context of good medical practice. 
As Lord Goff puts it, “no doubt, in practice, a decision may involve others 
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beside the doctor. It must surely be good practice to consult relatives and others 
who are concerned with the care of the patient.”105   
 
If Lord Goff’s comments contain a kernel of recognition that a patient does not 
live in isolation, he sees the desirability of consulting them in terms of ethics, not 
law; and even there he is keen to stress the limited impact of any such 
consultation on the final decision.106 Lord Jauncey seems to have been thinking 
of the medics themselves when he baldy states in his closing remarks that 
“convenience to those charged with his care should never be a justification for 
the decision to treat,”107 but in the pejorative tone of this unconsidered remark he 
sets the court’s face against an issue of very practical concern to the supportive 
family of the patient. At the beginning of court consideration of cases of this 
type, the prospects of a role for the family in the decision-making process look 
very gloomy.      
 
However, judge-made law is not trapped in single expression, as is legislation. 
The common law changes with the times. Since Re F the jurisdiction has been 
tested, extended and developed in numerous ways.  How has the family fared in 
this progression? 
 
Development of the Jurisdiction after Re F  
 
Exclusive determination: The judicial prerogative of determining a patient’s best 
interests is reinforced by the singular accolade of ‘best’. It was firmly established 
in the case of Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation)108 that, although there may be 
any number of quite good options, in law there is only one ‘best’. The effect of 
this is to reduce still further the scope of the family to influence the treatment 
decision, as the case demonstrated: 
                                                 
105 p78, but this is a matter of medical ethics, rather than law. (See also footnote 93)  
106 At p78: “It is very difficult, and would be unwise, for a court to do more than stress that, for 
those involved in these important and sometimes difficult decisions, the overriding consideration 
is that they should act in the best interests of the person who suffers from the misfortune of being 
prevented by incapacity from deciding for himself what should be done to his own body, in his 
own best interests.”  
107 p83 
108 [2001] Fam 15 
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S was a 29 year old woman with severe learning difficulties and 
unwise, for a court to do more than stress that, for those involved in 
these important and sometimes difficult decisions, the overriding 
consideration is that they should act in the best interests of the person 
who suffers from the misfortune of being prevented by incapacity 
from deciding for himself what should be done to his own body, in 
his own best interests.” a fear of hospitals, who was very distressed 
by menstrual bleeding. Her mother applied for a declaration that 
sterilisation or hysterectomy would be lawful in the absence of 
consent, and the family gave graphic evidence of the difficulties of 
coping with S’s menstruation.  The medical evidence was in favour 
of a contraceptive coil, which would only ease menstrual flow and 
required surgery every 5 years. Ward J concluded that the coil would 
be lawful, but also made the declarations sought, and left the 
decision of which treatment to adopt for discussion between the 
mother and the doctors.  
 
S’s family was supportive and caring, trying to cope with the difficult 
practicalities of S’s condition. The treatment option they preferred met S’s 
needs, but it also took account of the context of her care, and addressed the needs 
of the wider family. However, it was not the option preferred by the medics – 
who did not have to live with the practical consequences.   Ward J appears to 
have been motivated by a desire to give the family’s concern’s maximum sway 
in the face of medical advice which went against their preferred treatment 
option.109 
 
The Court of Appeal firmly rejected his tactic: “judicial decision ought to 
provide the best answer not a range of alternative answers.”110 The judgment of 
Butler-Sloss P reveals the court’s true view of the respective interests of family 
                                                 
109 “The judge appears to have accepted the evidence of the family and friends on these issues in 
preference to the expert evidence to the contrary in circumstances in which the significance he 
attached to that family evidence was disproportionate.” Per Butler-Sloss P at p25 
110 p27 per Butler-Sloss P 
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and medics, and the balance of power between them. It could not have been 
made clearer that, even if the family is taking a reasonable view, the ultimate 
decision is the judge’s, and that decision is more influenced by medics than 
family. 
 
As a matter of law, the approach of Butler-Sloss P may be clear, but as a matter 
of philosophy and logic it is deeply flawed. As Holm and Edgar point out,111 the 
decision-making process which it assumes is most closely aligned to the von 
Neumann-Morganstern conception of rational choice, whereby rational decision-
makers make the decision that maximises their expected utility; but there is 
nothing in this model which guarantees a unique best choice. There may be 
several actions that have the same expected utility; or the outcome that is valued 
most highly may not be linked to the action that leads to maximising expected 
utility; or the choice that maximises utility may carry also the risk of greatest 
loss. Neither is it compatible with consequentialism as an ethical approach, 
because ‘utility’ and ‘best’ have changed meaning. In a consequentialist 
reckoning, the value given to outcomes is not the value to the decision-maker (ie 
the patient), but the value to all entities affected by the decision. A truly 
consequentialist assessment of outcome would consider the impact of the 
decision on the patient’s family as highly material. It would weigh their interests 
in the balance, not dismiss them as irrelevant. 
 
Holm and Edgar find so little of merit in Re S’s insistence on a singular ‘best 
interest’ that they are driven to ask “how intelligent persons could ever come to 
adopt the views put forward by Butler-Sloss P.”112 The answer must be found in 
the question of jurisdiction. Whereas a singular answer is problematic in logic, in 
law quite the reverse is true:113 
      
“One of the important functions of the judge is to instil into the 
situation certainty and finality, which the family may well have 
                                                 
111 In ‘Best Interest: A Philosophical Critique’ (2008) Health Care Anal 16 197 
112 At p198 
113 See Sheelagh McGuiness, ‘Best Interests and Pragmatism’ (2008) Health Care Anal 208 at 
p212. 
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difficulty in adjusting to but which they can at least accept as the 
judgment of the appointed impartial authority. Equally it is the 
function of the judge to protect the medical professions from the 
threat of criminal or civil proceedings as a consequence of the 
exercise of their best endeavours. It is simply not helpful for either 
the family or the doctors to be presented with a declaration that two 
or more possible alternatives are lawful.”114 
 
Butler-Sloss P could call in defence of her obvious intelligence Coggan’s115 
distinction between ‘theoretical truth’ and ‘practical truth’. Where a 
disagreement in respect of the treatment of an incapacitated person exists, there 
must be a mechanism for resolution. The inherent jurisdiction is that mechanism, 
and the courts are determined that decision-making authority is to be theirs 
alone.   
 
 
Use of force: Patients who lack the capacity to consent do not necessarily lack 
the capacity to express a view, and sometimes that view is contrary to the 
assessment of their best interests. How then is the medic to put his assessment of 
best interests into effect? If doctors are not to retreat again into self-defensive 
inaction, the court jurisdiction needed also to extend them protection from 
liability for the use of force. 
 
The issue was tested in the case of Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare Trust v. W:116 
 
A patient arrived at the hospital in labour, but denying that she was 
pregnant. The medical assessment was that the baby would be 
stillborn if not delivered quickly, so the obstetrician wanted to use 
forceps or, if that should fail, emergency Caesarean procedures. A 
psychiatrist gave evidence that she lacked capacity to consent.   
                                                 
114 p30-31 
115 In ‘Best Interests, Public Interest, and the Power of the Medical Profession’ (2008) Health 
Care Anal 219 at p220. 
116 [1996] 2 FLR 613 
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Johnson J held that both continued labour and the death of the foetus would have 
serious consequences for the health of the patient, so the proposed rapid delivery 
was in her best interests. The use of reasonable force to achieve it was lawful, 
simply as a logical extension of Lord Goff’s principle of necessity.117 
 
If there had ever been any doubt about it, the extension of the court’s jurisdiction 
to provide authority for the use of force made it abundantly clear that the courts 
were serious about enabling their decisions to be brought into reality. The role of 
the incapacitated patient, and by extension the family, is simply to abide by it.   
 
Interim orders: Sometimes a decision is needed urgently, to secure the position 
until there is time to consider issues fully. In the context of treatment decisions 
for incompetent patients, there was a jurisdictional problem with this, because 
hitherto it had always been considered that declarations were not available on an 
interim basis.118 The intellectual objection to interim declarations is the 
possibility that those factors which determine lawfulness of treatment, namely 
incapacity and best interests, may change in the time between making the 
declaration and administering the treatment. 
 
However Part 25.1(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 introduced to 
English law the concept of an interim declaration. Although the Notes to Part 52 
make clear that the Law Commission had recommended such relief in the 
context of judicial review proceedings, the Rules conferred the power without 
limitation. It was not long before the possibility of applying the new rule to 
declarations under the inherent jurisdiction was raised. In NHS Trust v. T (Adult 
Patient: Refusal of medical treatment):119 
 
T suffered borderline personality disorder. She had a history of self-
harm by blood-letting, to the extent that transfusion was necessary to 
                                                 
117 p 615 
118 For earlier non-availability of interim declarations, see F v. Riverside Mental Health NHS 
Trust (1994) 20 BMLR 1; and  St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust S [1999] Fam 26 at 61. 
119 [2004] 3 FCR 297 
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save her life. She had previously been persuaded to consent to such 
treatment, but in January 2004 she signed an advance directive 
refusing it, giving her reason as belief that blood carries evil around 
her body. In April 2004 the need for blood transfusion again arose. 
Pauffley J declared that such treatment would be lawful in the 
present emergency circumstances (it was administered, and T 
recovered); and the matter should be relisted for directions for 
consideration of lawfulness in the future. When it came before 
Charles J for directions, the medical authority in effect sought an 
interim declaration.   
 
Charles J emphasised that an interim exercise of the court’s jurisdiction required 
the same legal foundation as a final decision: lack of capacity and necessity. It 
was an unusual feature of the case that the usual uncertainties were largely 
absent: all parties agreed that the patient’s mental condition was most probably 
permanent and the urgent need for treatment would arise again in the same way. 
The judge found sufficient evidence to satisfy him both that the patient lacked 
capacity and that treatment would be in her best interests, and he therefore made 
the declaration sought.  
 
However Charles J also recognised that more and better evidence was possible, 
that such further evidence should be put before the court if it is to reach a proper 
decision, and that the conclusion after consideration of such further evidence 
may be different120. The interim declaration was therefore seen and used as a 
holding device, itself protective of the protective jurisdiction.  
 
The absorption of interim powers into the inherent jurisdiction demonstrates the 
court’s concern to maintain maximum flexibility. Interim powers are a useful 
addition to the declaratory armoury, which ensure that the court can take 
determinative control of a case – for the protection of patients and doctors, and 
to the exclusion of the family – at the earliest appropriate moment. 
 
                                                 
120 Para 51 
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Interplay with statute: It is not just the common law which has, at various times 
in the last half century, been preoccupied with the affairs of mentally 
incapacitated adults. Parliament too has made provisions, and so the interplay of 
the declaratory and statutory jurisdictions had to be worked out. 
 
In respect of formally detained patients, statute impacts on inherent jurisdiction 
through section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983. That provision removes the 
requirement for consent to medical treatment which is given in respect of the 
mental disorder for which the patient is detained, as long as such treatment is 
given under the direction of the approved clinician. A problem arises because a 
mental disorder which leads to detention may nonetheless leave the patient’s 
capacity to consent intact. The effect of s63 is to limit the autonomy of detained 
patients with unimpaired capacity to treatments which are independent of their 
mental illness or disorder.  
 
The impact of this was demonstrated in the case of LB v. London Borough of 
Croydon:121 
 
LB was a 24 year old woman, who had been abused in childhood and 
now suffered personality disorder, which manifested itself in self-
harming behaviour. When detained, she was removed from any 
opportunity to self-harm in her usual ways, so she denied herself 
food instead. She applied for a declaration that she should not be fed 
medically against her will. Although immediate crisis was averted 
because she was persuaded to take some food again, both LB and the 
Local Authority wanted to know if tube feeding would have been 
lawful, to guide future treatment. 
 
The courts had no doubt that feeding by naso-gastric tube amounted to medical 
treatment within the meaning of the statute;122 or that such treatment would be 
                                                 
121 [1995] 1 FCR 332. See also Tameside & Glossop Acute Services Trust v. CH [1996] 1 FLR 
762. 
122 Per Thorpe J at p 344; per Hoffman LJ at 138 
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directed towards the psychopathic disorder which had led to detention.123  
Thorpe J however found that LB had capacity to make a proper decision in 
respect of the proposed treatment,124 and she had decided to refuse it. He further 
held that, if his conclusion as to capacity was wrong, forcefeeding would not be 
in her best interests unless and until her physical state was so debilitated as to 
threaten her survival.125  
 
At common law, the effect of these findings would be that the proposed 
naso-gastric feeding was lawful only in extreme circumstances. However 
Thorpe J had little difficulty recognising that s63 dispensed with any need 
for LB’s consent: statute “legalize[d] what the common law would not.”126 
The Act of Parliament was a good deal less liberal, less protective of 
individual autonomy, than was the common law, but it prevailed, as the 
Court of Appeal confirmed. 
 
Thorpe J found this statutory limitation on autonomy “disquieting,”127 and he 
questioned the fairness of it. His concern was clearly for the weakness of the 
position into which it puts the competent but mentally ill patient. He was 
mollified only a little by the Official Solicitor’s reminder that a Code of Practice 
requires the professionals to seek consent from patients with capacity, even if the 
treatment falls within s63.128  
 
In terms of the common law jurisdiction’s comparison with statute, Thorpe J’s 
findings on capacity and criticism of the treatment regime show a more sensitive 
                                                 
123 Per Thorpe J at 345; And per Hoffman LJ at 138-139, “a range of acts ancillary to the core 
treatment fall within the definition….It does not follow that every act which forms part of that 
treatment….must in itself be likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of that disorder…It 
would seem strange if a hospital could, without the patient’s consent, give him treatment directed 
to alleviating a psychopathic disorder showing itself in suicidal tendencies, but not without such 
consent be able to treat the consequences of a suicide attempt.” 
124 p343 
125p344. He distinguishes LB’s personality disorder from anorexia nervosa. LB’s refusal was an 
expression of her core personality. She would regard the proposed treatment as a repetition of the 
invasive abuse of her childhood. The consequence of treatment would therefore be to magnify 
the disorder and reduce the prognosis for the only known treatment, namely psychotherapy. She 
was driven to her current position by a restrictive care regime and absence of care plan. 
126 p345 
127 p345  
128 p345 
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appreciation of the subtleties of the disorder than the operation of s63 insists on; 
and an attempt to facilitate treatment by empowering, rather than overpowering, 
the patient. However his ultimate acknowledgment that best interests point to 
survival confirms a deontological value, reminiscent of the original 
understanding of ‘necessity’. 
 
The Court of Appeal was less discomforted by the case, seemingly because it did 
not share Thorpe J’s view of LB’s capacity.129 Nonetheless, the mood of both 
courts’ judgments expresses a protective instinct. The ceding of jurisdiction is 
not accompanied by any ceding of moral compass; it is simply a matter of due 
process.   
 
Ceding jurisdiction to parliamentary priority extends further than direct statutory 
provision, to encompass also the parliamentary delegation of discretion, as was 
demonstrated in A v. A Health Authority.130 A declaration is effective “between 
the parties to the proceedings in which it was made, as a conclusive definition of 
their legal rights.”131 Consequently, and by analogy to the recognised limits on 
the theoretically limitless jurisdiction of wardship,132 the courts will refuse a 
declaration under the inherent jurisdiction that would be coercive on a Local 
Authority, unless the court is satisfied that it does not encroach on the authority’s 
public law functions or, if it does, that such encroachment can be justified on 
public law grounds.  
 
However, concession to parliamentary authority is not automatic. Where the 
statutory intention was less concrete, the courts have demonstrated a 
determination to extend their protective jurisdiction beyond controversial issues 
of surgery, into areas of mundane, everyday care (as Lord Goff had foreseen). In 
the case of Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction):133 
 
                                                 
129 Hoffmann LJ at p 140; Neill J at p142 
130 [2002] Fam 213 
131 Per Judge LJ in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1999] Fam 26 at p59, as quoted by 
Munby J in A v. A Health Authority [2002] Fam 213. 
132 For example, a Local Authority’s decision on adoption in A v. Liverpool City Council[1982] 
AC 363 
133 [2000] 2 FLR 512 
 128 
F was a mentally incapacitated adult, one of 8 siblings who had been 
taken into care on the basis of seriously inadequate parenting. Her 
mother sought her return home. An earlier hearing had determined 
that F was outside the guardianship provisions of the Mental Health 
Act, so the Local Authority sought a declaration under the inherent 
jurisdiction that it would be in F’s best interests to remain in their 
care. Johnson J held as a preliminary issue that the court had 
declaratory jurisdiction, and the mother appealed on the basis that the 
statutory regime had ousted the common law powers. 
 
The judgments traced the development of the statutory powers. In their original 
form,134 the statutory powers of guardianship would have met F’s needs,135 but 
(as has already been noted) later statutory provisions narrowed the definition of 
susceptible persons.136 It was acknowledged that this restriction had been a 
matter of legislative policy,137 to reduce the extent of state interference in private 
lives; but the judges unanimously rejected mother’s submission that curtailment 
of guardianship simultaneously implied ouster of common law jurisdiction.  
 
Butler-Sloss P saw the statutory and common law jurisdictions as parallel, rather 
than intersecting: 
 
“..the guardianship provisions in the 1959 Act…were clearly neither 
comprehensive nor exhaustive and did not cover a multitude of 
everyday activities in which decisions are made on behalf of a person 
unable to decide for him/herself…The effect of the 1982 changes 
was, inter alia, to reduce the number of people susceptible to the 
guardianship regime. It did nothing to change the situation of the 
                                                 
134 s33 of the Mental Health Act 1959 (that which killed parens patriae) created powers of 
Guardianship (broadly equivalent to the powers of a father over a child under the age of 14) in 
respect of a person under the age of 21 and suffering psychopathic disorder or subnormality of a 
nature and degree to warrant it.   
135 Per Butler-Sloss P at p515 
136 By substituting the term “mental impairment” in place of “subnormality”, and requiring the 
impairment to be associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct: The 
Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982 and the Mental Health Act 1983. 
137 Butler-Sloss P quotes Lord Elton’s introduction of the proposed changes to Parliament at 
p515 
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day-to-day care of the mentally incapacitated adult…the English 
mental health legislation does not cover the day-to-day affairs of the 
mentally incapacitated adult, and the doctrine of necessity may 
properly be invoked side by side with the statutory regime.”138 
 
Sedley LJ took a more circumspect view. Recognising the restrictive purpose of 
the legislative policy behind the guardianship amendments, he accepted that the 
mother’s case would have been unanswerable if heard in the immediate 
aftermath of amendment.139 However, relying on the inexorable march of time, 
and the consultative documents preceding the Mental Capacity Act, he 
concluded that the legislature had since had a further change of heart. Where 
guardianship was formerly seen as a restriction of civil liberties, recognition of 
its benign aspects was again being rediscovered: “what was once an eloquent 
silence has with the passage of time and events acquired the character of an 
uncovenanted gap in provision for the incapacitated”140- and the historic 
interplay of court and Parliament is to fill each other’s gaps. 
  
Thorpe LJ did not answer the mother’s argument squarely. His agreement with 
the other two judgments was based on conviction that a finding of no jurisdiction 
would be “a sad failure”,141 and he was “encouraged to the rejection of an 
outcome which [he] regard[ed] as unpalatable”142 simply by citation of cases 
which emphasise the protective purpose of the inherent jurisdiction. In the end, 
he simply refused to allow the protective impulse of the court to be swept away 
on a tide of liberal legislation.143  
 
                                                 
138 p522 
139 At p530: “The court would have had to confront the fact that it was being asked to sanction 
state intervention in a situation which Parliament had recently removed from the state’s sphere of 
influence.”   
140 p531 
141 p527 
142 p527 
143 At p527: “Of course regimes of guardianship whether statutory or inherent in their foundation 
can be operated so as to impinge upon or deny the rights of the individual. To minimise that risk 
powers contained in the 1959 Act were drastically reduced and both in statute and codes of 
practice safeguards are declared for the protection of the individual against error, abuse or excess 
in the protector. In my judgment it cannot follow (italics added) that that reduction intended to 
benefit patients must operate consequentially to deny patients the protective aspects of 
guardianship which the common law is able to furnish…” 
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What unifies the judgments is a determination to ensure that the interests of 
vulnerable adults are not left in a vacuum. Where F should live and be cared for 
represented a serious justiciable issue, with no practical alternative to court 
intervention. If the court could not act, vulnerable people would, like F, “be left 
at serious risk with no recourse to protection, other than the future possibility of 
criminal law.”144 It is the consequentialist approach on a protective principle writ 
large. Moreover, it is an extension of inherent jurisdiction taken with an attitude 
of suspicion towards families very much in the forefront of the judicial mind. 
That suspicion may have been justified on the particular facts, but the attitude 
permeates the judicial thinking, and its ripples extend beyond the instant case, to 
families in general.     
 
So, when the inherent jurisdiction is pitted against statute, it cedes authority 
where necessary, but also extends its reach where it can. Yet this is no power 
struggle, no competition for jurisdictional turf. Time and again, the court calls 
for more statutory intervention,145 for Parliament to take responsibility for the 
jurisdiction which the courts have forged out of a sense of necessity – as of 
course it now has, in the form of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Statutory reform 
was not the defeat of the inherent jurisdiction, but the triumph of judicial 
campaigning, for if the courts felt the need of a jurisdiction protective of both 
patients and doctors, they were also aware of the limited ability of their own 
creation to meet that need. 
 
Discovering the limitations: It is an unavoidable feature of the law as the House 
of Lords declared it in Re F that the lawfulness or otherwise of the treatment act 
is independent of court approval. A declaration changes nothing, but it entails 
independent scrutiny and a third party opinion, so doctors rely on it as evidence 
that their actions fulfil common law requirements. Insofar as the declaratory 
procedure was conceived to protect doctors, it is significantly flawed by the fact 
                                                 
144 Butler-SlossP at p 523 
145 See for example, Butler-Sloss P in Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) at p531, and Charles J 
NHS Trust v. T (Adult Patient: Refusal of medical treatment) at para 74. To reinforce his call for 
statutory reconsideration, Charles J even adds an extensive tailpiece to his judgment, spelling out 
the implications of development of the inherent jurisdiction. 
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that a declaration can be wrong. If challenged and revoked, the doctor who has 
acted in reliance on it is left unprotected. 
 
This flaw in the jurisdiction was tested in the case of St George’s Healthcare 
NHS Trust v. S:146 
 
S presented at her GP’s surgery 36 weeks pregnant and suffering 
from pre-eclampsia. She was advised that the baby needed to be 
delivered urgently, otherwise the lives of both S and baby would be 
at risk. She rejected that advice. The GP arranged for her to see an 
approved social worker, who arranged for S’s compulsory admission 
in hospital under s2 Mental Health Act 1983. From there S was 
transferred to a maternity unit, and ex parte application was made to 
court seeking authorisation of Caesarean delivery without consent. 
Hogg J granted the declaration, and the baby was born healthily. S 
subsequently appealed the declaration and applied for judicial review 
of the decisions of the social worker and hospital authorities. 
 
The case revealed a woeful disregard for legal requirements of compulsory 
detention in the urge to preserve lives, which effectively robbed Hogg J’s 
declarations of any value. As Judge LJ put it, 
 
“It is inappropriate to describe the order as void, or made without 
jurisdiction. But it is an order which MS is entitled to have set aside 
as ex debito justitiae. This may involve some unfairness to the 
doctors and nurses at St. George’s who were all conscientiously, and 
in very anxious circumstances, seeking to do the right thing. But the 
unfairness (indeed, injustice) to MS would be very much greater if 
the order were not set aside……While it may be available to defeat 
any claim based on aggravated or exemplary damages, in the 
extraordinary circumstances of this case the declaration provides no 
                                                 
146 [1999] Fam 26 
 132 
defence to the claim for damages for trespass against St. George’s 
Hospital.”147    
 
If there had been any doubt, these conclusions make clear that the court’s 
protective priority is the patient, not the doctor. Affording legal protection to 
medics was intended to encourage them to act, but not to act officiously. The 
courts’ instinct is to protect incapacitated patients from too much medical 
interference, as well as too little. The inherent jurisdiction will not protect 
doctors who overstep the mark. This offers patients the hope of redress, but it is 
no comfort to families, who may feel instead that doctors could be better 
constrained by a more balanced approach to decision-making authority. 
 
Equally, the inherent jurisdiction will not offer hypothetical protection. The 
foundation of the jurisdiction in an assessment of best interests means that the 
declaratory procedure operates on a snapshot of time. With the infinite variety of 
people’s lives and medical conditions, it is inevitable that the same procedure 
which is in a given patient’s interests now, may not be in six months time. 
Consequently the procedure is not fitted for advance or hypothetical decisions, 
however protective they may seem to be.  
 
Both the human urge to seek such a declaration, and the impossibility of safely 
granting one, were illustrated in the case of R v. Portsmouth Hospitals NHS 
Trust ex p Glass:148 
 
The hospital took the view that a severely disabled 12 year old child 
was dying, and wanted to administer morphine (which depresses 
respiratory function) to alleviate distress. His mother refused 
consent, but the treatment was commenced, leading to violence 
between family members and hospital staff. Meanwhile other family 
members resuscitated the child themselves, and he recovered. The 
mother sought, inter alia, declarations of what would constitute 
                                                 
147 p62 
148 [1999] 3 FCR 145 
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lawful treatment should she ever need to take the child to that same 
hospital again. 
 
Woolf LJ was sympathetic to Mrs. Glass’ desire for reassurance149 - after all, she 
had already demonstrated once that her view of appropriate medical treatment 
brought about a better result for the child than would have the hospital’s - but he 
had no doubt that it would be inappropriate for the court to grant the declarations 
she sought: 
 
“For the court to act in anticipation in this area to try and produce 
clarity where, alas, there is no clarity at the moment, would …be a 
task fraught with danger….The answer which will be given in 
relation to a particular problem dealing with a particular set of 
circumstances, is a much better answer than an answer given in 
advance.”150    
 
On the other hand, courts seem willing to take a different approach where it is 
not the most appropriate treatment plan which is unforeseeable, but the 
circumstances when it will be necessary to put it into effect. Once the court has 
decided to make a declaration that invasive resuscitative procedures are not in a 
patient’s ‘best interests’, uncertainty about when the doctors may be able to rely 
on it can be remedied by the simple expedient of attaching an expert (medical) 
report to the court order, as it did in the case of Re B (Medical Treatment).151 
There is clearly an imbalance between a family’s ability to secure prospective 
support of the court, and the medics’.  
  
                                                 
149 p151. In fact, Mrs. Glass was clearly right in her refusal to trust the relevant medical 
expertise. As was observed by Judge Casadevall in a separate opinion after the hearing at the 
European Court of Human Rights, “the facts have shown  - nearly six years later and to date – 
that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, maternal instinct has had more weight 
than medical opinion.”, Glass v. UK [2004] 1 FCR 553, at para 2. 
150 p151 
151 [2008] EWHC 1996, Coleridge J presiding. 
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Conclusions 
 
The court’s jurisdiction to determine medical treatment disputes begins with the 
torts of battery and trespass to the person. The principle of physical inviolability 
requires that, to be lawful, medical treatment depends on the consent of the 
patient. Where the patient is unable to consent, if the expectations of modern 
civilised society are to be met, that principle requires modification. 
 
The modifications adopted depend on the source of the incapacity. Where the 
patient is a child, the law includes the power of consent in the bundle of parental 
responsibilities. If the parental decision is challenged, the court has modern 
statutory powers to decide the question according to the child’s welfare, or 
ancient powers of parens patriae to decide according to his best interests. Where 
the patient is an adult, both of those jurisdictions were extinguished, and a gap in 
the law arose. 
 
To fill that gap the House of Lords in Re F created a new legal authority for 
medical treatment of patients unable to give consent, purportedly on the basis of 
the common law defence of ‘necessity’. In truth, the necessity at the heart of Re 
F was the law’s, not the patient’s, as it encompassed much more than life-saving 
treatment. The ‘necessity’ of providing treatment for those unable to give 
consent was located in a doctor’s duty to act in his patient’s best interests. The 
lawfulness of treatment was logically therefore independent of court authority, 
but an unfettered discretion of doctors was thought to be undesirable. 
Assumption of the power to scrutinise medical decisions was the court’s trade-
off for extending to medics protection from legal action.   
 
The modifications of the general law principle which were found, or created, in 
respect of both children and adults are then both based in the notion of the ‘best 
interests’ of the person lacking capacity. In respect of children, the 
understanding of ‘best interests’ was shaped by the context of an ancient 
jurisdiction which represented a property privilege as much as a protective duty; 
and in respect of adults by the context of a quasi-contractual relationship of 
patient and doctor. Both of these contexts foster a narrow, individualistic concept 
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of the person lacking capacity. In adopting the criteria of these contexts, the law 
inevitably also adopted their narrow concept. This left families largely excluded. 
Once a treatment decision is in the hands of the court, the role of the patient’s 
family was originally conceived as marginal. They may provide information, and 
are expected to live with the consequences, but their own preferences and their 
own interests are not part of the legal consideration. 
 
However, the inherent jurisdiction is supremely adaptable, as its development in 
respect of the use of force, interim orders and statutory interplay demonstrate. If 
it can encompass coercion, update its procedures and extend its boundaries, it 
can also adapt its understanding of the concept of ‘best interests’. If it were to be 
accepted that a patient is best served, not by an individualistic assessment of her 
interests, but by weighing those interests in the context of family, then the 
inherent jurisdiction could flex to accommodate this more sympathetic vision – 
as the following chapter demonstrates.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
“Best Interests” In The Courts 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the court understanding of ‘best interests’ in the context 
of medical treatment disputes decided under the inherent jurisdiction. 
Categorising authorities by their central issue reveals four main groups, 
involving respectively issues of sterilisation, life-preservation, borderline 
capacity and religious belief. 
 
Each category raises special moral or ethical issues, revealing the existence of 
fundamental judicial assumptions or values, which have shaped the court 
interpretation of ‘best interests’ and have an influence beyond the boundaries of 
their origins. The effect of these preoccupations has been to limit the role of the 
family in the medical decision-making process, in a way which is neither 
necessary nor appropriate. Understanding where the limitations come from 
enables us to reconceive ‘best interests’ in the medical context. Comparison with 
a related area of law, namely paternity testing, then demonstrates that a wider 
interpretation of the concept, more sympathetic to families, is both workable and 
desirable.    
 
 
Decisions about medical treatment are taken countless times every day in 
hospital corridors, surgery consulting rooms, and private homes up and down the 
country. Usually reaching a determination is a fairly informal process, in which 
those most closely connected with the patient contribute to varying degrees 
according to the circumstances of the case. Adapting Lord Donaldson’s account1 
of the process, it may be said that no single person dictates a patient’s treatment 
plan, because there are checks and balances in the process. The doctors can 
                                                 
1 Re J (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 at p41 
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recommend treatment A in preference to treatment B, and they can refuse to 
adopt treatment C on the grounds that it is medically contra-indicated or for 
some other reason is a treatment which they could not conscientiously 
administer. Patients for their part can refuse to consent to treatment A or B or 
both, but cannot insist on treatment C. The inevitable and desirable result is that 
choice of treatment is in some measure a joint decision2.  
 
However, when the treatment concerns a patient who cannot give consent, the 
balance of power shifts. A physician’s professional code of ethics requires her to 
consider the family’s views3 before reaching a determination of the patient’s 
‘best interests’, but having so considered, ultimately the treatment decision is 
hers alone. 
 
If others involved in the care of the patient disagree with the doctor’s decisions, 
for resolution of the dispute they must refer the matter to court. The balance of 
power then shifts again. This time, the judge assumes the sole right to determine 
the patient’s best interests. 
 
A judge presented with the responsibility of determining the patient’s ‘best 
interests’ is unlikely to have any medical expertise, and will be a stranger to the 
individual whose life course he now determines. A position of equal ignorance in 
respect of both sides of the disagreement does not, however, imply the extension 
of equal regard to their views. Bound by respect for professional medical 
judgment and ethics, the court can only choose between treatments 
recommended by the doctor, or no treatment at all. It cannot insist on treatment 
C,4 because the medical profession retains supremacy in matters of medical 
                                                 
2 Huxtable puts it rather less generously: “English law does not simply require the doctors to 
grant you whatever you want; instead, you will only get what you want if it is, first, something 
the doctors agree that you need.”: ‘Whatever You Want? Beyond the Patient in Medical Law 
(2008) Health Care Anal 288 at 293.  
3 The GMC Guidance document ‘Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together’ at 
paragraph 76(f) directs doctors to consider “the views of people close to the patient on …whether 
they consider the proposed treatment to be in the patient’s best interests.” 
4 See the Court of Appeal decision in R v. Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust ex p Glass [1999] 3 
FCR 145  and Per Cazalet J in A NHS Trust v. D [2000] 2 FLR 677:  “There can be no question 
of the court directing a doctor to provide treatment which he or she is unwilling to give and 
which is contrary to that doctor’s clinical judgment.”   
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judgment. In contrast, the family loses any supremacy it may have thought it had 
from knowing the patient best. The judge can override completely the views of 
the patient’s family.5 Even hearing them is merely a matter of good practice and 
tact. The result is an imbalance in the operation of inherent jurisdiction: the 
views of medical experts have an in-built influence, and the views of the family 
an in-built marginalisation. 
 
This imbalance in influence of the two primary sources of information to the 
court itself says much about judicial assessments of ‘best interests’, but in the 
nature of common law, as cases have been decided and binding precedents 
established, it has become possible to discern other formative factors too. If 
decided cases are grouped together according to their central issue, they fall into 
four categories: namely issues of sterilisation, life-preserving treatment, 
borderline capacity and religious belief. Each of these categories raises particular 
moral or ethical issues, and court determination of them reveals special judicial 
assumptions or axioms at play. Given the universal application of the ‘best 
interests’ test, these special preoccupations, pertinent to a particular category of 
cases, are carried over into other categories too, where their pertinence may be 
rather less obvious. And so the concept develops.  
 
A snapshot representation of the judicial development of the concept of ‘best 
interests’ can be found in the grid at Appendix One, but to identify the 
preoccupations which have shaped the concept, it is instructive to consider each 
of the categories in turn.  
 
 
A. Sterilisation 
 
Paradoxically, it was sterilisation which gave birth to the inherent jurisdiction. 
As the issues which surgical sterilisation raises have been explored, and the 
                                                 
5 See for example, An NHS Trust x. X [2005] EWCA Civ 1145 and  W Healthcare NHS Trust v. 
H [2005] 1 WLR 834.  In Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15 the Court of Appeal 
overturned the first instance decision, on the basis that the judge had given too much weight to 
family concerns! 
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advancement of science has offered less invasive means of securing the same 
effect, the frequency of its appearances in the law reports has diminished, to the 
point where sterilisation cases no longer represent a great time burden for the 
courts. However, its early centrality to the development of the court jurisdiction 
has given it a formative role in developing the judicial perception of best 
interests. 
 
As a medical procedure, sterilisation has special features6 which distinguish it 
from other interventions:  
 
Extinguishing a basic right: The very purpose of sterilisation is to exclude what 
many people see as a fundamental right of existence, namely the right to 
reproduce. (For court purposes there is a distinction between sterilisation which 
is incidental to therapeutic treatment, and sterilisation for its own sake;7 and it is 
only the latter with which courts are concerned.8) In itself, this gives rise to 
moral and emotional considerations of importance. 
 
The court upholds the importance of the right to reproduce where there is scope 
to benefit from that right,9 but is surprisingly willing to go behind the notion and 
look to the content of such rights. Where mental incapacity renders them empty 
and unexercisable, the emotive aspect of overriding reproductive ‘rights’ is 
rapidly dismissed, as it was in Re B,10 and has been ever since. Holman J in Re 
                                                 
6 See Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 per Lord Brandon at p57, per Lord Goff 
at p79. 
7 “..there is a real distinction between medical treatment undertaken with a view to securing 
abortion or sterilisation and that undertaken for a different purpose, for example the excision of a 
malignant tumour, which has this incidental result. It is only the former type of treatment which 
the law regards as being in a special category, probably because of its irreversible and emotive 
character in the light of the history of our times.” Per Lord Donaldson in Re F at p 19. 
8 Re GF (Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 293. In conversation with the office of the Official 
Solicitor, the OS perception is that the rarity of litigated cases in recent years may be due to 
clearer designation by medics concerned of a therapeutic purpose for the operation.  
9 As in Re D [1976] Fam 185, where the patient, aged only 11 at the time of the sterilisation 
application, was considered to have capacity to marry in due course. Heilbron J refused the 
application, and all the judges who have later considered her decision have been robust in their 
approval of the refusal. See for example Lord Donaldson in Re F at p 19; Lord Hailsham in Re B 
(A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199 at p 204; Lord Oliver in Re B at p211; Butler-
Sloss P in Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 at 556. 
10 [1988] AC 199. Per Lord Hailsham at 204: “...this right is only such when the reproduction is 
the result of informed choice of which this ward is incapable.” Per Lord Oliver at 219: “...the 
right to reproduce is of value only if accompanied by the ability to make a choice and in the 
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X11 was prepared to operate away the right to reproduce even in the face of a 
patient’s expressed desire to have a baby, because  
 
“X is quite unable to make any sensible, informed decision for 
herself, so other people have to make it for her. Even though 
subjectively she feels she would like to have a baby, it remains 
objectively completely contrary to her (I emphasis the word her) best 
interests to do so.”12  
 
Yet the same could be said of many competent people’s decision to have a baby. 
Babies are conceived and born in unwise circumstances every day, as the tabloid 
newspapers testify. Paternalism13 is at play here, enforcing on those who lack 
capacity a standard of decision-making higher than that which is expected of 
competent people.     
 
Permanence: Sterilisation is usually considered to be permanent – an irreversible 
interference with healthy organs. As such, it is a matter on which medical 
opinions are not unanimous, and therefore a matter of importance to the courts.14  
 
As medical science advanced, and reversible sterilisation procedures became 
possible, the courts gave something of a sigh of relief.15 The intervention they 
were asked to sanction thereby became less draconian, and the responsibility 
assumed in giving sanction therefore less onerous.   
 
                                                                                                                                   
instant case there is no question of the minor ever being able to make such a choice or indeed to 
appreciate the need to make one.” 
11 Re X (Adult patient: Sterilisation) [1999] 3 FCR 426 
12 At p431 
13 Andrew Bainham, in ‘Handicapped Girls and Judicial Parents’ [1987] LQR 334, sees it in the 
more complex terms of contradictory rights: “A sophisticated theory of children’s rights must 
recognise the existence of the child’s protective interests alongside her interest in self-
determination. Lord Hailsham’s speech [in Re B] may therefore be interpreted as indicating that, 
in the case of severe handicap, the former interest outweighs the latter.”   
14 For example Re D at p195, Re X at p431 
15 For example, Re M (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] 2 FLR 497 per Bush J at p497. 
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Yet in reality it is never suggested that the procedure ever would be reversed, 
and the medical evidence is sometimes even explicitly against reversal.16 It is 
hard to imagine a factual scenario where sterilisation would be in the patient’s 
best interests in the first place but yet its subsequent reversal is plausible.17 If the 
woman is competent to consent to reversal surgery herself, then her incapacity at 
the time of the sterilization was only temporary, and the operation should never 
have been sanctioned in the first place. If she is subject to court jurisdiction on 
the question of reversal, she must necessarily lack capacity now. If she lacks 
capacity to consent to surgery, it would be illogical for a court to hold that 
restoring the possibility of parenthood, with its myriad responsibilities, would be 
in her best interests.  Such simple reasoning demonstrates that, if the concern 
about permanency has validity, it is in truth an ethical, rather than a practical 
problem; and therefore the apparent relief offered by reversal procedures is 
illusory.   
 
Historic Misuse: Sterilisation procedures cannot be isolated from the history of 
their eugenic use,18 which modern social conditions condemn and abhor. The 
very cases with which the court is concerned, namely patients who are mentally 
defective, are those where modern European and American history is most 
shameful. It is worth remembering that the judges19 who decided the leading 
                                                 
16 Re P (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1989] 1 FLR 182, in which (at p 193) Dr. Heller 
regarded the question of reversibility as “academic, because it was his strongly held view that T 
should never have a child and, therefore, he could not see the point of any reversal operation.”  
17 The only clear justification for reversal would be if the patient regained competence, but if 
there was ever any possibility of that occurring, it could not be said that the original sterilisation 
was appropriately carried out, as envisaged by Lords Hailsham and Oliver in Re B.  
18 The most notorious expression of court sanctioned sterilization for eugenic purposes is the 
judgment of Justice Holmes in the American Supreme Court case of Buck v. Bell (1927) 274 US 
200 at 207:  “It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for 
crime, or let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit 
from continuing their kind…Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” In fact, Carrie Buck 
was a young woman of normal intelligence who had been institutionalised not because of mental 
retardation, but to hide the shame of pregnancy – a pregnancy that resulted from rape. Moreover, 
Carrie Buck’s mother was only mildly mentally retarded, and Carrie’s child was not retarded at 
all. Seventy-five years after the Supreme Court sanctioned Carrie’s sterilisation, Mark R. 
Warner, the state governor of Virginia, formally apologised for the abuses of the case. See SJ 
Gould, ‘Carrie Buck’s Daughter’ in The Flamingo’s Smile; Reflections in Natural History and 
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, ‘The Wicked Witch Is Nearly Dead: Buck v. Bell and the sterilisation of 
Handicapped Persons.’ Temple Law Q (5) 995 
19 Heilbron J (Re D) was born in 1914; Lords Hailsham, Bridge, Brandon, Templeman, Oliver, 
Donaldson, Goff and Jauncey (Re B and Re F) were born in 1907, 1917, 1920, 1920, 1921, 1920, 
1926 and 1925 respectively, and all of them served in World War II. 
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cases on the use of sterilisation on patients lacking capacity had all lived through 
an era where eugenicist views were not uncommon in England, and then through 
the Second World War, where the full horror of such arguments were made 
plain. The collective judicial memory was conscious of the need to avoid both 
eugenicist considerations and the perception of them,20 and has remained so.21  
 
This aspect of sterilisation explains the strength of judicial support for the 
earliest reported decision, that of Re D, where the mother’s views were expressly 
founded on the social undesirability (as she saw it) of D ever conceiving a 
child,22 and the doctor was seen to have lost his impartiality by over-
identification23 with the mother. Heilbron J would have preferred that D’s carers 
even consider abortion,24 rather than pursue sterilisation for social ends. 
 
And yet in Re M25 there is, behind the rhetoric, more than a hint of considering 
the practical implications of another generation of disabled children. In the same 
paragraph as warning against eugenics, Bush J used an argument which has clear 
eugenic overtones to explain where M’s best interests lay: 
 
“If [M] were pregnant then she would have to be monitored even 
more closely than any normal healthy adult because of this 50% 
chance of [the disability] being handed on to any child she might 
bear. Tests would have to take place, which would be very 
                                                 
20 As Bush J put it in Re M (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] 2 FLR 497 at p 499: “We 
are the victims of the European history of operations of this kind in the way in which some 
countries and some regimes have misused this kind of operation for eugenic purposes. It is, 
therefore, right that we in this country should be particularly watchful that we do not go down 
that road, and that people should not be sterilised merely because they are severely handicapped 
or weak, or likely to give birth to a child who may equally be so.” 
21 Even the late cases continue to emphasis their distance from eugenic considerations: eg Re X 
{1999] 3 FCR 426 at 431, Re S (Adult: sterilisation) [1999] 277 at 279. 
22 D’s mother was “worried lest D might be seduced and give birth to a baby which might also be 
abnormal…She had always believed that D would not, or should not, marry.” (p190) 
23 “Dr Gordon, whose sincerity cannot be challenged, was persuaded by his emotional 
involvement with the mother’s considerable problems and anxieties and his strong personal 
views in favour of sterilisation to form a less than detached opinion…” (p 192) 
24 “I think it was a pity that both Dr. Gordon and the mother were so reluctant to accept [other 
forms of contraception] and even the alternative of abortion, if, unhappily, it ever proved 
necessary, rather than the proposed use of such an irrevocable procedure.” At p195. Of course 
abortion itself is loaded with all sorts of moral and ethical controversies, but seemingly these are 
of lesser importance than the need to avoid sterilisation on social grounds. 
25 Re M(A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] 2 FLR 497 
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uncomfortable for her and would have to be done under anaesthetic, 
whereby blood would be taken from the foetus by means of uterine 
puncture and tested in that way. So if the foetus was – and it was a 
50% chance – diseased, then an abortion would have to be carried 
out. It is that risk that one is entitled to look at so far as the ward is 
concerned, and to say that this adds to the danger of her becoming 
pregnant.”26  
 
This is a eugenic argument! If there was true blindness to the issue of whether 
any child born would be disabled, then the question of testing for disability, and 
abortion if found, would not arise. Does this suggest that judges are in reality 
pursuing precisely those social goals which they purport to condemn?  
 
A wider view of the cases suggests not. The otherwise universal thrust of the 
judgments is a vigorous denial of social considerations, as exemplified in Re X,27 
although the facts rarely demand such overt expression of it. In truth, Bush J’s 
apparently eugenic argument is a manipulation, not of the court’s purpose, but 
rather of the best interests test.28 It demonstrates how the articulation of best 
interests can become an exercise in justifying, rather than finding, the judicially 
preferred outcome; and the preference is to avoid any suggestion of eugenics.  
 
                                                 
26 At p499. 
27 “..there may or may not be a theoretically increased risk that if X were to give birth to a baby, 
that baby in turn might have impaired mental or intellectual capacity. I stress that that risk does 
not form any part of the motivation of X’s parents in making the present application, nor does it 
form any part of my reasoning in deciding to grant the proposed declaration. Many people now 
live good, fulfilling and rewarding lives in our society, despite impairment, of whom X is herself 
a very good example. The purpose of the proposed sterilisation has nothing at all to do with 
preventing possible birth of a possibly mentally impaired baby.” Holman J at p431 
28 Numerous other factors in the case pointed in favour of sterilisation, but Dr. Goldthorp – a 
major part of, but not the only,  medical evidence – was vulnerable to the allegation that he had 
changed his mind to favour sterilisation only after it became apparent that there was a high risk 
of disability in any child conceived. If the judicial decision was to be immune from such 
allegations, the relevant part of Dr. Goldthorp’s evidence had to be explained in terms of M’s 
best interests.          
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These “special features” are the justification29 for court intervention, as 
determined by Re F, and as such they inform court decisions. The court is not 
asked to authorise or legitimate medical actions which would otherwise be 
unlawful, but to provide a protective “third opinion” on the best interests of the 
patient. So, alien though these special features are to the majority of medical 
interventions, they have shaped the concept by which they too are decided. 
Caution in the face of reproductive rights has lead to protectionism; fear of 
irreversibility has lead to preference for minimal, reactive intervention; and 
avoidance of social engineering has lead to emphatic individualism. Best 
interests latterly came  to “encompass medical, emotional and all other welfare 
issues,”30 but only as filtered, from the outset, through the triple lens of 
protectionism, reactivism and individualism. 
 
The process by which the court identifies ‘best interests’ in sterilisation cases is 
now clearly established, and was neatly summarized in Re X:31 
 
“…I need to consider, first, the degree of risk or likelihood of X 
becoming pregnant, if there is no form of contraception. … 
Secondly, the risk of physical or psychological harm to X if she does 
become pregnant or give birth to a child….Thirdly, the range of 
possible alternative methods of contraception and the risks 
associated with them or whether there is any acceptable but 
reversible or less invasive alternative to sterilisation.”  
 
The first two steps address protectionist considerations, and the third the 
requirement for minimal intervention. The whole process is conducted from 
individualist considerations, as is demonstrated by the fact that the locus of best 
interests across all the cases fall into just three broad categories: rejection of 
                                                 
29 Lord Donaldson says (in Re F at p19) that Re D illustrates the need for court review: “no one 
cast the slightest doubt on the skill, bona fides or caring disposition of those who recommended 
and would have carried out the operation. They were simply blinkered to the possibility that they 
may be wrong.”  But potentially the same may be said of all medical interventions. Mostly (for 
reasons of economy?convenience?) the system is prepared to live with that; only by reason of its 
special features are we not prepared to do the same with sterilisation.  
30 Per Butler-Sloss P in Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 at p555. 
31 Re X (Adult patient: Sterilisation) [1999] 3 FCR 426 at p428 
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social policy considerations,32 protection from pain and vulnerability,33 and 
minimization of disadvantages of disability/maximization of freedom.34  
 
This leads to the ironic conclusion that the better carers are at looking after their 
mentally incapacitated charge, the less likely the court is to support them. The 
case of Re S (Adult: Sterilisation)35 vividly demonstrated the point: 
 
S was 22, attractive but mentally incapacitated, and vulnerable to 
sexual exploitation. Nothing untoward had happened to date, but her 
parents feared for her future and sought to eliminate any risk of 
pregnancy by sterilization. Johnson J found that there was no 
identifiable occasion when S had been at risk or would be in the 
future, and refused a declaration that sterilization would be in S’s 
best interests.  
 
Johnson J was reluctant to go against the parents’ wishes, noting that the irony 
that “if a young woman is being cared for and supervised by caring and 
responsible parents, then the wish of the parents is to be overridden; whereas a 
similar decision will be upheld if made by parents who are careless and 
irresponsible,”36 but he felt constrained to do so in the interests of identifiable 
consistency in court decisions. Johnson J’s concern was that, if sterilisation were 
to be lawful in a situation of minimal risk, then it would be difficult to conceive 
of any factual situation where relief would be refused, so that the whole court 
procedure would become otiose – which would be wrong in principle.37  
 
                                                 
32 Re D 
33 Re B, Re M, Re P, Re ZM, Re X, Re W 
34 Re X, Re M, Re A (if it had been fully argued) 
35 [1999] 1 FCR 277. See also Re LC (Medical Treatment: Sterilisation) [1997] 2 FLR 258, 
which was factually different in that L was cared for in a residential home, with paid staff round 
the clock. Although L had previously been sexually abused in care, the court was now convinced 
that the care provided to her was so good that any future risk was negligible, and in any event 
less than the risk inherent in the proposed surgery. 
36 At page 282 
37 “Whatever may be the appeal of a particular set of circumstances, the principle must be 
maintained that this form of medical procedure should never be carried out upon a woman 
incapable of giving her consent unless there has been the prior approval of a High Court judge 
that the procedure is in the light of all the circumstances one which is in the bets interests of the 
woman. “ p 283 
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This is self-justification by the courts, at the expense of any consideration of 
what is practically required to keep the risk to the patient negligible. There are 
platitudes about how caring and responsible S’s parents were, but no serious 
attempt to engage with them about the practical demands of this caring 
responsibility, to assess whether this would or could continue; and no practical 
support for the excellent job they were doing. 
 
Third Party Interests: In truth there is another special feature of the sterilisation 
cases, which has not attracted judicial consideration, namely that third party 
interests are obviously affected. Where pregnancy is not prevented, there may be 
a child. Since that child is not yet in existence when the court is asked to 
consider sterilization, its potential interests have no legal standing,38 but the 
possibility of a birth has implications for others. Where the sterilisation under 
consideration is of a woman, her wider family may be called upon to care for the 
baby;39 and where the sterilisation under consideration is of a man, pregnancy 
would be have a very clear effect on any woman he may impregnate.  
 
In Re A, the only reported case to consider sterilisation of a man, the question of 
third party interests was specifically left open by the Court of Appeal.40 Whilst 
happy to accept that the best interests of a patient encompass interests as wide as 
“cultural, familial, spiritual and other”, Butler-Sloss P was somewhat grudging 
when it came to even the potential of third party interests,41 but Thorpe LJ seems 
more enthusiastic, preserving the argument in the very first paragraph of his 
judgment. It is perhaps surprising that the door which was carefully left ajar has 
                                                 
38 See Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245; and St George’s Healthcare 
NHS Trust v. S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
39 As was expressly considered in Re P (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1989] 1 FLR 182, 
where the potential grandmother changed her evidence to the effect that she would raise any 
child born to P, rather than allow it to be adopted, but on the basis that P would have to live 
elsewhere. Living away from her mother would have implications for P’s best interests which 
Eastham J was happy to take into account. 
40 [2000] 1 FLR 549, per Butler-Sloss P at p 556, and Thorpe LJ at p558. 
41 “[Mother’s Counsel] mounted an argument in his skeleton argument that the judge was wrong 
to ignore the effect on ‘third party interests’ (eg the child and/or the young woman). It was only 
briefly pursued in oral argument. On the facts of this case, that argument is not well-
founded……..I agree however with Thorpe LJ that the question whether third party interests 
should ever be considered in a case concerned with the best interests of a patient ought to be left 
open”, at p 556. 
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not been pushed at since: there are no reported cases where third party interests 
have been specifically argued. 
 
Carers’ interests are obvious in those sterilization cases where the driving issue 
is not fear of pregnancy, but fear of menstruation.42 Coping with menstrual 
bleeding is an unpleasant task for the carers (in the reported cases, all of whom 
are family members) of a mentally incompetent woman, and it is experienced as 
an additional, biologically pointless burden, coming just at a time when care is 
becoming more difficult anyway simply by virtue of the patient’s increasing size. 
It would not seem unreasonable if the family preference is for those forms of 
intervention which end menstruation totally, rather than lessen it. However, this 
kind of third party interest is perceived by the court as one of “carer’s 
convenience,”43 and dismissed accordingly, however extreme the practical 
demands.  
 
Yet, where there is strong evidence that menstrual bleeding causes the patient 
herself distress, the courts have no difficulty in sanctioning even hysterectomy, 
the most invasive form of sterilization. Unsurprisingly, the presentation of cases 
in court is shaped by this awareness. In Re GF,44 the case was considered on a 
strictly therapeutic basis only, and a declaration was said to be unnecessary (but 
would have been granted had it been needed). In Re ZM &OS,45 the medical 
evidence of heavy, painful and irregular bleeding, was graphically supported by 
evidence from Z’s mother and sister (from which it is easy to surmise the impact 
on family life, although the evidence is never framed from that perspective). A 
declaration in favour of hysterectomy was granted, even against the submissions 
of the Official Solicitor. 
 
                                                 
42 Re GF (Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 293; Re ZM & OS (Sterilisation: Patient’s Best 
Interests) [2001] 1 FLR 523; Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [2001] 1 Fam 15 
43 To paraphrase Lord Jauncey, in Re F at p83. 
44 Re GF (Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 293. The case set out the criteria for carrying out 
sterilization without court approval: that two medical practitioners are satisfied that it is 
necessary for therapeutic purposes, is in the best interests of the patient and there is no 
practicable, less intrusive means of treating the condition. 
45 [2000] 1 FLR 523, Bennett J. 
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In marked contrast, in Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation)46 the Court of Appeal 
was very critical of Wall J for attaching disproportionate weight to the evidence 
of the family,47  who favoured hysterectomy, against medical evidence which 
favoured the less invasive Mirena coil, at least to begin with. The higher court 
refused to sanction sterilisation. 
 
The contrasting outcomes of Re ZM and Re S demonstrate a rigidly 
individualistic approach to best interests. The descriptions by the families of the 
practical realities of menstruation are markedly similar; and both women 
experienced pain and distress. The declaration was granted in Re ZM because 
there was medical evidence that blood flow was “abnormal”, so medical 
intervention would be therapeutic; and refused in Re S because it wasn’t, so 
intervention would simply be a matter of convenience. Convenience is too close 
to eugenics for comfort. 
 
Yet recognition of the caring burden need not be seen as the first step on a 
slippery slope to eugenics. Cases seeking judicial approval of sterilisation to 
alleviate the burden of menstruation are not brought by the state, but by 
individuals and families. They are not a device for social engineering, but a plea 
for help in coping with difficult circumstances. A sympathetic judgment will not 
mean that courts are inundated with similar claims because, fortunately, 
significant mental disability in pre-pubescent girls is factually rare, and its 
implications different in every case. There are no floodgates in individuality.  
 
Would the outcome of Re S have been different if her mother had said that the 
practical difficulties of dealing with her menstruation were so overwhelming that 
she could no longer continue to provide care?48 A plausible argument could then 
                                                 
46 [2001] Fam 15 
47 Per Butler-Sloss P at p 25. “The understandable concerns of a caring mother and the problems 
of dealing with S during her menstrual periods do not, on the facts of this case, tilt  the balance 
towards major irreversible surgery for therapeutic reasons when they are unsupported by any 
gynaecological, psychological or other medical evidence.” 
48 Such a ploy may be objectionable as emotional blackmail, but it is amply demonstrated in the 
context of consent to blood testing for paternity (see later).  Moreover there is clear indication 
that the court would be swayed by such an argument in the comment of Hollis J in Re W (An 
Adult: Sterilisation) [1993] 3 FCR 426t: “If worry affected the mother, then it would be likely 
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have been constructed that hysterectomy was in S’s best interests because of her 
emotional and psychological need to remain living at home. The evidential 
lacuna before Wall J would be thereby filled, and the court could grant the 
declaration. 
 
When the concept of best interests is so obviously malleable, it is not difficult to 
see how a well-advised family could squeeze their arguments into the narrow 
mould of patient-centred considerations to which the court gives weight, should 
they be so determined.  Indeed, exactly that process can be seen when looking at 
decided cases chronologically,49 and it may be an inevitable implication of the 
common law method of argument. However it militates against an open 
consideration of the true basis for medical intervention, and suggests suspicion 
of family motives where there need be none. How much more honest, and more 
open to scrutiny the process would be if it simply made space for families to 
present their views and interests as a legitimate consideration for the court – a 
possibility which Re A leaves open. 
 
Conclusions: As a medical procedure sterilisation has special features which 
informed the inherent jurisdiction and the understanding of ‘best interests’ from 
its very invention. The court’s aversion to eugenic sterilisation amounts to a 
deontological principle which ensured that the court’s jurisdiction was launched 
with a protectionist, reactive, and above all individualistic interpretation of best 
interests. The effect has been to constrict considerations of a patient’s interests 
into narrow channels which overlook genuine individual interests in family care, 
and deny those families the recognition which their efforts and self-sacrifice 
deserve. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
that that would affect her care of W. This is not a factor that has been dwellt upon by Counsel 
before me, but it is nevertheless a factor that I take into account.” 
49 For example, Heilbron J regretted the family’s failure to consider less intrusive alternatives to 
sterilisation in Re D; so the next time similar issues came to be argued before court  (in Re B) we 
see the calling of evidence to exclude all lesser forms of contraception as ineffective and the birth 
process as disastrous. The pattern continues along the timeline of cases. For overview, see 
appendix 1. 
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B. Life saving treatment 
 
Sometimes medical treatment can hold the balance between life and death; 
sometimes it is not clear which may be preferable. Usually the patient herself is 
in no position to express a preference. In tragic circumstances which are fraught 
with moral ambiguity, the court may be asked to adjudicate on the continuation 
or termination of treatment. At the root of any decision are values much more 
profound than the strictly legal. The life-or-death consequences demand that the 
familiar guide of “best interests” is interpreted according to much more 
fundamental concepts than usually disturb judicial equanimity.50 
 
The Importance of Chance:  From the earliest authority, it has been apparent that 
whose view of “best interests” ultimately prevails will depend in the first 
instance on chance – the chance of disagreement in the treating hospital: 
 
Re B (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)51 : A baby girl, 
B, was born with Down’s Syndrome and an intestinal blockage. The 
blockage would lead to her death within days if untreated, but 
relatively minor surgery was likely to secure for her the full Down’s 
Syndrome life expectancy of 20 -30 years. 
 
(a)The parents refused consent to the operation, taking the view that 
it was kinder to let her die.  
 
(b) The doctors referred the matter to the Local Authority who 
applied ex parte to make B a ward of court. Ewbank J granted the 
applications and directed that the operation be performed.  
 
                                                 
50 “These cases evoke some of the fundamental principles that undergird our humanity. They are 
not to be found in Acts of Parliament or decisions of the courts but in the deep recesses of the 
common psyche of humanity whether they be attributed to humanity being created in the image 
of God or whether it be simply a self-defining ethic of a generally acknowledged humanism.” Per 
Hedley J in Portsmouth NHS Trust v. Wyatt [2004] EWHC 2247 at para 21. 
51 [1981] 1 WLR 1421 
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(c) B was then moved to a different hospital where the surgeon (Z) 
declined to operate when he learned of the parents’ views. The 
matter went back before Ewbank J who revoked the order.  
 
(d) The parents were then served with the legal proceedings and 
made representations. Enquiries identified two surgeons who were 
prepared to operate, but Ewbank J concluded that the parents’ wishes 
ought to be respected. 
  
(e) The appeal against that decision was heard later the same day. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the operation would be in B’s 
best interests. 
 
If B had happened to have been born in Surgeon Z’s hospital,52 the case would 
never have come before the courts, the blockage would not have been treated, 
and B would have died. Everybody accepted that the parents’ decision was an 
“entirely responsible one, doing what they considered best.”53 Yet by chance 
disagreement, their decision was challenged and ultimately overridden; the 
blockage was treated, and B lived.  
 
For B’s mother and father, the decision not to consent to surgery was the first 
expression of their parental responsibility. The judges’ only direct explanation 
for disregarding it was the “shock” they must be feeling from the birth of a 
disabled child.54 Of course that was not the true reason behind the Court of 
Appeal’s decision. Chance having put the case before the court, it was 
determined according to law. B then being a ward of court, the court’s “first and 
                                                 
52 Or indeed, most hospitals: Surgeon Z believed that the same decision as his “would be taken 
by the great majority of surgeons faced with a similar situation.” (Quoted by Templeman LJ at 
p1423.) 
53 Per Dunn LJ at p1424. 
54 “The shock to caring parents finding that they have given birth to a child who is a mongol is 
very great indeed, and therefore while great weight ought to be given to the views of the parents 
they are not views which must necessarily prevail.” Per Templeman LJ at p 1422.  “Therefore” 
implies “because” they are in shock. So a view considered over time should be weighed 
differently? 
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paramount” consideration had to be the interests of the child.55 On the question 
of what was “best” for the child, the Court of Appeal simply disagreed with 
parents. 
 
The First Judicial Preference - Life Over Death: The disagreement turned on 
assessment of the value of a life lived with Down’s Syndrome.56 As the parents 
saw it, the intestinal blockage was “God or nature giv[ing] the child a way out”57 
of a life of severe mental and physical handicap. The Court of Appeal (and 
Ewbank J before he heard from the parents) saw it differently: medical science 
should prevail over God or nature unless the life thereby preserved “is 
demonstrably going to be so awful that in effect the child must be condemned to 
die.”58 If B’s life was still imponderable, failure to preserve it would be wrong. 
Ergo, the parents’ view was wrong.  
 
But was B’s life – or life with B in it - really imponderable? Reading the 
decision of the court suggests instead that it was simply ‘not pondered’. There 
was absolutely no express consideration by the Court of Appeal of how B’s life 
would in fact be led. B was now a ward of court. Who would bring her up? With 
their wishes about her very existence overridden, would the parents accept the 
burden of parenting a disabled child for her entire life? The Local Authority had 
applied to free B for adoption, so substitute parents would have to be found. 
What would be the prospects of finding adoptive parents for a severely 
handicapped baby? If the search failed, how would she fare in long-term care? 
None of these questions were addressed by the court. It is of course possible that 
the parental views would still have been considered “wrong” if these questions 
had been asked, but the failure to ask them shows that the judicial preference is 
solely one of principle: life over death except in extremis. 
                                                 
55 As Dunn LJ put it at p1424, the court “cannot hide behind the decision of the parents or the 
decisions of the doctors; and in making the decision this court’s first and paramount 
consideration is the welfare of this unhappy little baby.” Or per Templeman LJ at p 1424: “The 
judge was much affected by the reasons given by the parents and came to the conclusion that 
their wishes ought to be respected. In my judgment he erred in that the duty of the court is to 
decide whether it is in the interests of the child that an operation should take place.” 
56 The positive aspects of which are probably clearer today than they were when the case was 
decided in 1981.  
57 As quoted by Dunn LJ at p1424 
58 Per Templeman LJ at p 1424. 
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A Rebuttable Preference - Judicial Balancing: One of the difficulties of such an 
approach is finding an acceptable formulation of the extreme situation which 
justifies deviation from the general thrust of principle. If medical treatment is not 
intended to prolong life, than what is its purpose? Life being what it is, it was not 
long before a case came before the courts posing exactly that question. When 
Ward J in Re C (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)59 granted medics 
permission “to treat the minor [patient] to die”, he fuelled anxieties that any 
approach short of prolonging life at any cost was the start of the slippery slope 
towards euthanasia.60  
 
The phrase was used in an ex tempore judgment, and Ward J himself had quickly 
amended the phraseology of the order to sanction instead “treat[ing] the minor to 
allow her life to come to an end peacefully and with dignity”. Yet, however 
euphemistically the order was worded, the substance of the judgment remained, 
and it demonstrated that the judicial concept of best interests could countenance 
death as the preferred option.  
 
Such a view demands clarification, and the Official Solicitor led the exploration 
at the next available opportunity. In the case of Re J,61 a baby was born 
prematurely and suffered severe brain damage. He was unlikely to develop even 
limited intellectual abilities but was probably able to feel pain. His most 
optimistic life expectancy was late teens. The hospital sought leave to follow a 
course of treatment which would not require him to be ventilated. When the 
judge granted the application, the Official Solicitor appealed. He made two 
submissions: first, the absolutist one that the court should never withhold 
consent to treatment which may allow survival; and secondly, the qualified one, 
that consent could be withheld, if the quality of life anticipated after treatment 
                                                 
59 [1990] Fam 26. C was born with severe and irreversible brain damage. The Local Authority 
applied to court for a declaration that she should be treated in accordance with a specialist report 
which recommended that the objective of treatment should be to ease suffering rather than 
prolong life. 
60 One of the objectives of the Official Solicitor’s appeal was to test exactly that, and the Court of 
Appeal supported his pursuit of it: “Third, the Official Solicitor wished to allay anxieties in some 
quarters that the hospital staff were treating C in a way designed to bring about her death…The 
Official Solicitor has been quite right to adopt this course.” Per Lord Donaldson at p36. 
61 [1991] Fam 33 
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would be intolerable.62 The Official Solicitor therefore forced the court to state 
its position on treatment as life preservation.  
 
The parents did not take a view63 so, despite Lord Donaldson’s emphasis on a 
multi-party approach,64 the decision was taken on medical and legal instincts 
alone. The court clearly rejected the absolutist submission, and thereby an 
approach to best interests which valued life above all else. Whilst recognising a 
very strong presumption in favour of prolonging life, it was said to be rebuttable. 
Morally, this is a significant step, and the court was keen that it should not be 
exaggerated: the door was firmly closed to euthanasia, by distinguishing between 
the imposition of death, and choosing a course of action which would fail to 
avert death.65  
 
But though the Official Solicitor’s absolutist rejection was clearly rejected, his 
qualified submission was not clearly adopted. “Intolerability” was rejected as a 
quasi-statutory yardstick.66 It was to raise its head again later, but for now it was 
retained as a descriptive term only, with a new emphasis on its subjectivity,67 
seeing it from the patient’s point of view. The implicit balancing exercise was 
embraced.68 On one end of the seesaw goes the strong presumption in favour of 
life; but on the other end there must be consideration of “the pain and suffering 
and quality of life” if it continues, and “the pain and suffering involved in the 
                                                 
62 This submission is clearly based on the judgment of Templeman LJ in Re B. 
63 Per Taylor LJ at p 53: “In the present case the parents, finding themselves in a hideous 
dilemma, have not taken a strong view…” 
64 At p41. 
65 Per Lord Donaldson at p44: “What is in issue…is not a right to impose death, but a right to 
choose a course of action which will fail to avert death.” 
66 Per Lord Donaldson at p 47; per Balcombe J at 52 
67 per Taylor LJ at p55: “the correct approach is for the court to judge the quality of life the child 
would have to endure if given the treatment and decide whether in all the circumstances such a 
life would be so afflicted as to be intolerable to that child. I must say “to that child” because the 
test should not be whether the life would be intolerable to the decider. The test must be whether 
the child in question, if capable of exercising sound judgment, would consider the life 
intolerable.” Lord Donaldson adopted at p47 the formulation of Justice Asche in Re Weberlist 
(1974) 360 NYS 2d783 at 787: “the decision can only be made in the context of the disabled 
person viewing the worthwhileness or otherwise of his life in its own context as a disabled 
person…” 
68 “Re B seems to me to come very near to being a binding authority for the proposition that there 
is a balancing exercise to be performed in assessing the course to be adopted in the best interests 
of the child. Even if it is not, I have no doubt that this should be and is the law.” Per Lord 
Donaldson at p 46. 
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proposed treatment itself.”69 However, the pivotal point of the seesaw was 
deliberately undefined:70 each case must be considered as if in isolation – the 
anti-thesis of casuistry.  
 
This noble-sounding approach is in fact little more than a smokescreen for 
unfettered judicial discretion. In the case of a child like J, the view of the patient 
can never be known or even guessed at for the simple reason that his fate – the 
very fate which brought the matter to court – was that he had never been and 
would never be able to form a view. To ascribe one to him is mere supposition, 
saying more about the views and imagination of the decision-maker than about J. 
Rejecting casuistry, and without any principle to guide assessments of best 
interests in the context of prolonging life or standing by for death, all the court 
can offer is an ethic of virtue or care, yet the individualistic and subjective 
interpretation of best interests by the Court of Appeal in Re J disavows both. At 
this point, the law has assumed authority to decide matters of enormous 
significance, but left its judges floundering in a jurisprudential vacuum.  
 
Avoiding the Preference – When Life has Gone Already: The logical difficulties 
inherent in a ‘balancing’ approach based in neither principle nor ethic become all 
too obvious when the patient in question suffers even worse disability than J, but 
less cognisance of it – the tragedy of the patient in a persistent vegetative state, 
for whom all function, but also all sentience, is lost.71 What are the factors to 
balance against the sanctity of life, when the patient has no awareness of whether 
he lives or dies? 
 
In Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland72 nine judges were unanimous in their decision 
that the principle of sanctity of life should not prevail, but at variance in their 
methodology and reasoning. In particular, although all accepted the propriety of 
declaratory proceedings on the Re F model, the understanding of the best 
interests test differed markedly. 
                                                 
69 Per Lord Donaldson at p 46. See also Taylor LJ at p55. 
70 Per Balcombe J at p 52: “I would deprecate any attempt by this court to lay down such an all-
embracing test since the circumstances of these tragic cases are so infinitely various.” 
71 As Lord Goff described it at p 863, “a living death”. 
72 [1993] 2 WLR 316 
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The issue was lawfulness of withdrawal of treatment which Anthony Bland had 
been receiving for three years, in the certain knowledge that death would follow 
soon after. This is significantly different to that in Re J, which was a prospective 
one of permission never to embark on a course of treatment in the first place. 
However it is phrased, the Bland scenario takes doctors one step closer to 
euthanasia,73 and public anxiety ran high.74 The need to be clear about the 
court’s function and power was acute. 
 
At first instance, Sir Stephen Brown P was satisfied that treatment conferred “no 
therapeutic, medical or other benefit” to the patient, and its discontinuance 
would be in accordance with good medical practice. Therefore withdrawal of 
treatment was in Anthony Bland’s best interests.75 The agreement of the family 
to the proposed withdrawal was of some, albeit unexplained, importance. The 
President was performing the balancing exercise, simply putting at each end of 
the seesaw whatever factors seemed significant to him and declaring that those 
factors in favour of discontinuance weighed more heavily. 
 
                                                 
73 Certainly for many people the court’s distinction between active agency to bring about death, 
and removing artificial support for life so that death supervenes (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 
p802), was a distinction without difference. Much commentary has been written about the 
validity of the distinction (see for example J.M. Finnis, ‘Bland: Crossing the Rubricon?’ (1993) 
109 LQR 329, and J. Keown, ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland’ 
(1997) 113 LQR 481. Andrew McGee in ‘Finding a Way through the Ethical and Legal Maze: 
Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia” (1995) MLR 357 at 383 offers a supportive 
explanation of the distinction: “What is proposed in euthanasia is that we wrest from nature 
control of our ultimate fate: we decide when and how we should die, and we ensure that we have 
the last word. In lawful withdrawal, by contrast, the very opposite is the case: we interfere with 
nature, not in killing the patient , but in keeping the patient alive, and the question of whether or 
not we should withdraw treatment is at bottom the question of whether we should restore to 
nature her dominion, allowing nature finally to take its course, with the patient dying a natural 
death. In short, the moral relevance of the distinction can therefore be put in this way: euthanasia 
interferes with nature’s dominion, whereas withdrawal of treatment restores to nature her 
dominion after we had taken it away when artificially prolonging the patient’s life.”  
74 As Hoffman LJ put it at p825, “People are worried, perhaps not so much about this particular 
case, but about where it may lead. Is the court to assume the role of God and decide who should 
live and who should die?”  
75 At p805 
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In the Court of Appeal, the judgements examined more critically the concept of 
best interest. Mere existence was not considered a benefit,76 but much wider 
considerations than simply the physical were embraced: 
 
Sir Thomas Bingham MR gave weight to “the constant invasions and 
humiliations to which his inert body is subject;…the desire he would 
naturally have to be remembered as a cheerful, carefree, gregarious 
teenager and not an object of pity; to the prolonged ordeal imposed 
on all members of his family, but particularly on his parents; even, 
perhaps….a belief that finite resources are better devoted to 
enhancing life than simply averting death.”77  
 
Butler-Sloss LJ included “some degree of monitoring of the medical 
decision”78 and a respect for continuing humanity.79  
 
Hoffmann LJ included “personal privacy and dignity.”80  
 
They too carried out the balancing exercise, and decided that the patient’s 
interests in withdrawal outweighed the abstract requirement to preserve life.81 
The stark choice between sanctity and quality of life was acknowledged,82 and 
made. This approach clearly encompasses an ethic of care: the concept of “best 
interests” is stretched wide enough to include consideration of the impact on 
others of a proposed course of treatment. The ordeal which the treatment 
represented to his family was a factor which added weight to the discontinuance 
end of the seesaw. To that extent it is a refinement of the simple balancing 
exercise, and one which recognises interests other than the patient’s. 
                                                 
76 Per Sir Thomas Bingham MR at p 813: “”I cannot conceive what benefit his continued 
existence could be thought to give him.” 
77 At p813. 
78 At p 819 
79 At p820: “To limit the quality of life [balancing factors] to extreme pain is to take a demeaning 
view of a human being. There must be something more for the humanity of the person of a 
P.V.S. patient. He remains a person and not an object of concern.” Further, at p 822 “..he has a 
right to avoid unnecessary humiliation and degrading invasion of his body for no good purpose.” 
80 At p829 
81 Per Butler-Sloss LJ at p823. 
82 Hoffman LJ at p830 rejected the Amicus’ argument that there was no conflict between them 
because the principle of sanctity of life could be understood as embracing a need for respect for 
dignity etc. To his mind this was “rhetoric intended to dull the pain of having to choose.” 
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However, the House of Lords took a different approach. Clinical value of 
treatment was emphasised over best interests, simultaneously reducing thereby 
both the principle of sanctity of life and the breadth of best interest 
considerations: 
 
(a) Lord Goff considered that treatment had no therapeutic benefit, 
and could therefore be properly regarded as medically useless. 
Sanctity of life not being an absolute principle, the futility of 
treatment justified its discontinuation, and no balancing act had to be 
performed.83 
 
(b) Lord Keith specifically doubted that best interest could be said to 
favour discontinuance, on the basis that an insensate patient was 
completely indifferent to whether he lived or died.84 Holding the 
view that mere existence was not a benefit,85 and that the principle of 
sanctity of life was not absolute, a doctor was under no duty to 
provide treatment which conferred no benefit, and therefore 
withdrawal was lawful. 
 
(c) Lord Browne-Wilkinson redefined the legal question to one of 
reasonableness of medical opinion.86 Since the doctors took the view 
                                                 
83 At p 869: “…there is in reality no weighing operation to be performed. Here the condition of 
the patient, who is totally unconscious and in whose condition there is no prospect of 
improvement, is such that life-prolonging treatment is properly regarded as being, in medical  
terms, useless…..I cannot see that medical treatment is appropriate or requisite simply to prolong 
a patient’s life, when such treatment has no therapeutic purpose of any kind….it is the futility of 
treatment which justifies its termination.” 
84 At p 858. 
85 At p859 
86 At p 884: “..the legal question in this case ..is not whether the court thinks it is in the best 
interests of Anthony Bland to continue to receive intrusive medical care but whether the 
responsible doctor has reached a reasonable and bona fide belief that it is not……the court’s only 
concern will be to be satisfied that the doctor’s decision to discontinue is in accordance with a 
respectable body of medical opinion and that it is reasonable.” Eminent though he is, Lord 
Brown-Wilkinson’s view must be limited to the narrow facts of this case. The Bolam test is 
concerned with standards of care, and must have limited scope in cases where the issue before 
the court is whether treatment, or its withdrawal, is in the best interests of the patient. See for 
example comments of the Court of Appeal in An NHS Trust v. X [2005] EWCA Civ 1145 at paras 
94-95.  
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that there was no benefit in staying alive, and discontinuance 
satisfied the Bolam test, it would be unlawful to continue treatment. 
 
(d) Lord Mustill rejected the idea that the patient had any interest at 
all in continuation or termination of life;87 that being so, the 
justification for treatment without his consent disappeared, taking 
with it any duty to continue it.88 
 
Avoiding avoidance: Where does this leave the judicial concept of best interests? 
A majority of the Law Lords purported to agree with the Court of Appeal and for 
the same reasons,89 which should be authoritative support for the refined 
balancing exercise and a broad interpretation of best interests. However two 
Lords specifically rejected such a view;90 and they all adopted a decision 
mechanism which avoids court assessment of best interests altogether. The 
import of the House of Lords judgment in Bland is that when the patient has no 
medical interests, there is no balancing act to perform – which significantly 
undermines the Court of Appeal approach.  
 
It is possible to reconcile the judgments of the higher courts, by limiting the 
House of Lords’ approach to the specific medical facts. Whereas it would be 
logically possible to apply the Court of Appeal’s concept of best interests to 
other medical scenarios,91 the same cannot be said of the House of Lords 
                                                 
87 At p 897: “He feels no pain or anguish…..it seems to me to be stretching the concept of 
personal rights beyond breaking point to say that Anthony Bland has an interest in ending these 
sources of others’ distress. Unlike the conscious patient he does not know what is happening to 
his body, and cannot be affronted by it; he does not know of his family’s continuing 
sorrow….The distressing truth which must not be shirked is that  the proposed conduct is not in 
the best interests of Anthony Bland for he has no best interests of any kind.” 
88 At p 897: “Thus although the termination of his life is not in the best interests of Anthony 
Bland, his best interests in being kept alive have also disappeared, taking with them the 
justification for the non-consensual regime and the co-relative duty to keep it in being.” 
89 Per Lord Goff at p 863. The others then agree with Lord Goff – Lord Keith at p 859, Lord 
Lowry at p875 . 
90 Lord Browne-Wilkinson at p884 by redefining the question, and Lord Mustill at p897 in the 
forthright words quoted at n37 above. 
91 The final position of the seesaw may be different if, for example, family/society’s suffering in 
continuation of treatment was counter-balanced by pain of the patient in discontinuing it, but the 
very exercising of balancing factors provides exactly the mechanism whereby different interests 
can be considered.  
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approach. It only works in a situation of complete lack of sentience.92 For this 
reason, it is at least arguable then that the approach of the higher court does not 
overrule the broad view of best interests adopted by the Court of Appeal, for use 
in less extreme medical conditions, with implications obviously to the benefit to 
families. 
 
The lower courts were certainly less than impressed with the approach of the 
House of Lords, and simply did not follow it. The abandonment of the best 
interests test was felt to cede too much power to medics. (Indeed Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s formulation of the legal question would require only that the clinical 
preference accords with a body of good practice for it to be determinative.93) Sir 
Thomas Bingham MR articulates such a reply to their Lordships as soon as the 
Court of Appeal next had the opportunity, in Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v. 
S,94 where again the patient was in a persistent vegetative state, and the Court of 
Appeal was keen to scrutinise medical judgment.  
 
A significant difference of approach between tiers of court is revealed. The 
lower courts, who are accustomed to dealing in facts, see court involvement – 
court determination - as a desirable practice, offering protection to patients, 
doctors, families and the public95 (seemingly, in that order of priority). On the 
other hand, the House of Lords, a court of principle, is prepared to countenance 
this as a short term approach of necessity only.  
 
Lord Goff was practically motivated: he was impressed by the care being taken 
by the BMA’s Medical Ethics Committee to provide guidance to the profession, 
and concerned by the cost burden of reference to court. He wanted only cases of 
                                                 
92 As was impliedly recognised by Lord Mustill at p899: “This is not at all to say that I would 
reach the same conclusions in less extreme cases, where the glimmerings of awareness may give 
the patient an interest which cannot be regarded as null.” 
93 It is to be noted that Lord Mustill at p898 specifically doubted the validity of the Bolam test in 
this area of determination 
94 [1994] 1 WLR 601 at p 609: “It is, I think, important that there should not be a belief that what 
the doctor says is in the patient’s best interests is in the patient’s best interests. For my part I 
would certainly reserve to the court the ultimate power and duty to review the doctor’s decision 
in the light of all the facts.” On the other hand, although Bingham MR quotes the Consultant 
referring to the views of the patient’s mother (at p 605), he actually makes no direct reference to 
family views in this case. 
95 See Bingham MR at p815-816 
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special need to invoke court procedure.96 Lord Mustill, however, was deeply 
uncomfortable about the use of this court procedure at all. He spends over three 
pages of the law report97 explaining the reasons for his discomfort, but foremost 
amongst them is acknowledged lack of authority in matters which are moral, 
rather than legal: 
 
“If the criteria for the legitimacy of the proposed conduct are 
essentially factual, a decision upon them is one which the court is 
well accustomed to perform, and may properly be obtained through 
the medium of an application for declaratory relief. If however they 
contain an element of ethical judgment, for example if the law 
requires the decision-maker to consider whether a certain course is 
‘in the best interests’ of the patient, the skill and experience of the 
judge will carry him only so far. They will help him to clear the 
ground by marshalling the considerations which are said to be 
relevant, eliminating errors of logic, and so on. But when the 
intellectual part of the task is complete and the decision-maker has to 
choose the factors which he will take into account, attach relevant 
weights to them and then strike a balance the judge is no better 
equipped, though no worse, than anyone else. In the end it is a matter 
of personal choice, dictated by his or her background, upbringing, 
education, convictions and temperament. Legal expertise gives no 
special advantage here.”98    
 
By implication, the lower courts rejected such squeamishness. Although their 
assertion of judicial determination was framed as a check on medical 
professionals, its operation is universal – so it excludes family influence too. 
Paradoxically, Lord Mustill’s speech could be read as a passionate expression in 
the House of Lords of the family’s claim to greater influence on the assessment 
of the best interests of their loved ones. Family members are in no less a position 
of authority than any other contenders for moral decision-making authority, and 
                                                 
96 At p 874 
97 Pp 887-891 
98 At p 887-8 
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arguably their familiarity with and concern for the patient gives them an 
advantage. The only basis for court supremacy, therefore, should be one of 
protection of the patient, in comparatively rare instances of carer inadequacy, 
improper motivation or abuse of power. However, no such family-friendly 
interpretation occurred to the lower courts.  
 
When just such a protective application came to court in Re R (Adult: Medical 
Treatment),99, the President simply distinguished Bland as factually different, 
and adopted instead the balancing exercise of Re J, as if their Lordships had 
never spoken:100 
 
The 23 year old patient had been born with serious brain damage and 
was now deteriorating neurologically and physically. The medics 
believed that CPR in the event of a life-threatening incident would be 
“nothing more than striving officiously to keep him alive for no gain 
to him”. The chances of success were almost nil, and the procedure 
carried some risk of injury. R’s parents supported the doctors’ view, 
but carers in his home were concerned and initiated court 
proceedings.  
 
Sir Stephen Brown P adopted the best interests test of Re J, and held that the 
decision was fully within the consultant’s responsibility. The factual outcome of 
the case was consistent with the House of Lords in Bland, but the reasoning 
adopted was the Court of Appeal’s.  
 
How far such reasoning could be stretched became apparent in the next case to 
be determined. In Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant)101 the life 
in need of preservation was that of an entirely competent woman with a six year 
old daughter and leukaemia. She urgently needed a bone marrow transplant. Of 
three possible donors identified, the one with the best prospect of success was 
her 25 year old severely handicapped sister, Y. Y had not lived with her family 
                                                 
99 [1996] 2 FLR 99 
100 At p 107. The only quotations from the House of Lords in Bland are those at p 108-109, 
which refer to the desire to limit applications to court. The subsequent case of A NHS Trust v. D 
[2000] 2 FLR 677 maintained the same methodology too. 
101 [1997] 2 FCR 172 
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since the age of 10, but their mother visited her regularly. Connell J decided that 
the donation procedure would be in Y’s best interests. 
 
The decision is remarkable in a number of respects. Connell J did not just widen 
the assessment of Y’s interests to include factors other than the strictly medical; 
he went further, and actually downplayed the medical interests.102 Y’s emotional, 
psychological and social interests in prolonging and improving relations with her 
family were said to outweigh medical ones, even though such interests were only 
vaguely identified.  
 
At first blush Connell J’s decision seems to be the very embodiment of what we 
are searching for – a willingness to recognise competing family interests in a 
medical treatment dispute. Feenan certainly sees the decision as ‘signal[ling] a 
shift ...towards respecting the importance of relationship in determining best 
interests.’103  
 
On closer consideration, the case does not support such an analysis. In truth the 
benefit which Y actually derived from the relationships with either her mother or 
her sister was highly questionable. The evidence was that the sister visited her 
infrequently, and Y did not understand that her regular visitor was her ‘mother’. 
There was no expert psychological opinion on what benefit Y actually did derive 
from visits, but the emotional bond of a child to her parent was clearly not a 
factor. Insofar as the judgment expressed respect for relationships, they were 
surprisingly tenuous relationships to favour. 
 
The decision is better seen as the starkest illustration of the court’s fundamental 
preference for life over death, and the susceptibility of the concept of ‘best 
interests’ to distorted interpretation in order to further that preference. A 40% 
chance of extending someone else’s life by a further eighteen months simply 
                                                 
102 At p 178: “…the evidence shows that the bone marrow harvested is speedily regenerated and 
that a healthy individual can donate as much as two pints with no long term consequence at all. 
Thus the bone marrow donated…will cause her no harm and she will suffer no real long-term 
risk.” And what of the short and medium term risks of surgical procedure? What of any 
psychological implications? 
103 In ‘Case Commentary: A Good Harvest’ [1997] CFLQ 305 at p305. 
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bought sufficient social and moral benefits to outweigh the disadvantages to a 
woman who could not understand the (not insignificant) procedures involved, 
even though there were two other potential (but less well matched) donors.104 If 
Connell J’s decision is questionable,105 that is not because the factors he took 
into account were wrongly considered, but because they were wrongly weighed. 
 
Beyond the First Preference: Set in this chronological context, the decision in Re 
T (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)106 is a natural development and a 
reasonable application of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Bland: 
 
T was born with biliary atresia, a liver complaint. He had had 
unsuccessful surgery when a few weeks old, which caused pain and 
distress. The unanimous medical opinion was that a liver transplant 
would be in his best interests, and that without it he would die by the 
age of two and a half. However, the information sheet used to 
explain the procedure to patients and their families acknowledged the 
enormity of a transplant decision, and claimed to respect individual 
decisions.107 T’s parents, who were neonatal nurses now working 
outside the UK (in a country with no facilities for liver transplant), 
refused consent.108 Another hospital, to which the family had been 
referred, respected that decision and would not operate against it.109 
                                                 
104 It is worth noting, as does Feenan, that the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of Human Beings with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, which was 
completed after the decision in Re Y prohibits removal of regenerative tissue from mentally 
incapacitated persons unless, inter alia, there is no compatible donor available who has capacity 
to consent (Art 20(2)(ii)). 
105 Connell J was himself anxious to limit the attachment of any wider significance to his 
decision. He said (at p178): “It is doubtful that this case would act as a useful precedent…” 
106 [1997] 1 All ER 906 
107 “It is a very big decision to make…If the family choose not to proceed with the 
transplantation once they are acquainted with the facts, the decision is respected.” Quoted by 
Butler-Sloss LJ at p 245 and Roch LJ at p 256 
108 As her Counsel put the argument and summarised by Butler-Sloss LJ at p 248, “The choice 
was to allow the child a short life where he was well and happy for most of the time and would 
be likely to die peacefully or to cause him to undergo major invasive surgery with a good success 
rate but all the risks, discomfort and distress for a young child and a lifetime of drugs and the 
possibility of further invasive surgery and other treatment. The consequence of the treatment was 
to commit the mother to a lifetime of care of the child with the requirement of total commitment 
to the child. The importance of the element of morale was not to be underestimated.”   
109 “Dr. P…formed the view that she was a loving and devoted mother, and from her professional 
background, an unusually well-informed parent. They concluded that her reluctance to submit 
her son to the operation was founded in love and care for him. She was to the best of her ability 
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The Local Authority invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the court, 
and Connell J ordered that the child be brought back to the UK for 
transplant assessment. The mother appealed, successfully. The Local 
Authority was refused the declaration it sought. 
 
The Court of Appeal considered that Connell J had got the balancing act wrong: 
“he did not weigh in the balance reasons against the treatment which might be 
held by a reasonable parent on much broader grounds (italics added) than the 
clinical assessment of the likely success of the proposed treatment.”110 The 
approach of Butler-Sloss LJ is consistent with her understanding of best interests 
in Bland and expressly embraces an ethic of care: 
 
“This mother and this child are one for the purpose of this unusual 
case and the decision of the court to consent to the operation jointly 
affects the mother and son and it also affects the father. The welfare 
of this child depends upon his mother. The practical considerations 
of her ability to cope with supporting the child in the face of her 
belief that this course is not right for him, the requirement to return 
probably for a long period to this country, either to leave the father 
behind and lose his support or to require him to give up his present 
job and seek one in England, were not put by the judge into the 
balance.”111 
 
However, the decision in Re T is usually dismissed as an aberration, explicable 
by the need to correct the error of the judge at first instance in deciding the case 
                                                                                                                                   
discharging her duty of trust to the child and her decision should be respected……Dr. P and his 
team, while strongly recommending the operation, would wish to respect the decision of the 
mother and would not be prepared to perform the operation without her consent.” Per Butler-
Sloss LJ at p 246 & 247 
110 Butler- Sloss LJ at p 250-251, reasons such as “deep-seated concern of the mother as to the 
benefits to her son of the major invasive surgery and post-operative treatment, the dangers of 
failure long-term as well as short-term, the possibility of the need for further transplants, the 
likely length of life, and the effect upon her son of all these concerns.” Moreover the judge did 
not consider “the evidence of Dr. P and his strong reservations to the effect of coercing, as Dr P 
put it, this mother into playing the crucial and irreplaceable part in the aftermath of major 
invasive surgery not just during the post-operative treatment of an 18 month old baby but also 
throughout the childhood of her son. ” This broader view of best interests is welcomed by 
Andrew Grubb in ‘Medical Treatment (Child): Parental refusal and the Role of the Court’ [1996] 
4 Med L Rev 315-319 at 318 
111 P251 
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according to assessment of the reasonableness of parental views.112 The Court of 
Appeal judgments do not support such an interpretation. They do dispel any 
suggestion that reasonableness of parental views is decisive,113 but this is not the 
main thrust of the judgments. The demand for a broad interpretation of best 
interests is unambiguous114 and unanimous. The discussion of the role of 
parental wishes is merely the technical means by which a ground for successful 
appeal is made out. 
 
More pertinently, Waite LJ sets out a view of the role of parental wishes which 
fits comfortably with the carer’s claim to narrow the court role to one of 
protection only (as the above interpretation of the House of Lords’ decision in 
Bland suggests): 
 
“…there is a scale, at one end of which lies the clear case where 
parental opposition to medical intervention is prompted by scruple or 
dogma of a kind which is patently irreconcilable with principles of 
child health and welfare widely accepted by the generality of 
mankind; and that at the other end lie highly problematic cases where 
there is genuine scope for difference between parent and judge. In 
both situations it is the duty of the judge to allow the court’s own 
opinion to prevail in the perceived paramount interests of the child 
                                                 
112 See, for example, Thorpe LJ in Re C (A Child)(Immunisation: Parental Rights) [2003] EWCA 
Civ 1148 at paragraph 21: “The outcome of that appeal is unique in our jurisprudence and is 
explained by the trial judge’s erroneous focus on the reasonableness of the mother’s rejection of 
medical opinion thus excluding other relevant factors.” He went on to those other relevant factors 
as “including the risks and consequences of the surgery, the mother’s crucial role in the aftermath 
of surgery and the practical consideration that the judge’s order would have required both 
parents, alternatively the mother alone, to return to the jurisdiction from a distant commonwealth 
country probably for the long period that the surgery and its aftermath would require.”   
113 But Roch J was too simplistic when he said at p 255 that “it is …misleading to ask, once it is 
accepted that the parents are devoted and responsible, whether their decision is reasonable or 
unreasonable because parents who are responsible and devoted will almost certainly reach a 
decision which falls within the range of decisions which can be classed as reasonable. If a 
decision falls outside the range of permissible decisions, it is unlikely that the parents are 
responsible and devoted parents who have sought only to decide in th best interests of their 
child.” In the context of sterilisation, the mother in Re B was applauded as devoted and 
responsible, but she still made an impermissible decision. 
114 In addition to the references to Butler-Sloss LJ above, see Waite LJ at p524: “Had the judge 
viewed the evidence more broadly from the standpoint of his own perception of the child’s 
welfare when appraised in all its aspects, he would have been bound in my view to take 
significant account of other aspects in this case.” And per Roch LJ at p256. 
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concerned, but in cases at the latter end of the scale, there must be a 
likelihood (though never of course a certainty) that the greater the 
scope for genuine debate between one view and another the stronger 
will be the inclination of the court to be influenced by a reflection 
that in the last analysis the best interests of every child include an 
expectation that difficult decisions affecting the length and quality of 
its life will be taken for it by the parent to whom its care has been 
entrusted by nature.”115 
 
This approach is then criticised for giving undue weight to the mother’s own 
medical qualifications,116 but that reading too is misplaced.117 Butler-Sloss LJ118 
is not persuaded by the mother’s arguments because she is a medical 
professional herself and therefore in some way to be equated with the treating 
medics119, but rather by a realistic assessment of the clinical implications of 
treatment proposed, and a willingness to see T in the context of the relationships 
on which the success of treatment depended.120 The judgment simultaneously 
recognises both that there is a limit to what can be expected of third parties (even 
devoted mothers!), and that the support of third parties can be critical to 
successful outcome. The case was not – but could have been – decided the same 
way by reference either to utilitarianism or to an ethic of care. By contrast, 
Connell J’s approach at first instance is focussed excessively on the individual in 
                                                 
115 At p 254 
116 Fox & McHale point out that the BMA regards treating members of one’s own family as 
unethical. Implicitly, the Court of Appeal drew a distinction between ‘treating’ and ‘caring’, but 
Fox and McHale suggest this was only possible because the Court ‘downplayed the importance 
of medical opinion’: ‘In Whose Best Interests?’ [1997] 60 MLR 700-709 at p704 
117 An interesting comparison may be drawn with the case of Re MM (Medical Treatment) 
[2000] 1 FLR 224, where the mother was described by one doctor as “a very educated person in 
questions of immunology”. The case was in fact settled by agreement but the court recorded that 
it would have overridden parental objections to treatment, even though they were informed and 
‘rational’, because the evidence that the proposed treatment was in the child’s best interests was 
‘overwhelming’. 
118 It is worth noting that she decided this case not long after completing the report of the 
Cleveland Commission, with all that that implies for her awareness of the dangers inherent in 
riding roughshod over families.  
119 “ As she said at p251, “If the decision in this case was a matter of assessing the clinical 
opinion of the doctors, the judge was clearly right to prefer their views to the mother’s, who 
could not be as well qualified to give an opinion. But this matter has to be looked at more 
broadly. ”  
120 It is interesting to note that Butler-Sloss J was considering the case not long after she 
completed the Cleveland Enquiry. She would have been fully aware of the dangers lurking in too 
ready a dismissal of families.   
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the narrowest sense. It demands absolute self-effacement of carers in the 
preservation of life, even where the quality of life after treatment is questionable 
– an approach which is not suggested in any of the preceding authorities, least of 
all in the House of Lords in Bland.  
 
Finally, it is suggested that Re T can be explained as falling into a special 
category of cases – organ transplants.121 It is certainly possible to see 
transplantation as a clinically more extreme version of the artificial prolonging 
of life achieved for Anthony Bland by artificial nutrition; and organ donations122 
were mentioned in the category of ‘special treatment’ in Re F. However, there 
are too few cases of transplantation to examine for ‘special category’ status,123 
and in any event there is no need. The objections to Re T are really protests 
against a decision which looked beyond the clinical interests of the individual 
patient, and  was prepared to countenance an outcome contrary to the first 
preference for preservation of life.  
 
The case should be seen instead not as an aberration, but as evidence that the 
best interest test is capable, when interpreted broadly, of distinguishing the 
extreme from the run-of-the-mill, of facilitating extraordinary outcomes in 
extraordinary circumstances rather than forcing complexity into the straitjacket 
of universal norms  – another ground for preferring the reasoning of the Court of 
Appeal in Bland to that of the House of Lords. 
 
Preference Dilemma: There was nothing at all run-of-the-mill about Re A 
(Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation),124 a case where it was not 
possible to fall back on the first preference for life: 
                                                 
121 The origin of this is probably the comment of Roch LJ at p256 that “The presumption on 
favour of the sustaining of life is not irrebuttable and perhaps has less weight where the issue is 
whether to prolong or not to prolong life by means of organ transplantation.” 
122 Per Lord Donaldson at p19. 
123 The other reported case is Re M (Child: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1999] 2 FCR 577 
where the parents consent to a heart transplant for their 15 year old daughter, but the child herself 
refused. The court was concerned with issues of capacity, and in fact declared that the transplant 
would be lawful without the child’s consent. On the other hand, in November 2008 the Local 
Authority withdrew their application for a declaration in favour of a heart transplant operation for 
a 13 year old girl, Hannah Jones, who did not wish to undergo it. ( See Elizabeth Grice, Guardian 
November 12th 2008, pB9)  
124 [2001] Fam 147 
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Twin girls, Jodie and Mary, were born joined at the pelvis and 
sharing a common artery. Mary’s lungs and heart were too deficient 
to oxygenate and pump blood. Had she been a singleton, she would 
have died shortly after birth, but the common artery enabled Jodie’s 
heart to circulate blood for both of them. 
 
The treatment in issue was surgical separation of the girls. Separation did not 
involve any organ transplant or donation of bodily parts from one child to the 
other. If they were separated, Mary would die within minutes, but Jodie had the 
opportunity of “good quality life”;125 if they were not separated, both would die 
within 3 – 6 months “because Jodie’s heart will eventually fail.”126  
 
The parents refused to consent to the surgery. Their primary reasoning was a 
sincere belief that “it is God’s will that the children are afflicted as they are and 
they must be left in the hands of God”127 – moral reasoning based on mainstream 
religious faith, and backed by the Archbishop of Westminster.128 In addition, 
they expressed fears that, living as they did on the tiny island of Gozo, with 
limited medical facilities, they would not be able to cope with a child with the 
serious disabilities they believed Jodie would have if she survived the 
operation.129 
 
If the treating doctors had taken the same view, or even if they had disagreed 
with it but been prepared to accept parental authority, “there could not have been 
the slightest criticism of them for letting nature take its course in accordance 
with the parents’ wishes.”130 It was recognised that other medical teams may 
well have done just that. However, the twins happened to be born at St. Mary’s 
                                                 
125 At p163 
126 At p165 
127 At p155. The faith in question was Catholicism – professed by 1.131 billion people 
worldwide (according to the Annuario Pontificio 2008), so not an extreme cult by any reckoning. 
“Their view might be described as controversial but, unlike the objections to blood transfusions 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses, they are not obviously contrary to any view generally accepted by our 
society. Still less are their views contrary to those generally accepted in the remote community 
from which they have come to this country.” Per Robert Walker LJ at p 245  
128 Per Robert Walker LJ at p244 
129 At p172. 
130 At p173, per Ward LJ. 
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Hospital, where the medics neither agreed nor accepted parental authority, and 
so the question of surgical separation was referred to court. 
 
The case posed two enormous legal problems, the first of which is our main 
concern. Since the two babies would experience opposite results from the same 
surgical intervention – one life, the other death – in determining whether surgery 
should go ahead or not, the court had in effect to choose between competing and 
incompatible interests. (The second problem, namely that since actions leading 
to death are usually prohibited and punished by the law of murder, is of lesser 
relevance to our consideration.131)     
 
Any suggestion of preferring one life to another would have driven a coach and 
horses through many precious tenets of English law and morality, but in 
particular the principle of sanctity of life, that first preference which has shaped 
the courts’ approach to best interests. Ward LJ (who lead the Court of Appeal’s 
consideration of the first problem) was therefore scrupulous in placing the right 
to life of both of the babies into the balance.132 In order to distinguish between 
their best interests he adopted an argument from academia133 and determined that 
the court’s task was to strike a balance between the children by considering the 
worthwhileness of the treatment.134 Given the different conditions of the babies, 
                                                 
131 Sabine Michaloski, in ‘Sanctity of Life: Are Some Lives More Sacred Than Others?’ (2002) 
Legal Studies 377, considers that this issue should have been the sole determining basis of the 
case, and that the logic and integrity of the criminal law points to surgical separation amounting 
to murder. Her view is flawless in logic, but somewhat sterile, failing as is does to give any 
appreciation of the real life situation, the people behind the case reports. Law is only necessary 
because there are people, with all that that implies in terms of needs, emotions, strengths, 
weaknesses and aspirations. To leave humanity out of the picture renders legal discussion 
absolutely otiose. Jenny McEwan, in ‘Murder By Design: The ‘Feel-Good Factor’ and the 
Criminal Law’[2001] Medical law Review 246, takes the same intellectual argument without the 
sterility. She says that the judgment is highly questionable in terms of law, logic and morality; it 
has left the law in a mess and it was achieved by a fudge, but she stops short of saying the 
decision was actually wrong. It is a luxury of commentary that commentators can criticise 
decisions, whereas judges actually have to make them! 
132 At p 196, para 10(i): “The universality of the right to life demands that the right to life be 
treated as equal. The intrinsic value of their human life is equal. So the right of each goes into the 
scales and the scales remain in balance.”  
133 John Keown, in 113 LQR 481 at 485, whose argument is itself based in the House of Lords 
judgment in Bland. 
134 “..the question is always whether the treatment would be worthwhile, not whether the 
patient’s life would be worthwhile. Were one to engage in judgments of the latter sort, and to 
conclude that certain lives were not worth living, one would forfeit any principled basis for 
objecting to intentional killing” at p 187. Michael Freeman, in ‘Whose Life Is It Anyway?’[2001] 
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the balance came down heavily in favour of Jodie.135 Finally he put into the 
scales the manner in which the babies were individually able to exercise their 
right to life, on which he assessed Mary as “parasitic.”136  
 
The situation was appalling for the parents by accident of nature, but the court’s 
decision effectively forced them, against their instincts, to stand by and watch 
one of their children die for the sake of the other. Deciding the case against their 
wishes did cause Ward LJ discomfort.137 The reasons he gave138 were that they 
had assumed the worst possible outcome of surgery for Jodie; that although a 
disabled child represents a burden to parents, it is the best interests of the child, 
not the parents, which are paramount; and that in their repugnance at the idea of 
killing Mary, they failed to face up to the consequences for Jodie of not allowing 
surgery. Yet despite the enumeration of reasons for disagreement, Ward LJ’s 
position was really summarised in a single sentence: “In my judgment, parents 
who are placed on the horns of such a terrible dilemma simply have to choose 
the lesser of their inevitable loss.”139   
 
Such reasoning is clearly utilitarian. “Worthwhileness of treatment” is simply a 
linguistically tortuous way of saying that Ward LJ balanced the competing 
                                                                                                                                   
Medical Law Review 259, considers that Ward LJ “got the right answer” but by the wrong 
reasoning. He considers that distinction between worthwhileness of treatment and 
worthwhileness of life is a nonsense, because the treatment is only worthwhile if the life is 
worthwhile. Freeman was willing to state that Mary’s life was worth less than Jodie’s, but this is 
a morally explosive statement, and impossible for any judge to make. In our system of precedent-
made law, it would have implications way beyond what was under consideration in the particular 
case. That is not to say, however, that the actual reasoning was not in fact very similar. At p197, 
Ward LJ said that “The best interests of the twins is to give the chance of life to the child whose 
actual bodily condition is capable of accepting the chance to her advantage even if that has to be 
at the cost of the sacrifice of the life which is so unnaturally supported.”    
135 For the same reason, Brooke LJ (who lead the consideration of the second issue) determined 
that Fate, in the form of Mary’s weaker condition, had chosen which twin would be the victim of 
necessity. For either to live, it was necessary that one should die; Mary’s condition meant that 
she was self-designated. There was no human being deciding the balance, so no moral objection 
to the defence of necessity, and the operation would be lawful.   
136 P197, para (iv) 
137 “It gives me no satisfaction to have disagreed with their views of what is right for their family 
and to have expressed myself in terms they will feel are harshly and unfairly critical of them. I 
am sorry about that. It may be no great comfort to them to know that in fact my heart bleeds for 
them.” At p 196. In fact, tragically Ward LJ’s own daughter had died not long before he decided 
the case. 
138 At p 195-196 
139 At p 196 para (iv). 
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interests to see which decision produced the greatest good (or in the 
circumstances, the least bad). 
 
This decision therefore took consideration of best interests to a new level.140 The 
parents’ interests in assuming or avoiding a burden of care were summarily 
dismissed, but giving weight to the interests of someone other than the patient 
herself could not be avoided, simply because the relevant treatment directly 
affected two patients at once. Mary’s interests alone would undoubtedly have 
been against surgical separation. Those interests were simply outweighed by 
Jodie’s opposite – and greater, in a utilitarian sense – interests. 
 
The stark moral demands of the particular facts should not prevent us from 
recognising that the issue was essentially about how the best interests test can 
accommodate competing interests. Interests can – and do - compete in far less 
dramatic ways than life and death, and more or less directly. There is no reason 
in logic or morality why the same balancing exercise should not be carried out in 
less morally stark circumstances. Indeed, the same exercise could have been 
done to test the parents’ case in respect of Jodie. Their interest in avoiding a 
burden of care with which they believed they could not cope would simply be 
outweighed by the greater imperative of sanctity of life, and the same decision 
would have been reached.141 The balancing exercise would still work however – 
                                                 
140 And for this reason, it has been argued that the case was simply outside the proper remit of 
law. Barbara Hewson was instructed as Counsel for the Pro-Life Alliance, which was not a party 
to the case but was invited to make written submissions. She then published an article (‘Killing 
Off Mary: Was the Court of Appeal Right?’ [2001] Medical Law Review 281) to the effect that 
the court should have declined to hear the case, because really it amounted to a moral difference 
of opinion between the parents and the doctors, and it is arrogance to suggest that the court has 
any superior authority in areas of morality. Ward LJ anticipated this in his judgment at p155, 
where he said that “This court is a court of law, not of morals, and our task has been to find, and 
our duty is then to apply, the relevant principles of law to the situation before us”; and again at p 
173, where he said “the only arbiter of that sincerely held difference of opinion is the court. 
Deciding disputed matters of life and death is surely and pre-eminently a matter for a court of 
law to judge. That is what courts are here for.” 
141 That the court would consider life to outweigh all other factors can be seen from the next case 
of life-saving treatment to be decided, W Healthcare NHS Trust v. H [2004] EWCA Civ 1324. 
The feeding tube of a 59 year old woman with multiple sclerosis (and incompetent for the 
preceding 20 years) had become dislodged. The “wonderful, caring” family (per Brooke LJ at 
para 11) did not want it reinserted, but the treating doctors did. The family’s case was “as strong 
as it could be about the patient’s horrible existence and wishes” (per Coleridge J, quoted by 
Brooke LJ at para 10). Yet, since the patient was sufficiently sentient to experience the effects of 
death by starvation, the judge was unable to say that the life-prolonging treatment would provide 
no benefit, and the Court of Appeal upheld his decision that her best interests required 
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and allow the possibility of interests other than the patient’s prevailing – where 
the risk/benefit to the patient was less fundamental, and the burden to the family 
disproportionate.  
 
Retreat to First Preference: Despite the opportunity that this presented for a more 
equitable approach to medical treatment in a family context, such an expanded 
use of the balancing exercise to determine best interests was not taken up in 
subsequent cases. As the emotional trauma of Re A subsided, so too did the 
concept of competing interests. Instead of shedding light on the limitations of an 
approach excessively focused on the individual, the unspoken imperative seems 
to have been to limit the decision to its specific – and traumatic – facts.  
 
Instead, the lingering effect of Re A was fear. If the extension of best interest 
considerations could sanction death in that case, how far could it go? It was 
precisely that fear which motivated one Mr. James Burke to bring his application 
to court: 
 
R (on the application of Burke) v. GMC:142 Mr. Burke suffered a 
degenerative physical disease. He sought judicial review of a GMC 
guidance document in respect of withholding and withdrawing life 
prolonging treatments. He was likely to remain competent until the 
very last stages of his life, and feared being left to die of thirst or 
starvation on the  basis of someone else’s assessment of his interests. 
He wanted a declaration that it would be unlawful to withhold/draw 
artificial nutrition or hydration. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
reinsertion. Even when it is horrible, continued existence weighed most heavily in the balance.    
(Later cases, for example Re K (A Child)(Medical Treatment: Declaration) [2006] EWHC 1007, 
have accepted evidence that the distressing effects of death by starvation can be controlled by 
analgesic and anxiolytic medication (para 23), but there is no mention of the medics here offering 
that opinion. Why not? Possibly because the patient was an adult, so the question of advance 
directives altered the consideration. Or possibly because it did not suit the medical case?)  
142 [2005] QB 424 
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Munby J143 saw the case as focus[ing] on the extent to which we should respect 
autonomy.”144 He referred to a “cluster of ethical principles which we apply to 
decisions about how we should live,”145 adding to sanctity of life and respect for 
autonomy, a respect for the dignity of the individual human being, which he then 
sought to elevate by means of an expansive interpretation of best interests: 
 
“..evaluation of a patient’s best interests involves a welfare appraisal 
in the widest sense, taking into account, where appropriate, a wide 
range of ethical, social, moral, emotional and welfare 
considerations….Indeed it would be undesirable and probably 
impossible to set bounds to what is relevant to a welfare 
determination.”146 
  
He emphasised that the determination of best interests is not for the doctors, but 
for the patient if competent and the court if not.147 The assessment has to be 
made from the perspective of the particular patient, and - most importantly – he 
accepted that its “touchstone” was intolerability.148  
 
What does that mean? “Touchstone” is defined in the Oxford English dictionary 
as  
 
(1) a finegrained dark schist or jasper used for testing alloys of gold 
etc. by observing the colour of the mark which they make on it. 
(2) a standard or criterion 
 
                                                 
143 Who had appeared as Counsel in many of the leading cases in this area of law, including Re F 
[1990 2 AC, Re J [1991] Fam 33, Re T [1992] 3 WLR 782, Re T (Adult Refusal of 
Treatment)[1993] Fam 95, Re S [1993] 1 FLR 26 and Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 
789. 
144 P429 
145 P443, quoting from Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789 
146 Pp455 and 457 
147 At p465: “Doctors can properly claim expertise on medical matters; but they can claim no 
special expertise on the many non-medical matters which go to form the basis of any decision as 
to what is in a patient’s best interests. Medical opinion, however eminent, can never be 
determinative of what is in a patient’s best interests.” He even went so far as to say that, even if a 
court could not grant a mandatory order requiring an individual doctor to treat a patient, after Re 
J, he saw “no reason in principle why the court should not…grant declaratory relief against him” 
at p 487  
148 At p 463 para111 and again at p465 para116(12). 
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It is usually understood to indicate a test for something.149 Therefore, Munby J 
was suggesting that if the continued existence which treatment would offer was 
intolerable to the patient, his best interests permitted withdrawal/withholding of 
it. 
 
The judgment is impressively erudite, but it ranges way beyond the scope of Mr. 
Burke’s concerns. In essence Munby J equates best interests with the wishes of a 
competent patient,150 allowing him to say that “Important as the sanctity of life 
is, it may have to take second place to human dignity.” As a response to the fear 
engendered by the court sanction of death in Re A, these were powerful words. 
Patients heard the message, loud and clear, that they alone held the power to 
decide their treatment – even where doctors disagreed, and even if that meant 
choosing death over life. The power of doctors was curtailed, and families were 
ignored,151 but both disability rights groups and the pro-euthanasia lobby were 
delighted. 
 
The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, was dismayed. It could see where such a 
view of the law might lead, and was anxious to stop it.152 A single judgment153 
was handed down, in which the judges first analysed Mr. Burke’s fear, and then 
dismissed it as groundless,154 criticising the hijacking of his case by others with 
                                                 
149 Although it is doubtful that Munby J ever intended it to be seen quite so starkly, as the Court 
of Appeal recognised. Others however did seize on the touchstone approach as a workable tool 
(see for example the arguments of the parents in Portsmouth NHS Trust v. Wyatt [2005] EWHC 
693]. 
150 As the Court of Appeal noted at para 27. 
151 At least in so far as they might claim interests of their own. There would be space to recognise 
the patient’s interest in the family within the wide concept of best interests, and the family would 
have the right to refer a case to court if they felt that withholding/drawing ANH was contrary to 
the patient’s wishes or interests (p490 para 202), but the former is not a family interest, and the 
latter is more akin to a “substituted judgment” role than recognition of their own interests.  
152 And their fears were quickly justified - the public appetite for such an approach was 
considerable. Within 6 weeks, the Court of Appeal had cited parts of Munby’s judgment with 
approval in W Healthcare  NHS Trust v. H [2005] 1 WLR 834, and within 7 weeks, another high 
profile case had been decided which relied on an interest in dignity of death – Portsmouth NHS 
Trust v. Wyatt [2004] EWHC 2247, discussed below. 
153 Thereby increasing the force of the decision by emphasising its unity. 
154 From para 8 of his statement (para 6 of the judgment), “I am concerned that even if my death 
is not imminent, a doctor may be able to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration”. The 
dismissal came in para 13: “There are no grounds for thinking that those caring for a patient 
would be entitled to or would take a decision to withdraw ANH in such circumstances”; and 
again at para 40, “...the doctor with care of Mr. Burke would himself be obliged, so long as the 
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their own agenda.155 They curtly reprimanded Munby J for “setting out a 
textbook or a manual” and allowing the court to be “used as a general advice 
centre.”156 Paradoxically, they were so desperate to quash Munby J’s judgment, 
that they felt obliged to answer it point by point.157 They drove back the concept 
of best interests into context-dependency; and then in the context of treating an 
incompetent patient, they confined its meaning to an objective test.  
 
Two aspects of the Court of Appeal’s approach to best interests merit further 
attention. Firstly, the Court of Appeal rejected the ‘touchstone’ approach158 - the 
idea of a single benchmark, whatever the circumstances. This rather begged the 
second point, namely the scope of best interests considerations. Rather than 
addressing directly the issue of what factors may be relevant, the Court of 
Appeal simply stated that the concept is “easiest to apply when confined to a 
situation where the relevant interests are medical.”159 Does that mean that the 
intention was to limit the interests of incompetent patients to medical 
considerations only? 
 
It seems unlikely. Given the urgency to discredit expressly most of the 
conclusions of Munby J, the absence of contradiction of his inclusive view of 
best interests indicates tacit acceptance.160 It is indeed easier to assess best 
                                                                                                                                   
treatment was prolonging Mr. Burke’s life, to provide ANH in accordance with his expressed 
wish. We do not believe that this has ever been open to doubt.” 
155 Para 14. Mr. Burke’s litigation was supported by the Pro-Life lobby. See Charles Foster, 
“Burke: a Tale of Unhappy Endings” [2005] JPI Law 293.  
156 Paras 19 and 21. “The danger is that the court will enunciate propositions of principle without 
full appreciation of the implications that these will have in practice, throwing into confusion 
those who feel obliged to attempt to apply those principles in practice. The danger is particularly 
acute where the issues raised ethical questions that any court should be reluctant to address, 
unless driven to do so by the need to resolve a practical problem that requires the court’s 
intervention.” 
157 It would be “inappropriate to leave the judgment to be seized on and dissected by lawyers 
seeking supportive material for future cases…we counsel strongly against selective use of 
Munby J’s judgment in future cases.” Para 24 
158 Paras 62 & 63.  
159 Para 29. Such scant consideration of best interests has been criticised elsewhere. Charles 
Foster, in “Burke: a tale of unhappy endings” [2005] JPIL 293 at 301, accused the Court of 
Appeal of being “naïve and dangerous” in implying that judges need no help in deciding what 
“best interests” means – “A ‘best interests’ test  simpliciter is so elastic as to be meaningless”.   
160 At paragraph 24 the Court of Appeal acknowledged that “a great deal of what is contained in 
the body of the judgment is uncontroversial”. Numerous cases had already broadened the scope 
of best interest beyond medical interests to include ‘medical, emotional and all other welfare 
issues’, eg Re MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541 at 555, and Re A (Male 
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interests where the only considerations are medical, but that does not make it 
impermissible to include other considerations where appropriate. The context of 
the Court of Appeal judgment has to be considered just as much as the context of 
the best interests test, and the Court of Appeal was trying to squash a judgment 
which seemed to open the door to euthanasia for competent patients, not limit the 
interests of incompetent patients. Nonetheless there is retreat here from the 
previous willingness of differently formulated Courts of Appeal to adopt wider 
views. It is a reactionary judgment, entrenching the line that the earliest cases 
had established: strong respect for life, a principle of autonomy, and judicial 
assessment of best interests where patients are unable to decide for themselves.  
 
Rebutting the Preference, With Tools Salvaged in Retreat: Whilst the judgment 
of Munby J held sway, before the Court of Appeal took back the tiller, the 
common law held its breath.161 Others eager to rely on his judgment were forced 
to wait – for five months, in the case of the next standard-bearing litigation, that 
of Portsmouth NHS Trust v. Wyatt:162 
 
Baby Charlotte was born at 26 weeks gestation, with chronic 
respiratory and kidney problems and deficient brain growth. The 
medical evidence was that she had no sense of sight or sound and 
was effectively without volition; she experienced pain, but it was 
                                                                                                                                   
Sterilisation) [2001] 1 FLR 549 at 555. It is indeed easier to assess best interests where the only 
considerations are medical, but that does not make it impermissible to include other 
considerations where appropriate. The context of the Court of Appeal judgment has to be 
considered just as much as the context of the best interests test, and the Court of Appeal was 
trying to squash a judgment which seemed to open the door to euthanasia for competent patients, 
not limit the interests of incompetent patients. It is a reactionary judgment, entrenching the line 
that previous cases had established: strong respect for life, a principle of autonomy, and judicial 
assessment of best interests where patients are unable to decide for themselves.  
161 Although parts of Munby J’s judgment were cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in W 
Healthcare Trust v. H & Others [2005] 1 WLR 834 at para 24. 
162 [2005] EWCA Civ 1181. Per Wall LJ at para 40-42: “..the hearing of Mr. & Mrs. Wyatt’s 
appeal had unfortunately been substantially delayed. The reason for this was that at the date of 
the appellants’ notice (28th April 2005) there was pending in this court an appeal by the GMC 
against a decision of Munby J in Burke…In the course of his wide-ranging judgment Munby J 
had accepted a submission…in relation to the formulation of the “best interests” test on which 
Mr. and Mrs. Wyatt wished to rely, but which it was thought this court was likely to review…In 
the event this court’s judgment in Burke was not handed down until 28th July 2005 with the 
consequence that Mr. and Mrs. Wyatt’s appeal had to be heard in the long vacation. The result of 
this is that, when Mr. and Mrs. Wyatt’s appeal was heard in this court on 25th August, more than 
5 months had elapsed since Hedley J heard the evidence in the case, and more than 4 months 
since he had given judgment.” 
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doubtful whether she could feel pleasure. The medical team sought 
declarations authorising them not to use artificial ventilation if her 
condition deteriorated. Against the parents’ wishes, declarations 
were granted in October. Contrary to medical expectation, Charlotte 
survived the winter. Although there was no improvement in her 
condition, so that she remained terminally ill, its consequences were 
substantially ameliorated, and in particular her oxygen dependency 
was significantly improved. The parents applied to discharge the 
declarations. 
 
When Hedley J had granted the original declarations he identified the 
understanding and concept of ‘best interest’ as the true difficulty in the case.163 
He adopted a “generous interpretation,”164 but he allowed intolerability only as a 
“valuable guide” to, not a gloss on or supplementary test to best interests;165 and 
then he did the balance sheet exercise. In an echo of Munby J’s paeon to human 
dignity,166 he had included Charlotte’s interest in “securing a ‘good’ death”;167 in 
an echo of Ward J’s assessment of Mary in the conjoined twins case, he included 
her prospects of physical survival, on which the prognosis was minimal. 
Together these factors outweighed sanctity of life.  
 
Again, the judge had expressed discomfort at reaching conclusions contrary to 
parental wishes.168 He asked himself what weight was to be attached to their 
views. This verbal formulation might suggest acknowledgment that parental 
views are actually an interest of the patient’s to be put into the balancing 
exercise, but the answer he gave himself belies such an interpretation, for he 
                                                 
163 [2004] EWHC 2247 at para 22. 
164 [2004] EWHC 2247 at para 23. He went on to quote from Re A (Male Sterilisation) and Re S 
(Adult Patient: Sterilisation). 
165 [2004] EWHC 2247 at para 24. He explained at para 38 that “Although I believe and find that 
further invasive treatment would be intolerable to Charlotte, I prefer to determine her best 
interests on the basis of finding what is the best that can be done for her.” 
166 Munby J had given judgment in Burke on 30th July 2004; Hedley J gave judgment in Wyatt on 
7th October 2004. At para 27, Hedley J set out the “fundamental principles of sanctity of life, the 
best interests of Charlotte…and her inherent right to respect for her dignity.” (italics added) 
167At para 28. “It would be absurd to try to describe that concept more fully beyond saying that 
everyone in this case knows what it means – not under anaesthetic, not in the course of painful 
and futile treatment, but peacefully in the arms of those who love her most.” 
168 See para 34 and 39: “it is my one regret that my search has lead to a different answer than that 
sought by these parents.” 
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simply restated the conventional approach.169 A respectful, and critical, attitude 
to parental views was all that he considered to be required – even when the 
parents were conducting themselves entirely appropriately.170 
 
By the time the application to discharge the declarations was heard, the stress of 
the situation was telling on everybody, and the conduct of the parents was much 
more challenging. The family had reported the doctors to the police, claiming 
serious offences in relation to her care. Mr. Wyatt had to be accompanied on all 
hospital visits by a member of security staff, following an assault on medics. 
Further proceedings had been necessary to extend the ambit of clinical discretion 
after Mr. Wyatt sought to intervene in routine decisions about drug levels to be 
administered.171  
 
Hedley J stuck to his view of best interests,172 and was more robust in his 
support for the majority medical opinion.173 This time there was no expression of 
discomfort at disagreeing with the parental view when he refused their 
application.  
 
It was the approach to intolerability which necessitated delay in the case. The 
parents wished to rely on the touchstone approach, arguing that Charlotte’s life 
was not intolerable to her.174. Once the Court of Appeal in Burke had rejected 
that approach, the Court of Appeal in Wyatt was able to support Hedley J. 
Although ‘intolerability’ was ruled out as a ‘touchstone’, the concept was not 
banished altogether – presumably because as a tool for judgment, it is too useful. 
Wall LJ’s formulation of its role is a masterful exercise in obfuscation: 
                                                 
169 Namely that he should “remind [him]self in [his] consideration of Charlotte’s best interests 
that Mr. and Mrs. Wyatt know her best. [He] should pay proper attention to their intuitive 
feelings whilst reminding myself that they may project those on to Charlotte.” (para 34) 
170 At para 42, Hedley J acknowledged “the dignity” of the parents and their “commitment” to 
Charlotte, showing “a generous spirit in adversity”.  
171 See Hedley J [2005] EWHC 693 at para 18, and Wall LJ [2005] EWCA 1181 at para 21. 
172 More confidently, since it had by then been affirmed by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss in Re L 
(A Child)[2004] EWHC 2713, as Hedley J pointed out at para 14. 
173 “I am quite clear that it would not be in Charlotte’s best interests to die in the course of futile 
aggressive treatment” para 16. 
174 See para.s 59-62 of the CA decision. It is worth noting that Mr. and Mrs. Wyatt were 
represented by David Wolfe QC, who had acted for the Disability Rights Counsel in Burke and 
whose submission in that case posited to Munby J the notion of intolerability as a touchstone for 
best interests. 
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“ whilst ‘intolerable to the child’ should not be seen as either a gloss 
on or a  supplementary guide to best interests, it is….a valuable 
guide in the search for best interests in this kind of case.”175  
 
What is the difference between a “supplementary” guide and a “valuable” guide? 
The answer lies in Wall LJ’s reasons for rejecting the touchstone approach: 
 
“..the forensic debate should… be unfettered by any potentially 
contentious gloss on the best interests test which are likely either 
inappropriately to shift the focus of debate, or to restrict the broad 
exercise of the judicial discretion involved in balancing the 
multifarious factors in the case.”176   
 
In other words, judges can use intolerability to help them make their own 
decision; but no one else must use intolerability to tell judges what decision to 
make. It is a difference of locus of power. The Court of Appeal’s decision 
displays determination to keep decisions about life and death treatment 
exclusively in the hands of the judiciary. There is a public interest in life-and-
death medical decisions for patients lacking capacity, and the best interests test is 
manipulated by the court to ensure its protection. 
 
Instead of permitting any “gloss” on the discretionary interpretation of the best 
interests test, Wall LJ restated the established principles in a list of “intellectual 
milestones”177 for judges. This approach – which is nothing more than a revision 
guide - proved more useful to judges, as was demonstrated when the court was 
next asked to implement the best interests test: 
 
                                                 
175 Para 91 
176 Para 86 
177 Para 87: “The judge must decide what is in the child’s best interests. In making that decision 
the welfare of the child is paramount, and the judge must look at the question from the assumed 
point of view of the patient…There is a strong presumption in favour of a course of action which 
will prolong life, but that presumption is not irrebuttable…The term ‘best interests’ encompasses 
medical, emotional, and all other welfare issues…The court must conduct a balancing exercise in 
which all the relevant factors are weighed….and a helpful way of undertaking this exercise is to 
draw up a balance sheet.” 
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An NHS Trust v. MB:178 M was an 18 month old child with severe 
spinal muscular atrophy. He had virtually no movement other than of 
his eyes, and he had been unable to breath without artificial 
ventilation for more than 7 months. Early death was inevitable, but 
he was conscious, and assumed to be able to see, hear and feel touch, 
with an awareness of his surroundings and people. The Trust sought 
leave to withdraw ventilation, but the parents wanted a tracheostomy 
for long-term ventilation. 
 
There were significant differences to Wyatt on both sides of the argument. The 
treatment in question was the same, but here the medical team were trying to 
stop something they had already started, rather than secure approval for never 
starting it in the first place. And the parents were unimpeachable.179 The medical 
team apparently saw no difference between M’s condition and Charlotte’s,180 but 
the judge did.181 Though small, the benefits M experienced in life were sufficient 
to tip the balancing scales in favour of continued treatment. Escalated treatment, 
however, would not be justified. 
 
                                                 
178 [2006] EWHC 507 in which Holman J at para 17, “doubt[ed] [his] own intellectual capacity 
on the one hand to exclude [intolerability] even as a ‘gloss on’, much less supplementary test to, 
best interests; and yet on the other hand treat it as a ‘valuable guide’. If it means no more than 
that the conclusion that is in the best interests of the patient to be allowed to die should only be 
reached in a clear and strong case, then that is already part of the intellectual milestones..” For 
him intolerability “really expresses a conclusion rather than provides a test.”  
179 Holman J described the mother’s commitment at some length at para 42: “Almost every day 
she is at the hospital and with him from about 12 noon until about 8.45pm – ie over 8 hours and 
longer at weekends…I have to caution myself that she cannot, because of her relationship, be 
objective; but it is the fact that no one other person has spent so much time with M and been as 
intimate in their contact with him. I do consider that she is, in various respects, very 
understandably and humanly, deluding herself. But I consider her to be entirely honest in 
evidence; and even if not wholly objectively reliable, considerable weight has to be attached to 
her account as a source of evidence.” 
180 Eight doctors of consultant status made statements supporting the Trust, but none of them 
made any reference to, or gave any recognition of, any possible current pleasure or benefit to M 
from his life: para 26. 
181 Para.s 63- 69. Then at para 102 “It is impossible to put a mathematical or any other value on 
the benefits. But they are precious and real and they are the benefits, and only benefits, that M 
was destined to gain from his life. I do not consider that from one day to the next all the routine 
discomforts, distress and pain that the doctors describe…outweigh those benefits so that I can 
say that it is in his best interests that those benefits, and life itself, should immediately end. On 
the contrary, I positively consider that as his life does still have benefits, and is his life, it should 
be enabled to continue…” 
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How much was the decision based on the fact that artificial ventilation had 
already been started? Such reasoning was not expressed. M’s condition had 
deteriorated since its commencement. Reasoning along these lines would have 
suggested that doctors could never review the appropriateness of treatment – 
clearly an absurd proposition.  
 
How much instead was the decision to do with regard for the parents? 
Comparison with the subsequent cases of Re K (A Child)(Medical Treatment: 
Declaration)182 and Re B (Medical Treatment)183 suggests that the parental role 
was significantly contributory. Certainly it would have been very harsh to a 
selflessly devoted mother to grant the application. M was not in a persistent 
vegetative state. Whatever the legal niceties, it would have felt like there was no 
distinction between stopping treatment and causing death. How much was it due 
to the fundamental respect for sanctity of life? It took only very small benefits to 
attract the protection of the court. 
 
Conclusions: The approach of the courts to disputes about life-preserving 
treatment has now crystallised.184 The best interest test has been shaped by a 
moral debate about dominion over life and death. Preservation of life is a clear 
first judicial preference, but life is not sacred beyond all other considerations, 
and the preference can be rebutted. The ultimate decision may be more moral 
than legal, but courts demonstrate persistent determination to hold determining 
authority, in preference to either medics or families.  
 
                                                 
182 [2006] EWHC 1007. Sir Mark Potter P himself makes the comparison at para.s 53 – 57 inc. 
Listing the differences between the cases, he includes as a positive factor for M that “he is in a 
close relationship with a family that have spent and are able to spend very considerable time with 
him”. In contrast, K’s parents had been unable to care for her and she had been taken into care 
from birth. Her mother was kept informed of K’s condition and accepted the move to palliative 
care; her father said that he visited daily, but did not oppose the application. The only reference 
to their active involvement in caring was the proposal that K could spend her last days in a 
hospice, where the parents could also stay, being provided with full care and hotel services.  
183 [2008] EWHC 1996, where the profoundly disabled child’s mother was herself a minor, and 
the child was being looked after by foster carers.  
184 See for example the recent cases of Re B (A Child) (Medical treatment) [2008] EWHC 1996 
and Re OT [2009] EWHC 633. The case note of the latter recites the highlights of the cases listed 
above, almost with an air of ennui, and the case itself firmly asserts compliance of the court 
approach with the European Convention. 
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When life in all but the narrowest sense is lost already, the House of Lords 
determined that the best interests test could not be relevant, but on the way the 
Court of Appeal showed how it could encompass much wider concerns than 
purely the patient-focused. Unfortunately the two cases which most reflect this 
wide interpretation, Re T and Re A (Conjoined Twins), were characterised by loss 
of life, or the expectation of it. Taken up by pro-euthanasia campaigners in 
Burke, the court was driven into retreat, out of public interest considerations. 
Subsequent cases reserved the notion of ‘intolerability’ as a prop for judicial 
thinking, but left ‘best interest’ considerations in the thrall of the first preference 
for preservation of life, and once again bound to a patient-focused, medically-
centred interpretation.   
 
It need not be so. Even if the court is to retain ultimate authority, in the balancing 
exercise they have adopted a mechanism for decision-making which is 
consciously liberated from strict principle or ethic, and looks instead to 
protection and pragmatism. As select authorities demonstrate, there is space 
within the existing milestones (in logic and in practice), to accommodate family 
interests, both in their own right and in competition with the patient’s. It does not 
undermine the patient’s interests to put them in context, anymore than opinions 
are quashed by hearing two sides of the argument. On the contrary: it strengthens 
a valid case, and shows up the weakness of an invalid one. If fear of treatment 
decisions which do not preserve life is not enough to exclude judicial capacity 
for making them, then neither should it be sufficient to exclude from 
consideration factors which may incline judicial thinking that way. 
 
 
 
C. Borderline capacity 
 
One of the clearest, and most treasured, tenets of medical law is that the 
autonomous patient can refuse treatment, even if - on any objective assessment - 
it would be in his best interests to accept it. A competent patient can reject what 
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is good for him for any reason, or indeed for no reason at all.185 It is a fine and 
liberal principle, deservedly at the heart of a society that wishes to be open to the 
freedoms of its citizens. 
 
However in reality, when patients make decisions which apparently run counter 
to the best interests of their health, there is a clash of expectations. The instinct 
of the medical profession to heal is affronted. The response is often to question 
the capacity of the patient to make her own decision. If a patient lacks capacity 
to make a treatment decision, then the doctor is free to treat according to his own 
perception of the patient’s best interests. 
 
When the dispute is referred to the higher authority of the judiciary, the court’s 
bluff is called: how far will the law really leave people to suffer the 
consequences of their own decisions? The court holds the power to determine 
capacity, and therefore performs a ‘gate-keeping’186 role to the exercise of 
autonomous choice. Before the patient can choose to refuse, she must first satisfy 
the judge that she is capable of making the choice. Judicial determination of 
competency, or rather the absence of it, shuts off individual choice and opens the 
door to judicial – and therefore objective - assessment of best interests.   
 
Consideration of medical treatment cases where courts first determined the 
existence or otherwise of competence, reveals something about both the content 
of ‘best interests’ as a judicial concept, and the reality behind the principle of 
autonomous choice. Once again, the source of the (potential) incapacity makes a 
difference, and it is therefore necessary to consider adult and minor patients 
separately.  
 
Adult Patients 
Adults are assumed to be competent unless the contrary is shown. However, the 
existence of a right to choose whether or not to accept treatment does not 
                                                 
185 “It matters not whether the reasons … were rational or irrational, unknown or even non-
existent” per Lord Donaldson in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 782 at p115. 
186 A phrase used by Huxtable in ‘Whatever you want? Beyond the Patient in Medical Law’ 
(2008) Health Care Anal 288 at p295. 
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necessarily imply that the right has been exercised; and even if some preference 
has been expressed, its extent and limits may be open to question. In situations of 
medical crisis, the very fact of decision-making is laden with opportunity for 
challenge. 
 
When a choice is not a choice: In the case of Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment)187  the patient’s apparent choice to refuse treatment put her life in 
jeopardy. Although doctors were prepared to accept her refusal, some family 
members were not: 
 
T was aged 20, and 34 weeks pregnant. After sustaining injuries in a 
road traffic accident she was taken into hospital, where she was 
diagnosed as suffering from pneumonia. Drugs were administered 
but her condition deteriorated. T spontaneously said that she did not 
want blood transfusion, although none was in contemplation at the 
time.  
 
In premature labour, T was moved to a maternity hospital where it 
was decided to deliver the baby by Caesarean section. When T 
reiterated her refusal of blood transfusion, she was reassured that 
transfusion was not usually necessary; and when she asked about 
alternatives, she was given a falsely optimistic assessment. T then 
signed a refusal of consent form, without either reading it or being 
given an explanation.  
 
The baby was still born, and T’s condition deteriorated further, 
falling into unconsciousness. T’s father and boyfriend applied to 
court for a declaration that it would not be unlawful to administer a 
blood transfusion. 
 
                                                 
187 [1992] 3 WLR 782 
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In a late sitting at the judge’s lodging, Ward J found that T was not fully rational 
when she signed the refusal form, due to her condition and the effects of narcotic 
medication. He granted the declaration, and the blood transfusion was given.  
 
In an emergency situation, where the patient’s life was in danger, and the 
treatment proposed uncontroversial to the majority of the population, judicial 
instinct was to question capacity and find it wanting, on the basis of the very 
condition which demanded its exercise; and then to protect the patient from 
herself. As the law was applied, T had lost her competency a good while before 
she lost consciousness.  
 
Two days later, at the full hearing, the medical evidence changed. Ward J then 
felt compelled to conclude instead that T’s ability to make a rational decision 
was intact when she signed the refusal form. Nonetheless, he stuck to his 
conclusion of incapacity, justifying it instead by the misinformation about 
alternative treatments: T had been lulled into a false sense of security, so that her 
refusal did not extend to the situation of emergency which subsequently 
transpired.  
 
In other words, although T had freely refused treatment, she had not understood 
that to mean refusal of the only possible life-saving treatment, and therefore her 
refusal was not valid when that became the reality. She had not chosen enough 
for the court to allow autonomy to carry the day. 
 
The Official Solicitor appealed. The Court of Appeal would have been prepared 
to find that T lacked capacity on the basis of her medical condition alone188 - 
which suggests that it would be difficult for anyone in circumstances of medical 
crisis to satisfy the conditions of autonomy sufficiently to make a valid refusal of 
(relatively minor but) life-saving treatment – but the appeal was decided on 
different grounds. T’s spontaneous rejection of blood transfusion, and its 
repetition at the maternity hospital, had been voiced when only her mother was 
                                                 
188 Per Lord Donaldson at p 111: “I think that there is abundant evidence which would have 
justified this court in substituting findings that T was not in a physical or mental condition which 
enabled her to reach a decision binding on the medical authorities 
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with her, and her mother was a Jehovah’s Witness.189 The influence of the 
mother’s faith had been a bone of contention throughout T’s life190 and was 
central to the Court of Appeal’s view of her ability to make her own decisions. 
All three judges were agreed that the influence exerted by her mother would 
alone have been sufficient to vitiate T’s supposed autonomy.191  
 
The Court of Appeal decision draws a line between individual autonomy and 
family support. T’s mother was counselling her daughter at a time of need in the 
way that she thought best. We cannot know what support T derived from her 
mother’s presence at her bedside, beyond what can be inferred from T not asking 
her mother to leave. The offering of advice and assistance is welcomed by the 
court - up to a point192 - but when advice and assistance becomes direction,193 the 
locus of decision-making authority is altered and autonomy is overborne.  
 
The very circumstance of medical decision-making, and the fact of intimate 
relationship, collude in a tendency to reach the point of overbearing sooner than 
may otherwise be the case: 
 
                                                 
189 Ward J had been aware of “the mother’s fervent belief in the sin of blood transfusion” (quoted 
by Butler-Sloss LJ at p 118), but it had not formed the stated basis of his conclusions. 
190 T’s parents had separated when she was a young child. T had originally stayed with her father, 
until her mother refused to return her, when there were contested residence proceedings. T’s 
custody was given to the mother, but she was forbidden to bring T up as Jehovah’s Witness. 
Although T grew up in a household where her mother pursued her beliefs, she was never 
baptised. Aged 17, T had gone to live with her grandmother and resumed a relationship with her 
father. The following year she had started living with her boyfriend, thereby choosing a lifestyle 
in contradiction to Jehovah’s Witness beliefs. 
191 As Lord Donaldson continued, “ even if, …she would otherwise have been in a position to 
reach such a decision, the influence of her mother was such as to vitiate the decision which she 
expressed.”  
192 The patient is “entitled to receive and indeed invite advice and assistance from others in 
reaching a decision, particularly from members of the family. But the doctors have to consider 
whether the decision is really that of the patient. It is wholly acceptable that the [patient should 
have been persuaded by others of the merits of such a decision and have decided accordingly. It 
matters not how strong the persuasion was, so long as it did not overbear the independence of the 
patient’s decision. The real question in each case is “Does the patient really mean what he says or 
is he merely saying it for a quiet life, to satisfy someone else or because the advice and 
persuasion to which he has been subjected is such that he can no longer think and decide for 
himself?”  per Lord Donaldson at p113. 
193 And when the advice in question is contrary to medical opinion it is likely to be seen as 
crossing the line between support and direction rather sooner than if it supports medical 
orthodoxy. If T’s mother had not been a Jehovah’s Witness, and had been counselling her 
daughter to accept blood transfusion would her influence have been challenged? 
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“When considering the effects of outside influences, two aspects can 
be of crucial importance. First the strength of will of the patient. One 
who is very tired, in pain or depressed194 will be much less able to 
resist having his will overborne than one who is rested, free from 
pain and cheerful. Second, the relationship of the ‘persuader’ to the 
patient may be of crucial importance. The influence of parents on 
their children or of one spouse on the other can be, but is by no 
means necessarily, much stronger than would be the case in other 
relationships.”195 
 
So, almost by definition, the family’s role in medical treatment decisions is, 
according to this view, to be excluded.  
 
Yet it was also family members who took T’s situation to court,196 thereby 
enabling the court to become involved.  The driving force behind the 
interpretation of T’s decision at both levels of court is not exclusion of families, 
but simple protectionism. Ward J, in a situation of immediate crisis, prioritised 
life over autonomy, denying the latter in order to secure the former. The Court of 
Appeal would have done the same, but in greater leisure could dress its 
conclusions in the language of individual autonomy.197 Even then, the apparent 
support for autonomy is illusory. Autonomy is not preserved; it is simply 
replaced by the court, instead of by the family.  
 
For T, the result was that she was denied effective support from anywhere. The 
medical information was dismissed by the court because it was misleading;198 
                                                 
194 Which must surely encompass just about everybody with a significant medical decision to 
make! 
195 Per Lord Donaldson at p114 
196 Lord Donaldson at p106 actually criticises the doctors for not referring the matter to court: 
“T’s father and [boyfriend] decided to seek the assistance of the court. Quite how they set about 
it I do not know, but it was an unusual and…praiseworthy initiative. It was also one 
which...should have been taken by the hospital authorities themselves on the Monday.” 
197 As a mechanism for restricting family influence it is clumsy and tactless. How much more 
effective in preventing undue influence would it be to give overt recognition to family views? 
Once out in the open, the threat of hidden influence recedes. The family view can be dismissed 
on its own merits, without insult to a patient’s competence.   
198 If ‘misleading’ advice vitiates autonomy, then doctors have a simple way of manoeuvring all 
patients that they want to treat into a situation of non-autonomy. The suggestion may be cynical, 
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and the mother’s advice was dismissed because it was overbearing. T was 
therefore deemed incapable of making a decision at all, and the court stepped in 
to apply its own best interests test.  
 
What lies behind the court’s need to take control is the conflict between two 
interests – that of the patient, and that of the society in which he lives.199 It may 
be clear in law that in the ultimate the right of the individual is paramount, but in 
practice the effect of conflict is simply to shift the position of the problem, and 
require a very careful examination of whether, and if so the way in which, the 
individual is exercising that right. In cases of doubt, as Re T demonstrates, the 
courts come down on the side of public interest200 and the preference for life 
over death, at quite a high cost to the integrity of the individual. 
 
The understanding of capacity: In order to achieve the protectionist outcome, the 
understanding of what capacity is gets distorted. Throughout the judgments of Re 
T, ‘autonomy’ is discussed in very robust terms, as if it is a clear and absolute 
condition, when in reality (and particularly in illness), it is more likely to be 
experienced in shades of grey. Lord Donaldson was looking for a capacity 
“commensurate with the gravity of the decision”201 to be made. The more serious 
the decision, he said, the greater the capacity required – and what could be more 
serious than a life-and-death decision?  
 
This understanding of capacity persists through the cases that followed,202 but it 
is ethically mistaken, because it conflates seriousness of effect with complexity 
of the decision-making process when in logic and in reality, there is no such 
                                                                                                                                   
but there is an obvious parallel with the paternalistic practice of bowdlerising the information 
given to minor patients, with the end result that their understanding is so partial as to enable their 
views to be discounted: see for example Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 
FLR 810. 
199 As Lord Donaldson explicitly acknowledged at p112: “The patient’s interest consists of his 
right to self-determination – his right to live his own life how he wishes, even if it will damage 
his health or lead to his premature death. Society’s interest is in upholding the concept that all 
human life is sacred and that it should be preserved if at all possible.”  
200 Lord Donaldson is unapologetic about this at p112: “doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the 
preservation of life for if the individual is to override the public interest, he must do so in clear 
terms”. 
201 At p113 
202 See for example Thorpe J in LB v. Croydon DHA [1995] 1 FCR 332 at p773, and Butler-Sloss 
LJ in Re MB [1997] 2 FLR 426 at p 437 
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corollary between the two.203 In truth, the corollary is between seriousness of 
effect and court difficulty in acceptance.  
 
Only when the issue came before the courts in a medical timeframe of 
comparative leisure, was the court able to express a more informed approach to 
the assessment of competence:  
 
Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment):204  The 68 year old patient was a 
chronic schizophrenic serving a prison sentence in a secure hospital. 
His ulcerated foot became gangrenous. He refused to consent to 
amputation, but agreed to more conservative treatment, which 
averted the immediate crisis. When the hospital refused to give any 
undertaking not to amputate in the future, C sought an injunction to 
prevent amputation without written consent. 
 
Thorpe J identified three stages of making the decision as to medical 
treatment:205 firstly, taking in and retaining treatment information; secondly, 
believing it; and thirdly weighing that information, balancing risks and needs. 
C’s reason for refusing amputation, that he would “rather die with two feet than 
live with one,”206 would not be compelling for most of us, but the medical 
evidence failed to establish that his general capacity was so impaired by 
schizophrenia as to render him incapable of any stage of the decision-making 
process. Therefore his right to self-determination was not displaced, and the 
injunction was granted.  
 
On the face of it, this decision seems boldly supportive of autonomy, even where 
its exercise would mean the loss of a preservable life, but how bold was it really? 
C’s right to make an absurd choice was upheld at a time when the decision was 
merely a hypothetical one (and he had already proved the medical predictions of 
death without amputation false on one occasion). It is a moot point whether the 
                                                 
203 See earlier discussion in chapter 2. 
204 [1994] 1 WLR 290 
205 At p 292 
206 At p291 
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same court would have had the courage of that conviction if the proceedings had 
been brought not as an injunction, but in the throes of medical emergency. It 
would not seem difficult to recast a preference for two dead feet over one living 
one, not as idiosyncrasy, but as failure to weigh information and balance risk. 
 
Exactly such recasting is implicit between the first instance and Court of Appeal 
judgments in LB v. Croydon District Health Authority,207 where the tension 
between the court’s urge to secure the public interest in saving lives and the need 
to make findings about individual competency was next tested: 
 
LB was a young woman of 24, who had been abused as a child and 
now suffered a personality disorder, which was expressed in a 
pattern of self-harming behaviour. Restrained in hospital, without 
access to any implements by which she may cause herself injury, LB 
instead denied herself food. Her physical health deteriorated to the 
point where the medical team wanted to tube-feed her. LB applied to 
court for a declaration that she should not be medically fed against 
her will. The immediate crisis was averted when LB started to eat 
voluntarily again, but the proceedings continued because both the 
Health Authority and the patient wanted to know the legal position, 
in case the same situation arose again. 
 
The background causes to LB’s condition, and the behaviour she adopted as a 
coping mechanism, were distressing but this was compounded by a woeful 
failure of the system to offer her the only treatment which really offered any 
hope of improving her condition, namely psychotherapy. Treatment by tube-
feeding was the equivalent of applying sticking plaster to an ulcerated wound; 
and any form of compulsion merely compounded the sense of abuse. 
 
In that context, Thorpe J was unusually sensitive to the psychological effect on 
the patient of a finding of incapacity. He determined that LB had capacity to 
carry out all three stages of the decision-making process that led to refusal of 
                                                 
207 [1995] 1 FCR 332 
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food. In case that conclusion was questioned208 (as he must have known it was 
likely to be) he also made an alternative finding that, if she lacked the necessary 
competence, tube-feeding would not be in her best interests unless her physical 
state became so low as to threaten survival.209 At common law, therefore, Thorpe 
J’s decision would have allowed the patient her autonomy, precisely up to the 
point where the public interest in preserving life came into play, and no further.  
 
The Court of Appeal would not have been so generous. Although they made no 
decision on capacity, Hoffmann LJ expressed doubts210  about Thorpe J’s 
finding, with which Neill LJ211 agreed: he  
 
“found it hard to accept that someone who acknowledges that in 
refusing food at the critical time she did not appreciate the extent to 
which she was hazarding her life, was crying inside for help but 
unable to break out of the routine of punishing herself, could be said 
to be capable of making a true choice as to whether or not to eat.” 
 
There is force in these concerns, but also unnecessary cruelty to the patient. In 
his overall determination of the case, Thorpe J achieved a result which was 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal, without dealing the patient such a blow. His 
order empowered the Health Authority to force feed LB in extremis, but also 
empowered LB (a critical factor in the care of self-harming victims of abuse), 
with the hope that the extreme situation would therefore not be reached.212   
 
                                                 
208 The Health Authority cross-appealed against the findings on capacity, but determination by 
the Court of Appeal was not necessary because the main appeal failed.    
209 The reasons he gave for this conclusion were “First, the refusal is an expression of the 
patient’s core personality. Second, the treatment would inevitably be regarded by the patient as a 
repetition in adult life of the invasive abuse suffered in childhood. Third, the consequence of 
treatment would be to magnify the disorder and thus further reduce the already poor prognosis 
for the only recognized treatment…Fourth, the patient is driven to her current position by a 
restrictive caring regime and by the absence of any present or proposed treatment plan.” (p344) 
210 At page 140 
211 At pg142. 
212 Such an interpretation of Thorpe J’s decision is supported both by the reasons he gave (see 
footnote 24) and by his damning statements about the lack of treatment plan and poor prognosis 
even if appropriate therapy was provided.    
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The Court of Appeal did not have to make a finding on the question of capacity 
because the case was centred on statutory provisions, since LB was detained 
under the Mental Health Act. Section 63 of that Act dispenses with the 
requirement of consent of the detained patient in respect of treatment given for 
the mental disorder from which she is suffering.213 Both courts accepted both 
that tube-feeding fell within the definition of ‘treatment’,214 and that it was to be 
administered to LB in connection with her mental disorder.215  Therefore, the 
Health Authority did not have to prove her lack of capacity. “Statute 
…legalize(d) what the common law would not.”216 
 
Thorpe J found this “disquieting,”217 and his declarations218 operated to limit the 
power of the doctors. When s63 removed the need for consent, the only 
constraint on the doctors was their professional obligation to treat the patient 
according to her best interests; and Thorpe J limited that to life-saving 
situations.219 His is a notably humane judgment, fully expressive of his 
experience as a judge of the Family Division. By comparison, the Court of 
Appeal’s greater willingness to dismiss LB’s capacity suggests not just a 
deference to statute, but a wider judicial tendency to honour the principle of a 
                                                 
213 As long as it is given by or under the direction of the Responsible Medical Officer. 
214 At p 345: “Naso-gastric feeding is a medical procedure which, in my judgment, could not 
possibly be said to fall outside the broad band of ‘care under medical supervision’.” 
215 The connection between the treatment under consideration and the mental disorder may be 
indirect and the treatment still fall within the authority of s63. For example, in Tameside & 
Glossop Acute Services Trust v. CH [1996] 1 FLR 762, the schizophrenic patient had a 
delusional belief that obstetric advice would be harmful to her baby. In the circumstance, 
treatment by Caesarean section was declared lawful pursuant to s63. 
216 Thorpe J at p 345 
217 And so it is, as this case demonstrated: where “the basis for detention is borderline personality 
disorder, where the patient does not lack capacity, where, save in extreme circumstances, to 
impose treatment would not be in the patient’s best interests” (p345), the effect of the statute is 
extremely draconian and illiberal. Thorpe J found some comfort in the Code of Practice – an 
advisory document which s118 of the statute obliges the Secretary of State to prepare for the 
guidance of medical professionals, and which requires (at least in its extant form, which the 
Secretary of State has powers to revise) medical professionals to seek consent from patients with 
capacity, even if the treatment falls within s63. In truth the comfort to be drawn from this is thin, 
for the Code is nothing more than aspirational. 
218 That ‘tube feeding for the purpose of saving LB’s life and/or alleviating symptoms of 
starvation would be medical treatment for her disorder within the meaning of s63.’ 
219 It is fair to point out that Thorpe J’s assessment of LB’s best interests went further towards 
meeting her wishes –and therefore was more respectful of autonomy – than did the doctors’, but 
it was still limited by the urge to protect the public interest in preserving life. He decided this 
case only 2 years (12th May 1992 to 20th July 1994) after he had decided the case of Re W in 
respect of an anorexic teenager. There too his generous findings of capacity were circumvented, 
by precedent which allowed him to override refusal and approve treatment ‘in the patient’s best 
interests’. 
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right to refuse treatment more in avoidance than observance.  When a proposed 
treatment offers to save life, refusal of it can easily be seen as evidence of 
incapacity to decide. 
 
Whose life is it anyway?: Nor is it only the life of the patient which invites lip-
service to autonomy, as the viable pregnancy cases reveal. In each case, the court 
decision secured successful delivery of the baby, at the expense of negative 
findings of maternal capacity: 
 
Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare Trust v. W220 : W arrived at the 
hospital in labour but denying that she was pregnant. The 
obstetrician sought authority to end the labour by means of forceps 
delivery or Caesarean section if necessary. Johnson J determined 
that, whether or not she was capable of comprehending, retaining and 
believing information about treatment, W was not able to balance the 
information given to her, and therefore lacked competence; and that 
termination of the labour would be in her best interests, in protecting 
both her physical health from the dangers of carrying a dead foetus 
and her mental health from the feelings of guilt if, by her refusal to 
consent, she caused its death. 
 
Johnson J interrupted the hearing in the Norfolk & Norwich case to determine a 
similar application, in which there was just fifteen minutes left before 
intervention would be too late to save lives: 
 
Rochdale Healthcare (NHS Trust) v. C:221 The patient had negative 
previous experience of Caesarean, and said that she would rather die 
than have another. The obstetrician’s opinion was that her capacity 
was not in doubt, but the Judge determined that a patient who could 
speak in terms which seemed to accept the inevitability of her own 
death was not able properly to weigh up considerations so as to make 
                                                 
220 [1996] 2 FLR 613 
221 [1997] 1 FCR 274 
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a valid decision, and the proposed intervention in labour was in her 
best interests for the same reasons as given in Norfolk & Norwich.  
  
The other two cases came before different judges: 
 
Re L (Patient: Non-consensual Treatment)222 : The patient agreed to 
Caesarean delivery in principle but could not consent to the 
necessary anaesthesia because of a needle phobia. Kirkwood J 
determined that the phobia amounted to an involuntary compulsion 
which rendered her incapable of weighing relevant treatment 
information, and she therefore lacked capacity. 
 
Re MB (Medical Treatment)223  : The Court of Appeal confirmed 
Hollis J’s declarations of lawfulness where the patient’s needle 
phobia caused her to panic and withdraw consent to Caesarean 
section. (Having the advantage of consideration without the time 
pressure of medical emergency, the appeal court also seized the 
opportunity to provide guidance for future cases.224)  
 
On every occasion the court was at pains to express itself concerned exclusively 
with the interests of the woman herself,225 and avoid any consideration of foetal 
interests. But, no matter how clear the law is, judges are human beings, and the 
ethical dilemma of a viable foetus remains.226 The desire to secure safe delivery 
of the child demonstrably had an effect on the court’s decisions as to capacity. 
                                                 
222 [1997] 2 FLR 837 
223 [1997] 2 FLR 426 
224 For an interesting critique of how the Court of Appeal, in upholding Hollis J’s decisions on 
the facts, actually failed to live up their own guidelines see Michalowski, ‘Court-Authorised 
Ceasarean Sections – The End of a Trend?’ [1999] Modern Law Review 115.  
225 Johnson J even made this explicit in Norfolk & Norwich at p616: “Throughout this judgment I 
have referred to ‘the foetus’ because I wished to emphasise that the focus of my judicial attention 
was upon the interests of the patient herself and not upon the interests of the foetus which she 
bore.” The Court of Appeal in Re MB unequivocally rejected any jurisdiction to take the interests 
of the foetus into account, even though the ratio of decision did not require such a statement.   
226 As the Court of Appeal pointed out in Re MB at p440. 
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Johnson J expressly acknowledged the reality227 behind his legal language in one 
case, and happily related the actual outcome of the case in the other,228 accepting 
the woman’s capacity to consent to the treatment he had approved without the 
slightest hint of irony.229 Kirkwood J began her deferred judgment with the 
mother’s expression of delight at the outcome of a healthy baby,230 as if it were 
ex post facto justification of the court’s decision – which the fourth case shows it 
truly to be, because in that case, the patient was not delighted at the outcome, 
and sued for damages:  
 
St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S231  :  MS consulted a GP 
when 36 weeks pregnant and was found to be suffering from pre-
eclampsia. She was advised that both her own and the baby’s life 
would be at risk unless the baby was delivered urgently, but she 
rejected that advice because she wanted a natural birth. The GP 
arranged for her to be seen by an Approved232 Social Worker, who 
arranged for MS to be detained in Springfield, a mental hospital, 
under s2 of the Mental Health Act. She was transferred to a general 
hospital, St George’s, where she continued to refuse consent to 
treatment. Hogg J granted St George’s ex parte application for a 
declaration dispensing with the need for consent for Caesarean 
section. 
 
In the perceived need for speed, significant mistakes were made – all against the 
interest of the patient as an autonomous adult. The judge was never told that S 
had instructed solicitors, or that she and they were ignorant of the legal 
proceedings. Counsel misinformed the judge that S had been in labour for 24 
                                                 
227 He continued, after the sentence quoted in footnote 219, “However, the reality was that the 
foetus was a fully formed child, capable of normal life if only it could be delivered from the 
mother.” 
228 “ …in the time it had taken to come to court, the patient had changed her mind and given her 
consent to the procedure”: Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust v. C [1997] 1 FCR 274 at p 276 
229 Empirical evidence supports the suspicion that medical professionals frequently do not 
question capacity when the decision accords with their recommendation: see Raymont et al, 
‘Prevalence of Mental Incapacity in Medical Patients and Associated Risk Factors: Cross 
Sectional Study’ (2004) 364 The Lancet 1421. 
230 Re L ibid at p 840 
231 [1999] Fam 26. (See previous discussion in the context of court jurisdiction) 
232 i.e. within the meaning of the Mental Health Acts. 
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hours. Other than drawing judicial attention to the admission under the Mental 
Health Act for assessment of her mental and psychiatric condition, which was 
still ‘ongoing’ and had as yet led to a diagnosis merely of ‘moderate depression’, 
the question of capacity to consent to medical treatment was not even 
considered. The judge did not ask about it; and Counsel did not volunteer the 
information that he had recently received a medical report which confirmed S’s 
capacity. The implication from the fact that the court exercised its powers at all 
would seem to be that S was simply assumed to lack competence. However there 
is some suggestion that the topic was not addressed at all because of the opposite 
assumption, namely that she was competent - but no one appreciated the 
fundamental importance of that fact.233 It is difficult to know which 
interpretation is worse! Either way, the fundamental disrespect for autonomous 
choice when life – or rather, potential life - is at stake could hardly be more 
clear. 
 
Following the declarations, the baby was born healthily but initially rejected by 
the mother. M was returned to Springfield, where her detention under the Mental 
Health Act was terminated, and she discharged herself, without any specific 
treatment for mental disorder or mental illness ever having been prescribed. She 
went on to appeal against Hogg J’s declarations, and apply for judicial review of 
the decisions of the social worker and the hospital authorities. 
 
A powerful Court of Appeal234 handed down a single judgment, granting both 
the appeal and the judicial review. Condemning all involved for a “fail[ure] to 
maintain the distinction between the urgent need of MS for treatment arising 
from her pregnancy and the separate question whether her mental disorder 
warranted her detention in hospital”, the Court of Appeal found the conclusion 
that detention was believed to be warranted in order to deal with MS’s 
pregnancy and the safety of her unborn child, “unavoidable.”235  
 
                                                 
233 per Judge LJ, handing down the judgment of the Court of Appeal, at p 41. 
234 Comprising Butler-Sloss, Judge and Robert Walker LJJ 
235 At p57 
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The judgment strongly reinforced the theory of the autonomy of the pregnant 
woman. However in doing so, the Court of Appeal openly revealed the yawning 
gap between the higher courts, which expound legal doctrine, and everyone else, 
who has to apply it. The Court of Appeal had the luxury of contemplation in the 
abstract: no identifiable person was going to live or die according to their 
decision. MS had already recovered, and her baby was thriving. How much 
easier then to espouse lofty principle, than when faced – like the social worker, 
the doctors, and Hogg J - with a living individual whose unconventional decision 
risks not just her own life, but another being capable of independent existence? 
In truth, their response was guided by a different principle, namely the 
preservation of life, to which the autonomy of a pregnant woman fell easy 
victim. As Hogg J expressed it, “if the mother wishes to appeal this case, it 
means it has worked.”236 
 
The Court of Appeal recognised the chasm – and implicitly accepted it without 
concern. When asked to consider the impact of an adverse judgment on the 
career of the social worker, the court expressed itself astonished by the very idea: 
 
“At the very worst [adverse judgment] would mean that she had 
made a mistake that had taken volumes of papers, days of legal 
argument and the measured reflection of this court to identify. 
Whatever our conclusion we admire her courage in reaching any 
decision at all in such difficult circumstances when faced with a life 
and death situation and an unusual, unreasonable mother-to-
be……..for humane reasons, she has erred in law.”237        
 
This is not the swingeing criticism usually expected when public bodies act 
unlawfully, and when fundamental rights are infringed. Compensation in the 
form of damages was expected;238 but personal censure was not. Even whilst 
speaking the rhetoric of autonomy, the appeal court recognised the practical 
imperative of protectionism when life is at risk. 
                                                 
236 Quoted by Judge LJ at p 41. 
237 At p53 
238 See p62 
 199 
 
The gap between law and facts: Acceptance of a shortfall between the holding of 
a legal principle and its translation into experience is simply realism. The gap 
exists – and will continue to exist – because medics are not lawyers. Their 
professional instinct is to approach these cases from a different direction. From a 
medical point of view, the starting point is treatment need; so doctors look at a 
patient’s decision, and measure it against their own assessment of best interests. 
Where they conflict, there is a tendency to question the ability to make the 
decision. Where there is an urgent call to save life, and little time for legal 
argument, courts of first instance do less irreparable damage by following the 
fundamental principle of preserving life: courts of fact behave like medics.  
 
Only when there is time for consideration can a properly legal approach hold 
sway. Lawyers start with the principle of autonomy. They look at a patient’s 
decision, and measure it against the criteria of competency. When the judgment 
is about the rectitude of past or hypothetical future action – removed from the 
messy business of immediate consequences - the decision-maker is able to hold 
to their own view of best interests, and so find it easier to countenance the 
patient choosing something different. Courts of law behave like lawyers.  
 
This conflict of approach, the impact it has on assessments of competence, and 
its effect on treatment decisions, were all vividly demonstrated in the case of Re 
B (Adult: Refusal of Treatment)239  :  
 
B was an able and talented woman of 41, who had suffered a 
devastating illness which left her tetraplegic and kept alive by 
artificial ventilation. She wanted the ventilator to be switched off, 
claiming that it amounted to unlawful trespass as treatment without 
her consent. The court was asked to determine her capacity. 
 
Butler-Sloss P went to the hospital to hear from B directly. Subject to the 
evidence of psychiatrists, she formed the view that B demonstrated “a very high 
                                                 
239 [2002] 2 FCR 1 
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standard of mental competence, intelligence and ability.”240 Five doctors gave 
evidence, all of them confirming the judge’s view. Drs. R and C, who were 
involved in B’s daily care, both accepted that she had capacity, but felt unable to 
comply with her wishes, because it felt like “being asked to kill”241 her. Dr. G, a 
consultant surgeon unconnected with the treating team, accepted competence 
with the reservation that, without experience of life in a rehabilitation unit and in 
the community, B may not be fully informed.242 Dr. I, a consultant psychiatrist 
unconnected with the treating team, recognised B’s competence, but also 
recognised that he had “looked throughout for reasons to demonstrate that she 
was not competent.”243 Dr. Sensky, instructed by the Official Solicitor, was so 
impressed by B that he placed her “at the extreme end of competence”. 
 
Such overwhelming evidence of competence, when the relevant law is 
unambiguous, begs the question of why the matter had to go to court at all. As 
the evidence of the treating doctors demonstrated, it came down to a collision of 
expectation. For medics steeped in tradition of preserving life, a decision to end 
it, no matter how rational, was impossible to implement. The principles of 
autonomy and beneficence were in conflict, and the cold tenet of law asked too 
much of caring people who had formed a relationship with B.244 Even the judge 
was not unaffected. She, however, was able to separate her decision in respect of 
competency from its consequences.245 She ended her decision-making by 
returning the responsibility for consequences firmly to B, with something not far 
short of a plea to reconsider: 
 
“…my decision leaves Ms. B with a future choice which she can 
consider freely now that she will be relieved of the burdens of 
                                                 
240 At para 53 
241 The evidence of Dr. C as set out in the judgment at para 57.  
242 The judge was not swayed by his reservation, observing that making decisions without direct 
experience of their consequences is a common feature of life; to expect otherwise would be 
unrealistic. (at p 63) 
243 At para 71, italics added. 
244 For B’s decision to be implemented it was accepted that she would have to be moved to a 
different hospital (probably an unprecedented event), who agreed to accept her from the outset 
on the basis of treating her according to her wishes. (Para 85) 
245 “I am not asked directly to decide whether Ms. B lives or dies but whether she, herself, is 
legally competent to make that decision.” (para 12)   
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litigation. She is not bound by her past decision and when she goes 
to the hospital prepared to accept her, she has the right to reflect on 
what she may wish to do with her life. I would like to add how 
impressed I am with her as a person….I hope she will forgive me for 
saying, diffidently, that if she did reconsider her decision, she would 
have a lot to offer the community at large.”246       
 
Conclusions: The cases dealing with assessments of adult competence 
demonstrate that, even whilst espousing the rhetoric of autonomy, wherever their 
decision has an immediate life-or-death effect, the courts follow a protectionist 
agenda. The capacity for autonomy is questioned, and often found wanting, 
simply by reason of the very condition which prompts its exercise. Even if 
capacity is admitted, its exercise is questioned. Has a decision really been made, 
does it extend to the actual circumstances in contemplation, and is it truly 
independent? They all offer the possibility for avoiding the consequences of an 
apparently autonomous choice. Only in circumstances of leisured and 
hypothetical argument has the court actually upheld the right to refuse treatment. 
Courts are gatekeepers to autonomous decision-making, and they manipulate 
assessments of capacity just as locksmiths cut keys, to protect adults from the 
consequences of their own decisions whenever those consequences flout judicial 
values.        
 
Child Patients 
The law starts from a different position in respect of child patients. Subject to 
statutory provision,247 they are assumed to lack capacity to consent to treatment 
by virtue of their minority. Their parents, acting in the child’s best interests, have 
the power to give or refuse consent;248 and the court steps in with a protective 
jurisdiction when parental decisions are challenged.  
 
                                                 
246 Para 95 
247 Section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 provided that the consent to medical treatment 
of a person over the age of 16 will be valid. See earlier discussion on jurisdiction. 
248 See earlier discussion of jurisdiction. 
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So long as children are obviously children, this approach is tolerably practicable, 
and cases come to court only when the medics disagree with the parents’ opinion 
of best interests. However children grow up, and it’s a process rather than an 
event. Most children demand, and most parents acknowledge, that the degree of 
control which parents exercise over the lives of their offspring recedes 
incrementally as they mature and develop the ability to make choices for 
themselves. Although young people gain legal majority on the day of their 
eighteenth birthday, and statutory recognition of their consent to treatment on 
their sixteenth birthday, in practice they will have been developing the skills of 
adulthood for some time before then. Between the incapacity of childhood and 
the autonomy of adulthood is an undefined time of borderline competence, when 
the limits of state paternalism and children’s rights are tested.   
 
The struggle for power - parents or children?: Judicial determination of capacity 
borderline by reason of age first came about as resolution of an implicit power 
struggle between parents and older children. The House of Lords determined (in 
both senses of the word249) the law, in the case of Gillick v. West Norfolk & 
Wisbech AHA250 : 
  
Mrs. Gillick was the mother of 5 daughters under the age of 16. 
When the Department of Health issued to area health authorities 
guidance on family planning services which suggested that 
contraceptive advice and treatment could be given to children 
without parental consent, she sought an assurance from her local 
authority that no such treatment would be given to her daughters 
without her knowledge and agreement. When the health authority 
refused to give such assurances, she applied to court for a declaration 
that the guidance was unlawful.  
 
                                                 
249 The case both worked out what the law was, how it had developed and why, and set it on a 
new course for the future. In Lord Scarman’s words, “This case is the beginning, not the 
conclusion, of a legal development in a field glimpsed by one or two judges in recent times…., 
but not yet fully explored.” 
250 [1986] AC 112 
 203 
Considering the impact this case had on the future development of the law, it is 
worth noting that it was far from a unanimous decision. In the House of Lords 
itself, two  speeches were in favour of Mrs. Gillick; of the majority, two 
speeches were detailed arguments in favour of the defendants, but on different 
reasoning, and the third simply a short averment purporting to agree with them 
both. Of the nine judges who considered the case, only four of them agreed with 
the ultimate outcome.  
 
In the Court of Appeal, Mrs. Gillick won. The main issue for determination251 
was identified as “the extent of a parent’s rights and duties with respect to 
medical treatment of a girl under 16.”  
 
(a) The leading judgment was given by Parker LJ, who determined that 
such parental rights and duties were complete and exhaustive, with no 
distinction between contraceptive and other types of medical advice. He 
found the suggestion of individual assessment over fixed age of capacity 
“singularly unattractive and impracticable, particularly in the context of 
medical treatment.”252 He did draw some authority from Re D, equating 
contraception advice with sterilisation, and wardship with parenting, but the 
authorities he chiefly relied on were much older,253 and not concerned with 
medical treatment. 
 
(b) Fox LJ followed broadly the same reasoning, but accepted that the older 
cases reflected “far too extreme” a notion of parental authority. He considered 
the possibility of a minor’s capacity to consent acting as a trump card, but 
rejected it as an unlikely direction for the law to take.254 Interestingly for 
                                                 
251 The second issue was expressed as “the extent to which, if at all, the provisions of the 
criminal law assist in the determination of the extent of the parents’ rights and duties in relation 
specifically to contraceptive and abortion advice and treatment.” Per Parker LJ at p122 
252 At p 124 
253 R v. Howes (1860) 3 E & E 332, and Re Agar-Ellis [1883] 24 Ch.D 317 
254 At p144. Without thought of continuing progression of common law, the authorities which he 
found to display no such tendency were the very ones (n52) he had earlier rejected.  
 204 
children’s autonomy, his closing comments indicate a view of best interests 
which takes no account of children’s own views at all.255 
 
(c) Eveleigh LJ took it simply as a matter of “common sense”256 that 
decision-making power rested with the person having custody of the child 
unless displaced by the child’s welfare. Only in cases that would be 
“extremely rare and almost impossible to conceive when the parents are 
thoroughly responsible people”257 would it be permissible to act in spite of 
parental wishes. 
 
When the case reached the House of Lords,  
 
(a) Lord Fraser split the issue into two distinct questions, and reversed the 
order of importance:258 
 
(1) whether a girl under the age of 16 has the legal capacity to give 
valid consent to contraceptive advice and treatment including 
medical examination; 
(2) whether giving such advice and treatment to a girl under 16 
without her parents’ consent infringes the parents’ rights. 
 
His positive conclusion on the first issue was almost cursory.259 On the extent 
of custodial rights, he flatly rejected the insistence on a fixed age as “contrary 
                                                 
255 At p145, “I would not, in any way, wish to underrate the value of the part which an 
experienced doctor can play in the practical resolution of the problems with which we are 
concerned. Nor should one underrate the parents’ part. They know the child and its history. In 
most cases, whatever the law may be, the best outcome is likely to be that which is the 
consequence of full co-operation between the parents and the doctor in deciding what is in the 
child’s best interests.” 
256 At p146 
257 At p149 
258 Per Lord Fraser at p166 
259 He dismissed every one of the statutes relied on in the Court of Appeal, both individually and 
collectively. His view was that s8 Family Law Reform Act 1969 left open the question of 
whether the consent of a minor under 16 had ever been valid before; that NHS Regulations do 
not show that a minor under 16 cannot appoint a doctor, only that someone else may do it on his 
behalf; that the Mental Health Act is of only remote relevance since it is not in dispute that a 
child under 16 is in the custody of his parents – the question is rather the extent of the custody 
powers; and the Education Act puts no obstacle in the way of a minor seeking treatment without 
the encouragement of the education authority. “It seems to me verging on the absurd to suggest 
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to the ordinary experience of mankind, at least in Western Europe in the 
present century.”260  
 
Coming down in favour of a welfare-based solution, he slips from a general 
confidence that “important medical treatment of a child under 16 would 
normally only be carried out with the parents’ approval”261 to a specific 
consideration of contraceptive treatment. The practical risks of driving girls 
away from seeking advice lead him to conclude that a doctor may treat 
without parental consent IF he is satisfied of basic prerequisites.262 He found 
“nothing strange”263 in leaving such wide non-clinical discretion in the hands 
of doctors, and regarded any consideration of criminal law as irrelevant 
because doctors treating within his guidelines would lack any criminal 
intent.264 
 
(b) Lord Scarman reduced the issue to a single question.265 He found in the 
development of the common law a principle that parental rights are derived 
from parental duties and exist only as long as is necessary for the protection 
of the child.266 When a child reaches sufficient understanding and intelligence 
to be able to capable of making up his own mind, parental right yields.267 
 
                                                                                                                                   
that a girl or boy aged 15 could not effectively consent, for example, to have a medical 
examination of some trivial injury to his body or even to have a broken arm set…..I am not 
disposed to hold now, for the first time, that a girl aged less than 16 lacks the power to give valid 
consent to contraceptive advice and treatment, merely on account of her age.” (p169)   
260 At p171: “in practice most wise parents relax their control gradually as the child develops and 
encourage him or her to become increasingly independent. Moreover, the degree of parental 
control actually exercised over a particular child does in practice vary considerably according to 
his understanding and intelligence and it would, in my opinion, be unrealistic for the courts not to 
recognise these facts.” 
261 At p173 
262 Namely that the girl will understand his advice; that he cannot persuade her either to inform 
her parents or to allow him to do so; that she is very likely to begin or continue to have sexual 
intercourse with or without contraceptive treatment; that unless she receives treatment her 
physical or mental health, or both, are likely to suffer; and that her best interests require it.   
263 At p174 
264 At p175 
265 At p181: “Can a doctor in any circumstances lawfully prescribe contraception for a girl under 
16 without the knowledge and consent of her parents?” 
266 P184 
267 P186 
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Inherent lack of certainty is simply “the price which has to be paid to keep the 
law in line with social experience.”268 For him the principle is of general 
application, and contraceptive treatment merely one instance of its 
application, and the responsibility vested in doctors is acceptable because 
theirs is “a learned and highly trained profession regulated by statute and 
governed by a strict ethical code.”269 
 
So, Lord Fraser’s vision was of parental rights ceding to doctors’ right to act in 
the best interests of their patients on the narrow issue of contraceptive treatment; 
and Lord Scarman’s vision was a much wider one of parental rights ceding to the 
child’s. Lord Bridge declared himself in agreement with both of them! 
 
At least the dissenting judgments managed better consistency, both turning on 
the specific treatment in issue: 
 
(c) Lord Brandon considered that provision of contraceptive advice and 
treatment to girls under the age of consent to sexual intercourse amounted to 
promoting, encouraging or facilitating an offence, was probably itself an 
offence, and was in any event contrary to public policy. For him, the issue of 
parental rights simply did not arise. 
 
(d) Lord Templeman did not consider the provision of contraceptive 
treatment to be criminal as long as it was supported by appropriate consent, 
but criminal law was at the root of his conclusion that such consent would 
have to be from a parent. In providing that consent did not afford a defence to 
a man charged under s6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, he concluded, 
Parliament had indicated that a girl under 16 lacked sufficient maturity to 
decide a question of contraception.  
 
On the wider principle of children’s developing autonomy, there was also a 
surprising degree of accord. Lord Templeman simply considered that whether 
                                                 
268 P191 
269 P190 
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consent of a child under 16 was valid would depend on the nature of the 
treatment, and the age and understanding of the patient270 - with the clear 
implication that a child’s consent to some treatments would be valid. Lord 
Brandon’s views in the context of less controversial forms of treatment are not 
categorically stated but a tantalising glimpse into what they may have been 
appears from the other judges quoting his decision in R. v. D.271 Although Parker 
LJ had distinguished it as a criminal law case, Lord Scarman272 relied on it as 
acceptance of developing autonomy in preference to legal pre-determination of 
age.  
 
So taken all together, notwithstanding disagreement on the particular treatment 
in issue, the judgments of the House of Lords clearly reject the detailed casuistry 
of the Court of Appeal, and adopt instead a more generous interpretation of 
developing autonomy, based on pragmatic reality.273  
 
Superficially, Gillick seems to be a blow to the quest for family involvement in 
medical decision-making in respect of young people: the court endorsed 
individualism even of minors otherwise totally dependent - financially, 
educationally, for housing, feeding and clothing - on their parents. However, the 
factual nexus of the case suggests that such an interpretation is unduly 
pessimistic.  
 
The prerequisites of Lord Fraser and Lord Scarman are particularly important in 
this context: before a doctor can treat in the absence of parental consent, he has 
                                                 
270 P201 
271 [1984] AC 778 
272 At p 188 
273 At the real life effects of the Court of Appeal decision was made obvious to the House of 
Lords.  It was later summarised by Silber J in R(Axon) v. Sec. St. for Health [2006] EWHC 37: 
“In the period between the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Gillick case and that of the 
House of Lords, during which medical professionals were required to pass on information to 
children’s parents, the number of young women aged under 16 who sought advice on 
contraception fell from 1.7 per resident thousand to 1.2 per resident thousand, which was a 
striking and disturbing reduction of just under one-third. In addition, the rates of attendance at 
places where contraception advice and treatment were given did not return until 1988-1989 (or 
until 1990 according to the Brook Organisation, the charity providing free confidential sexual 
health advice to under 25s) to their previous levels prior to the Court of Appeal decision in 1984. 
These statistics provide clear and powerful evidence of what happens when young people are not 
assured of confidentiality when they are considering obtaining advice and treatment on sexual 
matters.”  
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to try to persuade the young person to involve their parents. If that fails, the 
doctor must still be convinced that his patient is capable of understanding 
medical advice independently – that she has reached intellectual maturity. These 
prerequisites suggest that the House of Lords was more supportive of a family 
role than first impressions may have suggested. In truth, the House of Lords 
decision in Gillick says more about our cultural attitude to teenagers and the way 
they progress to adulthood – sexually before financially – than it does about 
wider issues of family involvement in healthcare decision-making. 
 
The struggle for power - children or courts? : In protecting burgeoning juvenile 
autonomy from overbearing parental authority, the seeds are also sown for the 
restriction of the court’s own protective powers. If a child is autonomous vis-à-
vis her parents, that same autonomy should also (in solidarity to the rights 
recognised for adults) restrict the powers of the court to impose its own view of 
best interests. As a result, Gillick’s generous interpretation of developing 
autonomy was soon found to cause the courts problems. Autonomy implies that 
decisions can be made with which others disagree. If minors are afforded the 
ability to make treatment decisions, how can the courts avoid decisions with 
which they do not agree– those which offend the first judicial preference - and 
protect young people from themselves? 
 
In the case of Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)274  E was less than 
3 months short of his 16th birthday. Thirteen days before the court hearing he had 
been diagnosed with leukaemia. Immediate treatment with blood products 
offered an 80-90% chance of cure, but E and his family were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, who did not consent to the use of blood products. The chances of cure 
by other treatments were reduced to 60%. Medics initially followed the riskier 
course, but E’s condition deteriorated so the hospital applied to court for leave to 
treat E as they considered necessary. The court spent ten hours dealing with the 
case, finally giving judgment at around midnight, by which time it was just 
hours, or at most a day, before E’s condition would become critical. 
 
                                                 
274 [1993] 1 FLR 386 
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The problem arose not because of any doubt that E could give a valid consent to 
treatment,275 but because he (and his parents) refused it. It is worth noting that 
there is a qualitative difference between consent to and refusal of treatment. 
Overriding consent simply means that no treatment is given, and the status quo 
continues. Overriding a refusal is a more confrontational interference with 
autonomy, both intellectually and physically. It requires forcing something on 
the patient. One might therefore expect even greater circumspection before 
countenancing it.276 
 
Ward J was “impressed” by E’s “obvious intelligence, by his calm discussion of 
the implications, by his assertion even that he would refuse well knowing that he 
may die as a result”; and he found that E was “of sufficient intelligence to be 
able to take decisions about his own well-being”. Yet none of this was sufficient, 
because the decision E made would lead to his unnecessary death, and therefore 
contravened the first judicial preference. The court solution was to set the 
threshold of understanding necessary for a finding of Gillick competence 
extremely high. The judge concluded that E did “not have a full understanding of 
the whole implication of what the refusal of that treatment involves,”277 meaning 
the painful process of death which E would have to endure, and the distress 
which his parents would be caused. “..[H]e has not the ability to turn his mind to 
it, nor the will to do so. Who can blame him for that?”278  
 
This approach amounts to overt, unapologetic protectionism. It is in striking 
contrast to Butler-Sloss P’s clear acceptance that adults make decisions without 
full experience of their consequences.279 The threshold of competence was 
manipulated to retain for the court the ability to impose its own ability of best 
                                                 
275 Had E’s views coincided with the medical view, it is extremely doubtful whether his 
competence to consent would ever have been questioned.  
276 Ward J did indeed consider the practical effect of granting the application, at p 394: “I find 
that E will protest, but I have no evidence before me which satisfies me that he will carry his 
protest to the point of pulling out the tubes or fighting the doctors as they endeavour to insert 
them or smashing the blood bags above his bed. On the contrary I find that, although he will 
protest, at the end of the day he will respect the decision of this court.” 
277 At p 385 
278 At p385. 
279 See n241 above. Even if E could not turn his mind to these matters, his parents presumably 
had such understanding, or could be given it. Their refusal was overridden as well.  
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interests on the patient. The hurdles that teenager E would have had to jump to 
be allowed to determine his own best interests were simply set higher than those 
for patient just a few months older. 
 
E’s parents were alluding to this when they argued that it would be wrong for the 
court to intervene when E was “so close to his 16th birthday”280 – someone 
within three months of having a legally recognised right to consent, should be 
treated as if they had already achieved it.281 Their argument was very much in 
the spirit of Gillick282 but its relevance lay in the unspoken assumption that the 
statutory right to consent to treatment carried with it also its opposite, the right to 
refuse. Such is the power of the protectionist urge, Ward J ignored completely 
the “almost there” argument. As soon as the court got the opportunity, it also 
shattered the assumption that consent and refusal of minors are but mirror-
images of each other.  
 
In Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to Treatment),283 R was just two months 
short of 16, and in the care of the Local Authority. She suffered episodes of 
mental illness characterised by violent and suicidal behaviour. She was detained 
under the Mental Health Act, and admitted to an adolescent psychiatric unit, 
where the proposed treatment was compulsory administration of anti-psychotic 
drugs, to which the Local Authority initially consented. Later that same evening 
in a lucid conversation with her social worker, R indicated that she would refuse 
treatment. The Local Authority therefore withdrew its consent and applied for 
wardship, with leave to administer the medication. The Consultant Psychiatrist 
gave evidence that without treatment R would soon lapse into psychotic state, 
but between episodes she sufficiently understood the nature of the illness and the 
treatment to be competent to give or refuse consent. 
 
                                                 
280 Submission of Counsel for E’s parents, quoted at p398. 
281 In fact, when he did reach adulthood, E continued to refuse treatment with blood products. 
Without the wardship jurisdiction, and with no realistic argument of incapacity, the medics were 
then bound by his refusal, and he died. (As told by his Counsel to Johnson J in Re S 
(Minor)(Consent to Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065 at 1075). This real-life litmus test of 
judicial protectionism case played on the judge’s mind in the later case of Re P 
(Minor)(MedicalTreatment: Best Interests) [2003] EWHC 2327 
282 And exactly the kind of argument that Parker LJ in particular had worried about!  
283 [1991] 3 WLR 592 
 211 
Waite J considered that the court lacked power to override the refusal of a 
competent minor. However, he found as a fact that R’s condition precluded her 
from “competence”. Considering the proposed treatment to be in her best 
interests, he granted permission for it to be administered against her will. How 
much was his assessment of R’s competence influenced by his clear preference 
for treatment, and the need for a court jurisdiction to impose it?  
 
When the Official Solicitor appealed on R’s behalf, the Court of Appeal agreed 
with Waite J that she lacked competence, by reason of her fluctuating mental 
state,284 rather than her age. Given that R had lucid periods, as Douglas points 
out,285 it would have been more honest to justify enforced treatment on the basis 
of Mental Health Act powers, than under common law powers more properly 
related to competence by virtue of age, but up to this point the ratio of the case is 
unexceptional, and commentators would probably have been prepared to accept 
it.286 Similarly, it was uncontraversial287 when the Court of Appeal asserted 
unanimously that their powers in wardship went beyond parental powers. What 
caused concern was the Court of Appeal’s determination that there was power to 
override the refusal of a competent minor, its apparent willingness actually to 
use such power, and Lord Donaldson’s restrictive interpretation of Gillick. 
                                                 
284 Per Farquahrson LJ at p31: “We are not here solely concerned with the developing maturity of 
a 15- year-old child but with the impact of a mental illness upon her. The Gillick test is not apt to 
a situation where the understanding and capacity of a child varies from day to day according to 
the effect of her illness. I would reject the application of the Gillick tests to an on/off situation of 
that kind.”; and per Lord Donaldson at p 25, “…there is no suggestion that the extent of this 
competence can fluctuate upon a day to day or week to week basis. What is really being looked 
at is an assessment of mental and emotional age, as contrasted with chronological age, but even 
this test needs to be modified in the case of fluctuating mental disability to take account of that 
misfortune.” Such a view stands in stark contrast to the approach subsequently adopted in the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (see later), which lends support to the argument of Douglas noted at 
87 below.  
285 Gillian Douglas, ‘The Retreat from Gillick’ MLR [1992] 55(4) 569 – 576 at p 572. The 
reluctance to use Mental Health Act powers on minors is usually explained as a reluctance to 
stigmatise the child. The UK government explicitly used such an argument in the context of 
compliant adults too when the Bournewood litigation reached the European court (see following 
chapter). Such an attitude to Mental Health Act powers is self-fulfilling: the more we avoid them 
as stigmatising, the more a stigmatising attitude is endorsed. Moreover, what could be more 
damning to an adolescent than to tell them they have failed to outgrow the competence of a 
child? 
286 See for example, Andrew Bainham, in ‘The Judge and the Competent Minor’ LQR 1992 108 
(Apr) 194 – 200 at p 200; Lynn Hagger in ‘Some Implications of the Human Rights Act 1998 for 
the Medical Treatment of Children’ Med. L. Int 2003 6(1) 25 -51 at p29; and even Gillian 
Douglas ibid. 
287 See earlier discussion on jurisdiction. Bainham, ibid p196, could “readily accept” that the 
court had “technical jurisdiction” to override the wishes of a competent minor. 
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The distraction of distinguishing consent and refusal: James Munby QC had put 
the argument for R and the Official Solicitor explicitly on the basis of the 
fundamental principle of autonomy,288 implying that consent and refusal are 
simply opposite sides of the same legal concept, and should be afforded equal 
respect. Lord Donaldson was not impressed. Effectively he dismissed again any 
application of the autonomy principle to minors, by undercutting the power of 
consent so recently won: 
 
“…consent….is merely a key which unlocks a door. Furthermore, 
whilst in the case of an adult of full capacity there will usually only 
be one keyholder, namely the patient, in the ordinary family unit 
where a young child is the patient there will be two keyholders, 
namely the parents, with a several as well as a joint right to turn the 
key and unlock the door. If the parents disagree, one consenting and 
the other refusing, the doctor will be presented with a professional 
and ethical, but not with a legal, problem because, if he has the 
consent of one authorised person, treatment will not without more 
constitute a trespass or a criminal assault.”289 
 
Lord Donaldson interpreted the final Gillick decision as authorising a competent 
minor to become a dual “keyholder” concurrently with her parents, rather than 
taking control of the only key.290 He envisaged the possibility of dual keyholders 
taking opposing views, and neither of them being decisive, and in so far as the 
                                                 
288 At p14: “Legal policy gives effect to the libertarian principle that the individual has the right 
to determine what is done to his own body and that no one else may decide what is done to it 
even on the ground that it is for his benefit: see On Liberty 2nd Ed. (1859) ch1 pp7-30, by John 
Stuart Mill….That policy constitutes the law’s acknowledgment that paternalism, in the sense of 
determining what is objectively good for another, has no place in this branch of law.” 
289 At p22. 
290 See p23: “I do not understand Lord Scarman to be saying that, if a child was ‘Gillick 
competent’…the parents ceased to have an independent right of consent as contrasted with 
ceasing to have the right of determination, that is, a veto. In a case in which the ‘Gillick 
competent’ child refuses treatment, but the parents consent, that consent enables treatment to be 
undertaken lawfully, but in no way determines that the child shall be so treated. In a case in 
which the positions are reversed, it is the child’s consent which is the enabling factor and again 
the parents’ refusal is not determinative.”  
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House of Lords had said anything different, he curtly disregarded that as “obiter” 
and “wrong.”291   
 
This interpretation strains the spirit of the House of Lords decision in Gillick to 
the limit,292 and feels like an overruled judge still smarting from the 
experience.293 Andrew Bainham has three fundamental objections294 to 
concurrent keyholding, but the first of them is that it can only work on the 
assumption that the doctor is dealing solely with the parent or solely with the 
child, and is unaware of disagreement. This may be the case where the 
competent minor is, for example, unconscious, but is clearly not going to be the 
case where the issue is administration of drugs such as to R. Bainham is right to 
highlight the dilemma for medics, but he overlooks the more important 
implication, that their difficulty is society’s. Put another way, if neither parent 
nor competent child has determinative power, then who does?  
 
Lord Donaldson did not offer an explicit answer, but the logical implication of 
concurrent keyholding must be that the doctor could lawfully follow which ever 
course he personally preferred295 – a highly questionable extension of medical 
discretion, a backward step from the principle of autonomy, and a serious 
                                                 
291 “If Lord Scarman intended to go further than this and to say that in the case of a ‘Gillick 
competent’ child, a parent has no right either to consent or to refuse consent, his remarks were 
obiter, because the only question I issue was Mrs. Gillick’s alleged right of veto. Furthermore I 
consider that they would have been wrong.” P23 
292 As even was acknowledged within the court by Staughton LJ, who declined to offer an 
opinion but saw this as a difference of view between Lord Donaldson and Lord Scarman – p27. 
Commentators agreed. As Andrew Bainham put it, ibid p194, “No one doubted that Lord 
Scarman..was according priority to the competent child’s wishes where those clashed with the 
parents’ views – no one, that is, except apparently the Master of the Rolls.”  
293 Lord Donaldson’s judicial career was often controversial and publicly criticized, for example 
his handling of the NIRC and the Maguire IRA trials. He clearly felt strongly about the issues 
involved in Gillick and Re E, both decisions which attracted strong criticism. In September 1992, 
just three months after refusing another appeal against his view of the law in Re W, he chose to 
retire early.   
294 The other two are (a) that it flies in the face of the settled interpretation of s8 (1) Family Law 
Reform Act 1969 (although in fact it is doubtful whether there ever really was any “settled 
interpretation” of s8. When Balcombe LJ in Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s 
Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758 at p 86 invited Counsel to refer him to any cases other than 
Gillick which settled the interpretation of the section, they were unable to find any.); and (b) that 
it turns the clock back from Gillick, where the House of Lords gave clear precedence to the views 
of the competent child.  
295 Although when actually placed in the position of making the decision, because although her 
parents consented, a 15 year old girl refused to consent to heart transplant, the doctors in Re M 
(Child: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1999] 2 FCR 577 preferred to refer the matter to court. It 
is of course impossible to know whether medics are always so scrupulous. 
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impediment to the supportive functioning of patients and families. Concern 
about the power this approach vests in doctors is simply exacerbated by a close 
reading of the background facts of the case: consideration was first given to 
compulsory medication because R “was becoming increasingly defiant,”296 and 
the unit would only accept R as a patient if it had “an entirely free hand in regard 
to the administration of medication to her, whether she was willing or not.”297 
The lack of judicial challenge298 to these factors colludes in a possibility of 
treatment for the patient management needs of institutional carers.299  Any 
interpretation of borderline capacity which exacerbates this tendency must be 
regrettable, because of the threat it represents to the liberty of us all.      
 
Inevitably, this interpretation of the law was challenged at the earliest 
opportunity. With the advantage of statute firmly on her side on the question of 
consent, in Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction),300 a 16 
year old girl asserted an equal and opposite right to refuse treatment. She was in 
Local Authority care because her parents had both died, and was admitted to a 
residential unit suffering anorexia. The Local Authority wanted to transfer her to 
a specialist eating disorder unit, against her wishes.  
 
Opting for separate representation, W argued that s8 FLRA gave her the same 
right as an adult to refuse treatment, specifically claiming that Lord Donaldson 
was wrong. The OS remained as amicus curiae and argued the same point. 
Thorpe J, constrained by the doctrine of precedent, had little room for 
manoeuvre. Although he did make a clear finding that W had sufficient 
understanding to make an informed decision, he said the court could authorise 
treatment without her consent (and gave leave for appeal).  Whilst the appeal 
was pending, W’s condition deteriorated markedly. W’s hopes of success 
probably sank as soon as Lord Donaldson was given the case, but on this 
                                                 
296 Per the senior registrar and director of child psychiatry at the unit where R was placed, at p19. 
297 Described by Lord Donaldson at p20. 
298 Farquharson is resigned to powerlessness in effect: at p30 he says “the decision of this court 
will have little impact, as she is likely to be subjected to the medication whether the appeal 
succeeds or not. If Waite J’s decision is upheld…she will be treated at the unit, otherwise she 
will receive the medication…at an adult hospital.  
299 The determination not to yield in the same way to the needs of family carers is striking. 
300 [1992] 3 WLR 
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occasion, he was fully supported by both the other members of the court, 
Balcombe and Nolan LJJ. 
 
The Court of Appeal maintained the view of consent as a legal301 device 
protective of doctors rather than patients: “the legal purpose [of consent]…is to 
provide those concerned in the treatment with a defence to a criminal charge of 
assault or battery or a civil claim for damages for trespass to the person.”302 The 
key was transformed into a flak jacket,303 but it was clearly a white one, because 
there is no mention at all of the provision to patients of a defence to unwanted 
intrusions on their autonomy. 
 
At first blush, the ‘flak jacket’ approach seems to be supportive of a decisive role 
for families in treatment disputes with young people. The argument that refusal 
of treatment by a 16 year old amounts to a veto, even if someone else with 
parental responsibilities consents, involves the proposition that the parent is 
deprived of the power of consent. The court’s response was a detailed exercise in 
statutory deconstruction.  It pointed out that section 8 says no such thing, 
providing only that parental consent would be unnecessary - which is quite 
different to ineffective. Reference was even made to the Latey Report304 on 
which the Act was founded. Balcombe LJ fixed on the mischief which the report 
intended s8 to remedy;305 Lord Donaldson provided his own emphasis on the 
conclusion.306  
 
                                                 
301 As opposed to clinical. “The clinical (italics added) purpose stems from the fact that in many 
instances the cooperation of the patient and the patient’s faith or at least confidence in the 
efficiency of treatment is a major factor contributing to the treatment’s success. Failure to obtain 
consent will not only deprive the patient and the medical staff of this advantage, but will usually 
make it much more difficult to administer the treatment. I appreciate that this purpose may not be 
served if consent is given on behalf of, rather than by, the patient.” 
302 Per Lord Donaldson at p76. 
303 Per Lord Donaldson at p78. 
304 The Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority, 1967, Cmnd 3342. The relevant part is 
contained in paragraphs 474 -484.  
305 At p86: that “doctors felt difficulty in accepting the consent of someone under 21 (the then 
age of majority) to medical treatment, even though parental consent might be unobtainable 
or..undesirable” 
306 At p78: “It recommended that: ‘without prejudice to any consent that may otherwise be 
lawful, the consent of young persons aged 16 and over….shall be as valid as the consent of a 
person of full age.’ (My emphasis)”     
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The conclusion that W’s argument was wrong in law was compelling. It is less 
clear however, that the decision was in reality supportive of families. In truth, it 
was the court’s keyholding role which was being protected, not the family’s. Re 
M (Child: Refusal of Medical Treatment)307 illustrates the point: when the child 
refused treatment, but the parents consented, the doctors did not consider 
themselves protected by parental consent, but sought (and were granted) court 
approval. 
 
However unimpeachable the statutory interpretation may have been in Re W, the 
failure of the court to question whether the power they found to exist should 
actually be used, or merely retained as a residual measure in extremis is a clear 
indication that the court was driven by a desire to protect its own jurisdiction, 
because it flies in the face of Gillick. All but one308 of the professional bodies 
which gave evidence to the Latey Committee had recommended that patients 
aged between 16 and 18 should also be able to give an effective refusal. More 
than 20 years of general social emancipation had gone by since the Latey 
Committee rejected their advice, and the Gillick decision would have provided 
unassailable grounds for limiting the use of power retained by statute309 – had 
the will existed. Instead, the protective urge prevailed, and it was Gillick that had 
to be restricted. As Nolan LJ310 put it, 
 
“…the present state of the law is that an individual who has reached 
the age of 18 is free to do with his life what he wishes, but it is the 
duty of the court to ensure so far as it can that children survive to 
attain that age.”    
 
However courts do not exist in a social vacuum. The approach of the House of 
Lords in Gillick was more in tune with the times than were the subsequent 
                                                 
307 [1999] 2 FCR 577 
308 The exception was the Medical Protection Society. 
309 Judicial restriction on the use of statutory power is a common feature of our legal system. For 
example, the statutory scheme of schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 was intended by the 
legislature to put the children of unmarried parents in the same financial position as children of 
married parents in the event of adult separation, but the courts have interpreted their powers 
much more restrictively.  
310 At p94. 
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attempts to restrict it. Whilst the Court of Appeal had been contending with 
nascent autonomy, so too had the legislature. The Children Act 1989, which 
came into effect in October 1991 between the decisions of Re R and Re W, 
included in s38(6) a child’s right to refuse medical treatment. Seemingly, the 
expectations of the legislature and the courts were at odds.311 It was statute, not 
judicial precedent, which forced the court to acknowledge, as it did in the case of 
South Glamorgan CC v. W & B,312 that their powers to override the wishes of a 
competent minor should be used only as a measure of last resort.    
 
The effect of limiting the court’s power to override refusal: Restraint on the use 
of court power to override the refusals of competent minors proved not to invite 
the moral chaos which Lord Donaldson had feared, because courts had resort to 
other ways to preserve their authority, chiefly the power to determine 
competence. It took seven years for the law reports to accumulate the next three 
instances of court intervention313 and all of them could easily be characterised as 
extreme, involving as they did life-or-death treatments, but the court did not dare 
to suggest that overriding refusal was being used as a measure of last resort. 
Instead, what really unites these cases is the court’s assessment of competence – 
and in particular its absence. The theory of autonomy may have been 
invigorated, but the court was not obliged to watch youthful inexperience erode 
the public interest in preserving life because in practice, the court was able to 
avoid the theory simply by finding as a fact that competence was lacking. 
                                                 
311 Bainham, ibid p197, points out that Re R was in conflict with ss43(8), 44(7), 38(6) and sch.3 
para 4(4) of the Children Act 1989, which provide that a child may refuse to submit to medical 
examination or psychiatric examination or treatment directed by the court, if the child has 
“sufficient understanding to make an informed decision”. Against this he concedes that the tenor 
of the Children Act works against the notion that the views of the competent child are decisive. 
In most instances, the formula adopted in the legislation is to require decision-makers to 
ascertain and consider the wishes and feelings of children to an extent consistent with their age 
and understanding. The more powerful point is that refusal of medical treatment has therefore 
been singled out as different to the usual run of decisions on which children’s views are 
considered. 
312 [1993] 1 FLR 574. Douglas Brown J, “without any doubt”, reiterated the power as Lord 
Donaldson had described it, and determined that the words of the statute at s100(2)(d) were 
insufficient to abrogate that power. The contrary intention of statute only limited its exercise. “In 
my judgment, the court can in an appropriate case – and they will be rare cases – but in an 
appropriate case, when other remedies of the Children Act have been used and exhausted and 
found not to bring about the desired result, can resort to other remedies.” (p584) 
313 Re S (A Minor)(Consent to Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065, Re L (Medical 
Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810,  and Re M (Child: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment) [1999] 2 FCR 577. 
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In Re M the patient was fifteen and a half and refusing consent to a heart 
transplant. Johnson J considered that she was ‘overwhelmed by the 
circumstances and the decision she was being asked to take’. In Re S and Re L 
the patients were 15 and 14 respectively, and both of them were refusing life-
saving blood transfusions.314 The judgments are peppered with tributes to the 
qualities of the young people, their ‘integrity and commitment,’315 but the courts 
show little hesitation in assessing them as incompetent to decide their own 
futures. In Re L the court effectively condoned an approach which effectively 
prevented the patient from demonstrating competence. The doctor had not felt it 
appropriate to go into detail with the patient about the manner of death she 
would experience without treatment. The judge accepted the doctor’s 
approach316 - and then based his assessment of L’s incompetence at least in part 
on the fact that she did not know all the information necessary to be able to make 
a competent decision! 
 
It is not simply coincidental that the patients’ choices contradict the judicial 
assessment of best interests. That contradiction is critical to the assessment of 
competence, for there are no cases where a young person holding views against 
the first judicial preference have been credited with competence. (And of course, 
where the young person’s views accord with what is recommended for her, there 
is no impetus to question competence in the first place.) 
 
The approach of the courts has now come full circle with the decision of Silber J 
in R (Axon) v. Sec. St. for Health,317 where the court robustly asserted that Gillick 
was determinative, and no exceptions should be permitted: 
 
“The speeches of Lord Fraser, Lord Scarman and Lord Bridge do not 
indicate or suggest that their conclusions depended in any way upon 
                                                 
314 For religious reasons – for further discussion of which see below. 
315 Re S p1076 
316 At p811. 
317 [2006] EWHC 37, where a mother of 2 girls aged 12 and 15 challenged Department of Health 
guidance on advice and treatment to be given to young people under 16 about sexual matters, 
including contraception and abortion. She sought a declaration that unless disclosure would be 
likely to damage the child’s physical or mental health, there was a duty to consult parents. 
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the nature of the treatment proposed because the approach in their 
speeches was and is of general application to all forms of medical 
advice and treatment.”318  
 
However, Axon was of course about positive access to treatment - the minor’s 
ability to consent, not refuse. The courts find it easy to condone capacity when it 
speaks in accordance with objective medical opinion. Axon did not concern those 
cases which offend court instinct, where minors refuse treatment objectively 
considered good for them. The ‘refusal’ cases were not even referred to in 
argument or judgment. 
 
Nonetheless, the robust assertion of juvenile autonomy, and the unequivocal 
application of the Gillick approach to all treatments, even to matters as difficult 
for the patient and as controversial to the public as abortion, sets a tone which 
would be hard to ignore in the context of a young person’s refusal of treatment. 
Respect for the young person’s own views319 certainly seemed to be at the heart 
of the Local Authority’s decision to withdraw their application for court 
approval of a proposed heart transplant on the consent-refusing 13 year old 
Hannah Jones, in autumn 2008.    
 
In withdrawing the application, Hannah’s Local Authority denied us the 
opportunity to test the court’s acceptance of this. It is not difficult to see how a 
judge could have assessed Hannah as too immature, too ‘overwhelmed’ by her 
situation, to be credited with capacity to make such a momentous decision. If 
and when such a case does come to be litigated, it may yet be that there proves to 
be a difference between the court approach to hypothetical cases such as Gillick 
and Axon,320 and its approach to cases of immediate effect, such as Hannah’s, in 
the same way as we have noted a difference between first instance and review 
                                                 
318 At para 86 
319 Hannah’s parents also declined to consent to the proposed treatment, but their decision was 
said to be based entirely on Hannah’s wishes. As her father told the journalist Elizabeth Grice, 
“...I just didn’t feel able to influence her. My wife and I agreed that whatever Hannah wanted, we 
would support her.” (Daily Telegraph. 12th November 2008) 
320 In neither case was there an identified individual with a healthcare issue turning on the 
decision. The daughters of Mrs. Gillick and Mrs. Axon had not, so far as anyone but their doctors 
may be aware, taken advantage of the government guidelines in issue. Their mothers were simply 
testing the theoretical rectitude of the guidelines, in case they (or any girls) ever did! 
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decisions in respect of adults.  Academic caution321 about the re-emergence of 
Gillick pre-eminence may still prove justified.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Like nappies and milk teeth, the incompetence of minors is eventually outgrown. 
The courts’ approach to determinations of capacity borderline by reason of age 
has been forged in the context of a struggle between parents’ and children’s 
rights, but it has implications for the court’s own authority too, deriving as it 
does from parental powers. Courts have long been willing to empower teenage 
children against their parents, but not so keen to forfeit their own ability to 
protect the inexperienced from themselves. Where a minor purports to make a 
treatment decision at odds with paternalism and the judicial preference for life 
over death, juvenile autonomy is a threat to the courts’ sense of themselves as 
guardians of the objectively vulnerable. 
 
This threat was at the root of the court’s reactionary approach to the question of 
whether consent and refusal are mirror images of the same concept, or legally 
distinct. The social conservatism of one judge in particular, Lord Donaldson, 
ensured that a consistent approach has been hard won, ultimately through the 
impact of legislation. Even so the courts have retained the power to intervene in 
extremis, and before then will quickly resort to assessments of incompetence, to 
pursue a protectionist agenda and enforce the “best interest” of reaching 
adulthood. Even if young people may now claim the right to make their own 
medical mistakes with reasonable hope of success, it is only up to the point 
where their life is imperilled – but as we have seen in our reflection on the 
courts’ interpretation of borderline competence in adults, this is in any event 
probably as good as it gets.   
 
 
 
                                                 
321 See for example Anne Morris, “Gillick, 20 years on: Arrested Development or Growing 
Pains”, PN 2005, 21(3), 158-175. Published in 2005, she wrote that “it may be too soon to herald 
the return of Gillick to anything like a pre-eminent position (as compared to Re R and Re W).” 
 221 
D. Religious beliefs 
 
Medicine is an earthly practice. Its objectives and achievements are focused in 
this world, with no reference to any other. The same cannot be said of many of 
its subjects.322 Belief in a greater power beyond earthly constraints is a common 
factor in all major religions, and for many adherents the importance of the 
afterlife exceeds that of the here-and-now. The potential for a clash of priorities 
is enormous. 
  
Adults: Since an autonomous adult can make the decision to accept or reject 
proposed treatment for any reason at all, it follows that a decision based on 
religious belief cannot be automatically invalid. Religious faith is by definition 
irrational, but it is not generally considered to be inconsistent with capacity to 
make decisions. The faith-based treatment decisions of a competent adult will 
normally be respected by doctors without challenge, and the patient will be 
allowed to suffer the consequences,323 not because they are grounded in religious 
doctrine, but because despite that autonomy is preserved.  
 
However sometimes the ideological clash is too stark, and the matter is referred 
to court. As we have already seen in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment),324 the 
court adopts a cautious approach - the unspoken assumption is that religious 
doctrine threatens autonomy.325 If a patient’s decision is counter to her objective 
welfare interests, her adherence to the religious doctrine which demands it will 
have to be clear and complete for the court to allow it to be determinative. 
Persuasion based on someone else’s religious belief, particularly where that 
person has influence over the patient, will be said to have overborne independent 
capacity. 
                                                 
322 Although there can be no certainty in such things, and no measure of the depth of conviction, 
popular estimates (see for example Wikipedia) are that around 80% of the population professes a 
religious faith. 
323 As was seen recently in a Shrewsbury hospital, when Emma Gough, aged 22, died hours after 
giving birth to twins because, as a Jehovah’s Witness, she refused a blood transfusion: Paul 
Vallely, The Independent, 6th November 2007. 
324 [1992] 3 WLR 782 
325 Per Lord Donaldson at p113-114 “Persuasion based upon religious belief can also be much 
more compelling …. and should alert the doctors to the possibility – no more – that the patient’s 
capacity or will has been overborne.”  
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Children: The legal considerations are different, as we have seen, where the 
patient is a minor. It is one thing for a religiously convinced, autonomous adult 
to reject a treatment plan which would preserve her own life; but quite another 
for that same person to make the same decision for someone else. Adults may 
martyr themselves, but they cannot sacrifice their children on the altar of their 
belief.326  As Thorpe J asked in Re S (A Minor)(Medical Treatment)327  “Are the 
religious convictions of the parents to deny their child a 50% chance of survival? 
Are those convictions to deny him the 50% chance and condemn him to 
inevitable and early death?” Courts too are earthly creations. Thorpe J did not 
ask “For a 50% chance of survival in this world, is it worth breaching one’s inner 
convictions?” “Best interests” are measured in the here-and-now, with no place 
for conscience or speculative immortality. Inevitably then, in every case328 where 
parents have refused  consent to life-saving treatment for young children on the 
basis of religious conviction, their wishes have been overridden. 
 
It should be less inevitable, but the same can also be said of cases involving 
older children, of borderline capacity, who have expressed their own refusal in 
unison with the parental view. Religious motivation is more likely to undermine, 
than support, the sense of developing competence329 - as Ward J put it in Re E330 
one may admire but is also “baffled by” religious conviction which faces death 
in preference to relatively straightforward medical treatment. The device adopted 
by the courts to protect the young is to manipulate the threshold of competence. 
                                                 
326 In Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 at p394 Ward J quoted 
Justice Holmes in the American case of Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) 321 Us Reports 158: “ 
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves, but it does not follow that they are free in 
identical circumstances to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full 
and legal discretion when they can make choices for themselves.” 
327 [1993] 1 FLR 376 at p380 
328 There have been three reported: Re S (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376, 
where the child was four and a half; Re O (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149, 
where the child was a premature baby; and Re R (A Minor)(Blood Transfusion) [1993] 2 FLR 
757, where the child was 10 months old.  
329 Lord Donaldson in Re W [1993] Fam 64  at p80 said that “I personally consider that religious 
or other beliefs which bar any medical treatment or treatment of particular kinds are irrational, 
but that does not make minors who hold those beliefs any the less ‘Gillick competent’. It may 
however contribute to the difficulties minors of borderline capacity have in establishing such 
competence, at least in the serious case which become litigated. There are no reported cases of 
judicial findings of competence, when the minor’s decision has been motivated by religious faith.  
330 [1993] 1 FLR 386 at 394 
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Even where capacity is not an issue, as in Re P (A Minor),331 the court 
consideration of ‘best interests’ cedes no ground to religious doctrine. P was 16 
years and 10 months old, and it would have been farcical to suggest that his 
grasp of the situation was any less than it would be in 14 months time, when he 
became legally adult. The religious motivation behind his refusal of life-saving 
treatment was simply treated as one of those exceptional cases where the court 
can override a competent minor. Johnson J made little attempt to manipulate the 
court’s conception of ‘best interest’ around religious scruple.332 It is implicit in 
his judgment that the court simply did not share that particular conviction.  
  
Jehovah’s Witnesses: All of these cases concerned the Jehovah’s Witness 
objection to use of blood and blood products, when such treatment held excellent 
prospects for saving a life on earth which would otherwise be needlessly lost, a 
consequence which clearly weighed heavily with the judges. Nowhere in any of 
the judgments is there any consideration of why the Jehovah’s Witnesses reject 
the use of blood and blood products, or of what they believe the consequences of 
treatment against their belief would be. That the court approaches assessment of 
‘best interests’ on a purely secular basis is made clear, but at the expense of 
forfeiting even any impression of respecting personal and family wishes. A basic 
requirement of respecting other people’s views is first to listen to them, even if 
you then disagree with them. The Jehovah’s Witness family, whose 
responsibility to care for the child will continue after her earthly life has been 
saved, is apparently not even extended that degree of influence. 
 
Yet Jehovah’s Witnesses are not an isolated or extreme sect. There are 130 000 
of them in the UK, and almost 7 million worldwide. Consideration of the 
substance of their belief would make judicial decisions seem less hostile to 
                                                 
331 [2003] EWHC 2327, where the minor was 16 years and 10 months old, and it would have 
been farcical to suggest that his grasp of the situation was any less than it would be in 14 months 
time, when he became legally adult. 
332 And, as Jane Fortin points out  (‘Accommodating Children’s Rights in a Post Human Rights 
Act Era’ (2006) Modern Law Review 299 at 315), no attempt to reconcile his order with P’s 
rights under Articles 3,5,8 or 14 of the European Convention. She suggests that Johnson J’s 
decision may be permissible as  proportionate to the risks involved in not receiving medically 
orthodox and life-saving treatment. 
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individual conscience, and therefore more consistent with the legal emphasis on 
adult autonomy. If disregarding parents’ wishes is as uncomfortable as judges 
say it is in other contexts, paradoxically, it would also make a secular decision 
easier to make. 
 
Jehovah’s Witnesses are literal believers of the bible. On the basis of four 
texts,333 they believe that blood, as the life-force, belongs to God and is not for 
human use. These texts refer to eating blood, but blood transfusion is covered by 
extension because it involves the use of blood as a nutrient, or food, and is 
therefore comparable. The prohibition on blood consumption is not, however 
absolute. Jehovah’s Witnesses are not, for example, required to be vegetarians. 
As long as the animal has been bled properly to drain most of the blood, it is 
permissible to eat what remains in the flesh.  
  
When a Jehovah’s Witness abstains from blood, he is in effect expressing faith 
that only the shed blood of Jesus Christ can truly redeem him.334 Conscientious 
violation of this doctrine is a serious offence, for which a member is subject to 
organised shunning (known amongst Jehovah’s Witnesses as being 
“disfellowshipped”335) with no reason to hope that a pardon from God could be 
expected.  
 
However Jehovah’s Witnesses also believe that when a person dies, their 
existence stops completely.336 Since existence is over, nothing can be done to 
them or for them, so they do not believe in a hell, or eternal damnation.337 So, 
                                                 
333 Genesis 9:4, Leviticus 17: 12-14, Acts 15: 29 and Acts 21:25 
334 See Awake! August 2006 p11 
335 See The Watchtower January 15th 1961 p6 and July 15th 1982 p20; and The Watchtower 
media release of June 14th 2000, by which the church council changed their policy, so that they 
would no longer expel members who had willingly had blood transfusions – but only because by 
so doing they had already excommunicated themselves, so that church action was unnecessary! 
Disfellowshipping is effectively expulsion from the Jehovah’s Witness way of life. Other 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, even close family members, can never again speak to the disfellowshipped. 
It is a very draconian punishment for those who have either chosen the Jehovah’s Witness way of 
life, or grew up knowing no other. 
336 From Ecclesiastes 9:5, 10.  
337 Each person can be remembered by God and eventually resurrected, when their previous 
actions will be judged. (From John 5: 28-29: “all those in memorial tombs will hear [Jesus’] 
voice and come out, those who did good things to a resurrection of life, those who practised vile 
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when considering the spiritual consequences of a court order for blood 
transfusion, the key word here is “conscientious”. Wherever the decision to give 
a transfusion is not made by a Witness but, for example, by a court,338 the 
conscience is not violated and there is no offence.339 
 
It may smack of sophistry, but it is consistent with the wider approach to blood, 
where absolutes are not required. It is what lies behind Ward J being able to find 
as a fact that “although [E] will protest, at the end of the day he will respect the 
decision of this court”340; and it explains why 15 year old S told doctors that “if 
the court ordered her to have transfusions she would comply;”341 and why the 
parents of L found no difficulty in explaining that they and all the congregation 
would “support her whatever the order of the court may be.”342 Thorpe J was 
accurate, apparently without understanding why,343 when he said of 4 year old 
S’s family that they would recognise that “consent was taken from them and, as 
a judicial act, absolves their conscience of responsibility.”344  
 
Paradoxically this belief in non-existence after death means that the clash 
between courts and Jehovah’s Witnesses is not as cataclysmic as may be the 
                                                                                                                                   
things to a resurrection of judgment.”) Suffering at the hands of others, against ones own will, is 
not ‘practising’ anything. 
338 See Mandi Fry, “Jehovah’s Witnesses and Blood Transfusion”, Christian Medical Fellowship 
October 1993 pp2 – 13. This invites the question of how a judge who was herself a Witness 
would decide such a case? At present there are, and have been, no Jehovah’s Witness judges in 
the UK. 
339 As the 15 year old patient told Johnson J in Re S (A Minor)(Consent to Medical Treatment) 
1994 2 FLR 1065 at p 1072: “if [treatment with blood products] was forced upon her it would be 
like rape and it would be those who had done it would be the sinners.” 
340 [1993] 1 FLR 386 at p 394. A submission had been made, on the basis of a Canadian case, 
that E would physically struggle against the machinery of transfusion. E had said that he was 
prepared to die for his faith, but he had not given any reason to believe that he would fight 
against enforcement of a court order which left his conscience in tact. 
341 [1994] 2 FLR 1065 at p1067 
342 [1998] 2 FLR 810 at p 813 
343 It is not clear form his judgment how informed he is about the Jehovah’s Witness belief. Did 
he know of the exception where transfusion was imposed, or was he simply relying on the 
positive view he had formed of the parents and their approach to parenting the child? The 
judgment tends to suggest the latter, because he precedes his conclusion by asking himself what 
difficulties S would go through being brought up by parents who believed his life was prolonged 
by an ungodly act. However, the judge in question was Matthew Thorpe, who is generally 
extremely sensitive to the wider effect of his judgments (as we noted when considering LB v. 
Croydon ), and his words follow very closely the phraseology of the exception. It is possible that 
he was bending over backwards to ensure that no responsibility – not even for acquiescing in 
someone else taking responsibility – could be laid on the parental consciences.  
344 [1993] 1 FLR 376, at p 380 
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clash with other faiths, where breach of faith may lead to eternal damnation. If 
judges aim to respect conscience and save lives, the approach routinely adopted 
with Jehovah’s Witnesses is therefore a double tragedy. Where the patient is a 
minor, the dismissal of parental views need not be so cursory; and when the 
patient is an autonomous adult, there is no mechanism345 for stepping in to save 
her from her own conscience. 
 
Whose Values?: Religious principle does not only reject secular treatment; 
sometimes it can demand treatment too. Assuming secular responsibility for 
denial of treatment raises different issues, because it is not the principle of 
sanctity of life which is challenged, but its limitations. When orthodox Jews 
wanted court reassurance that their 16 month old baby could have artificial 
ventilation reinstated if she deteriorated without it, the courts declined to 
sanction their approach.346 The doctors considered that C was in a “no chance” 
situation, and recommencement of ventilation represented further suffering. The 
parents believed that it was not within their religious tenets to contemplate the 
possibility of indirectly shortening life, even if that was not the purpose of the 
doctors’ care plan. The court backed professional ethics over personal belief. 
 
The same approach was evident in the case of An NHS Trust v. X,347 which 
concerned the withdrawal of treatment from an elderly man with strong Muslim 
beliefs. On appeal Lord Justice Waller answered the criticism that the judge had 
failed to take into account the religious beliefs (of the whole family) in the 
following terms: 
 
                                                 
345 Which is why, in the absence of any considerations of capacity, Sir Stephen Brown’s decision 
in Re S (Adult: Surgical Treatment0 [1993] 1 FLR 26 must simply be wrong. A pregnant woman 
was refusing consent to a Caesarean on religious grounds. The Health Authority sought a 
declaration that the operation would be lawful in the vital interests of the patient and the unborn 
child. The application came to the notice of court officials at 1.30pm, was heard from 2pm and 
decided at 2.18pm. The President made the declaration sought, with no discussion or hint of 
capacity considerations, and in the stated belief of no English authority in point. The decision 
demonstrates a powerful urge to preserve life (and potential life) at any cost, an utter disregard 
for religious belief, and a woeful ignorance of the law.  
346 Sir Stephen Brown, in Re C (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384. 
347 [2005] EWCA Civ 1145 
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“The fact that the judge put these at the end of his judgment does not 
in my view show that he did not have them properly in mind. It 
should be remembered in particular that the treating doctors had 
themselves had very much in mind the religious concerns of the 
family….[The judge] was clearly right to consider what was 
certainly the key question first, as to whether there was in his view 
any chance of recovery of quality of life so as to make the discomfort 
to which [the patient] was being put justified. Once he had formed 
that conclusion – that it was not justified – it was obviously going to 
be difficult for the religious views and the views of the family to 
overcome the obvious point that, since any decision to put [him] 
through further suffering would produce no benefit to [the patient], it 
would be difficult to see how it could be in [his] best interests.” 
 
As Holm and Edgar348 point out there are different value systems at play, and for 
a ‘best option’ to be chosen, one of them has to be dominant. Waller LJ hid it 
behind “the rhetorical device of presumptive definition”349 when he alluded to a 
‘key question’, but in effect he is simply asserting the dominance of the court’s, 
secular, value system. 
 
Against that background, the legal status of male circumcision must be seen as 
an aberration. There is a considerable body of medical opinion350 which regards 
both male and female circumcision as invasive procedures involving 
unnecessary mutilation of the genitals, yet only female circumcision is criminal. 
The circumcision of little boys is a matter of religious insistence for Muslims 
and Jews, and its legality was never challenged until less than a decade ago: 
                                                 
348 ‘Best Interest: A Philosophical Critique’ [2008] Health Care Analysis 197 at p202 
349 Holm & Edgar at p 202. In her response to their paper, Sheelagh McGuiness refutes this 
interpretation, claiming instead that the court was simply ‘protecting the legal rule that patients 
cannot demand whatever treatment they choose.’: ‘Best Interests and Pragmatism’ [2008] Health 
Care Analysis 208 at p210. 
350 The BMA took steps in this direction in March 2003 and June 2006, in its guidance notes 
(‘The Law and Ethics of Male Circumcision – Guidance for Doctors’), which state that “Doctors 
must consider whether their decisions impact on a person’s human rights and, if so, whether the 
interference can be justified….The BMA does not believe that parental preference alone 
constitutes sufficient grounds for performing a surgical procedure on a child unable to express 
his own view. Parental preference must be weighed in terms of a child’s interests…parents must 
explain and justify requests for circumcision, in terms of the child’s interests.” 
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 Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child’s religious upbringing and 
circumcision):351 J was 5 years old, and living with his mother, a 
non-practising Christian, in an essentially secular fashion. His father 
was Muslim, but not particularly observant. In the course of a 
protracted contact dispute, the father applied for permission to have J 
circumcised, against the mother’s wishes. 
 
Notwithstanding the prevailing view that circumcision for religious reasons 
confers no medical benefit352 (indeed, it causes pain and discomfort and is prima 
facie contrary to medical interests), Wall J accepted that it is lawful for parents 
jointly exercising parental responsibility to impose the surgery on their child. 
This conclusion is surprising353 in its deference of medical interests to religious 
beliefs and cultural identity, and the legal argument employed in justification 
was not compelling. Wall J accepted weak and unconvincing ‘authorities’ 
suggestive of legality, simply because it had always been assumed to be so.354  
 
Perhaps Wall J was simply concentrating his firepower, because on the facts of 
the case, there was no parental agreement. Wherever there is a dispute between 
                                                 
351 [2000] 1 FLR 571. The ratio of the case was followed in Re S (Specific Issue Order: Religion: 
Circumcision)[2005] 1 FLR 236, where circumcision was again found not to be in the child’s 
best interests. 
352 Although this may be about to change – see Alex Renton, The Guardian, 5th July 2009, 
‘Failure to Circumcise Men “May Have Cost Millions of AIDS Deaths”’. Renton suggests that 
the WHO and UNAids may be changing their view about 25 year old evidence which suggests 
that male circumcision plays a significant role in preventing transmission of the human immuno-
deficiency virus.  
353 Surprising, that is, in the present consideration of medical decision-making. In a more general 
context of cultural pluralism Michael Freeman had predicted in 1995 that “in a clash between the 
value of physical integrity and the value of cultural identity”, on the question of male 
circumcision the latter would prevail. See ‘The Morality of Cultural Pluralism’ [1995] 
International Journal of Children’s Rights (3) 1 at p16.  
354 The reasons he gave were actually threefold. He relied firstly on an obiter comment in R v. 
Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 that “ritual circumcision, tattooing, ear-piercing and violent sports 
including boxing are lawful activities; secondly on a statement in the Law Commission 
consultation paper 139, “Consent in the criminal law” stated at paragraph 9.2 that “male 
circumcision is lawful under English common law…”; and thirdly on the BMA’s acceptance of 
male circumcision is accepted by the BMA, albeit that its guidance acknowledged the “male 
circumcision has never been the subject of a case in English law, but this assumption of 
lawfulness has never been challenged.” For a more compelling argument suggesting that 
circumcision should be unlawful in the absence of statutory provision, see For a discussion of the 
lawfulness or otherwise of male circumcision, see Howard Gilbert, ‘Time to Reconsider the 
Lawfulness of Ritual Male Circumcision’ [2007] European Human Rights Law Review 1.   
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the parents, he (supported by the Court of Appeal355) stipulated that the matter 
should be referred to court, to be decided by application of section 1 of the 
Children Act. Judicial assessment of the child’s best interests then becomes 
possible. Once it had the opportunity, the court focussed on religious upbringing, 
over religious inheritance. Hence, although within religious law, J was 
undoubtedly Muslim, his daily experience was not. The sympathy of the court 
lay with secular considerations,356 and circumcision was found to be against his 
best interests.  
 
More recently, however, there has been one case where the court championed the 
religious over the secular: 
 
Ahsan v. University Hospitals Leicester NHS Trust357 : Negligent 
surgery left a 43 year old Muslim patient in a persistent vegetative 
state, and a claim for damages was brought on her behalf. The 
relevant issue was whether the award for cost of care should be 
calculated according to residence in a care home (where she 
presently placed) or at her family home (as the family wished, but 
more expensive). 
 
The defendants argued that, since she was wholly unaware of her surroundings, 
the court should look only to physical requirements, and disregard wider issues. 
However the lead clinician gave evidence that care at home could be said to be 
in her best interests, not in the sense of simply replicating a treatment regime, but 
“using the concept of best interests applied to the family as a whole.”358 
Although the judge declined to give any weight to the spiritual benefit of 
prayer,359 he was keen to extend due regard and respect for the patient’s religious 
beliefs: 
                                                 
355 Per Thorpe LJ at p576 and Butler-Sloss LJ at p577.  
356 Per Wall J at p “It is a strong thing to impose a medically unnecessary surgical intervention on 
a residential parent who is opposed to it.” 
357 [2006] EWHC 2624 
358 Quoted by Hegarty QC sitting as a High Court Judge, as paragraphs 28 -33.  
359 At para 45 “..these are ultimately matters of belief…the spiritual realm is one into which the 
forensic process cannot venture. It proceeds on the basis of what can be established by evidence 
and not on the basis of what is believed, no matter how firmly and fervently.” 
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“I do not think for one moment that a reasonable member of the 
public would consider that the religious beliefs of an individual and 
her family should simply be disregarded in deciding how she should 
be cared for in the unhappy event of supervening mental incapacity. 
On the contrary I would have thought that most reasonable people 
would expect, in the event of some catastrophe of that kind, that they 
would be cared for, as far as practicable, in such a way as to ensure 
that they were treated with due regard for their personal dignity and 
with proper respect for their religious beliefs.”360 
 
Even though “no tangible benefits, whether physical or emotional”361 were likely 
to flow from recognition of the religious views of the patient (as far as they 
could properly be attributed to her) or her family, they were the basis on which 
the court preferred the home care option – and thereby imposed a greater burden 
of damages on the defendants. 
 
It may be tempting to see this as an instance of the court being prepared to admit 
a wider test of best interests where the consequences of court decision are merely 
financial (in the same way that we have seen courts diverge on assessments of 
borderline capacity according to whether they consider a case in the throes of 
emergency or with the luxury of hindsight). However, there is a more credible 
interpretation. The common factor in all of the other cases considered above is 
that religion was at odds with medicine, and on every occasion the court 
favoured secular science. In Ahsan, the religious imperative dovetailed with the 
clinical assessment of best interests. Even the defendant’s expert witness 
acknowledged that, although he disregarded the faith-based wishes of the family 
in his capacity as an expert, he would take them into account as a clinician.362 
The court is, once again, giving preference to the medical view. The more 
sympathetic approach to both families and religious values is only a happy 
consequence of the medics taking such an approach themselves. 
                                                 
360 Para 51 
361 Para 56 
362 Quoted at para 53.   
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The question then becomes, why were the medics able to afford respect to 
religious values in Ahsan, when they had not in any other case? In Ahsan, unlike 
the other cases, the religious demands posed no threat to, may even have 
enhanced, the medical imperative to make better. When a patient is in a 
vegetative state, there is nothing medicine can do to improve their physical 
condition; so there is nothing to lose in trying to promote any other aspects of 
personhood remaining. When that vegetative state was itself brought about by 
negligent medicine, it ill behoves the culprits to deny whatever comfort is 
perceived by the victims. At the point where science can offer no more, medicine 
will allow faith a place.  
 
That medical professionals should accord such precedence to science is probably 
inevitable – medicine in the 21st century is a scientific discipline. That the law 
should accord such precedence to medicine is not inevitable - autonomous adults 
are not protected from their own religious scruple. Ahsan demonstrates that, in 
cases where treatment disputes arise from religious conviction, the best interests 
test is primarily a protectionist device. 
 
Conclusions: Religious belief is not the antithesis of autonomy, but courts adopt 
a cautious approach. Wherever an objectively sensible (and in particular, a life-
saving) treatment plan is rejected on the basis of religious scruple, the courts use 
whatever device is available to them to circumvent the patient’s views. When 
courts determine ‘best interests’, there is no place in the balancing exercise for 
religious views if they conflict with scientific ones: only when medical science 
has run out of things to offer, and in an act of enforced penitence, will courts  
sanction religious considerations over secular.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 232 
E. Immunisation and paternity testing 
 
Much can be achieved with the prick of a needle: a body may be vaccinated 
against disease, or subject to analysis for genetic inheritance.363 The experience 
of the procedure, from the point of view of the patient who is pricked, is very 
much the same, but the purpose of the procedure, and the court approach to 
disputes about it, is different. Cases of immunisation and paternity testing both 
involve children as recipients of a medical intervention, but they demonstrate 
different uses of the ‘best interests’ test to resolve disputes. 
 
Immunisation 
 
Immunisation of children is not compulsory. The view of the medical 
establishment is overwhelmingly that immunisation is in the interests of 
children,364 but if parents jointly take a different view, the law respects their 
decision.365 This goes further than the everyday reality of parents and doctors 
reaching rough accord in hospital corridors, because the parental view is actually 
contrary to medical opinion. There are no instances of doctors challenging a joint 
parental decision and the court imposing the establishment view on united 
parents.366 Parents, acting jointly, genuinely have decision-making authority on 
this issue. 
 
There may be any number of reasons why immunisation has such a special 
status. It is of course a preventative measure, rather than curative; and it looks to 
securing herd immunity as much as individual protection. Any vaccination 
                                                 
363 Or disease carrier status, as in Re C (A Child)(HIV Testing) [2000] 2 WLR 270. This type of 
investigation however rarely comes before the court. There are too few judgments to allow any 
generalised conclusion of judicial approach. 
364 So much so that, in June 2009, Sir Sandy McCara, a former chairman of the BMA, submitted 
for debate at a BMA conference the motion that children should not be allowed to attend primary 
schools without a certificate of vaccinations.  
365 “Where parents are in agreement that their child should not be vaccinated, the law and doctors 
respect their view. It is not compulsory and no local authority, doctor, school or other agency 
would in ordinary circumstances apply to the court for a contrary decision.” Per Sumner J in Re 
C (A Child)(Immunisation: Parental Rights) [2003] EWHC 1376 at para 314  
366 Although for arguments in favour of exactly such imposition see Angus Dawson, ‘The 
Determination of Best Interests in Relation to Childhood Vaccinations’ [2005] Bioethics 72. 
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carries theoretical risks, however small and generally outweighed by the risk of 
contacting the disease, so that once herd immunity is achieved, any individual’s 
best interest could rationally be said to lie in not accepting those risks. 
Acceptance of a joint parental decision recognises all these factors – and 
explains why immunisation has not troubled the courts until relatively recently. 
 
The true sentiment of the court is revealed however in those cases where the 
parents do not agree, and the issue falls to judicial determination under the best 
interests test.  In the case of Re C (A Child)(Immunisation: Parental Rights),367 
where all the standard childhood vaccinations were in issue, although careful to 
deny that the decision should be seen as a general approval of immunisation,368 
Sumner J found the medical evidence in favour of immunisation “clear and 
persuasive,”369 and then determined that there were no non-medical factors 
sufficient to outweigh the medical indication of best interests. The Court of 
Appeal eagerly upheld both his conclusion and his approach.370 
  
On the surface, Sumner J’s approach seemed to take an inclusive attitude 
towards families, albeit strictly from the point of view of the child. With 
reference to Re T (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment), he specifically took 
into consideration the impact which a decision against them would have on the 
mothers and their care of the children,371 reminiscent of an ethic of care. 
However, on the facts, he dismissed the impact on the child’s best interests as 
negligible – a view which might have emboldened him to consider the matter 
from that perspective in the first place! The full extent of his consideration of the 
                                                 
367 [2003] EWHC 1376 at first instance and [2003] EWCA Civ 1148 on appeal. 
368 At paragraph 358. Whilst the view of the medical establishment remains as it is, the facts 
which may lead to a different decision are not easy to envisage. Presumably only specific 
evidence of adverse reaction to immunization would suffice, in which circumstances no one 
would be likely to bring an application. 
369 At paragraph 343 
370 Per Thorpe LJ at para 24: as long as the judge “consider(s) all relevant factors…the order in 
which he takes them is surely for him provided that he keeps each in its proper proportion and 
ultimately conducts a comprehensive survey.” Sedley J at para 34 referred to the judge’s 
complete discretion: “All the law requires is a logical and practical approach.”    
371 At paragraph 343. The way was opened for this approach by Wilson J in Re C(A Child)(HIV 
Testing) [2000] 2 WLR 270 at paragraph 58: “A different, yet allied, situation may arise where to 
override the parents’ wishes is to risk causing them such emotional distress as will disable them 
from caring properly for the child or, at any rate, was will indirectly affect the child’s own 
emotional stability to a significant extent.” However, although he saw the possibility, Wilson J 
did not espouse it. 
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family unit was a willingness to contemplate taking steps to protect one mother 
by prohibiting further litigation372 whilst she adjusted to his decision.  
 
More fundamentally, the Court of Appeal’s endorsement of Sumner J’s 
approach, and its downplaying of Re T, reveals the assessment of best interests to 
be strongly medically orientated. In fact the logical conclusion of allowing the 
determination to proceed by assessment of expert medical opinion first is that, at 
least where the preferred expert opinion is against treatment, that will be 
determinative373 - no other factors will ever get to be considered. So the family 
view will be decisive only as long as it is united. Where there is disagreement, a 
court assessment of ‘best interests’ strongly favours medical orthodoxy. 
 
Paternity Testing 
Blood testing for paternity is an investigative tool, not a therapy,374 and the court 
can only make provision for it in relation to wider civil proceedings where the 
issue of parentage falls to be determined, not as a free-standing application. Its 
significance is in the results, not in the procedure. However, when the relevant 
law first developed, the testing process generally required professional medical 
intervention. A blood test was physically invasive, and as such the principle of 
autonomy375 loomed large. It was enshrined in statute that no competent person 
                                                 
372 Paragraph 352. In the event, the mother rejected this attempt to protect her interests by herself 
appealing the decision! 
373 See Case Comment, [2003] Medical Law Review 377. 
374 Per Wall J in Re O & J (Paternity: Blood Tests) [2000] 1 FLR 418: “A blood test taken for the 
purpose of determining paternity cannot be said to be either curative or prophylactic, nor is it 
designed to facilitate diagnosis of any medical condition…Even given the broad definition of 
treatment contained, for example, in the decision of the Court of Appeal in B v. Croydon Health 
Authority [1995] Fam 133, [1995] 1 FLR 470 at 138 and 473 respectively, I am unable to accept 
that ‘treatment’ includes steps taken to avoid the potential psychological damage of children 
growing up without certain knowledge of their paternity.” 
375 “A person of full age and capacity cannot be ordered to undergo a blood test against his 
will.... The real reason is that English law goes to great lengths to protect a person of full age and 
capacity from interference with his personal liberty. We have too often seen freedom disappear 
in other countries not only by coups d’etat but by gradual erosion; and often it is the first step 
that counts.” per Lord Reid in S v. S; W v. Official Solicitor [1970] 3 All ER 107 at p111. 
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could be forced to undergo such a procedure against their will,376 and testing of a 
child required the consent of the person with care and control of him.377  
 
As medical science has progressed, better information can be gleaned from even 
naturally discarded body products, such as hair, so the ethical concerns of the 
procedure have diminished, or at least moved away from the issue of liberty to 
issues of privacy. Nowadays testing kits are readily available on the internet,378 
so practical reality has reduced the impact of the procedure379 and allowed the 
court to consider best interests primarily in terms of the impact of results. 
 
The leading case of S v. S; W v. Official Solicitor380 predates the Family Reform 
Act 1969, but was decided in expectation of its coming into force: 
 
S : H and W were married with 3 children. When the fourth child D 
was born, H denied paternity. He subsequently issued divorce 
proceedings on the grounds of W’s adultery with M. Within those 
proceedings the question arose of whether D was a child of the 
marriage, and blood tests were ordered. H and W consent to testing 
for themselves and D, but M refused. 
 
W : H and W were married with 2 children. W left H and gave birth 
to P five months later. Two years later, at H’s request, W sent H a 
photograph of the three children. H at once asserted that P was not 
                                                 
376 s21(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 provided that “…a blood sample which is 
required to be taken from any person for the purpose of giving effect to a direction under section 
20 of this Act shall not be taken from that person except with his consent.” 
377 S21(3) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969: A blood sample may be taken from a person 
under the age of 16 years …if the person who has care and control of him consents. (The consent 
of a minor over the age of 16 was as effective as if he was of full age, by virtue of s21(2)) 
378 For comment on this see Northover & Dennison, “Genetic Testing and the Impact on the 
Family”, Fam Law 32 (752).  
379 The Family law Reform Act 1969 s20 provided for the taking of blood samples only. The 
Family Law Reform Act 1987 s23 had made provision of testing “bodily samples”, but that 
section was not brought into force because the Home Office perceived “no discernible demand” 
for tests on anything but blood: Home Office Circular 91/1989. After much delay, the substantive 
law has now been updated to reflect the availability of less invasive testing procedures.  As from 
1st April 2001, pursuant to the Blood Tests (Evidence of Paternity)(Amendment) Regulations 
2001 (SI 2001/773), it is possible for samples of bodily tissue or fluid other than blood to be 
taken to determine paternity. 
380 [1970] 3 ALL ER 107 
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his child. W admitted adultery and H issued divorce proceedings, 
raising the issue of paternity. H and W were willing to consent to 
testing, but the judge refused to make the order. 
 
Although both mothers were agreeable381 to testing the child, they could not 
arrange for testing without first notifying the Official Solicitor.382 The Official 
Solicitor objected to testing, on the basis that it had not been shown to be for the 
benefit of the child.383 The House of Lords came to consider his arguments, 
knowing that legitimacy proceedings were on foot and would have to be 
determined. The question of blood tests effectively decided the evidence which 
could be heard. The husbands argued that it would be contrary to justice to 
deprive them of the best evidence (which testing offered), unless it could be 
shown that tests were contrary to the interests of the children. 
 
The nature of the jurisdiction: The Law Lords were unanimous in the view that 
blood testing did not fall within the “custodial” jurisdiction of the courts, which 
would require the child’s interests to be paramount. 
 
Lord Reid distinguished the custody cases on the basis that they 
involved ‘no competing question of general public interest’, whereas 
in paternity disputes “justice requires that available evidence should 
not be suppressed...[even though] it may be against the interests of 
the child to produce it.”384 He doubted that the ordering of blood 
tests was an exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction,385 but asserted 
                                                 
381 Per Lord Morris at pp 119 and 122 
382 As noted by  Lord Morris at p 119, pursuant to a Practice Direction issued by Sir Jocelyn 
Simon P, on 21st October 1968. 
383 The implication behind the Official Solicitor’s argument was that a child’s best interests lay in 
maintaining the status of legitimacy. Lord Reid did not consider this well founded. If the 
circumstantial evidence pointed towards the husband not being the father, then testing might 
actually improve the chances of preserving the status. In any event public policy had moved on, 
and did not require any special protection of legitimacy status. A finding of legitimacy which 
was not based on the best evidence possible, was unlikely to be convincing so as to mitigate the 
remaining (chiefly social) disadvantages of conception outside marriage. Per Lord Reid at p111, 
and generally echoed by Lord Morris at p120. The counter argument was that a child’s interests 
lie in knowing the truth: per Lord Reid at p111, Lord Morris at 121, Lord Hodson at 123. 
384 p112 
385 Instead, he said at p 112, “by appointing guardians ad litem and by a Practice Direction of the 
Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division of 21st October 1968, the court prevents parents who 
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that even if the court was limited to what a reasonable parent would 
do, a reasonable parent would consider public interest, and not refuse 
tests unless it would be clearly against the interests of the child.  
 
Lord McDermott identified two categories of court duty to minors. A 
general “protective” duty (to ensure that a minor did not suffer 
because of his incapacity) arose whenever a court exercised its 
powers in litigation where a child was engaged or involved. Its aim 
was “to ensure that he gets his rights rather than to place him above 
the law and make his rights superior to those of others.”386 
“Custodial” jurisdiction387 was a second category, which could not 
include blood testing, in the interests of best evidence;388 because 
giving pre-eminence to the interests of the child would place 
intolerable strain on the interests of justice,389 and because 
ascertaining the child’s interests in this context is invariably 
impossible.390 
 
Lord Morris took a more general approach, balancing the need for 
best evidence and the need to protect the interests of the minor 
                                                                                                                                   
retain care and control of their children from exercising their right to have blood tests. Then, 
when an order for tests is sought the true position appears to be that the court is being asked to 
lift this ban. I do not see why any special jurisdiction is necessary either to impose the ban or lift 
it.” 
386 p115, and therefore it “would not ordinarily afford ground for refusing a blood test merely 
because it might, in revealing the truth, prove the infant’s illegitimacy in duly constituted 
paternity proceedings.” 
387 As then encapsulated in the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 s1: “Where in any proceedings 
before a court…the custody or upbringing of an infant…is in question, the court, in deciding that 
question, shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration…” 
388 “It would be a backward step to start to whittle down the effect of s1, but it would just as bad 
to have to apply it’s final criterion on a finding of fact which was not reached on the best 
available evidence, and even worse if that had to happen because the court, having sped a 
paternity issue, considered that it should not be fully explored.” At p117-118 
389 “If …the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to provide in its discretion for a fair and 
satisfactory trial – were to give place to the suppression for the benefit of the infant of a means of 
finding the truth, the conflict between the interests of justice and the advantage of the infant 
would become too acute to tolerable…” at p 118 
390 “..to ascertain whether a full investigation of a necessary paternity issue will be in the best 
interests of the infant, must by its very nature be so difficult and conjectural as to become an 
impossible task more often than not.” at p118  
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according to the circumstances of the case391 (but giving precedence 
to the former on the facts of both these cases). 
 
Lord Hodson saw it as a conflict of interests, in which the court was 
exercising a duty of arbitrament,392 where all parties’ interests were 
relevant and none took priority. 
 
There was frustrated comment on the impossibility of knowing where the best 
interests of the child lay,393 and guarded suggestion that knowing the truth about 
their paternity is itself in the best interests of children,394 but the outcome of the 
case did not turn on either of these factors. Effectively the House of Lords 
recognised that the testing procedure could be ordered unless it was against the 
best interests of the person on whom it was to be performed, where justice and 
the interests of others demanded it – an emphasis remarkably different to all our 
previous considerations of best interest in the context of medical treatment.395 
   
Lord Reid declined to comment on the operation of the Family Law Reform Act 
1969 except to say that lower courts should apply the principles settled by higher 
courts on the question of when blood tests should be ordered.396 The implication 
                                                 
391 “..best evidence should, if possible, be completely available; but [the court] will also 
steadfastly have in mind that the interests and welfare of infants are always to be zealously 
protected and safeguarded….A court will have to decide whether, having regard to the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case, an infant’s interests are such that their protection 
necessitates the withholding from the court of evidence which may be very material.” at p120.  
392 “..the court is not truly exercising the custodial jurisdiction in which the interests of the child 
are paramount but the duty of arbitrament between parties in which their interests are relevant 
and must be considered as well as the interests of the infant whose body it is sought to examine.” 
At p 124 
393 Per  Lord Reid at p110 “In most cases it is virtually impossible to determine at the time when 
the order is sought whether taking the tests would or would not be in the child’s interest…”; per 
Lord McDermott at p118 “to ascertain whether a full investigation of a necessary paternity issue 
will be in the best interests of the infant, must by its very nature be so very difficult and 
conjectural as to be an impossible task more often than not.”;  Lord  
394 Per Lord Reid at p111 “it is said that… it is generally better for the child that the truth should 
out than that the child should go through life with a lurking doubt…”; per Lord Hodson at p123 
“there must be few cases where the interests of children can be shown to be best served by the 
suppression of truth” and at p124 “ it must surely be in the best interests of the child in most 
cases that…the child should be told the truth as soon as possible.” 
395 Medical treatment disputes fall fairly clearly into the ‘custodial’ jurisdiction, in respect of 
children by either by virtue of wardship or by statute, and in respect of adults because the 
inherent jurisdiction was modelled on parens patriae. 
396 P113 “The Act gives no guidance as to the circumstances in which blood tests should be 
ordered, and I think that must mean that superior courts are to settle principles insofar as it is 
 239 
is clearly that the House of Lords expected their decision to be followed long 
after the Act came into force. When the Act did come into force, that guidance 
came to be tested in a different context – the import of parental consent. The 
priority afforded to the interests of the child became the focal point of a power 
struggle between parents and the court. 
 
The impact of statute: Section 21(3) of the Family Reform Act provided that a 
blood sample could be taken from a minor “if the person who has care and 
control of him consents.” Where consent is forthcoming, the court is generally 
happy to go along with the carer’s decision397 - but not always. Where the carer’s 
request for testing is motivated by a desire to frustrate court proceedings, the 
court has refused it: 
 
O v. L398  :  V was born in December 1990 and raised as the child of 
H and W, who were married. They separated 3 years later, and W 
then indicated that her new cohabitant was V’s father, not H. H 
applied for contact, and within those proceedings W applied for 
blood tests. The Court of Appeal upheld findings that W’s 
motivation was to prevent contact; that contact was likely to be in 
V’s interests irrespective of the outcome of blood tests; and that 
precise definition of the biological relationship was not necessary to 
foster contact.    
 
In terms of S v. S, this case could be seen as an instance of testing being against 
the child’s interests,399 except that Wall LJ observed that resolution of the 
paternity dispute “would undoubtedly be in [V’s] interests” sooner or later.400 
                                                                                                                                   
necessary to disturb existing law in order to comply with the Act, and thereafter the lower courts 
are to apply those principles to cases which come before them.” 
397 See for example, Re T (A Minor)(Blood Tests) [1992] 2 FCR 663: mother initially refused 
consent, and the first instance judge refused the direction. Having changed her mind whilst 
appeal was pending, the Court of Appeal made the direction with a very short judgment. 
Bingham LJ at p664 gave the only hint of reasoning, namely that “it probably is desirable in the 
interests of the child and her long-term relationship with these parties.” 
398 [1995] 2 FLR 930 
399 In the immediate circumstances, the possibility of a finding that H was not V’s father may 
have an unhelpful effect on contact proceedings, whereas the assumption of legitimacy was 
supportive. 
400 At p 937. The modern view is that even unpalatable truth is preferable to uncertainty. 
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The case is more accurately interpreted as an instance of the public interest in not 
endorsing W’s attempt to manipulate proceedings outweighing V’s presently 
uncertain personal interests – again a very different emphasis to the one we have 
identified in disputes of medical treatment, except that in both instances the court 
holds the upper hand. 
 
Similar concerns may arise where a parent with care refuses consent, but in this 
scenario, the balance of power is critically affected by statutory provision. Until 
recent statutory amendment, the court did not in fact order a blood test to take 
place but merely directed that it may take place.401 The ultimate decision of 
whether testing will actually take place or not lay with the parent with care and 
control, who had the power of consent pursuant to s21(3) Family Law Reform 
Act 1969. This balance of power is in marked contrast to that vigorously 
defended by the court in matters of medical decision making (where the court 
listens to parental wishes, but ultimately makes its own decision). Fortified by a 
modern shift of attitude very much in favour of openness about biological 
origins, the court has fought hard against its apparent lack of authority, and 
ultimately overcome it.  
 
The unusual precedence of parental authority over court authority was apparently 
accepted by the House of Lords in S v. S; W v. Official Solicitor,402 but on a 
clearly obiter and unconsidered basis. In the same vein but (in terms of 
precedence) more powerfully, the Court of Appeal specifically upheld Callman 
J’s decision on that point in Re F (A Minor)(Blood Tests: Parental Rights).403 As 
Balcombe J put it 
 
                                                 
401 As was made clear by Ward LJ in Re H (A Minor)(Blood Tests: Parental Rights) [1996] 2 
WLR 506 at p99, quoting the Law Commission paper upon which the Act was based. “The 
distinction…has not always been fully understood and the misunderstanding has created 
confusion.” 
402 “No case has yet occurred in which a court has ordered a blood test to be carried out against 
the will of the parent who has the care and control of the child, and I am not certain that it would 
be proper to do that or that it will be possible to do that after Part III of the 1969 Act comes into 
operation.” Per Lord Reid at p112. It would later be pointed by Ward LJ in Re H (A 
Minor)(Blood Tests: Parental Rights) [1996] 2 WLR 506, that Lord Reid was giving judgment 
before the passing of the Act, and therefore failed to distinguish between the power to order or to 
direct.   
403 [1993] 3 WLR 369.  
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“the court will not order a blood test to be carried out against the will 
of the parent who has since birth had sole parental responsibility for 
the child.”404 
 
The court’s dismissal of the applicant’s counter-arguments has been strongly 
criticised by Jane Fortin as demonstrating judicial preference for marriage, and 
short-term stability over long term truth,405 and it may be that the Court of 
Appeal found it easy to accept the parental priority because of the particular facts 
of the case.406 However the marriage had already broken down, and the mother 
was into a third relationship by the time Wall J decided Re CB (A Minor)(Blood 
Tests),407 recognising a parental veto even whilst taking a dim view of the 
parent,408 so the preference to which Fortin objects cannot have been a 
motivating factor. 
 
In any event it was an opposing line of cases, decided against the claims of 
short-term stability and marriage,409 which eventually carried the day. Sitting as 
a Deputy High Court Judge, Mr. Michael Horowitz QC in Re G (A Minor)(Blood 
Test)410  looked to the sequence of events involved in testing, and concluded that 
                                                 
404 At p321 
405 See “Re F: The Gooseberry Bush Approach” [1993] 1 FLR 598. Because of these factors, at 
p301 she concluded that “the answer in Re F, implicit though unstated, was that the court at both 
levels concluded that E’s welfare would actually be endangered by B’s application and this 
outweighed the interests of justice to B.” 
406 Where the application was brought by “a stranger to the marriage, … to satisfy his own desire 
to know the truth about the consequences of a relationship with the mother that has terminated 
well before the birth” per Callman J, quoted at p319. The Court of Appeal placed clear priority 
on maintaining the stability of the family unit within which the child was being brought up (see p 
320 – 321). Practitioners came to advise on the basis of this approach, and the effect was seen in 
K v.M (Paternity: Contact) [1996] 3 FCR 517: having withdrawn his application for blood tests 
on advice that the court would not accede to it, the third party’s contact application was then 
simply dismissed on paper. 
407 [1994] 2 FLR 762 
408 At p763: “Neither Mr. F nor Mrs. B emerge with any credit in this case and both 
were...thoroughly unsatisfactory witnesses. Each, but particularly Mrs. B., radiated a degree of 
hostility towards each other that was almost tangible….her dislike of him permeated almost 
every answer she gave.” 
409 In Re G the marriage had already broken down, and whatever stability had been achieved was 
with the third party to the marriage. The granted the husband’s application for testing, even 
though he was noted to be a crack addict and contact was likely to be inappropriate. In Re H the 
marriage was subsisting, but the court granted the third party’s application for testing. 
410 [1994] 1 FLR 495.  
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the Act envisaged the giving of a direction even though it may subsequently 
remain unimplemented.411   
 
Wall J in Re CB (A Minor)(Blood Tests)412 distinguished Re G on the basis that 
the mother may have been willing to change her mind,413 but in truth the force of 
the refusal was not determinative for Mr. Horowitz QC. He cited the possibility 
of change of heart only to illustrate the theoretical value of a direction even 
without powers of coercive implementation.   
 
The Court of Appeal agreed with Mr. Horowitz QC. In Re H (A Minor)(Blood 
Tests :Parental Rights)414 the effect of Wall J’s approach was abundantly 
obvious. It is a litigation reality that parties express their case to fit the law.415 
Where expressions of non-compliance will lead the court not to make the order 
litigants oppose, they are encouraged to say they will not comply, and exactly 
that process was at play in Re H.416  On the basis of the distinction between the 
power to order and to direct, the Court of Appeal held that even dogmatic refusal 
of consent was not determinative of an application for paternity testing: 
 
“the legislature would not have made express provision that a refusal 
to comply with direction has a specified consequence if a refusal to 
submit to tests would have compelled the court not to make a 
direction at all.”417 
 
                                                 
411 “s20 empowers the court to give a direction and then, by s21(1), refers to a blood sample 
‘which is required to be taken’, and then goes on to provide that where there is such a 
requirement the blood shall not be taken from that person except with his consent. The scheme of 
the Act plainly envisages…that a direction may be given with which the adult may not comply 
and her non-compliance would not be unlawful or visited by the coercive powers of the court” 
pp499-500  
412 [1994] 2 FLR 762 at 773 
413 By Wall J in Re CB at p 773, where it was found as a fact that the mother would not consent 
in any circumstances.  
414 [1997] Fam 89 at 101 
415 As previously discussed in the context of carer’s burden in the sterilisation cases. 
416 Ward LJ quotes from the first instance decision of Coningsby J at p96: “I think they know the 
importance of categorically stating that they will not in any circumstances give consent to blood 
tests.”  
417 An interesting parallel may be drawn with birth registration. Mothers have much greater 
ability to subvert the truth of biological origins in the details they supply for birth registration, 
where the court has no powers at all. 
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If Fortin’s interpretation of judicial preference (for marriage and stability) were 
the only one at play, then Re H would have been decided differently. Instead, 
Ward LJ was quite dismissive of the idea that the married relationship needed to 
be protected from the risk of destabilisation which tests represent.418 Similarly, 
although the marriage in Re G had already ended, upholding the parental veto 
would have been expected as at least preserving the presumption of 
legitimacy.419  
 
These decisions are better explained by a judicial urge to protect court 
jurisdiction from manipulation by a parent. In Re G the mother’s refusal was 
grounded in her desire to protect from challenge the cohabitant’s belief in his 
paternity,420 rather than any direct consideration of the child. And in Re H the 
first instance judge explicitly saw the mother’s refusal as tactical, owing much to 
the decision in Re CB.  
 
 Those cases which Fortin sees as supportive of marriage are consistent with this 
view of judicial motivation too. In Re F, it was the applicant trying to use court 
procedure to his advantage in a factual scenario where his claims had minimal 
chance of success. And in Re CB, Wall J’s concern was that the statutory 
provision of a right of veto for the parent with care leads to unsatisfactory 
litigation.421 If an order was never going to be implemented, he considered the 
                                                 
418 He said at p 108 “If the cracks in the H marriage are so wide that they will be rent asunder by 
the truth then the piece of paper which dismisses the application hardly seems adhesive to bind 
them together.” 
419 Whereas in fact Mr. Horowitz specifically saw advantages in distancing the child from the 
husband, at p501: “he has been and may still be a ‘crack’ addict and has a criminal record, and 
there may be strong issues as to his suitability or unsuitability …” 
420 “..the mother and CB say they wish to make their life together. They say..that if the blood test 
came out positive in favour of the husband, this would be news that was, to say the least, 
unwelcome. I am far from satisfied that the interests of the child and justice require the mother 
and CB to maintain a belief which they wish was true but which was not in fact true…” at p502 
421 “The jurisdiction given by the statute is…unusual and unsatisfactory from the point of view of 
conventional jurisprudence. The normal judicial process is that the judge makes an order if (a) he 
or she thinks it is the right thing to do; (b) on the basis that it will be implemented; and (c) on the 
basis that it will be enforced…s221 makes it quite clear that the litigant is given an absolute veto 
in relation to implementation of the court’s order….I have to say that it is unusual for a judge to 
be asked to resolve an issue which is said to be justiciable, and in respect of which he has a 
discretion…at the same time for him to be told that whatever he decides will not be 
implemented. This will particularly be the case if the judge perceives that refusal to consent is 
either irrational or otherwise ill-founded…..I recognise the situation which results from my 
decision is unsatisfactory, since it permits a litigant whose conduct may be open to severe 
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order ought not to be made. He had focused on procedure, whereas Mr Horowitz 
and the Court of Appeal focused on substance, but the urge to avoid 
manipulation of the court was the same.  
 
Having established its authority to make directions, the court then set about 
securing implementation of its will. Frustration with the idea of parental veto 
came to a head with Hale J’s judicial gymnastics in Re R (A Minor)(Blood Test: 
Constraint).422 The case report gives absolutely no information about the 
background facts. There is no description of the adults involved, and apparently 
no consideration of what interests they may have had in the outcome of paternity 
testing. All that can be gleaned is that the child’s mother refused consent to 
blood testing in the face of an unexplained judicial determination that testing 
would be in the child’s best interests. Hale J made the startling order that the 
child be delivered into the care and control of the Official Solicitor, who was 
then to provide both the consent and the opportunity for samples to be taken.  
 
Removing a 22 month old child from her primary carer is a draconian measure 
by any scale. The Official Solicitor had serious reservations about his part in 
it.423 In fact, it was never implemented, because the mother changed her mind 
and gave consent – which probably says more about the frightening and coercive 
effect of judicial orders than it does about the mother’s views on testing. 
Furthermore, when the opportunity to repeat the tactic arose again in Re O & 
J,424 Wall J dismissed it (and every other possibility that was argued) as an 
impermissible device to circumvent the plain provisions of statute. However, he 
went further than his earlier expressions of dissatisfaction425 and made a stark 
call for legislative reform. He even made a veiled threat that, if the legislature 
                                                                                                                                   
criticism, and who may not be acting in the best interests of the child, effectively to dictate what 
should or should not happen.” At pp768 – 769, 770 & 774. 
422 [1998] 1 FCR 41 
423 According to Peter Jackson, Counsel acting as amicus curiae in the subsequent case of Re O  
& J (Paternity: Blood Tests) [2000] 1 FLR 418, at p431. 
424 [2000] 1 FLR 418 
425 In Re CB. See above. 
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did not act, the courts would force their hand by declaring the relevant parts of 
the statute incompatible with the anticipated Human Rights Act.426   
 
The combined effect of Re R and Re O & J was impressive: a legislative 
amendment was duly arranged.427 The new s21(3) provides that in the case of a 
child aged under 16 either the person with care and control may consent or, 
alternatively, the court may do so, if it considers that it will be in the child’s best 
interests for the sample to be taken. The result is twofold: firstly, that a parent 
can no longer thwart the will of the court, and secondly that the principle on 
which the court acts is identical to that used in immunisation (and all medical 
treatment) cases.  
 
Jurisdiction after statutory amendment: In theory, the statutory amendment did 
nothing to alter the basic nature of paternity testing disputes. In Lord 
McDermott’s phraseology,428 paternity testing is still a matter for the court’s 
protective jurisdiction only, not its custodial jurisdiction. When the amendment 
was first tested, within six weeks of its taking effect, in the case of Re T (A 
Child)(DNA Tests: Paternity)429 Bodey J explicitly recognised this: 
 
“..the welfare of T is not paramount… Instead, one has to apply the 
test of his best interests, weighing those best interests against the 
competing interests of the adults who would be affected one way or 
another, according to whether the application were granted or 
refused.”430 
 
This formulation of the law surely offers the best of both worlds: the interests of 
a vulnerable minor safeguarded, but assessed in the context of interdependence, 
                                                 
426 “If Parliament does not implement reform, the law in this area will continue not to serve the 
best interests of children. In these circumstances I anticipate that reform may need to be achieved 
when the Human Rights Act 1998 comes into force, by the point being taken that Part III of the 
1969 Act is not human rights compliant.” At p 434. 
427 By s 82 of The Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 (“CSPSSA 2000”), 
which took effect from 1st April 2001. 
428 In S v. S [1970] 3 All ER 107, and footnotes 385 and 386 above. 
429 [2001] All ER (D) 82. The case also determined the Human Rights Act argument, as Wall J 
had foreseen. 
430 At page 1194 
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where everyone affected is freely able to express their interests. It articulates 
precisely the model advocated in the ethical considerations of chapter 2. Its 
interpretation in practice offers insights into how the recognition of family 
interests in medical treatment disputes may work in reality. 
   
The facts of Re T were somewhat unusual: 
 
The child’s mother and her husband were unable to conceive a child 
together, and agreed that the mother would have sex with a third 
party. Over a three month period she had sex with A, a family friend, 
frequently but no pregnancy resulted and the mother terminated the 
arrangement. Ten years later the mother renewed her efforts, having 
intercourse with A and three other men. She became pregnant and 
gave birth to the child, T, who was raised as the husband’s.  
 
For a while, A saw T in the capacity of family friend, but the mother 
terminated the friendship because she considered that A was 
becoming too demanding. A’s adult daughter subsequently let out 
information doubting T’s paternity to others, including the mother’s 
niece and nephew who attended the local school. In a public row, A 
asserted his paternity with a placard at the husband’s place of work 
and on CB radio, and then claimed parental responsibility and 
contact orders from the court. The Family Proceedings Court refused 
blood testing. Six years later, when T was 7 years old, A renewed his 
application.  
 
Bodey J correctly identified the need to weigh the child’s interests against the 
competing interests of affected adults. He made a clear assessment that knowing 
the truth of his parentage was in the child’s best interests. In contrast, his 
consideration of the interests of the mother, her husband and A is vague. None of 
them present a flattering portrait in the facts of the case, and the interests they 
claim are largely ignoble. The settled relationship between the mother and her 
husband was actually cited as a reason in favour of testing, rather than seen as 
being threatened by it. The court overrode maternal opposition to testing on the 
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basis that her own “understandably strong feelings” precluded her from “seeing 
sufficiently clearly and objectively the best long-term interests of T.”431  
 
Clearly, the recognition of third party interests as a legitimate part of the 
equation did not in any way hamper the court’s instinct, or its ability, to use the 
‘best interests’ test as a means to impose its own views. The mother (and her 
husband) were able to argue their interests openly, rather than distorting them as 
indirect aspects of the child’s interests, and the court was still able to find them 
wanting. The admission of third party interests to the balancing exercise was 
demonstrably not a threat to the court’s ability to advance the interests of the 
vulnerable party.   
 
The Court of Appeal confirmed such a conclusion in the case of Re H & A,432 
where again the facts were less than flattering of the adults involved: 
 
The mother had an extra-marital sexual relationship with Mr. B over 
a prolonged period, with her husband in total ignorance. When twins 
were conceived and born, she initially allowed both men to believe 
they were the father, and her husband became the primary carer of 
the children. Mr. B began legal proceedings, including an application 
for blood testing. When the husband accidentally became aware of 
the proceedings, he gave evidence that he could not carry on in the 
family unit if the twins proved to be another man’s children. 
 
The judge at first instance refused testing, but the Court of Appeal overturned his 
decision. All of the adults were able to argue their own perception of interests, 
but none of them dominated considerations of the higher court, which simply 
found that HHJ Morgan had given too little weight to the importance of 
certainty, and too much to the risk of driving the husband away.433 The Court of 
                                                 
431 At p 1196 
432 [2002] EWCA Civ 383 
433 Paragraphs 21, & 28; and paragraph 24.  Per Thorpe LJ at para 27  “of the greatest 
significance are my misgivings over the judge’s strongly expressed assessment that to order the 
test would be to drive Mr. R from the family…the reality was that Mr R was on an incomplete 
journey of discovery of truth. Major adjustments still had to be made. There was much with 
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Appeal gave the preservation of marriage very little weight on the balancing 
seesaw - which represents an interesting counterpoint to Jane Fortin’s argument 
about judicial preference. Arguably, the court was giving greater weight to the 
competing interest of justice for the applicant - but the judgment is not expressed 
in those terms. In reality, the interest which weighed most heavily in this case 
was that of truth, not from the perspective of any of the parties involved, but 
from the perspective of the court.434 
 
Re T and Re H & A together demonstrate that, once ‘best interests’ are imported 
anywhere into the judicial balancing exercise, it is more or less certain that the 
court’s view of optimal outcome will be secured. Whatever the theoretical 
analysis of jurisdiction, the effect of a judicial assessment of ‘best interests’ is to 
facilitate the objectively preferred end result. Given the preferences identified 
earlier in the chapter as inherent in the judicial concept of ‘best interests’, the 
jurisdiction becomes custodial in all but name. 
 
Conclusions: Immunisations are a medical intervention of preventative care, 
within the custodial jurisdiction of the court. Paternity testing is non-therapeutic 
and therefore falls within the protective jurisdiction. However experience of the 
procedure, at least when the approach of the courts was first worked out, was 
virtually the same and offers the starting point of a convergence which has 
increased in law even as it has decreased in physical experience.  
 
Motivated by the need to protect its own and the public interest, the courts 
demanded and ultimately achieved statutory amendments which elevated ‘best 
interest’ considerations into the basis for exercise of its powers in paternity 
testing cases. In effect the court now exercises its power in a quasi-custodial 
                                                                                                                                   
which he had yet to come to terms, including a more realistic acknowledgment of the chances 
that Mr. B was the father of the twins. Mr and Mrs R had much to reconcile if their marriage was 
to endure. The complex processes which would have to continue post judgment might equally 
well be assisted by certainty, which may bring relief or which may alternatively at least excise 
doubt and suspicion. Unpalatable truth may be easier to live with than uncertainty.” 
434 Per Thorpe LJ at para 30: “Were the judge’s order to stand in the present case the 
consequence would be a long and acrimonious trial of the paternity issue when, in the absence of 
the only decisive evidence, each side would resort to evidence of marginal or doubtful worth in 
the determination to prevail. Such a development would be wasteful of both legal costs and 
judicial time.” 
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fashion. Subsequent cases have demonstrated that giving a legitimate place in 
considerations to the interests of third parties represents no hindrance to the 
court’s ability to secure its own view of optimal outcome. 
 
These same cases also demonstrate, however, an unimpressive selection of third 
party interests. Does it follow that, even if fully recognised, family interests in 
medical treatment disputes would be as easily outweighed as they appear to be in 
paternity testing disputes?  
 
There is reason to hope not: the context is all. Paternity issues lend themselves to 
defensive parenting. The proceedings arise from adult behaviour which is rarely 
flattering and leads to self-justification and self-protection. The scope for 
conflict between the interests of parent and child is great. On the other hand, 
therapeutic medical interventions usually have a very different background. 
There is no equivalent impetus for defensive parenting. The dispute is about how 
best to go forward, not how to re-write the past, and judicial “irritants” are less 
central to the case. Paternity testing cases show us that courts can weigh 
competing interests, but they do not necessarily imply that family interests will 
always be easy to dismiss.  
 
F. Conclusions 
 
The determination of someone else’s interests is a heavy responsibility. The 
suggestion that judicial assessments of ‘best interests’ are shaped not just by the 
facts of individual cases, but also by the social and cultural values of the 
decision-maker is neither surprising nor particularly controversial:435 like any 
other process, the outcome  reflects what goes in. What goes into court 
assessments of ‘best interests’ in cases of medical treatment dispute becomes 
apparent when the cases are categorised according to their principal issue.  
 
                                                 
435 For an example of the same contention in a related context, see Professor Fennell in ‘Best 
Interests and Treatment for Mental Disorder’ (2008) Health Care Analysis 16 255 at 266. 
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The inherent jurisdiction was forged in the context of sterilisation, whose special 
features invited a protectionist, reactive and individualistic approach to ‘best 
interests’. It developed in the context of a moral debate about life over death, 
where social implications compelled a tight hold on powers of determination, 
even to the extent of manipulating assessments of competence and overriding 
tenets of faith. The net result was a concept of ‘best interests’ which limited 
consideration of families to the purely instrumental. The impact of treatment 
decisions on the families in whom the patient’s life is embedded has no place in 
the determination unless and until that impact becomes such as to affect the 
patient’s own wellbeing. The effect of this is to distort the representation of 
cases, and encourage the very dissemblance which engenders suspicion of 
families and drives the urge to maintain exclusive powers of determination. 
 
Yet such a limited role for families is not a necessary corollary of maintaining a 
protective jurisdiction. In the struggles to work out the ambit of their newly 
invented jurisdiction, the courts settled on a wide understanding of interests and 
the mechanism of a balancing exercise to measure competing claims. Both of 
these factors lend themselves to affording the family a greater, more open role. 
When it is accepted that ‘best interests’ encompass social, emotional and 
psychological considerations, it is hard to see how a patient should be seen in 
any way other than as fully social, enmeshed in a network of relations implying 
both benefit and burden; and the experience of paternity testing cases 
demonstrates that even competing interests of family members can be admitted 
into a balancing exercise without abandoning an appropriate regard for the 
patient. 
 
Having concluded that recognition of families in the resolution of medical 
treatment disputes is both important to individuals and society, and possible 
within the mechanisms adopted in the development of the inherent jurisdiction, 
the failure to afford such recognition can be asserted as a major criticism of the 
common law. The next consideration should be whether the legislature has done 
any better. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Mind the Gap: The Bournewood Litigation and Statutory Reform 
 
This chapter considers the wider influences and pressures which challenged the 
common law approach to medical treatment disputes, and led ultimately to new 
legislation. 
 
The problems of decision-making in the informal care of adults who lack 
capacity had already engaged political attention when the Bournewood 
litigation subjected the inherent jurisdiction to the scrutiny of European 
Convention standards, and found it wanting. The total exclusion of a patient’s 
family by his medics was seen as a powerful indicator of detention, in respect of 
which the common law doctrine of necessity provided inadequate safeguards. 
 
The Government proposed statutory reform of the decision-making process in 
respect of persons lacking capacity, which led Parliament to pass the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 and amendments to the Mental Health Act 1983. Judicial 
developments of the inherent jurisdiction pending enactment represent the last 
gasps of an exhausted approach, stretched beyond coherence. 
 
 
 
In 1997, the extent of the inherent jurisdiction in respect of adults came to be 
tested as never before in the case of R v. Bournewood Community and Mental 
Health NHS Trust ex p L1 : 
 
L was an autistic man, severely disabled and in need of 24 hour care. 
He had no capacity either to refuse or consent to treatment. He had 
lived in a hospital for over 30 years, then been discharged to live 
with paid carers, Mr. and Mrs. Enderby. Three years into their care, 
                                                 
1 Court of Appeal judgment at [1998] 1 All ER 634; House of Lords judgment at [1998] 3 All ER 
289. 
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whilst at a day centre on 22nd July 1997, he became agitated. Mr & 
Mrs Enderby could not be contacted, so a doctor was called, which 
led to L being taken to hospital and admitted to the mental health 
behavioural unit.  
 
A dispute arose when the Enderbys wanted to take L home. The 
hospital told them that L had been admitted on an informal basis, 
without time limit. Even though the Trust regarded it as important 
for L’s future that he should return to live with the Enderbys “as 
soon as this is practical,”2 it did not consider that time to have 
arrived. The Enderbys were not allowed even to visit L.3 
 
Mr. and Mrs. Enderby regarded L as ‘one of the family’.4 There is no 
consideration in any of the judgments which followed of either the accuracy or 
relevance of this. From the facts as stated, it is difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions about whether the relationship between L and the Enderbys would 
satisfy the understanding of ‘family’ adopted for the purposes of current 
considerations.5 The element of payment for their provision of care suggests not, 
but payment is not necessarily incompatible with family, as the operation of the 
welfare benefits system acknowledges. In support of their own perception of 
‘family’, is the clear fact that L had lived as a dependent in the Enderbys 
household for some three years. The relationship was clearly not quasi-marital, 
but it was quasi-parental, and parenthood is the essence of ‘family life’. The 
lengths to which the Enderbys went in order to secure contact with L suggests a 
sort of emotional interdependence: clearly L was much more to them than a 
paying lodger. In the novel of L’s life, the Enderbys were certainly major 
characters, and vice versa. 
 
In any event, whether or not the Enderbys themselves were L’s ‘family’ makes 
little difference to current considerations because they acted in full concordance 
                                                 
2 Per Lord Woolf  in the Court of Appeal at p637; per Lord Goff in the House of Lords at p291. 
3 Per Lord Woolf  in the Court of Appeal at [1998] 1 All ER 634 at 637.  
4 Per Lord Woolf in the Court of Appeal at p636; per Lord Goff in the House of Lords at p291. 
5 See chapter 1 above. 
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with E’s biological and legal family. It is implicit in the judgments that L’s 
cousin, who was sufficiently engaged in L’s welfare to front the legal 
proceedings, performed little or no practical caring role. Given the unanimity 
between the Enderbys and the cousin, even if the practical care and the 
biological connection were provided by different ‘members’, L had a ‘family’, 
and it was that family which together challenged the decisions of the medical 
team. With the cousin acting as ‘next friend’, L applied for judicial review of the 
Trust decision, contending that he was being detained unlawfully, and seeking a 
writ of habeas corpus.  
 
The Trust’s response was that L was not detained, since he had been admitted 
informally (that is, without recourse to powers under the Mental Health Act 
1983), and remained in hospital without restraint. In the alternative, the Trust 
argued that, if he was detained, then such detention was lawful under the 
common law doctrine of necessity, since treatment was in his best interests.   
 
The case was uniquely important for two reasons. Firstly, and of particular 
concern to current considerations, it set the family and the medics in absolute 
opposition on the question of the patient’s immediate needs. The family was 
exemplary, and agreed by all parties at all times to represent the best long-term 
provision for L. Nonetheless, medics made decisions which excluded the family 
totally, and did so without apparently even considering the impact of such 
exclusion on either the family or the patient himself.6 When the family 
challenged the medics, the court resolution of their dispute would have to take a 
stance on the role of the family in medical decision-making. The issue did not 
come before the court framed in those terms because the law is not conceived 
that way. Overtly, the case turned on the question of personal liberty of adults 
lacking capacity, but its resolution would by implication say as much about 
family influence as it did about individual liberty. 
 
                                                 
6 Calling to mind the actions of social workers in Cleveland, which lead to the Cleveland Enquiry 
and ultimately to the Children Act 1989. 
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The other importance of the Bournewood litigation is the impact it had on the 
development of the law, both statutory and common law pending enactment. By 
the time the case reached its ultimate conclusion in the European court, the UK 
government had been forced to recognise, and subsequently repair, the 
weaknesses of the inherent jurisdiction. It had also had the opportunity of testing 
out in advance the compliance with European standards of the proposals which 
became the Mental Capacity Act 2005.    
 
The first judgment in the long litigation trail came on 9th October 1997 when 
Owen J determined that L was not being detained, and so dismissed his 
application. That decision, which is not reported in full, seems to have relied on 
the fact that L had neither resisted the transfer to hospital nor attempted to 
leave.7 His capacity to resist and, later, to leave (either from his long-term mental 
condition or because he was given drugs to sedate him) appears not to have been 
questioned. At first instance, the decision was a straight-forward application of 
the ‘best interests’ test under the inherent jurisdiction: the medical view was 
endorsed in preference to the arguments of L’s family.  
 
On L’s behalf, the family appealed. The Court of Appeal decision was handed 
down on 2nd December 1997.8 In the same month, the government consultation 
paper on capacity, Making Decisions, was published. (For a chronology of the 
litigation and legislative processes, see Appendix 3). 
 
The Court of Appeal disagreed with Owen J on the primary question of 
detention, which it gave it an objective definition: 
 
“… a person is detained in law if those who have control over the 
premises in which he is have the intention that he shall not be 
                                                 
7 Lord Nolan later quoted Owen J: “L has at all times been free to leave because that is a 
consequence of informal admission, and he will continue to be free to leave until Dr. 
Manjubhashini or somebody else takes steps to ‘section’ him or otherwise prevent him from 
leaving.” ([1998] 3 All ER 289 at p301) 
8 R. v. Bournewood Community & Mental Health NHS Trust ex p L [1998] 1 All ER 634. 
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permitted to leave those premises and have the ability to prevent him 
from leaving.”9 
 
Since the hospital refused to discharge L to his carers,10 his circumstances 
amounted to detention – and herein lay the novelty of the Bournewood litigation 
in respect of the inherent jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal went on to ask, in 
respect of adults, how far the common law doctrine of necessity - the 
jurisprudential basis for both doctors’ intervention and the judicial assessment of 
‘best interests’ - was compatible with statutory powers.11 Over many years, 
Parliament had made provision for the treatment in detention of adults lacking 
capacity through a series of Mental Health Acts. The Court of Appeal had to 
determine whether the current provisions, set out in the Mental Health Act 1983, 
precluded the common law doctrine (and therefore the inherent jurisdiction). In 
other words, could an assessment of a patient’s ‘best interests,’ by medics or by 
judges, bypass statutory provision and extend even to depriving them of their 
liberty? 
  
With the emphatic force of a single judgment, Lord Woolf, Philips and 
Chadwick LJJ determined that this was a step too far.12 Their decision was not 
made lightly: it involved examination of statutory provisions during the history 
of mental health reform, and going against opinions expressed in authoritative 
textbooks.13 There were two main limbs to the Court of Appeal reasoning. 
                                                 
9 Per Lord Woolf at p639 
10 The Enderbys “had made it plain that they wanted to take him back into their care. It is clear 
that the hospital was not prepared to countenance this. If they were not prepared to release L into 
the custody of his carers they were not prepared to let him leave the hospital at all. He was and is 
detained there.” Per Lord Woolf at p640. For the Court of Appeal, the exclusion of the family 
was key to the finding of detention. 
11Insights could have been gained from the decision of Wall J in a case concerning minors, Re C 
[1997] 2 FLR 180, especially pages 197-198. However, as Munby J later acknowledged in City 
of Sutherland v PS [2007] EWHC 623 at para 24, ‘Curiously, and unfortunately, its significance 
as an indication of how the inherent jurisdiction with respect to incapacitated or vulnerable adults 
should properly be exercised has… never been appreciated.  
12 “Our conclusion is that the right of a hospital to detain a patient for treatment for mental 
disorder is to be found in, and only in, the 1983 Act, whose provisions apply to the exclusion of 
the common law principle of necessity…” p645 
13 Per Lord Woolf at p647 : Hoggett Mental Health Law (4th Edn, 1996) p9 and Jones Mental 
Health Act Manual (5th edn, 1996) p340.   
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Firstly, relying on government command papers,14 section 13115 of the Mental 
Health Act (which preserves the right to admit a patient to hospital informally), 
was said to address the position of a positively consenting patient only.16  L did 
not resist, but he lacked capacity to consent, and was therefore beyond the scope 
of the section. Secondly, the common law powers of necessity were considered 
available only to individuals to protect someone who is ill, whether that illness is 
due to physical or mental causes; where the 1983 Act covers the situation – as it 
does where admission to and treatment in hospital is concerned - no necessity to 
act outside the statute can arise. L was therefore detained without lawful 
authority.17 
 
The effect of the Court of Appeal’s decision was dramatic for L. The Trust 
immediately admitted him under section 3 of the Mental Health Act. Three days 
later L made an application to the Mental Health Review Tribunal for discharge. 
Before that application could even be heard, on 5th December he was released to 
Mr. and Mrs. Enderby’s care and on 12th December he was discharged from 
hospital. In other words, when statutory safeguards forced the Trust to measure 
their actions against statutory criteria, what had been done under the purported 
authority of common law was quickly acknowledged to be inappropriate. 
Medical power was reined in, and the patient restored to the care of his family. 
 
The effect of the decision was – or was said to be - also dramatic for the wider 
healthcare services. No fewer than three parties - the Secretary of State for 
                                                 
14 “We think that the position was accurately stated in Review of the Mental Health Act 1959 
(Cmnd 7320):….’1.6 There is nothing in the Act which authorises or implies that an informal 
patient may be compelled without his consent to enter hospital or to receive treatment…’ We 
also note the pragmatic advice given in para 1.8: ‘Where the patient does not have the mental 
capacity to know what is taking place an absence of objection on his part cannot in law be taken 
as either implying or withholding consent to admission…’”  [Woolf 645-6]  
15 S131(1): Nothing in this Act shall be construed as preventing a patient who requires treatment 
for mental disorder from being admitted to any hospital or mental nursing home in pursuance of 
arrangements made in that behalf and without any application, order or direction rendering him 
liable to be detained under this Act, or from remaining in any hospital or mental nursing home in 
pursuance of such arrangements after he has ceased to be so liable to be detained. 
16 Woolf  at p645   
17 Although any euphoria that his legal success may have brought on was quickly dampened by 
the court’s move to discourage any claim for damages: referring to Murray v. Ministry of 
Defence [1988] 2 All ER 521, where it was said that a person unaware of imprisonment and 
suffering no harm can normally expect only nominal damages, that is all the Court would have 
been prepared to award. [per Lord Woolf at p648] 
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Health, the Mental Health Act Commission and the Registered Nursing Homes 
Association - were granted leave to intervene in the appeal to the House of 
Lords. In their submissions to the Lords, these intervenors collectively contended 
that, if the Court of Appeal decision was allowed to stand, 
 
“…large numbers of mental patients who would formerly not have to 
be compulsorily detained under the 1983 Act will now have to be so 
detained….There will be an additional 22 000 detained patients 
resident on anyone day as a consequence….plus an additional 48 000 
admissions per year under the Act18… [T]he majority of th[ose 
affected].. would be patients in need of long term care…. [I]f the 
judgment is held to apply to patients receiving medical treatment for 
mental disorder in mental nursing homes not registered to receive 
detained patients, the above estimates would be very much higher. It 
is obvious that there would in the result be a substantial impact on 
the available resources; … not only for the mental health services 
and professionals who have to implement the 1983 Act, but also for 
mental health review tribunals and for the commission itself.”19   
 
These predictions represented an Armageddon for legal bureaucracy and 
institutional care, and they had a powerful impact on the reasoning of the House 
of Lords. Lord Goff sets them out in detail and in a position of prominence, early 
on in the speech which lead the way to overturning the decision of the Court of 
Appeal, on 25 June 1998. Lord Steyn seems to view them as the only 
justification for a conclusion which he otherwise finds unpalatable.20 
 
(In fact these dire predictions never materialised. In the years between the 
European judgment, which effectively supported the Court of Appeal approach, 
and the coming into force of statutory reforms, there was not a significant 
                                                 
18 Against a background of the average number of detained patients resident on any one day in 
England and Wales being approximately 13 000, according to the evidence of the Mental Health 
Act Commission. 
19 Per Lord Goff at p293 
20 “If considerations of financial resources are put to one side, there can be no justification for not 
giving to compliant incapacitated patients the same quality and degree of protection as is given to 
patients admitted under the 1983 Act.” ( at p303) 
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increase in the number of applications to detain involuntary patients under 
section 3. It seems unlikely that the Department of Health would be so very 
inaccurate in its estimated numbers of people subject to de facto detention; or 
that so many people’s living conditions were suddenly modified so that detention 
was no longer an issue. More probably, as Scott-Moncrieff21 has argued, large 
numbers of people simply continued to be unlawfully detained. The House of 
Lords, of course, could not have known this, nor could their Lordships have 
countenanced it anyway.)   
 
On the primary question of detention, Lords Goff, Lloyd and Hope considered 
that L had not in fact been detained, on the basis that he had not attempted to 
leave, and his ward was unlocked. This interpretation of the requirements of 
detention was, however, explicitly tied to the requirements of the tort of false 
imprisonment,22 upon which L’s application for habeas corpus was based. By 
somewhat pedantic insistence on the elements of an ancient English tort, the 
majority circumvented rigorous consideration of the concept of ‘detention’, in 
order to reach a desired conclusion.    
 
The Lords were not, however, unanimous in their pedantry. Lords Nolan and 
Steyn disavowed such an approach. Lord Nolan agreed with the Court of Appeal, 
looking to the actions of the Trust in refusing to release L to the care of the 
Enderbys, and practical reality: 
 
“…if Mr L…was not detained ...there was no ground in law upon 
which the hospital and its staff could be called upon to justify their 
unwillingness to release him.”23 
 
Lord Steyn was still more forthright: 
                                                 
21 In ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step Back’ (2007) Journal of Mental Health Law 107 
22 “I should record at once my understanding that the question is whether the tort of false 
imprisonment has been committed against Mr. L and I do not wish the use of the word 
‘detention’ in this context to distract attention form the true nature of the question.” He then 
refers to the Court of Appeal’s statement of detention, as per Woolf 639 and notes that  “…no 
mention is here made of the requirement that, for the tort of false imprisonment to be committed, 
there must in fact be a complete deprivation of, or restraint upon, the patient’s liberty” per Lord 
Goff at p297. 
23 At p302 
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“… this case falls on the wrong side of any reasonable line that can 
be drawn between what is or what is not imprisonment or 
detention….The argument of no detention stretches credulity to 
breaking point. The truth is that for entirely bona fide reasons, 
conceived in the best interests of L, any possible resistance by him 
was overcome by sedation, by taking him to hospital and by close 
supervision of him in hospital, and, if L had shown any sign of 
wanting to leave, he would have been firmly discouraged by staff 
and, if necessary, physically prevented from doing so. The 
suggestion that L was free to go is a fairy tale.”24  
 
Strictly speaking, the majority having found no detention, it was not necessary to 
determine the question of lawful justification, but the issue was addressed as one 
of importance. At the point where ‘best interests’ are determined, the House of 
Lords was unanimous. 
 
Section 131 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was traced back to an identical 
provision at s5(1)b of the 1959 Act, which was enacted following the 
recommendation of the Percy Commission over half a century ago, that 
compulsory detention should only be used where necessary.25 Consequently, the 
section was intended to authorise two types of admission – the voluntary patient 
(who, having the capacity to consent, did consent) and the informal patient (who, 
lacking such capacity, did not object). By extension, the current s131(1) 
preserved the common law principle of necessity as a means of admitting 
compliant incapacitated individuals.26 Even Lord Steyn was convinced.27  
                                                 
24 At p305 
25 “We therefore recommend that the law and its administration should be altered, in relation to 
all forms of mental disorder, by abandoning the assumption that compulsory powers must be 
used unless the patient can express a positive desire for treatment, and replacing this by the offer 
of care, without deprivation of liberty, to all who need it and are not unwilling to receive it.” At 
paragraphs 289, 290 and 291, quoted by Lord Goff at p295. 
26 For Lord Goff (at p297), “It was plainly the statutory intention that informal patients would be 
treated as best interests required. Such treatment could be justified on the basis of common law 
doctrine of necessity and did not require statutory justification.  
27 At p307: “On orthodox principles of statutory interpretation the conclusion cannot be avoided 
that s131(1) permits the admission of compliant incapacitated patients where the requirements of 
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So the matter of legal jurisdiction was resolved, and in a manner fully 
reminiscent of Re F: the process of statutory reform had clouded the intentions 
of history, and the doctrine of necessity was the means by which order was 
restored. Given the dire predictions which so impressed the Lords, once again 
precisely whose necessity was being met must surely be questionable. 
 
With the legal basis for their actions affirmed, the Law Lords were unanimously 
agreed that the doctors treating L had met the standards required of them28- his 
‘best interests’ had been served. In reaching that conclusion, the absence of 
critical consideration of the doctors’ decisions is quite remarkable. Nowhere is 
there any consideration of countervailing considerations, even though it was 
acknowledged that the Enderbys had managed to cope with L’s “tantrums” 
before,29 and it was the medics’ ultimate intention that he should return to live 
with them. There is no consideration of the potential for damage to his interests 
in removing him, and keeping him apart, from his surrogate family.  
 
Had such arguments been canvassed, it is possible that the facts would have 
justified a conclusion that the benefits of hospitalisation outweighed them, but 
their total absence evidences the danger inherent in the common law approach 
(as developed up to this point): when ‘best interests’ are evaluated, too much 
power vested in the medics. Judicial interpretation tends to disregard other points 
of view, even those who fulfil the difficult role of ‘family’ with undisputed 
success. When medical assessment of a patient’s ‘best interests’ can bypass 
                                                                                                                                   
the principle of necessity are satisfied….I have to accept that the view of the CA on the meaning 
of s131(1) cannot be upheld.”   
28 Per Lord Goff at p297 “All steps taken were justified as according to L’s best interests.” Lords 
Lloyd and Hope agreed, at p301 and 308 respectively. Lord Nolan put his agreement in explicit 
terms, and ahead of his dissension on the point of dissension, at p 301: ‘I am satisfied that the 
trust and its medical staff behaved throughout not only in what they judged to be the best 
interests of Mr. L, but in strict accordance with their common law duty of care and the common 
law principle of necessity.’  Lord Steyn does not descend to detailed consideration of the doctors’ 
decisions and actions, taking it for granted that they would be properly motivated. Having 
accepted that the common law doctrine was preserved, he simply says (at p307) “The detention 
and treatment of L was lawful”.  
29 Per Lord Woolf at p636, ‘Mr & Mrs Enderby are capable of coping with incidents when they 
occur. During the four years L was living with them police were not called and L had not needed 
to be admitted to hospital.’ Whether the Court of Appeal would have been any more willing to 
examine the substance of the doctors’ decisions is a moot point, because, finding that the 
jurisdiction did not exist, there was no reason to pursue their considerations that far. 
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statutory provision and extend even to depriving them of their liberty, in its the 
exercise of the inherent jurisdiction the court can not only disregard the family 
unit; it can effectively approve its dismantling too. 
 
The House of Lords’ preservation of the common law doctrine may have been 
economically advantageous to government and institutional care providers, but it 
came at substantial cost to patients such as L. Any compliant incapacitated 
patient was thereby denied the safeguards provided by legislation30 and left at the 
whim of discretion. As Lord Steyn put it, 
 
“This is an unfortunate result…It places effective and unqualified 
control in the hands of the hospital psychiatrist and other health care 
professionals. It is, of course, true that such professionals owe a duty 
of care to patients and that they invariably act in what they consider 
to be the best interests of the patient. But neither habeas corpus nor 
judicial review are (sic) sufficient safeguards against misjudgments 
and professional lapses in the case of compliant incapacitated 
patients.”31  
 
Given that compliant incapacitated patients are diagnostically indistinguishable 
from compulsorily detained patients, the result was a gaping hole in the 
protective scope of the law. Ironically, that jurisdiction which was born of an 
urge to protect incapacitated individuals was now shown to leave them 
vulnerable, and at least partly because of that unbalanced approach to medical 
views which we have already identified as detrimental to family interests. It 
became known as ‘the Bournewood gap’, and to many – including Lord Steyn32 
– it was indefensible.  
 
                                                 
30 Lord Steyn listed them: the limitation on admission to a maximum of 28 days for assessment, 
or 6 months for treatment, and only on the written recommendation of 2 doctors; the 
requirement, pursuant to s58, of either consent or a second opinion before certain treatments are 
given; the right to apply to the Mental Health Review Tribunal; entitlement to after care services; 
the protection of the Code of Practice; and the supervision of the Mental Health Act 
Commission.  
31 At p307-308  
32 At p303 
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L’s family were not minded to accept the House of Lords ruling, and they 
pursued his claim to the European Court. Whilst the litigation was pending, and 
the government was preparing its defence, there was undoubtedly much high 
level thinking about relevant issues going on in government circles.33 
 
• In October 1999 the government published its proposals for a new law 
on capacity. They included provision for a general authority to make wide-
ranging decisions (about care and welfare, as well as medical matters) on 
behalf of an incapacitated person, if the decider acted reasonably and in the 
incapacitated person’s best interests. 
  
• In June 2002 the government also published a draft Mental Health Bill 
and a consultation paper. One of the twin objectives34 of the Bill, as 
described in the consultation paper, was to bring the law more closely into 
line with modern human rights’ law (notably the case law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights). Specifically, part 5 of the Bill was entitled 
‘Informal Treatment of Patients Not Capable of Consenting’ and provided 
safeguards for qualifying patients. Government proposals acknowledged 
the vulnerability of the common law to the criticisms of Lord Steyn and the 
Court of Appeal, but sought to reinforce the practical advantages of Lord 
Goff’s majority decision. 
 
• On 17th June 2004 the Mental Capacity Bill was introduced in the 
House of Commons. It provided for a detailed statutory framework to 
empower and protect vulnerable people not able to make their own 
decisions and for safeguards not currently available under the common law.  
 
Just 16 weeks later, on 5th October, the European Court gave its decision in 
Bournewood.35 
  
                                                 
33 See the Chronology of Legislative and Litigation Progress at Appendix 3. 
34 The other was to provide a legal structure for requiring mentally disordered persons to submit 
to compulsory treatment without necessarily requiring them to be detained in hospital 
35 HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 
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At the European level, L complained that he had been detained in violation of 
Art 5(1) of the Convention; and that the procedures available for review of the 
legality of his detention did not satisfy Art 5(4).36 The two provisions are closely 
related but not overlapping. The former regulates the circumstances in which 
one’s liberty can be taken away, whereas the latter requires a review of its 
legality thereafter.  
 
On the question of detention, the UK defence37 was set in the context of a 
purported national preference, long-held, for the ‘informality, proportionality 
and flexibility’ of common law over the formality of statutory procedures, and 
the resource implications. It was argued that compulsory powers imposed a 
stigma,38 from which a person already suffering from a socially difficult illness 
should be shielded: just as incapacitated persons requiring medical treatment 
could be admitted and treated in hospital informally in his or her best interests, 
so too should incapacitated persons requiring psychiatric treatment. Consensual 
non-imposed treatment was considered more likely to attract a degree of 
cooperation from the patient and to be therefore more therapeutically beneficial; 
and the informal process afforded the required dignity to the patient. 
 
The European court was unpersuaded.39 In particular, it considered itself 
unfettered by the House of Lords’ finding on detention because it had adopted 
                                                 
36 Art 5(1)(e): Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of spreading of infectious diseases, of 
persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants. 
Art 5(4): Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
He also claimed that he had been discriminated against as an ‘informal patient’ under Art 14, but 
this was later determined to be subsumed within the Art 5 claim – para 145. Finally he claimed 
just satisfaction under Art 41, but his success in both Art. 5 claims was itself considered to be 
just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage – an affirmation of the Court of Appeal’s view.  
37 The UK arguments are summarised at para 80 of the judgment. 
38 Perceiving mental illness, and the use of coercive powers in respect of it, is certainly a long-
held national preference – recall the arguments in Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to 
Treatment) [1991] 3 WLR 592 and footnotes 278 – 280 of chapter 3. 
39 The ECHR reasoning as to the question of detention is set out in paragraphs 90 and 91 of the 
judgment.  
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the tortious test, rather than the Convention concept of ‘deprivation of liberty’40 
in Art 5(1), to which the distinction between actual restraint and restraint which 
was conditional upon his seeking to leave, was not of central importance.41 
Instead, the key factor was that the health care professionals exercised complete 
and effective control over L’s care and movements from the moment he 
presented acute behavioural problems to the date he was compulsorily detained. 
The court repeated Lord Steyn’s description of suggestion to the contrary as 
‘fairy tale’. 
  
On the question of justification, the ECHR accepted that the common law 
doctrine of necessity did accommodate the minimum conditions for lawful 
detention,42 but did not satisfy the further element of lawfulness – namely, the 
aim of avoiding arbitrariness: 
  
‘…the Court finds striking the lack of any fixed procedural rules by 
which the admission and detention of compliant incapacitated 
persons is conducted. ... In particular and most obviously, the Court 
notes the lack of any formalised admission procedures which 
indicate who can propose admission, for what reasons and on the 
basis of what kind of medical and other assessments and conclusions. 
There is no requirement to fix the exact purpose of admission…and, 
consistently, no limits in term of time, treatment or care attached to 
that admission. Nor is there any specific provision requiring a 
continuing clinical assessment of the persistence of the disorder 
warranting detention. The nomination of a representative of a patient 
who could make certain objections and applications on his of her 
behalf is a procedural protection afforded to those committed 
involuntarily under the 1983 Act and which would be of equal 
                                                 
40 For consideration of the European concept and its application to persons of unsound mind, see 
the cases of Winterwerp v. The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387, Guzzardi v. Italy (1980) 3 
EHRR 333, Neilsen v. Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR 175, HM v. Switzerland (2002) 11 EHRR 175.   
41 “The Court recalls that the right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person 
to lose the benefit of Convention protection for the single reason that he may have given himself 
up to be taken into detention, especially when it is not disputed that that person is legally 
incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing with, the proposed action.” Para 90 
42 Although it found that, at the relevant time, the doctrine was still developing and each element 
of it may not have been fully defined: paras 116-118 
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importance for patients who are legally incapacitated and have, as in 
the present case, extremely limited communication abilities…. As a 
result… the hospital’s health care professionals assumed full control 
of the liberty and treatment of a vulnerable incapacitated individual, 
solely on the basis of their own clinical assessments completed as 
and when they saw fit: as Lord Steyn remarked, this left ‘effective 
and unqualified control’ in their hands.”43  
 
The absence of procedural safeguards failed to protect against arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty on grounds of necessity, and therefore violated Art 5(1). 
None of the suggested procedures for redress were sufficient to satisfy Art 
5(4)44. Interestingly, the government relied, in part, upon the declaratory 
jurisdiction of the High Court, but it made no serious attempt to present an 
argument on that basis. It could not cite a case where the court had found a 
‘serious justiciable issue’ in parallel circumstances because there had not been 
one. There never could have been, because as the House of Lords acknowledged 
in Re F, the lawfulness of the action under consideration whenever the court 
exercises its declaratory jurisdiction is independent of any declaration. The 
European Court properly dismissed the notion of the declaratory jurisdiction as a 
protective safeguard, quite summarily.45 
 
So, the government lost. L, his family and the Court of Appeal were vindicated. 
Allowing medics to exercise complete and effective control of a patient was not 
acceptable. Where did that leave the government proposals for reform, and the 
question of resources? By now government proposals included notions which 
were ultimately enacted as the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, amendments 
to the Mental Capacity Act by the Mental Health Act 200746, and the indications 
of the European court were favourable. It was recognised that the proposals set 
                                                 
43 Para.s 120 & 121 
44 At paras 136 - 140: Neither Habeas corpus nor judicial review were wide enough to bear on 
those conditions which were essential for lawful detention on the ground of unsoundness of 
mind. The actions for false imprisonment and assault did not involve the submission of expert 
evidence, or court assessment of that expertise, and no case was cited in which that had 
happened. The declaratory jurisdiction had never been used in a relevant way. 
45 Para 141 
46 Although public consultation on those proposals did not start until after the European decision 
in Bournewood. (See chronology in appendix 3). 
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out to meet government policy concerns, but at the same time made provision for 
“detailed procedural regulation of the detention of incapacitated individuals.”47 
Perhaps the proposed statutory regime could articulate the best of both worlds: 
the informality, proportionality and flexibility of the approach carved out at 
common law, and the procedural safeguards and certainty of statute. 
 
However, the passing of legislation takes time. Whilst the Mental Capacity Bill 
and the amendments to the Mental Health Act were progressing through the 
enactment procedure, the common law marched on. When the question of 
detention arose again in the context of an incapacitated patient, the courts had to 
reconcile the inherent jurisdiction with the European Court’s pronouncements – 
and it fell to Munby J to work out how. He gave judgment in the case of JE v. 
DE, Surrey County Council48 on 29 December 2006: 
 
DE was 76, blind and suffering significant short-term memory 
impairment. He needed extensive assistance with daily living, but 
was able to express his wishes and feelings with some clarity and 
force. An interim declaration had been made that he lacked capacity 
to decide where he should live. His wife, JE, was his usual carer, but 
she suffered intermittent mental health problems of her own. 
Following an incident on 4th Sept, she felt she could no longer care 
for DE, placed him in a chair on the pavement in front of their house, 
and called the police.  Surrey CC put DE in residential care home X 
on 4th September 2005, and subsequently moved him to a different 
home, Y, on 14 November 2005. The care notes recorded that from 
the very first day DE was repeatedly saying that he wanted to go 
home with JE. 
 
JE brought an action under the inherent jurisdiction claiming that Surrey County 
Council had breached DE’s rights under Art 549 of the European Convention on 
                                                 
47 Para 122 
48[2006] EWHC 3459 
49 See f/n33 above 
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Human Rights, and both JE and DE’s rights under Art 8.50 The question for 
Munby J to determine was whether DE had at any (and if so what) time since 4th 
September 2005 been, and was he then being, deprived of his liberty by SCC?51  
 
Although SCC tried to suggest that DE would not have been prevented from 
leaving had he actually tried to,52 Munby J looked to practical reality as it was 
experienced by DE. The message given to him was precisely to the opposite 
effect.53 The crucial question was not his freedom within the institutional setting, 
but his ability to ‘remov[e] himself permanently in order to live where and with 
whom he chooses…’54 On that basis DE was and continued to be detained: “A 
person can be as effectively ‘deprived of his liberty’ by the misuse or 
misrepresentation of even non-existent authority as by locked doors and physical 
barriers.”55  The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Bournewood was vividly 
replayed, and the House of Lords’ pedantry eschewed.56 
 
Having demonstrated that the common law approach was capable of interpreting 
facts in an ECHR-compliant fashion,57 Munby J then felt able to reassert the 
                                                 
50 Art 8(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence 
(2)There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
51 Para 11 
52 Summarising SCC submissions at para 105: iv. The only limitation is that it is the clearly-
expressed view of SCC that it would not be in his best interests for DE to return to live with JE; 
indeed SCC ‘will not agree’ to DE returning to live with or visit with JE. Likewise it is SCC’s 
view that it is not in DE’s best interests to go on unplanned, unaccompanied outings with JE 
when she is unsettled or unstable, so that she would not be able to keep him safe 
53 para107 
54 Para 115 
55 Para 125 
56 Expressly, at para 14 
57 Later cases have not always followed the same line. In particular the finding of no detention by 
McFarlane J in LLBC v TG [2007] EWHC 2640 on 14th November 2007, is apparently at odds 
with the approach of Munby J. It is best explained on the basis that in TG the point was never 
fully argued – the family were representing themselves and their submissions did “not descend to 
the necessary detail required to determine whether or not Art 5 applies” (para 107). McFarlane J 
simply said that the submissions of the Local Authority and the Official Solicitor supported his 
conclusion, and noted that it was important the TG’s placement had been authorised by the court, 
under orders which gave the family the power to apply to vary or discharge, and were continued 
by consent at a time when they were represented. (para 109) Moreover, by the time judgment 
came to be given, there was a broad  agreement that TG should stay with the family, coupled 
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inherent jurisdiction at the next opportunity, which came on 9th March 2007, in 
the case of City of Sutherland v PS 58  : 
 
PS was a lady of 82, lacking capacity and in poor physical health. 
When ready for discharge from hospital, her daughter CA told the 
hospital she was intending to discharge PS to her own (CA’s) care, 
rather than to the T Unit, where she had lived for the previous 6 
months. On the Local Authority’s ex parte application Bodey J made 
an order under the inherent jurisdiction providing for PS to be placed 
in the T unit until a full hearing the following Tuesday. Munby J 
then made declarations that PS lacked capacity59, appointed a 
receiver, and granted injunctions to prohibit CA from doing anything 
to prevent PS remaining at the T Unit. 
 
The Local Authority wanted injunctions because it was concerned that if it took 
steps itself to prevent PS leaving or being removed from the T unit without the 
protection of an appropriate order of the court it might fall foul of Art 5,60 as the 
care authorities had in Bournewood. This raised two questions: firstly, whether 
the court had jurisdiction to make such an order, and secondly, if it did, when 
and how it should be exercised. 
  
To Munby J, it was ‘quite clear’61 both that the jurisdiction existed, and that it 
extended to ‘authorising that person’s detention … and the use of reasonable 
                                                                                                                                   
with serious concerns about their ability to work with authorities. On a practical level, findings of 
deprivation would not have helped anything. 
58 [2007] EWHC 623 
59 On five separate issues – to litigate, to decide where she should reside, to decide who she 
should have contact with, to decide on issues concerning her care, and to manage her financial 
affairs (para 4). This function-by-function approach to capacity reflects the influence of the 
Mental Capacity Act, by now enacted but not yet in force.  
60 Para 7 
61 Para 16. When dealing with the appointment of a receiver, in respect of which provision is 
made in Part VII of the Mental Health Act 1983, he was characteristically bold, at para 32: “Nor, 
so far as I am aware, has the existence of a parallel statutory regime ever been treated as fettering 
the parens patriae jurisdiction on relation to children save in those cases where the statute in 
question either ousts the jurisdiction altogether or specifically regulates or fetters the exercise of 
the jurisdiction. I can see absolutely no reason why the inherent jurisdiction in relation to 
incapacitated or vulnerable adults should be any different….” 
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force (if necessary) to detain him and ensure that he remains there.’62 He touched 
only briefly on the history of the jurisdiction (in whose development he had 
already played a significant part) before concluding that the court could grant 
“whatever relief in declaratory form is necessary to safeguard and promote the 
vulnerable adult’s welfare and interests,”63 and his concept of detention was 
expressly in the sense of Article 5. Herein lay his only acknowledged limitation 
of the inherent jurisdiction: that “since the court is a public authority for this 
purpose...any exercise of its inherent jurisdiction must…be compatible with the 
various requirements of Art 5.”64 He set about making it so.65 
 
The inherent jurisdiction needed to be ‘mould[ed] and adapt[ed].’66 Crucially, to 
achieve compatibility on the standard of ‘lawfulness’, the inherent jurisdiction 
needed precision.67 Munby J provided it, deus ex machine, in a statement of 
minimum requirements68 : 
 
i. the detention must be authorised by the court on 
application made by the Local Authority and before the 
detention commences. (“the requirement for prior court 
sanction”). 
 
                                                 
62 As we have seen, the question of whether the use of force came within the jurisdiction had 
already been determined by Johnson J over a decade previously, in Norfolk & Norwich 
Healthcare Trust v. W [1996] 2 FLR 613. 
63 Para 13 
64 Para 18 
65 At para 22 he quotes Sedley LJ’s observation in Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2000] 2 
FLR 512 at 532 that “One of the advantages of a declaratory remedy… is that the court itself can 
do much to close the so-called Bournewood gap in the protection of those without capacity.” In 
fact, such is Munby J’s skill in shaping the inherent jurisdiction pending full operation of the 
Mental Capacity Act that Gillian Douglas wonders (in a case commentary to Re GJ, NJ & BJ in 
[2008] Fam Law 997 at 999) whether that Act, which was so long in the making (and, one might 
add, the related amendments to the Mental Health Act 1983) is now necessary at all.  
66 Para 22 
67 To meet the standard of lawfulness, any legal provision must be ‘sufficiently precise to allow 
the citizen – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action might entail.’ (Para 20iia) Specifically in 
the context of the detention of incapacitated persons, domestic law must give effect to the 
principle that an individual cannot be deprived of his liberty on the basis of unsoundness of mind 
unless three minimum conditions are satisfied: he must reliably be shown to be of unsound mind; 
the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; and the 
validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder. 
68 At para 23. 
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ii. Subject to the exigencies of urgency or emergency the 
evidence must establish unsoundness of mind of a kind or 
degree warranting compulsory confinement. In other words, 
there must be evidence establishing at least a prima facie case 
that the individual lacks capacity and that confinement of the 
nature proposed is appropriate. (“the evidence requirement”). 
 
iii. Any order authorising detention must contain 
provision for an adequate review at reasonable intervals, in 
particular with a view to ascertaining whether there still 
persists unsoundness of mind of a kind or degree warranting 
compulsory confinement. (“the review requirement”). 
 
These minimum requirements were subsequently fleshed out in the case of Re 
GJ, NJ and BJ (Incapacitated Adults),69 when detailed timetables and 
arrangements were set out for review of the court-authorised detention, both at 
the interim stage and after the final hearing.  
 
Rather than constraining common law powers, the effect of these ‘minimum 
requirements’ is simply to shift the focus of its exercise. As we established in 
earlier chapters, the House of Lords made clear when overriding the Court of 
Appeal in Re F that the inherent jurisdiction is declaratory, not permissive. On a 
proper legal analysis, the court does not ‘authorise’ anything under the inherent 
jurisdiction. It merely gives a neutral scrutiny and opinion of ‘best interests’, 
which is the guiding principle of the doctors’ actions under the doctrine of 
necessity. Court approval of the medics’ decision was never the legal 
justification of the doctors’ subsequent actions; even in the most sensitive issues 
like sterilisation and withdrawal of life-saving treatment, it was only a matter of 
good practice. Munby J’s requirement for prior court sanction of a patient’s 
detention is therefore legally incoherent. 
 
                                                 
69 [2008] EWHC 1097. The post-hearing reviews can be compared to references to the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal in respect of formally detained patients.  
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If a court is to give its prior sanction, Munby J ordains that the evidence 
requirement must be met. The threshold is very low. It requires no more than the 
doctor would need to satisfy his own professional standards anyway, so it is 
difficult to see how relaying it to a court offers an increased protection. The 
additional filter of a judicial brain as well as the recommending doctor’s is 
unlikely to make a substantial difference, given the long history of deference to 
medical opinion70. It need hardly be pointed out that the evidence requirement 
does nothing to remove the established blinkers in respect of families and family 
interests. And by what standards is the ‘appropriateness’ of confinement to be 
judged? Judicial discretion is as unfettered under Munby J’s minimum 
requirements as it was under the original jurisdiction.  
 
The review requirement purports to limit the arbitrary potential of medical 
authority by imposing an obligation on doctors to justify their decisions on a 
continuing basis. There has long been power to achieve similar effect in cases of 
detention under statutory powers, but only to the lower judicial authority of a 
Tribunal. Such an ongoing role for the court under the inherent jurisdiction is 
novel71 and would amount to an extension of authority. No more defensible than 
the other of Munby J’s minimum requirements, it merely amounts to periodic 
repetition of their follies.  
 
Far from delivering precision, Munby J has offered uncertainty in the pursuit of 
incoherence.  Rather like his decision in Burke, Munby J’s judgments in 
Sunderland and Re GJ, NJ & BJ may have tackled the demands of the moment 
with a vigour which is at first compelling, but they carry implications for law 
which are unsustainable. In truth, the coming into force of the Mental Capacity 
Act and the deprivation of liberty safeguards represent for the now distorted 
inherent jurisdiction the dignified release which Munby J, of all judges, should 
welcome.      
 
                                                 
70 See for example Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] WLR 582 and 
Maynard v. West Midlands RHA [1984] 1 WLR 634. 
71 At least for adults, and it brings to mind the debate around the Children Act, when the 
intention of statutory reform was to limit the use of inherent jurisdiction to one-off 
considerations, curtailing the ongoing role of wardship. 
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Conclusions: The Bournewood litigation fell like a tsunami on the inherent 
jurisdiction. As a basis for treating incapacitated (but compliant) patients, the 
doctrine of necessity, the very basis of the jurisdiction, fell foul of European 
Convention standards because it failed to avoid arbitrariness. The self-invented 
power of the courts to make declarations of a patient’s ‘best interests’ was, and 
could be, no protection against such failure, because the lawfulness of an action 
based on the doctrine of necessity is independent of any court declaration. 
Subsequent judicial attempts to paper over this central failing are the dying gasps 
of a jurisdiction, like Mary the weaker of the conjoined twins, fated to die.  
 
By implication, the Bournewood litigation also rejected the dominance of the 
medical approach to treatment decisions. The English judgment closest to the 
approach of the European court was that of the Court of Appeal, for whom the 
total exclusion of the family by the medics had been an important indicator of 
detention. When that decision forced the treating doctors to reconsider L’s 
position, they rapidly accepted that his treatment conditions should change. The 
Bournewood litigation forced courts to recognise that a patient’s interests needed 
safeguards against arbitrariness; it should also tell us that an important part of 
that is hearing the voices of a patient’s family.       
 
Ultimately, the Bournewood litigation showed up the inherent jurisdiction for 
what it always was – a pragmatic response to a practical difficulty, lacking 
intellectual rigour and ethically vague. Well-intentioned it may have been, but fit 
for the twenty-first century it was not. 
 
Both independently and driven by the Bournewood litigation, in any event 
statutory reform was on the cards. The Mental Capacity Act was conceived in 
the demands of common law pragmatism, and nurtured in the decisions of the 
inherent jurisdiction. Its birth, just as the judicial approach expired at the 
European hurdle, could not have been more timely. Whether a patient’s family 
fares any better in the decision-making process under the new legislation is 
considered in the final chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
 
New Legislation: The Mental Capacity Act 
 
 
This chapter considers the role of the family in new legislation. It argues that the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 fails to acknowledge the unique characteristics of 
families, referring to them only as a subset of carers. Even though it is primarily 
patient-focussed, the ‘best interests’ checklist is susceptible to family-friendly 
considerations; but the general authority operates to exclude the family from a 
decisive role in significant issues. The overall effect of the legislation will be to 
leave families largely in the same position as they were in under the inherent 
jurisdiction, whose ethos shaped the statute both before and after enactment. 
 
 
The Bournewood litigation was a significant pressure on government to reform 
the law relating to incapacitated adults, but it did not arise in a vacuum. Like all 
pivotal moments of the common law, the litigation reflected the concerns of the 
time as much as it drove them.  
 
Government agencies had been considering some of the issues which 
Bournewood raised even before the first instance decision, with the Law 
Commission’s report, ‘Mental Incapacity,’1 published in February 1995. Medical 
advances and community care policies had made mental incapacity, and the need 
for decision-making which goes with it, visible in the community in a way which 
had never been experienced before and politically, recognition of the issue had 
dawned.2 The sheer numbers of people whose lives are affected by the mental 
                                                 
1 In which it was noted to be “widely recognised that, in this area, the law as it now stands is 
unsystematic and full of glaring gaps. It does not rest on clear or modern foundations or 
principle. It has failed to keep up with social and demographic changes. It has also failed to 
keep up with developments in our understanding of the rights and needs of those with mental 
disability.” (para 1.1)   
2 Who Decides? para 2.2 : ‘The number of people over 85 will increase by 30% in this decade. 
Advances in health care and in living standards mean that many people will now live longer. 
The incidence of incapacity increases as people get older. Dementia of all types affects over 
5% of all those over the age of 65. In those over 80, the figure rises to 20%. The changes in 
population structure have consequently made the issue of decision making for those who 
 274 
incapacity of adults, and the need to make medical decisions on their behalf, had 
turned the issue into a societal problem, and ensured government attention.  
 
The extent of the response to the consultation paper confirmed the perception of 
need.3 Submissions were received from charities working on behalf of people 
without capacity, from local authorities, doctors, professional organisations, 
those working with the law, and – in large numbers - from members of the 
public, many of whom had personal experience of caring for a person without 
capacity.4 
 
Conceiving the remedy: Perhaps if government action was prompted by 
perception of a problem for society, it should not be surprising that the remedy 
was also conceived as a social one. Although it was axiomatic throughout the 
legislative process that statutory provision should aim to protect vulnerable 
people,5 such an aim has to be pursued in context. There was never any intention 
of relieving the burden of incapacity by a state assumption of responsibility: 
extending the provision of public care, and revisiting the care in the community 
philosophy was not on the agenda. There was to be no nationalisation of the 
issue.  
 
Equally, there was no appetite for formality.  On the contrary, the intention was 
to provide for the management of incapacity wherever it arose in the ordinary 
course of life, by whoever found responsibility landing on them, and therefore 
particularly in the absence of institutionalised care.6 The very format in which 
                                                                                                                                   
become incapacitated increasingly important.’ The Regulatory Impact Assessment of the 
Mental Capacity Act refers to dementia affecting ‘over 700000 people in the UK’ and the 
expectation that this will rise to 850 000 by 2010. 
3  The government took this as ‘confirm[ation] that this is an important area of social policy 
which has a significant effect on the daily lives of many people.’: introduction para 3. 
4 Making Decisions, introduction para 2 
5 See para 1.3 of the Code: “The underlying philosophy of the Act is to ensure that any 
decision made...on behalf of someone who lacks capacity to make the decision … for 
themselves is made in their best interests.” Also para 1.4: “The Act is intended to assist and 
support people who may lack capacity and to discourage anyone who is involved in caring for 
someone who lacks capacity from being overly restrictive or controlling. But the Act also aims 
to balance an individual’s right to make decisions for themselves with their right to be 
protected from harm if they lack capacity to make decisions to protect themselves.” 
6 This is in marked distinction to most other jurisdictions, where protective measures are based 
largely on guardianship models, eg South Australia, Ontario, Scotland. ‘Guardianship’ models 
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the new regime is laid out – not just a dry piece of legislation, but also a simple 
language, user-friendly Code, complete with illustrative vignettes7 – is part of 
the message: the broad scope of the provisions which duly became the Mental 
Capacity Act applies to everyone who looks after or cares for someone unable to 
make decisions for themselves, including family members, however devoted or 
reluctant they may be.  
 
The regulation of informal care of the mentally incapacitated could have been 
coercively motivated. A body of academic literature8 already contended that 
objective determination by a family of an individual member’s best interests is 
unlikely to be possible; and further, that informal care-giving, and particularly 
families, ought to be recognised as generating a distinct set of moral obligations. 
Representations made to the Law Commission9 included the contention that 
voluntary family carers should not be expected to consider the interests of the 
cared-for person to the exclusion of the interests of anyone else; and the 
government explicitly asked whether relatives and carers could be expected to 
put the interests of the incapacitated first.10 In response, with the protective 
intention in mind, an attitude of compulsion would not have been surprising.  
 
Instead, the attitude struck was one of support.  The Secretary of State prefaces 
the Code with a declaration that  
 
“for many people, the most important relationships will be with the 
wide range of less formal carers, the close family and friends who 
                                                                                                                                   
focus predominantly on the procedure for delegating powers to a substitute decision-maker, 
rather than on the procedures through which substitute decision making should be 
operationalised. Although the authority to intervene is closely regulated, the decisions made 
upon intervention are not. (See Dunn et al p118)  
7 Intended to be more user-friendly than traditional, dry descriptions of law, these fictional 
‘case studies’ un(?)wittingly reveal something of the DCA preoccupations behind the new law. 
In particular, it will be suggested later in this chapter that the vignettes chosen to illustrate how 
the new provisions should be interpreted reveal a background suspicion of families and family 
involvement in decision-making. 
8 Buchanan & Brock 1998, Hill-Smith 1998, see earlier chapters. 
9 Mental Incapacity (LC 231) para 3.31.  
10 Who Decides? Para 3.24: Q11iii  
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know the person best, some of whom will have been caring for them 
for years.”11   
 
Even before the Code was published, academic commentary noted in the draft 
provision, an ethos of support for social and caring networks. Peter Bartlett saw 
that the ‘general authority’ “in most cases allows anyone to make a decision”; 
and pointed to the lack of any requirements to comply with formalities or give 
notification.12 Kirsty Keywood saw the provisions as ‘validating the decision-
making role of those closely involved in caring for the person without 
capacity.’13   
 
A role for the family? The legislation was built, then, on twin pillars of intent:  
protecting the vulnerable, and supporting their care networks. Unfortunately, 
while these are related goals, they may also be conflicting. The forum where the 
incompatibility of the statutory aims will be realised is the family, as the 
respondents to the Law Commission made clear. The family is the care setting 
where interests become interdependent, and it is no longer possible to make a 
life-choice for one member without impacting on the life choices of others. In 
those circumstances, it is important to ask what substance there is to the 
professed support of family relationships and their special characteristics.  
 
The very generality of the Secretary of State’s declaration, and the universality 
of the ‘general authority’, reveal the absence of real consideration of the special 
interests of families, as distinct from other types of caregiver. In their 
designation as ‘family carers,’14 it is apparent that the only way the family is 
conceived within the statutory provisions is as a subset of carers. The inclusion 
of families is generic only, with no recognition of the factors which, as we have 
seen in earlier chapters, in truth distinguish them from other carers. 
                                                 
11 Foreword,  fourth paragraph. 
12 ‘Adults, Mental Illness and Incapacity: Convergence and Overlap in Legal Regulation’ 
[2003] Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 25(4) 341-353 at 347. 
13 ‘Gatekeepers, Proxies, Advocates? The Evolving Role of Carers under Mental Health and 
Mental Incapacity Law Reforms.’ Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 25(4) 355-368 at 
360. 
14 See p2 of the Secretary of State’s Foreword, paragraph 4.4 and frequently thereafter in the 
Code. 
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This underlying attitude to family relationships is revealed both in the specific 
provisions of the Act15 and in its general scope. Although the provisions apply to 
anyone in the position of giving care, they are not so universally applied to 
anyone in need of receiving it. The Mental Capacity Act provides only for 
incapacitated persons over the age of sixteen. The care and treatment of children 
– who lack capacity automatically by virtue of their age and immaturity - is still 
generally to be determined according to common law principles.16 A major area 
of family life, where medical decisions have to be made for others, is clearly not 
affected at all by the new legislation.  
 
As children mature, the teenage years of uncertain competence are further 
complicated by statutory indecision: for young people between the ages of 16 
and 18, there is an overlap between the Mental Capacity Act and the Children 
Act 1989, with no rules to determine the selection of jurisdiction. The MCA 
Code suggests that the question of a young person’s capacity is medicalised. 
Cases of incapacity by reason of mental impairment or disturbance, and cases of 
medical treatment disputes between doctors and families of a young person aged 
16-18, would be appropriately referred to the Court of Protection.17 However, 
social incapacity cases - for example, where a young person is simply 
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the treatment decision – and cases of a young 
person’s competent refusal of treatment, would still be referred to the Family 
Division of the High Court.18  
 
The potential for distorted judicial assessments of youthful capacity for 
benevolent ends is therefore still as ripe as we previously found it to be. The 
impact of the new statutory provisions on young people will depend on the 
extent to which the new statutory approach proves different to the common law 
in its approach to families. If the new statutory provisions simply replicate the 
                                                 
15 See later 
16 See page 216 and para 12.2 of the MCA Code. The two exceptions to this are not relevant to 
consideration of medical treatment decisions. Cases in respect of young people aged between 
16 and 18 may be heard either in the Court of Protection or in the Family courts, with powers 
of transfer between them. 
17 Para 12.7 
18 Para 12.14 
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old approach to family, then they have introduced regrettable procedural 
complexity for no gain. On the other hand, if the statutory provisions approach 
families differently, the probability of anomalous decisions looms. When a 
treatment decision has to be made for a young person, it would be curious if the 
family role in the decision-making process were to be different according only to 
the physiological basis of the need for substitute judgment: a young person is 
still a young person, and a family is still a family, by whatever medical necessity 
they find themselves in need of treatment.  
 
The Five Statutory Principles: The Act begins with a statement of five 
principles19 which underpin its provisions. They summarise, in essence, the 
philosophical approach behind the practical provisions. Consequently they reveal 
much about the role of the family, as perceived by legislators. So fundamental 
are they that it is worth setting them out in full: 
 
a. A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is 
established that they lack capacity. 
 
b. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision 
unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been 
taken without success. 
 
c. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision 
merely because he makes an unwise decision. 
 
d. An act done, or decision made, under this Act or on behalf of 
a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his 
best interests. 
 
e. Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be 
had to whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as 
                                                 
19  Section 1 
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effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the 
person’s rights and freedom of action. 
 
The focus of these principles is clearly the person who lacks capacity, which in 
itself tells us something about the approach which the Act takes to families. The 
message of the principles, as the Code tells us,20 is that the Act is intended to be 
“enabling and supportive of people who lack capacity, not restricting or 
controlling of their lives.” The intention in respect of those who are expected to 
do the enabling and supporting, how restrictive or controlling of their lives the 
legislation is intended to be, is much less clear. 
 
The general authority: Families become actors in the legislative drama when 
these principles come to be put into effect. The Act gives a general authority to 
act whenever anyone does an act in connection with the care or treatment of an 
incapacitated person,21 as long as he does so reasonably believing that it is in that 
person’s best interests.22 Legal authority arises simply from undertaking the task, 
irrespective of medical qualification or familial nexus. This is the embodiment of 
the statutory intention to provide for management of incapacity wherever it 
arises in the ordinary course of life. Clearly the general authority extends to 
families in the ordinary course of family life, but it is in no way special to 
families. 
 
Wide though it is, right from the outset the general authority was to have limits. 
The Law Commission recommended a category of cases which would always 
require court approval, and that recommendation is reflected in paragraph 6.18 
of the Code, which lists decisions which must be referred to the Court of 
                                                 
20 Chapter 2, first paragraph. 
21 But the incapacity is decision-specific, as the first principle and its explanatory notes in the 
Code make clear. (In the scenario on page 21 of the Code, Mrs. Arnold has capacity to deal 
with everyday financial matters, but not difficult investment decisions.) So the range of actions 
permitted under the general authority will differ according to where the patient currently sits 
on the incapacity spectrum: more intrusive actions will be permitted by the carers of a pvs 
patient than by the carers of a patient in the early stages of Alzheimer’s. For patients at the 
boundaries of competence, it will be difficult to know precisely when and to what extent carers 
will be permitted to step in. For an interesting discussion, seeking to ‘blur the line’, see 
Herring’s ‘Losing it? Losing What? The Law and Dementia.’, King’s College Lent Lectures.  
22 MCA s5. And as long as he does the act competently of course – there is no protection from 
negligence. 
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Protection: withholding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration in a 
pvs patient, organ or bone marrow donation, and non-therapeutic sterilisation.23 
Not surprisingly, these are issues which raise questions of ethical unease or 
dilemma, and for which the court had carved out its inherent jurisdiction in the 
first place. There is nothing in the Act or the consultation papers which suggests 
that the Court of Protection will or should approach these matters any differently 
to the High Court under the inherent jurisdiction. Rather, the discussion 
documents seem to endorse the observations of the judges.24 In the most 
significant of matters then, the role of families is unchanged.  
 
Even in less significant matters, the general authority extends to anyone 
performing an act of care or treatment of the incapacitated person. This will 
include other carers, including paid carers and, of course healthcare 
professionals.  It is the person performing the act or administering the treatment 
who must satisfy the statutory requirements, and must therefore believe that what 
he does is in the best interests of the incapacitated person. What role does that 
give the family in influencing decisions? 
 
The decision-making framework: In making a decision about the best interests of 
an incapacitated person, the decision-maker must follow the steps laid out in 
section 425 of the Act. In particular, pursuant to section 4(7), he must take into 
account the views of certain people. Without separate identification, family 
members will usually fit easily into the requirement to consult anyone engaged 
in caring for an incapacitated person, and close relatives if they take an interest 
in his welfare,26 if it is practical and appropriate to do so. Consultation is of 
course not decision-making, and even so the obligation to consult families is not 
absolute, but the expectation should be that that the family is consulted unless 
                                                 
23 The recommendations of the Law Commission had been more nuanced. They reflected the 
same concern for supervision of medical values as drove the House of Lords in Re F,  in the 
further suggestion that the Secretary of State be given power to prescribe additional treatments 
which should require court authorisation – ‘so that changes in medical science may be taken 
into account.’ The Code can of course be amended and updated without amendment of the Act, 
so perhaps the same objective is achieved. 
24 For example, the Law Commission report reiterates the comments of Lord Mustill in Bland  
(para 6.17) 
25 See appendix 4. 
26  See Code p66. A relative’s interest may, by implication, be short of actually caring for him. 
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there is good reason not to. The legislation has made space for families at the 
outset. 
 
In the consultation process, family members are invited to give two distinct types 
of information: firstly a recount of the incapacitated person’s own wishes and 
feelings, beliefs and values, and secondly their own views about his best 
interests. The first amounts to a recognition that the family has intimate27 
knowledge of the incapacitated person, which is a matter of value to decision-
makers. No one else is likely to have known the patient as well, or as long, and 
so be as informed about his wishes and feelings, beliefs and values. The second 
type of information is notably their opinion of the patient’s best interests (as 
distinct from their best guess of what he would choose now if he could). So, 
when the family does not hold decision-making power, it has at least been given 
a legitimate voice.28    
 
Families and IMCAs: There are indications in the Act that whatever this voice 
has to say must be worth listening to, for wherever there is no family to speak, 
the statute creates a surrogate – the Independent Mental Capacity Advocate. 
There is a clear link between families and IMCAs – the absence of one is the 
catalyst for appointment of the other29 – but they are not equivalents. 
 
The IMCA was conceived as a result of the many responses to the consultation 
paper which raised the issue of the role of advocates in supporting the rights of a 
person without capacity and assisting them in making decisions. 30 The IMCA’s 
role is ‘to support the person who lacks capacity,’31 to provide information to 
help work out what is in the person’s best interests, and to raise questions or 
                                                 
27 But it does not recognise their knowledge of the patient as unique, since the same 
consultation process applies also to anyone ‘engaged in caring for the incapacitated person’ – 
even if their involvement has been only recent, and started without any prior knowledge of the 
patient, as is often the case with paid carers.  
28 The Law Commission report which preceded the statute ‘saw the force of argument’ that 
“family members should be made visible in the new statutory scheme.” (para 3.33) 
29 See MCA Code pg 66 and para 10.42 
30 Making Decisions?  Para 21 
31 Code pg 179 
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challenge decisions which appear not to be in the best interests of the person.32 
These responsibilities reasonably reflect the expectations of a supportive family.  
 
However IMCA’s powers go further: they ‘represent’ the person without 
capacity in discussions to determine their best interests33 and they must be 
consulted. To help them do their job, they are allowed access to relevant 
healthcare records and social care records.34 In contrast, family members are not 
conceded powers of advocacy, the obligation to consult is qualified by 
considerations of practicality and appropriateness,35 and rules of confidentiality 
would normally prohibit their access to records.  
 
The contrast between the powers of families and of IMCAs suggests that the 
system expects more of families than it gives them credit for.  The creation of an 
advocate where there is no family suggests that we expect families to advocate 
on behalf of their incapacitated members, without officially recognising that role, 
and even hampering its performance with restricted access to information. 
Family support is valued, but family members are not trusted.36  
 
The implications of consultation: In reality, a voice is of little use unless it is 
heard and allowed to influence the decision-making process. The weight to be 
                                                 
32 Code para 10.4 
33 Code para 10.4 
34 Code para 10.5 
35 Where it is not practical or appropriate to consult family members, an IMCA must be 
appointed for serious medical decisions and care moves: Code para 10.77 
36 There are two mechanisms under the Act by which the position of family members may be 
strengthened. Holding a Lasting Power of Attorney (which can now cover personal welfare, 
including healthcare and consent to medical treatment: Code para 7.3) empowers family 
members – for then, it is not a matter of trust at all, but a competent decision of the patient 
himself. Alternatively, if no LPA is in place and there is an ongoing need for decision-making 
powers on serious questions of healthcare or personal welfare, the Court of Protection may 
appoint a Deputy who will in most cases be a family member (Code para 8.33). This latter, 
however, is envisaged as a device not just for promoting family involvement (Code para 8.39 
and scenario p250), but also for excluding it. Paragraph 8.39 of the Code also envisages the 
appointment of a Deputy where ‘there is a history of serious family disputes that could have a 
detrimental effect on the person’s future care’ and where ‘the person who lacks capacity is felt 
to be at risk of serious harm if left in the care of family members.’ The power of exclusion is 
arguably the more powerful, because exclusion cuts of family involvement in decision-making, 
whereas involvement is only to the usual standard of the patient’s best interests). Moreover, 
the real power inherent in either of these roles may be illusory. Decisions made under the 
general authority may not be inconsistent with decisions made by holders of LPAs or by 
Deputies, but it is not necessarily clear that the individual exercising the general authority 
would always know of such managers or attorneys, or of their decisions.  
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attached to the family’s views is a matter for the decision-maker to determine. In 
the explanations of the statutory principles which is offered by the Code, there 
can be detected a background suspicion of families. The ‘case studies’ which are 
intended to facilitate lay interpretation of the legislation may unwittingly reveal 
Department of Constitutional Affairs preoccupations. The second principle, for 
example, is illustrated by a scenario in which the patient’s mother is depicted as 
forcing onto her daughter her own opinions and experiences of ECT: 
 
“Sara, a young woman with severe depression, is getting treatment 
from mental health services. Her psychiatrist determines that she has 
capacity to make decisions about treatment, if she gets advice and 
support. Her mother is trying to persuade Sara to agree to electro-
convulsive therapy (ECT), which helped her mother when she had 
clinical depression in the past.”37 
 
In marked contrast, it describes the psychiatrist providing “factual information 
about the different types of treatment available and explain[ing] their advantages 
and disadvantages…[and] how different people experience different reactions or 
side effects.” It concludes by drawing a clear distinction between “what is right” 
for the patient and “the personal opinions of her mother”.   
 
Similarly, the third principle is amplified with a declaration of support for an 
individual’s right to disagree with their family: 
 
“Everybody has their own values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes. 
A person should not be assumed to lack capacity to make a decision 
just because other people think their decision is unwise. This applies 
even if family members, friends or healthcare or social care staff are 
unhappy with a decision.”38 
 
                                                 
37 Code, pg 24. 
38 Para 2.10 
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The implication is that the principles are to be operated as a bulwark against 
overly officious families, for the good of the individual. 
 
That implication is not limited to the general philosophy behind the Act. Where 
the Code explains the operation of its provisions, the same suspicion is imported. 
The scenario conjured to illustrate an assessment of capacity,39 for example, 
depicts an 82 year old woman recovering from a stroke, and her daughter 
attempting to extract information from her consultant to further the daughters’ 
view of where the old lady should live – and in dispute with her brother to boot! 
And where the Code explains the duty to consult family members in the 
determination of best interests, it is the potential for conflicting interests which is 
emphasised: 
 
“People with conflicting interests should not be cut out of the process 
(for example, those who stand to inherit from the person’s will may 
still have a right to be consulted about the person’s care or medical 
treatment). But decision-makers must always ensure that the interests 
of those consulted do not overly influence the process of working out 
a person’s best interests.”40 
 
The ‘insight’ families may ‘sometimes’41 have is apparently downplayed by 
comparison to the ‘specialist knowledge’42 of paid care workers and even 
voluntary sector support workers. After all, the approach to families implied by 
the Code of the Mental Capacity Act seems surprisingly reminiscent of the older 
approach in the Code to the Mental Health Act 1983.43 
                                                 
39 Pg 45: “Mrs Collins is 82 and has had a stroke…She is living in a house that has been the 
family home for years. Her son wants her to sell her house and live with him. Mrs. Collins 
likes the idea, but her daughter does not. She thinks her mother will lose independence and her 
condition will get worse. She talks to her mother’s consultant to get information that will help 
stop the sale.” 
40 Para 5.67  
41 Para 5.65 
42 Para 5.66 
43 The old provisions of Mental Health Act 1983 were limited to providing Nearest Relatives 
with basic information, and even then the obligation was not absolute: MHA83 Code of 
Practice: 2.27 -2.31. The family was to be viewed with suspicion, rather than as an ally. Para 
3.24 warns “In particular, the medical profession should be cognisant of the possible 
conflicting roles of informants, including the possibility of disagreements among those who 
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Taking all this together, undoubtedly the role of the family implicit in the general 
philosophy of the Act is limited. The family is only considered as a mouthpiece 
of the patient and opinion holder, and not as bearers of mutually dependent 
interests that deserved consideration in the assessment of that patient’s best 
interests. The family is still not part of the treatment equation, but merely of 
instrumental use: can it help the patient ‘make choices or express a view,’44 or 
can it ‘provide valuable background information’?45 Specifically, family 
members’ views and wishes about what they would want for the person must not 
influence the assessment,46 and nor should any consideration of the implications 
of the decision for the family unit.47 As far as families are concerned, the 
blindness of the common law seems to have been replaced only by the partial-
sightedness of legislation. 
 
‘Best interests’ Considerations. 
 
It is a medical commonplace that impairment of sensory perception in one area 
may be compensated by enhanced sensitivity in another. In the interpretation of 
the Mental Capacity Act, it could be that the influence of the family in substitute 
decision-making for one of its members works in the same way. The general 
authority to act is dependent on an assessment of the incapacitated person’s best 
interests. If it is excluded from the focus of deliberations, could the family 
nonetheless be given a more influential role by means of a more sympathetic 
concept of ‘best interests’ in the new statute?  
 
                                                                                                                                   
are consulted;… and the subjectivity, both of the criteria, and of relatives and carers who are 
required to make the necessary judgments.” Family subjectivity is assumed to be a bad thing, 
and there is no recognition at all of the impact of one member’s incapacity on the wider family.   
44 Code para 4.36 
45 Code para 4.49 
46 Code para 4.49 
47 For this reason, Choudhry’s prediction (in ‘Best Interests in the MCA 2005 – What Can 
Healthcare Law Learn from Family Law?’ (2008) Health Care Analysis 16 240 at p248), that 
the ‘best interests’ test under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is less likely than its parallel 
provision under the Children Act to be ‘hijacked’ by other parties presenting their own 
interests under the guise of the patient’s/child’s, may perhaps be over-optimistic. Being 
consulted for one’s view of another’s ‘best interest’ is a long way short of having one’s own 
interests taken into consideration. If family interests are still not part of the assessment, then in 
order to pursue influence, exactly the same temptation to ‘hijack’ persists.   
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Just as under the inherent jurisdiction, the ‘best interests’ of the person for whom 
a decision has to be made is the key element of substitute decision-making under 
the Act. The common law powers had been dominated right from the outset by 
the notion of ‘best interests’, to the extent that it would be easy to assume that it 
was a jurisprudential prerequisite of decision-making. It is not.48 The notion of 
‘best interests’ originated, as we have seen, in the doctrine of necessity. 
Incrementally, as cases demanded, its application was widened to other invasive 
medical decisions, and latterly to non-medical matters thought to impact on 
welfare.49 By these steps the ‘best interests’ benchmark simply became so 
pervasive in England and Wales that it extinguished debate, and its continuation 
as the base line in the new legislation was never in doubt, or seriously 
questioned.50  
 
The leap of imagination which the Mental Capacity Act achieved, however, was 
to turn such an individual concept into a universally applicable benchmark. The 
new legislation standardised ‘best interests’ by eschewing any reference to 
necessity. Instead, it answered the ethical debate between substituted judgment 
and individual interests with a unitary framework which incorporates both.51  
The ‘best interests’ of the person who cannot make a decision for themselves 
becomes both the reason and the authority for substitute decision making.52 The 
Mental Capacity Act does not just reject the old argument between substituted 
judgment and best interest approaches; it forces them into an arranged marriage. 
Then, by extending substitute decision-making to any health, welfare and 
                                                 
48 Other jurisdictions adopt a substituted judgement approach, in marked contrast to ours. 
49 See Dunn et al, “Constructing and Reconstructing ‘Best Interests’: An Interpretative 
Examination of Substitute Decision-Making under the Mental Capacity Act 2005”, [2007] 29 J 
Social Welfare & Family Law 117-133 at p119 
50  “There is little doubt that decisions made on behalf of a person without capacity should be 
made in their best interests. Respondents to the Law Commission’s consultation almost 
unanimous in their acceptance of this point, and the government shares this view ….”:  Who 
Decides? Para 3.22. So when the Code was published, it boldly stated at para 1.3 that the “The 
underlying philosophy of the Act is to ensure that any decision made…on behalf of someone 
who lacks the capacity to make the decision…for themselves is made in their best interests.” 
51 Determinations that are not in fact in the best interests of the person for whom they are made 
only attract liability if the decision-maker fails to demonstrate that he has adhered to the 
requirements of the best interests checklist. 
52 In the words of Dunn et al, ‘the justification for making decision-specific interventions’ 
(p118) (Italics added). The linking of both substitute decision-making authority and the best 
interests model is called “the appropriation of an objective accounting approach by subjective 
considerations” (p126). 
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financial decision, the legislation turns ‘best interests’ into “a universal 
mechanism for determination, applicable regardless of the decision-making 
context.”53 What started as a judicial tool of medical decision-making in 
extremis, becomes a general model for everyday health and social care.   
 
The difficulty with such a generalised concept is – and always has been - 
identifying it in specific cases. As Gurnham54 points out, the Act does not 
actually define ‘best interests’; it merely provides, in the form of the section 4 
‘checklist’, a framework for working it out in any given case. Just as the 
common law widened over time the issues to be determined by the ‘best 
interests’ benchmark, so too did it expand the understanding of what constituted 
‘interests’ at all. Originally, the focus was on medical interests, but it came to 
encompass emotional and other interests too. The progression of the concept was 
- as we have seen - “inconsistent and non-linear….fluid and idiosyncratic,”55 
producing a number of anomalous decisions, and (as I have argued) generally 
failing to recognise interests embedded in familial relationships, but it was 
progression nonetheless.  
 
Since legislation in general has such a long gestation period, it was inevitable 
that the common law progression would continue whilst statutory reform was 
being debated and decided.56 Both time, and the non-linear nature of common 
law development, made sure that whatever concept statute adopted would be a 
matter of choice, not of inevitable conclusion: as Dunn puts it, the concept of 
‘best interests’ encapsulated in the Mental Capacity Act therefore “reflects, but is 
not the culmination of,”57 the common law progression.  The question behind the 
                                                 
53 Dunn et al p122 
54 In ‘”Reader, I Detained Him Under the Mental Health Act”: A Literary Response to 
Professor Fennell’s Best Interests and Treatment for Mental Disorder’ (2008) Health Care 
Analysis 16 268 at p275. 
55 Dunn et al, ibid p 122 
56 This can be seen in the Law Commission’s report which began the legislative process. At 
paragraph 3.26, it envisaged recommendations which would “probably involve a significant 
departure from the present state of the law. This, as set out in Re F, appears to provide that a 
doctor who acts in accordance with an accepted body of medical opinion is both (1) not 
negligent and (2) acting in the best interests of a patient without capacity.” The common law 
had moved substantially beyond this position by the time the Mental Capacity Bill was 
presented to Parliament. 
57 Dunn et al, ibid p 122 
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legislation was where in the process of development to step in: which concept of 
best interests to entrench? 
 
From the outset, with the Law Commission’s report in February 1995,58 
legislative reform advanced a patient-centred concept of ‘best interests’. It was  
 
“designed to ensure that any substitute decision is taken at the lowest 
level of formality which is consistent with protection of the person 
without capacity, both from the improper usurpation of his or her 
autonomy and from inadequate or even abusive decision-making.”59 
 
The focus was on “the individual welfare of the person to whom [the 
benchmark] was applied.”60  There is no recognition of interdependency here.61  
 
On the other hand, the perception of the person without capacity for whom 
decisions have to be made is quite holistic.  When the decision-maker is 
undertaking his deliberations, section 6 (a) – (c) and the Code’s ‘quick summary’ 
of how to go about it direct him to ‘identify all the things that the person who 
lacks capacity would take into account if they were making the decision or 
                                                 
58 ‘Mental Incapacity’, Report no. 231. 
59 LC Report para 3.24 
60 Dunn et al, ibid p 121, italics added. Support for this view can be seen in the Law 
Commission’s report at paragraph 2.46: “Our overview paper suggested that the aims of policy 
for this project should be: 
(i) that people are enabled and encouraged to take for themselves those decisions which 
they are able to take; 
(ii) that where it is necessary in their own interests or for the protection of others that 
someone else should take decisions on their behalf, the intervention should be as limited 
as possible and should be concerned to achieve what the person himself would have 
wanted; and 
(iii) that proper safeguards should be provided against exploitation and neglect, and 
against physical, sexual or psychological abuse. 
61 Choudhry has suggested (in ‘Best interests in the MCA 2005 – What Can Healthcare Law 
Learn from Family Law?’ (2008) Health Care Analysis 16 240 at p248) that the inherent 
incompatibility with Human Rights Act principles which dogs the paramountcy principle 
under the Children Act is not a difficulty for the Mental Capacity Act because “no … hierarchy 
of interests exists”. If that is correct, it is only because you cannot have a hierarchy of one. 
Under the Mental Capacity Act, just as under the inherent jurisdiction, the patient is the only 
person whose interests are taken into account. Others may give their views of those interests 
(pursuant to s4(7)), but their own interests are specifically not part of the consideration. Since 
interdependency is, as I have maintained throughout, a feature of medical decision-making in 
reality, it seems only a matter of time before someone questions the compatibility of the 
Mental Capacity Act with HRA principles. 
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acting for themselves’. In particular, the decision-maker must ascertain the 
patient’s past and present wishes and feelings; any beliefs and values that would 
be likely to influence his decision; and anything else he would be likely to 
consider, including the effect of the decision on other people, obligations to 
dependants or the duties of a responsible citizen. 
 
The importance of matters other than the strictly medical is therefore enshrined. 
Physical wellbeing is not all that has to be considered. Non rational, even 
metaphysical, factors are given a place in the decision-making process. Evidence 
of those wishes, beliefs and values may be found, we are told, in the patient’s 
‘cultural background, religious beliefs, political convictions or past behaviour 
and habits,’62 and the best authorities of such intangible characteristics are 
recognised to be those who are close to the person who lacks capacity, such as 
close family members.63 The information families provide is of instrumental use 
only, but it is fundamental to the statutory concept of ‘best interests’, and its 
relevance to the ultimate decision is more assured than it was at common law.  
 
Insofar as the statutory concept of ‘best interests’ has attracted academic 
commentary,64 it has generally interpreted section 4 as a move to enhance patient 
autonomy. In particular, Bartlett sees it as strengthening the patient against the 
medics:  
 
“Notwithstanding the language used, [what became s4] is a move 
away from a traditional ‘best interests’ test, where the decision is 
based primarily or exclusively on criteria considered important by 
the decision-maker, to a test which requires the past and present 
views of the person lacking capacity to be considered, as well as the 
need to buttress the autonomy of that individual. The criteria are 
                                                 
62 Code para 5.46 
63 Para 5.54 
64 Note in particular the special issue of Health Care Analysis (2008) volume 16, publishing 
papers from a conference considering the issue. 
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therefore a move away from a simple ‘doctor (or carer) knows 
best’…”65 
 
This interpretation follows the common law approach, at least as to the place of 
families in the process of determining a patient’s interests, and therefore was 
perhaps the orthodox interpretation to be expected in the early stages of the 
legislative process.  
 
It does not however, indeed could not, take account of the Code, which was 
published very late66 in the legislative process, but which purports to guide our 
interpretation of the statutory provisions. The Code gives encouragement to an 
interpretation which is far more sensitive to families.  
 
The information which families are asked to supply can be seen as susceptible to 
recognition of interdependency. “Wishes and feelings ... beliefs and values”67 are 
indeed pertinent to autonomy, but they may equally encompass an ethic of care. 
The evidence of the ‘cultural background, religious beliefs, political convictions 
or past behaviour and habits’ in respect of patients embedded in families will 
demonstrate the mutuality of relationships, and – from the fact that the patient 
did not choose to reject his family and live instead as a hermit – that he placed a 
value on that mutuality.  
 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, s4 gives no grounds for valuing a person’s 
self-interest over his selflessness, his concern for himself over his concern for 
others. The Code states expressly that the other factors of s6(c) ‘might include 
the effect of the decision on other people, obligations to dependant or the duties 
of a responsible citizen,’68 For any patient who lives within a family, the 
statutory concept of ‘best interests’ can be construed as recognising the 
mutuality of his relationships – the obligations which they entail, as well as the 
benefits which they bestow. The recognition of values and habits, in a 
                                                 
65 ‘Adults, mental illness and incapacity: convergence and overlap in legal regulation’ [2003] 
Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 25(4) 341-353 at 348.  
66 Not until 23rd April 2007 
67 MCA 2005 s 4(6)(a) and (b) 
68 Code para 5.47 
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framework which accepts non-rational motivations, opens the way for 
recognition of family interests. As the Code makes clear: 
 
“The Act allows actions that benefit other people, as long as they are 
in the best interests of the person who lacks capacity to make the 
decision. For example, having considered all the circumstances of 
the particular case, a decision might be made to take a blood sample 
from a person who lacks capacity to consent, to check for a genetic 
link to cancer within the family, because this might benefit someone 
else in the family. But it might still be in the best interests of the 
person who lacks capacity. ‘Best interests’ goes beyond the person’s 
medical interests.”69 
 
Of course the patient is still the focus of the determination here, and is protected 
from abuse. “As long as they are in the best interests of the person who lacks 
capacity” is a vital caveat. In effect, the consideration of anyone’s interests other 
than the incapacitated person’s alone, is admitted by consent. Only if the patient 
can be shown in the past to have been motivated by consideration of the impact 
of his behaviour or condition on his family, can that be considered now in his 
incapacity. The bullying overlord of his downtrodden family cannot suddenly be 
expected to consider their wellbeing once he loses capacity; and the simply 
unthinking will not be credited with insight.  
 
The weakness of this interpretation of statute, however, is that although altruism 
may be recognised, it cannot be compelled. In truth, it is the patient’s family 
interests which may be admitted, not the patient’s family’s interests.  
 
Caution on behalf of families is reinforced by examination of the common law 
authorities to which we are referred for guidance. The Code illustrates the 
statutory provisions on this point by reference to Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone 
marrow transplant)70 and Re A (Male Sterilisation).71 As previously seen, Re Y 
                                                 
69 Code para 5.48 
70 [1996] 2 FLR 787, at footnote 17 of the Code. 
71 [2000] 1 FLR 549, at footnote 17 of the Code.  
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concerned a medical procedure of relatively modest invasiveness, was hedged 
about with judicial cautions and caveat, and still attracted criticism as a step too 
far. In Re A the proposed treatment was refused as not in the patient’s best 
interests. The Code does not refer to Re T, which is generally seen as a high-
water mark of family considerations determining best interests, but that may be 
of course because the case concerned an infant, outside the scope of the Act in 
any event. The caution intrinsic to the cited cases seems to make clear that, 
although there may be increased openness to arguments of a patient’s family 
interests, judicial interpretation of the threshold of best interests, should it come 
to that, is not likely to have shifted dramatically. 
 
The emphasis of the Act is not, however, on judicial interpretation. The ‘best 
interests’ determination is to be carried out by whoever has to make the decision 
in question, almost certainly not a legally qualified person, and in matters of care 
at least, very often not medically qualified or experienced either - often, in fact, a 
family member.  
 
In those circumstances there is no reason to assume that everyday decisions will 
automatically reflect common law decisions. A decision-maker’s determination 
of best interests has to be objectively reasonable, but not necessarily the same as 
a judge’s. The ‘best interests’ checklist may reflect the discursive interplay of 
judicial deliberations up to the time of statutory drafting, but its path of 
progression thereafter is put very largely outside judicial control. Other 
characters are likely to have much more impact on how the new Act is applied, 
and family members who care for their incapacitated relatives are therefore in an 
altered position of influence. In matters of everyday care at least, such as 
appropriate clothing or whether to apply a sticking plaster, decisions are 
effectively delegated to family or carers. There is every likelihood that, in such 
matters of everyday care, family decision-makers will afford different elements 
of the best interest checklist greater weight. 
   
In relation to medical treatment, however, the impact of this should not be 
overstated. Wherever any significant treatment decision has to be taken, there is 
likely to be a clinician involved, who assumes the role of decision-maker simply 
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from the fact that his is the expertise recommending the treatment. Even as 
doctors are bound by the Act, the foundation of their reasonable belief as to the 
patient’s best interests will be clinical judgment informed by their obligations as 
a doctor, set out in GMC guidance. The guidance document, ‘Consent: Patients 
and Doctors Making Decisions Together,’72 does not explore, still less attempt to 
define ‘best interests’. It refers to the Mental Capacity Act, and sets out medical 
obligations in the following terms:73  
 
75 In making decisions about the treatment and care of patients who 
lack capacity, you must: 
(a) make the care of your patient your first concern 
(b) treat patients as individuals and respect their dignity 
(c) support and encourage patients to be involved, as far as they want 
to and are able, in decisions about their treatment and care 
(d) treat patients with respect and not discriminate against them. 
 
76 You must also consider: 
(a) whether the patient's lack of capacity is temporary or permanent 
(b) which options for treatment would provide overall clinical 
benefit for the patient 
(c) which option, including the option not to treat, would be least 
restrictive of the patient's future choices 
(d) any evidence of the patient's previously expressed preferences, 
such as an advance statement or decision 
                                                 
72 Effective as of 2nd June 2008 
73 This is in marked contrast to the guidance in respect of patients aged 0-18, which provides at 
paragraph  12 that “An assessment of best interests will include what is clinically indicated in a 
particular case. You should also consider: 
a. the views of the child or young person, so far as they can express them, including any    
previously expressed preferences 
b. the views of parents 
c. the views of others close to the child or young person 
d. the cultural, religious or other beliefs and values of the child or parents 
e.  the views of other healthcare professionals involved in providing care to the child or 
young person, and of any other professionals who have an interest in their welfare 
f.   which choice, if there is more than one, will least restrict the child or young person's 
future options.” 
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(e) the views of anyone the patient asks you to consult, or who has 
legal authority to make a decision on their behalf, or has been 
appointed to represent them 
(f) the views of people close to the patient on the patient’s 
preferences, feelings, beliefs and values, and whether they consider 
the proposed treatment to be in the patient's best interests 
(g) what you and the rest of the healthcare team know about the 
patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values. 
 
Medical assessments of best interests, it may be assumed then, will continue to 
be patient-centred and focussed on clinical interests. The requirement to consider 
family views at 76(f) is an information-gathering, rather than a decision-sharing, 
exercise. The prevailing medical culture, which undervalues family interests, is 
apparently unmoved by the new legislation.   
 
Clinicians are not always so averse to treating patients with an eye to the 
advantage of others. It was as a result of representations by medical authorities 
that the Law Commission report and the government consultation paper which 
preceded the Mental Capacity Act raised the issues of genetic screening and 
elective ventilation,74 asking whether these procedures, favoured by many 
doctors, were “ethical and reasonable”. Framing the best interests test of the 
statute to exclude consideration of the interests of others effectively answered 
that question negatively. The only exception which the statute permits relates to 
non-therapeutic research on the mentally incapacitated, which s30 permits within 
safeguards. Strikingly, one of those safeguards is the duty to consult the family, 
at least in as far as they are caring for the patient or interested in his welfare. If 
the family provide the information that, in their opinion, the patient would not 
wish to be involved in the research, then the patient may not be involved.75  In 
this context alone, the family has the upper hand over the doctors.   
 
                                                 
74 See paragraph 5.33, Who Decides? 
75 Section 32(5) 
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In summary, consideration of both the broad philosophy and the specific 
provisions of the Act suggest that the new legislation may admit recognition of 
interdependency in day to day matters where the family is the decision-maker; 
but resists it in the more significant and medical matters, where others assume 
decision-making roles. Exactly where the impact of interdependence is likely to 
be greatest, the family role is most limited. Despite the ‘visibility’ of the family 
within the statutory concept of ‘best interests’, a patient focussed approach and 
the prevailing medical culture combine to resist the potential for the family 
assuming any greater influence in disputed medical decisions than it played at 
common law.  
 
In this context, academic criticism of the Act may now be considered. Dunn et 
al76 were not exclusively concerned with the role of the family but they 
identified three potential problems77 with the legislative approach to best 
interests, all of which will be realised in the family context. 
 
Their first concern was that the ethical dilemmas inherent in some substitute 
decisions remain, and are highly emotive and controversial. As a result, there 
will continue to be inconsistencies in the ways in which ‘best interests’ are 
conceptualised and determined.78  
 
Inconsistency of outcome is itself an undesirable quality in law but in matters of 
human individuality – such as health – it can be defended as preferable to 
inflexibility.79 The achievement of consistency by adherence to particular 
                                                 
76 “Constructing and Reconstructing ‘Best Interests’: An Interpretative Examination of 
Substitute Decision-making under the MCA 2005” [2007] 29 J Social Welfare & Family Law 
117-133 
77 Namely, a “fail[ure] to adequately resolve certain ethical dilemmas;…reduc[tion of] applied 
substitute decision-making to a series of compulsory generalised instructions; 
[and]…necessitating deliberation but offering little practical guidance to the process of 
determination.” (abstract) 
78 Pg 128. They cite the Wyatt case as an illustration of social controversy: the large scale 
media and public interest demonstrated an absence of consensus that the best interests 
benchmark was even an acceptable test to apply. Wyatt is a questionable illustration for 
discussions of the Mental Capacity Act, which does not apply to children. Perhaps it would be 
more helpful to consider the issues raised in Burke. 
79 The same criticism is traditionally thrown at the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, but it has 
stood the test of time much better than its formulaic (and therefore predictable) counterpart, the 
Child Support Act. 
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outcomes would quickly provoke outcry in matters as individual and context-
dependent as medical treatment decisions. Personal and particular decision-
making is at the very heart of the ‘best interests’ concept and inconsistency is an 
inevitable corollary of that. 
 
Dunn et al are not, however, objecting to inconsistency per se, as a public issue 
of predictability, one case compared to another. The problem they highlight is 
the unpredictable impact of the decision-making setting on the ‘best interests’ 
conclusion: 
 
“The MCA reflects the common law in conceiving substitute 
decision-making within an individual relationship, specifically the 
doctor-patient relationship, or in a detached, consultative setting, 
such as a case conference. However, this conceptualisation of ‘best 
interests’ potentially gives rise to tensions, not only when other 
people’s interests are integrally connected with the outcome of the 
decision (see Re Y), but also when ‘best interest’ determinations are 
made in social settings, such as family or group homes. Maximising 
the ‘best interests’ of one individual in these settings may not be 
beneficial to, and may even impact negatively on, the ‘best interests’ 
of others in the same setting.”80 
 
In other words, they complain that where a family member is decision-maker, 
the decision will be fraught with considerations of other people’s interests. This 
objection takes it as inevitable that decisions made in a family setting will reflect 
concern for how a decision made for one of its members impacts on others. 
 
The observation of tensions inherent in social settings is not a matter of insight 
on the part of Dunn et al, revealing lack of forethought in the legislative drafters. 
It is nothing more, nothing less than the familiar conflict between an ethic of 
autonomy and an ethic of care. There will always be a tension between the 
interests of different people in the same social setting: that is the essential 
                                                 
80 Pg 128 
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paradox of human relations and it was addressed right at the beginning of the 
legislative process.81  In framing the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act, 
allowing decisions to be made in a social setting was a positive decision, not an 
accident of drafting. Furthermore, our analysis of the Act suggests that family 
decision-making will be limited to the more minor decisions of everyday care. 
The highly emotive and controversial issues, where decisions will have a greater 
impact upon the lives of family members, necessarily involve third parties as 
treatment providers, and therefore decision-makers. 
 
Moreover, it does not follow that from the admission of decision-making in a 
social context that Dunn’s ‘inevitability’ (that decisions in reality will reflect 
consideration of the impact on others) is permitted. The statutory insistence that 
any decision must be made in the best interests of the person without capacity 
demonstrates that it is not. Open recognition of the mutual dependency of patient 
and decision-maker would have dissolved ‘tension’ into a mere ‘balancing 
exercise’, but such an approach was emphatically not adopted. Within the 
statutory ‘best interests’ assessment, the impact on others is only relevant one 
step further removed – namely on how that impact itself impacts on the patient. 
It is not permissible to consider that the burden of care if X did not have a hip 
operation would be too much for Y to bear. It is only permissible to consider 
whether X’s best interests are better served by undergoing the surgery and 
returning to live with Y, or by refusing the operation and losing Y’s care.   
 
The question then remains, whether decision-makers in a social setting can make 
choices which comply with the legislation; or whether the inevitability which 
Dunn et al predict will become reality, with the individual focus of decision-
making which the Act intended more honoured in the breach than the 
observance. This possibility lies behind the second problem identified by Dunn 
                                                 
81 At paragraph 3.33 of the Law Commission’s report it is noted both that “a small number of 
respondents...regretted the fact that we had provisionally rejected the grant of decision-making 
authority as an automatic consequence of family relationship”; and that “a small number of 
respondents also challenged the idea that an unpaid family carer should have to act in the best 
interests of a person lacking capacity, when the carer’s life and interests are intimately bound 
up with the other.” 
 298 
et al, namely the tension between a general framework and the specificity of 
actual substitute decision-making.82  
 
Their concern is that the codification of best interests into a statutory principle 
both requires decision-makers to approach their determinations with primary 
regard to their legal obligations, and assumes that this legalistic approach is 
compatible with the identities of and relationships between the decision-maker 
and the decided-for.83 In other words, the Act expects families both to make 
individually focussed decisions and yet also to continue functioning as a 
network. Dunn et al challenge the implicit assumption that this is even possible, 
pointing out the absence of empirical data in support. The price of the 
assumption being wrong, they point out, is either failure to achieve robust 
assessments of best interests, or deterioration in the personalised quality of care, 
or both.    
 
Dunn et al are right to identify the unspoken assumption on which the new 
legislation is founded, but the fears they articulate may be questioned. They may 
equally have pointed out the absence of data to disprove the assumption. There 
are no empirical studies which demonstrate that decision-makers within the 
family context cannot determine the best interests of their loved ones. As we 
have seen, there are arguments on which to base a claim that such decision-
makers are in fact best placed to make such determinations, informed as they are 
by a familiarity with the patient, which no other decision-maker can claim. There 
are also empirical studies which demonstrate that family carers are generally 
overwhelmingly motivated by the urge to promote, not damage, the interests of 
their loved ones.84 Indeed, even Dunn et al argue that best interests 
determinations should be contextual.85 By placing the decision-making authority 
                                                 
82 Pg 129-130 
83 There is some recognition that care has inherent in it multiple layers of duty/ interest etc. At 
paragraph 3.25 of Who Decides? the government notes that a local authority social services 
dept and General Practitioners may have a responsibility towards a relative or carer as well as 
towards the person without capacity.. There is however no similar insight to the reality that a 
family is simply a microcosm of this. 
84 See previous chapter. 
85 At pg 129: “Empowering substitute decision making must be based within the personal and 
interdependent relationship between the decision-maker and the person for whom the decision 
is being made.” On this, we can agree. 
 299 
in family hands at all, the legislation implicitly accepts the force of such 
arguments.   
 
In reality, it will never be possible to obtain empirical evidence to either support 
or disprove the assumption, because of the very subjectivity of the best interests 
test. When best interests were limited to medical interests, then the optimum 
course could be identified with relative certainty. Once the concept is expanded 
to include emotional and other interests, the optimum decision becomes much 
more open to interpretation and debate. Family decision-makers may still reach 
robust determinations of ‘best interests’, albeit that they weigh the various 
factors to be considered differently to the courts, and therefore reach different 
conclusions. Dunn et al complain that there is no relational element in the best 
interests determination,86 but our analysis of statutory provisions is more 
generous. At least in the limited matters where the family is decision-maker, 
there is some scope for relational considerations. 
 
The predicted consequences of Dunn et al’s second concern would so undermine 
the fundamental intentions of the Act, that any interpretation which avoids them 
should be given serious consideration. Their warning is more credible therefore, 
not as a criticism of the legislation as it must inevitably apply, but as an 
argument in favour of our interpretation of the decision making procedure. 
 
The third objection of Dunn et al is that the legislation “aids deliberation not 
determination”87 – that it provides the ingredients for the recipe, but not the 
means of cooking it. There are two constituent elements and a conclusion to this 
objection. First, it is pointed out that, having secured the revelation of conflicting 
values and opinions, the statute offers no means to resolve them. Clearly not all 
decisions can be referred to the Court of Protection for judicial review. Secondly 
it is said that the legislation fails to prioritise the numerous factors which it 
decrees to inform the best interests deliberation. This, however, is commended 
                                                 
86 Pg 129 continues: “…yet this relational element forms no substantive part of the Mental 
Capacity Act’s provisions. Instead, a ‘best interests’ determination is a detached and reflective 
procedure that is potentially incompatible with the situated and embodied nature of the 
relationship within which the ‘best’ decision could be based.” 
87 Pg 130 
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not criticised88 and indeed there are parallels in long-established legislation, such 
as section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. From these two observations 
it is concluded that the best interests principle may become defensively 
orientated, used to justify decisions retrospectively, rather than to guide them in 
advance. 
 
This chain of thought fails to appreciate the non-interventionist approach implicit 
in the legislation and the consultation documents which led up to it. Conceiving 
incapacity as a social problem, a social solution was devised. The intention was 
to create a guidance mechanism, to ensure a basis for decisions that would be 
acceptable in an open and democratic society, without that society having to 
assume the burden of actual responsibility. Authority was always meant to rest 
with the judgment of the person who happened to be making the decision. It is 
not a conflict resolution device which the statute lacks, but the very concept of 
potential for conflict.  
 
In the context of family care, this omission operates supportively if the family 
assumes full and exclusive responsibility, but dismissively as soon as they 
require help. The family of the Alzheimer’s patient who is cared for at home will 
have much more control of decisions on his behalf than the family of a patient 
with the same symptoms but living in a nursing home. The true objection to this 
is that it is neither family nor patient focussed, but administration and cost 
centred. 
 
Nor is it only this locus of decision-making authority which drives best interests 
considerations to a defensive orientation. The legislation was envisioned in 
defensive terms: it does not impose liability, but excludes it as long as procedural 
hoops are jumped. Yet there is nothing new in this. Far from being a novel 
feature of the Mental Capacity Act, defensive orientation has been an aspect of 
all legal adventures in this area since Re F itself, where judicial authority over 
                                                 
88 “In contrast with recent common law declarations, the Mental Capacity Act offers no 
guidance to draw up a balance sheet. By not assigning priority to the elements that constitute 
the checklist, the decision-maker must only assess best interests with reference to the relevant 
circumstances in which he or she is making a determination This is a correct and commendable 
approach…” pg 131 
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medical decisions was won on the promise of protection from liability. In truth 
the Mental Capacity Act goes further to achieving proactive influence on the 
decision-making process than the common law ever did.   
   
Taken together, the insights offered by Dunn et al’s objections to the Mental 
Capacity Act support the interpretation of the new legislation as susceptible to 
interdependency considerations in the hands of family decision-makers, but not 
otherwise and even so only from the perspective of the incapacitated person. As 
far as family interests and the ethic of care are concerned, the brave new world 
of statutory regulation has brought very little change to the position reached by 
the common law.     
 
Inherent Jurisdiction After the Act 
 
Given the mutual shadowing of statute and common law, the fate of the inherent 
jurisdiction may be questioned. As far as the Law Commission was concerned, 
the new statutory jurisdiction was designed to replace the old declaratory 
jurisdiction89 - indeed that whole jurisdiction was said to be ‘makeshift’ and 
‘temporarily in place pending the introduction of a coherent new statutory 
scheme’.90 Avoiding the mistakes of the Children Act and the Mental Health 
Acts, it was specifically acknowledged that the court would retain its ‘normal 
inherent jurisdiction’ to make declarations as to lawfulness where the statutory 
scheme provided no remedy as a ‘valuable safeguard’, but it was hoped that 
recourse would be had to it very rarely. The government consultation paper 
followed exactly that expectation.91 
 
Early academic commentary was not convinced. Peter Bartlett described the 
inherent jurisdiction as ‘the wild card in the incapacity landscape’.92 In his view, 
the expansion of the inherent jurisdiction was the court ‘claiming jurisdiction to 
make such decisions as may be required in the best interests of a person lacking 
                                                 
89 Mental Incapacity para 8.6. 
90 Mental Incapacity para 1.3 
91 Who Decides? Para 7.8 
92 ‘Adults, mental illness and incapacity: convergence and overlap in legal regulation’ [2003] 
Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 25(4) 341-353 at 351. 
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capacity’. Further, he perceives that the court saw that jurisdiction as 
‘independent….separate from the previous case law which placed decisions  in 
the context of other branches of law.’93 Referring to the use of the inherent 
jurisdiction in Bournewood-type cases,94 he concluded that it is “far from clear 
that the jurisdiction will disappear….If it remains, and an ‘inherent’ jurisdiction 
may be remarkably difficult to get rid of, it is not clear how it will play off 
against legislative reforms.”95 
 
In the short time during which the Mental Capacity Act has been effective, the 
indications are that the courts have simply pursued the old ends under a new 
guise. We have already noted how use of the inherent jurisdiction continued to 
develop specifically in the context of deprivation of liberty96 pending 
implementation of the Mental Health Act 2007 amendments to the Mental 
Capacity Act, to the point where it may be questioned whether there was any 
need for legislation at all. Since the new provisions came into force, the 
indications are that statute is simply being interpreted so as to comply with the 
former common law approach.   
 
The case of Surrey County Council v. MB97 was commenced under the inherent 
jurisdiction, but transferred into the Court of Protection for consideration under 
the Mental Capacity Act. The patient was lacking capacity. The medical 
witnesses wanted him to go to and remain at a particular medical unit, but they 
were unwilling to rely on the Mental Health Act, and had sought a declaration 
with compulsory effect instead. Charles J considered that s15(1)(c) of the Mental 
Capacity Act gave him discretion to make a declaration as to the lawfulness of 
their proposed action, in a free-standing provision which co-existed with the 
Mental Health Act provisions; and the statutory language was wide enough to 
include a declaration permitting compulsory removal and detention  as long as it 
was found to be in the patient’s best interests, and complied with the conditions 
                                                 
93 Ibid p351 
94 Specifically Re TF (An Adult: Residence) [2000] 1 MHLR 120 
95 Ibid p352 
96 Re GJ, NJ & BJ (Incapacitated Adults) [2008] EWHC 1097 
97 [2007] EWHC 3085, decided by Charles J on 9th October 2007 
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of Sunderland v. PS. Charles J was thereby acting under statutory authority, but 
as interpreted according to common law development – the tail wagging the dog! 
 
This approach shows every sign of becoming entrenched. The principles of 
Charles J’s judgment were referred to, agreed with, and followed by Sir Mark 
Potter P in Re P (Adult Patient: Consent to Medical Treatment)98 : 
 
P was a 22 year old man who suffered from severe, complex and 
presently uncontrolled epilepsy. He was cared for by his adoptive 
mother, AH, who took the view that the course of treatment 
recommended by his doctors exacerbated, rather than relieved, his 
symptoms. The PCT issued proceedings under the Mental Capacity 
Act to secure assessment and treatment of P. Expert evidence 
correctly applied the principles of s1 and the Code, and concluded 
the P lacked capacity to make the relevant decisions. 
 
The case vividly demonstrated a disagreement between the patient’s family and 
his doctors as to where his best interests lay. The ‘closeness of the relationship’99 
between P and AH was seen as key to the ‘real difficulty’ in the case. In fact four 
difficulties were said to stem from this:  
 
(1) Real and unresolved doubt as to whether P’s expressed 
views were his own or ‘no more than simple adoption and 
repetition of his mother’s views’ when he would otherwise be 
malleable and co operative with expert attempts to improve the 
condition of his life; 
 
(2)  Assessment required observation of him as an individual 
rather than ‘as reported or recounted in the presence and under 
the influence of his mother’ whose views were ‘eccentric, 
                                                 
98 [2008] EWHC 1403 at para.s 31-32.  
99 Para 19 
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misguided and…positively harmful’ in the eyes of medical 
orthodoxy. 
 
(3)  Separation of P and his mother against their will would be 
highly distressing to both. 
 
(4)  The assessment task would be more difficult if P was 
reluctant and fearful, rather than willing and co operative.100 
 
Accordingly, the doctors101 were noted to have been concerned to achieve a 
course of treatment with which P’s mother, and hence P himself, would co- 
operate. The court approach was to form its own view of P’s best interests, on 
the basis of both the MCA Code para 5.62 and the ‘balance sheet approach’ of 
the inherent jurisdiction.102  
 
The court view was that P needed urgent admission. There were two possibilities 
– an immediate admission to Oak Rise, or a slightly delayed admission to 
Romford. AH had previously indicated a willingness to co- operate with 
Romford, which gave it a ‘premium’ that was ‘obvious and desirable’.103 Both 
the medics and the court were prepared to follow the option which AH preferred. 
It was grudging, couched in terms of firm expectation, and backed up by threats 
to take the alternative route if AH did not live up to her expressions of 
cooperation,104 but it did give family views a decisive impact on treatment 
                                                 
100 At first blush, this may suggest that the unusual accommodation offered to AH’s views was 
motivated by fear that the proposed treatment could not be effective without her support. Such 
an interpretation does not, however, stand up to later judicial comment. Making fallback 
provisions to cover the possibility that AH would not live up to her promised co operation, 
Potter P noted that ‘because of his physical condition and generally compliant temperament, it 
is unlikely that he will be physically resistant to being transported from his home to Oak Rise 
or to his assessment and treatment once there.” (para 25) 
101 Para 19 
102 Referred to at para 22. NB It was exactly the absence in the statute of any such balance 
sheet approach which Dunn et al had lamented. See n89 above. 
103 Para 23 
104 ‘The whole basis upon which the experts are agreed that such a course, albeit involving a 
short delay, is nonetheless a desirable alternative to immediate admission at Oak Rise is that it 
will then involve consensuality rather than any degree of unwillingness, let alone coercion. 
Failing such consensuality, then it will be necessary to provide for P’s immediate admission to 
Oak Rise, and for provision to be made as to the need for reasonable and proportionate 
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decisions. Not since Re T, the anomalous acceptance of a mother’s refusal of her 
toddler’s liver transplant, has the impact of family care on a patient’s treatment 
been so acknowledged.  
 
Is such acknowledgement attributable to the new statutory framework? It is 
impossible to say. Certainly there is no mention in the judgment of any enhanced 
recognition of family views, such as would not have been seen under the 
inherent jurisdiction. However, the medics were clearly taking their duties of 
consultation, and in particular the context of P’s care, seriously – more seriously 
than the authorities under the inherent jurisdiction suggest. 
 
Judicial accommodation of AH’s preferences was firmly hedged about with 
provisions for securing P’s treatment at Oak Rise in the event that AH did not 
live up to her promise of cooperation. Of necessity, this took the matter into the 
territory of the Bournewood gap. It was clearly a matter of irritation to the 
judge105 that Counsel in the case had not considered the relationship between the 
Bournewood gap and the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act. He raised 
the authorities of Sunderland v PS and Re GJ, NJ & BJ himself, but considered 
that they begged, rather than answered, the question whether the powers of the 
Court of Protection under the Mental Capacity Act matched those of the inherent 
jurisdiction.106  
 
In order to answer his own question, the President claimed the support of Charles 
J’s decision in Surrey County Council v. MB (a copy of which he was 
subsequently given). He took a whole raft of statutory provisions – sections 
15(1)(c), 48, 16 and 17 – and paragraph 6.51 of the Code, and interpreted them 
as together entitling the Court of Protection to do under statute exactly what 
judges had previously done under inherent jurisdiction:107 
 
                                                                                                                                   
measures for securing the removal of P from his home for the purposes of in-patient 
assessment on the assumption that he and/or AH may not willingly comply.” Para 23 
105 See para 26 
106 Section 5 of the MCA authorises acts of restraint if necessary to prevent harm to P; but 
section 6 specifically provides that the definition of restraint does not extend to deprivations of 
liberty within the meaning of Art 5(1) of the European Convention.  
107 Para 29 
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“Thus, where the facts so justify, and the immediate welfare interests 
of an incapacitated adult so dictate the court may, by a prior 
declaration in appropriate terms, render lawful an act of restraint 
under s6(1)-(4) of the Act which might otherwise amount to a 
deprivation of liberty under s6(5), thus bridging the ‘Bournewood 
Gap’”. 
 
Contrary to Bartlett’s fears then, the indications of the first authorities of the 
statutory regime are that the inherent jurisdiction may not be such a wildcard 
after all. The declaratory jurisdiction may well become as little used as the 
legislature intended – as little used as the inherent jurisdiction in relation to 
children – genuinely a safeguard jurisdiction. If it does, it will be because the 
courts do not, after all, need to rely on a procedure of their own invention, when 
the judges can simply import the reasoning and the effect of that procedure into 
the new statutory provisions.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The new legislation owes much to the pre-existing common law. Judges led the 
calls for statutory reform; and case law established the principles on which it is 
based. The early indications are that the Mental Capacity Act is being interpreted 
and applied by judges in very much the same way as they interpreted and applied 
their old inherent jurisdiction. 
 
The Act is patient-focussed, and families are conceived only as a subset of 
carers. The mechanism prescribed for the determination of ‘best interests’ gives 
families the roles of informant and opinion-holder, but not that of independent 
interest-bearer. However, the Act is also a practical response to the social 
phenomenon of an aging population increasingly cared-for in the community, 
and so it awards decision-making authority to whomsoever has the responsibility 
of putting a decision into effect.  
 
In the more mundane, everyday matters the decision-maker may well be a family 
member, and the mechanism for determination of ‘best interests’ lends itself to 
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contextual decision-making.  It is likely that the weight ascribed by family 
decision-makers to the various factors under consideration may be different to 
the weight ascribed to them by judges, leading to objectively different outcomes. 
 
However, it is only the more mundane matters where family members are likely 
to be decision-makers. Significant matters, such as medical treatment decisions, 
will lie in others’ hands. Then, when their own interests are likely to be 
significantly affected too, the right to be consulted for their views affords to 
families a disappointingly limited role.  
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Conclusions 
 
Medical treatment disputes, and the issues at stake in their resolution, are 
undeniably complex. Patients and families are diverse in the needs, their 
capabilities and their expectations. At the end of our considerations, it is helpful 
to ask again those questions which first prompted our enquiry: how are medical 
treatment disputes to be resolved, and in particular what is the family’s role? 
     
What should be the role of the family? 
As I have shown in chapter 1, patients and families are interdependent. Support 
from a family implies a better prognosis for the patient, and support of a patient 
implies a burden on the family. Such interdependence is the reason why we 
cannot, as Coggon suggests,1 simply hope that what is best for the individual is 
also best overall2, but should devise a system for medical dispute resolution 
which takes into account the interests of families as well as patients. Logically 
and morally, families have a claim for influence in medical decision-making. 
Their role should be one of active participation. 
 
What is the most appropriate ethical basis for medical decision making … 
Affording an influential role to patients’ families in the medical decision-making 
process is a challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy of patient autonomy. While 
autonomy’s rise to ethical dominance served a vital purpose in the wake of 
tremendous social change, there is nothing immutable about it and society now 
has new needs. Modern health care provision leans heavily on ‘care in the 
community’, in which families play an essential part. In such a context, 
autonomy’s exclusion of the family makes it an unsatisfactory ethic. 
 
As we have seen in chapter 2, the most appropriate ethical framework for 
medical decision-making is one which not only protects patients’ individual 
                                                 
1 In ‘Best Interests, Public Interest, and the Power of the Medical Profession’ (2008) Health Care 
Analysis 219 at p220-221.  
2 We may recall from chapter 2 that the best interests of an individual does not necessarily satisfy 
a utilitarian approach: a small gain to the individual at great cost to others may be a less desirable 
outcome ‘overall’ than a lesser gain to the individual but at no cost to others. 
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liberties but also recognises the patient in context. Illness and disability limit our 
capacity to act as rationally autonomous decision-makers. In these 
circumstances, families are an anchor to our sense of self. The most appropriate 
ethic for medical decision making therefore combines deontological constraint as 
a minimum standard, and care as an ideal. 
 
…and what does it suggest for the role of the family? 
Such a combined ethic perceives the family as an intrinsic part of the patient’s 
predicament, part of both the problem and the solution. The family role in 
resolving disputes is transformed from bystander, to significant character in the 
drama of the patient’s life. Family considerations both extend and limit the 
narrative options. There is a tension inherent in such an ethical combination 
which decries easy answers to complex questions, but it does ensure that that the 
decision-making process is informed from the perspectives of both the patient 
and the family, to the wider advantage of all. 
 
What is the role historically afforded to families… 
Having established a moral claim to influence, and an ethical framework within 
which to exercise it, considerations can turn to practical experience. As was 
shown in chapter 3, the role historically afforded to the family in medical 
treatment disputes was a long way short of our ideal. Analysis of decided cases3 
revealed how judicial resolution of treatment disputes effectively limited family 
influence to polite hearing. The authority to determine disputes was exclusively 
reserved to judges, with a clear respect for medical expertise but no 
corresponding regard for familial relations. Families were useful sources of 
information and support, but family interests were not a relevant part of 
considerations.   
                                                 
3 By no means all such disputes end in litigation, but courts are powerful agents of authority. The 
approach they adopt to medical treatment disputes resonates beyond the individual cases which 
they determine so the role afforded to families by the court informs the role they can play in less 
contentious settings as well. As Muireann Quigley contends in ‘Best Interests, the Power of the 
Medical Profession, and the Power of the Judiciary.’ (2008) Health Care Analysis 233 at p 238, 
whereas a bad decision by a single doctor adversely affects his patients, a poor decision by a 
judge threatens by the doctrine of precedent to bind all doctors and all patients to bad decisions. 
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…and could it have been different? 
As was shown in chapters 3 and 4, the limitations of the family role were 
determined not by principled consideration, but by legal accident.  Whereas 
judicial powers extend to children by both modern statutory provision and by 
ancient inherent jurisdiction, over-zealous and poorly-considered statutory 
reform extinguished equivalent powers in respect of incapacitated adults. The 
courts were obliged to invent a jurisdiction to fill the lacuna and meet pressing 
social need. It was desperation, not idealism, which led the inventive powers of 
the House of Lords to settle on the old and vague doctrine of necessity, thereby 
creating a jurisdiction whose roots, like those of the jurisdiction in respect of 
children, are narrowly individualistic. The unsurprising result was that the 
principal guide to decision-making, namely the ‘best interests’ test, excluded 
families.    
 
Yet there is nothing inevitable about a narrow understanding of ‘best interests’. 
Indeed over time and in non-linear fashion, according to the accidental facts of 
individual cases as is the nature of common law, the concept of best interests 
developed a broader focus. The family, however, remained peripheral because, 
as was shown in parts A to D of chapter 4, the core values by which such 
development was navigated were focused on other difficulties, like eugenics, or 
capacity, or the moral urge simultaneously to preserve life and recognise limits 
to its value. 
 
The mechanism adopted for widening the understanding of ‘best interests’ was 
the ‘balancing exercise.’ The way to determine best interests was to put all 
constituent elements into the balance and see which end weighed most heavily. 
Once such an approach was adopted, it became possible to encompass more than 
strictly medical interests. Ultimately medical, emotional, cultural, spiritual and 
all other welfare interests came to be recognised.  
 
Once such broad interests are admitted, it is difficult to see why the patient 
should be seen as anything other than a fully social being, enmeshed in 
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relationships which imply both benefit and burden. The family may have been 
marginal to the values which led to the adoption of the mechanism but it need 
not be marginal to its operation. If it can be recognised that the patient himself 
has interests which point in opposite directions, and that resolution may be 
achieved by a balancing exercise, it is a small step in logic to accept that 
competing interests of others can be accommodated in the same way. And so, a 
more influential role for families is possible. 
 
Exactly that possibility was contemplated in Re A.4 The fact that it was not ever 
fully tested in court is more a testament to the hold on legal consciousness which 
autonomy and individualism have, then it is to the merits of the argument. It is 
not necessary to look very far afield to find an illustration of how such an 
approach might work. As was shown in part E of chapter 4, cases of paternity 
testing dispute after amendment5 of the Family Law Reform Act offer a working 
model6.  
 
It would of course have required a shift in the judicial mindset to admit family 
interests into the balancing exercise: individualism is largely a judicial norm, 
which would be unsettled7. It would not, however, have required legislative 
reform. The legal machinery of the balancing exercise was already in place, and 
family interests would simply have been another factor to weigh in the scales. 
Sadly, any prospect of progress by judicial enlightenment is now lost. Whatever 
may have been, with the enactment of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 the inherent 
jurisdiction is now superceded by statute.  
 
Why did the law change? 
The pressures which led to legal reform were several, as we have seen in chapter 
5. The judges themselves led the call for statutory reform, perceiving that 
                                                 
4 [2000] 1 FLR 549. See page 146 above, where it is noted that, in the context of male 
sterilisation the Court of Appeal consciously left open the possibility of argument based on third 
party interests. 
5 By s82 of The Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 
6 See pages 234 – 248 above. 
7 Thorpe LJ’s enthusiasm in Re A is less typical than Butler-Sloss P’s caution: see page146 
above. 
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judicial invention is an unsatisfactory basis for the law. Broader social realities 
of an ageing population and ever-growing healthcare costs ensured political 
engagement with the issue. Finally the Bournewood litigation exposed the law to 
the different jurisprudence of European Human Rights, and found it wanting. 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 was the culmination of many forces, not all of 
them driven by patients and their families.   
 
How did legislative reform affect the role of the family? 
The effect of legal reform on the family role in resolving medical treatment 
disputes was mixed, as was shown in chapter 6. The Act only applies in respect 
of adults lacking capacity, so whole swathes of family care are completely 
unaffected. For those to whom the new legislation does apply, the starting point 
in respect of families is sadly familiar. The ‘five principles’ of the Mental 
Capacity Act make it clear that the focus of decision making is still narrowly 
individualistic – the patient alone, not the patient in the family. 
 
On the other hand, the legislation has struck an attitude of support for informal 
decision making wherever responsibility falls, and in minor matters that will 
often be the family. An attitude of support in day to day care is something to be 
grateful for. Unfortunately it is also, as was demonstrated in chapter 6, the 
highwater mark of the legislation as far as families are concerned. What at first 
sight seems sympathetic to the claim for greater involvement in decision-making 
is, in fact, simply a reflection of the reality of ‘care in the community’ and the 
financial impossibility of any other policy approach.  
 
The legislation’s true disregard of families is seen in the universal operation of 
the general authority. It goes wherever lies the responsibility for putting a 
decision into effect. In everyday matters, like outfits and aspirin, a family 
shouldering the burden of daily care will indeed have unprecedented freedom of 
action – but then so would anyone else performing the same tasks, even the 
unknown bank nurse of institutional care. A family not shouldering the burden of 
daily care is unaffected by choices of clothes and low-grade painkillers, so 
would be unlikely to seek influence there anyway. In more significant matters, 
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like surgery and sedation, medical professionals are involved. Doctors perform 
the operation and prescribe the medication, so they have the general authority 
under the Act to make such treatment decisions. Families are much more 
affected by issues of hip replacement or palliative care, but at the very point 
where the impact on them is greater, their ability to influence the decision 
recedes. 
 
It is true that, even where they do not hold general authority to reach decisions, 
families ought to be consulted by decision-makers but, as we saw in chapter 6, 
the comfort in this is limited. Consultation does not imply influence. Families 
may give information about the patient, and their opinion of what is best for him, 
but they are not invited to express their own interests, still less expect them to be 
acted upon. 
 
For families, and for the hope of securing for them an influential role in medical 
decision-making, the most troubling feature of the new legislation is revealed in 
the provisions for IMCAs. A new invention, to be appointed only where no 
family exists, IMCA are essentially a statutory substitute. Their invention 
implies acceptance that families have a valuable role to play, for otherwise there 
would be no point in arranging  substitute. However, as was shown in chapter 6, 
their powers imply that families are at best taken for granted, at worst treated 
with suspicion.  IMCAs have a duty of advocacy, a right to be consulted and a 
right of access to information. Families, on the other hand, can only give their 
opinion, are bound by rules of medical confidentiality and can expect to be 
consulted only ‘if it is practical and appropriate’ to do so (which allows medics 
to admit families as much as they choose, but also to disregard them as they 
think fit). The comparison suggests that more is expected of families than they 
are given credit for, and the underlying attitude to families is still one of mistrust. 
 
So, what is the role of the family in medical treatment disputes? 
It is unsatisfactory. After fundamental changes in the structures and policies of 
health and social care provision, after a major piece of legislation, in law the role 
of the family in medical treatment disputes is largely unchanged.      
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Appendix 1 
 
The development of the best interest test over time and by treatment type 
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Case notes 
 
    ? 23rd July 1970: Testing allowed 
S v. S; W v. OS [1970] 3 All ER 107: blood testing is part 
of the general protective duty only, not the custodial duty 
of courts, so child’s interests are not pre-eminent. 
?     17th September 1976: Treatment refused. 
Re D [1976] Fam 185: Patient aged just 11, and with 
capacity to marry. Mother’s views rejected as social 
engineering. Doctor’s support rejected as lacking 
impartiality 
 ?    7th August 1981: Treatment allowed 
Re B (A Minor)(Wardship:Medical treatment) [1981] 1 
WLR 1421: if patient’s life was still imponderable, failure 
to preserve it would be wrong. 
  ? 
 
  17th October 1985: Treatment allowed 
Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112: 
juvenile consent, at least to contraceptive treatment, 
possible.  
?     30th April 1987: Treatment allowed 
Re B (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199: 
Patient aged 17. Her “right to reproduce” was dismissed 
because she would always lack ability to exercise it. 
?     1st December 1987: Treatment allowed 
Re M (Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation)[1988] 2 FLR 497: 
Patient aged 17. Eugenics disavowed but practical effect of 
foetal disability informed court assessment of patient’s 
interests 
?     29th June 1988: Treatment allowed 
Re P (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation)[1989] 1 FLR 182: 
Court approval given just three weeks before patient’s 18th 
birthday, against OS request to postpone the decision. 
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 ?    20th April 1989: Non-treatment allowed 
Re C (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1990] 
Fam 26: Best interests may be to ease suffering rather than 
prolong life. 
?     24th May 1989: Treatment allowed 
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1: 
Treatment of incapacitated adult patient lawful if in her 
best interests. Sterilisation in a special category for which 
seeking court approval is good practice.  
  ? 
 
? 
 
 21st September 1990: Treatment allowed 
Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 
FLR 386: 15 year old found to lack competence to refuse 
life-saving treatment. Religious objections overridden. 
 ?    19th October 1990: Non-treatment allowed 
Re J (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] 
Fam 33: presumption in favour of prolonging life is 
rebuttable. If patient is not terminally ill, determination of 
best interests includes account of pain and suffering if 
treatment is given, and may require a course of action 
which does not prevent death. Balancing exercise adopted.  
?     9th April 1991: Treatment allowed 
Re GF (Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 293 
Sterilisation for purely therapeutic purposes does not 
require court sanction. 
  ? 
 
  24th July 1991: Treatment allowed 
Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1991] 3 
WLR 592: 15 year old lacked competence by reason of 
mental illness. (Consent as a key: court consent can 
override juvenile refusal.) 
? 
 
 
    24th June 1992: Treatment allowed 
Re W (An Adult: Sterilisation) [1993] 2 FCR 187: 
Sterilisation lawful, even if risk of pregnancy small, 
because ‘responsible body of medical opinion’ in favour. 
  ? 
 
  10th July 1992: Treatment allowed 
Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) 
[1992] 3 WLR 758: 16 year old considered competent at 1st 
Inst. but incompetent by reason of anorexia by CA. Court 
can override even a competent refusal. (Consent as a flak 
jacket.) 
    ? 
 
22nd July 1992: Blood testing allowed 
Re T (A Minor)(Blood Tests) [1992] 2 FCR 663: Where 
both parents agree, the court would direct tests for DNA 
profiling. 
   ? 
 
 28th July 1992: Treatment allowed. 
Re S (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376: 4 
year old boy treated with blood transfusions against the 
religious views of his parents. 
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  ? 
 
  30th July 1992: Treatment allowed 
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95: patient 
lacked capacity to make proper refusal because of medical 
misinformation (1st inst) and undue influence (CA). 
   ? 
 
 12th October 1992: Treatment allowed 
Re S (Adult: Surgical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 26: 
patient’s religious objections to Caesarean overridden, 
without any discussion of jurisdiction or competence. 
  ? 
 
  27th October 1992: Treatment allowed 
South Glamorgan CC v. W & B [1993] 1 FLR 574: If all 
other remedies fail, courts can still use inherent jurisdiction 
to override a 15 year old’s competent refusal of treatment.   
 ?    4th February 1993: Non-treatment allowed 
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland: CA – mere existence is not a 
benefit, but wide concept of best interests adopted. HL – 
clinical value of treatment supercedes interest 
considerations when patient has no medical interests. 
    ? 
 
5th February 1993: Blood tests refused 
Re F (A Minor)(Blood Tests: Parental rights) [1993] 3 
WLR 369: Court would not order blood tests against the 
wishes of the parent with sole responsibility since birth. 
   ? 
 
 15th March 1993: Treatment allowed 
Re O (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149: 
Premature baby treated with blood transfusions against the 
religious views of the parents. 
   ? 
 
 24th May 1993: Treatment allowed 
Re R (A Minor)(Blood Transfusions)[1993] 2 FLR 757: 10 
month old baby treated with blood products against 
religious views of the parents, if no reasonable alternative 
and in life-threatening situations. 
  ? 
 
  14th October 1993: Treatment refused 
Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 : 
patient capacity confirmed, after medical crisis had passed. 
? 
 
    29th October 1993: Treatment refused 
Re LC (Medical Treatment: Sterilisation) [1997] 2 FLR 
258: even though patient in LA care, and had previously 
been sexually abused, the care now provided was so good 
that risk of pregnancy negligible. 
    ? 
 
7th December 1993: Blood tests directed 
Re G (A Minor)(Blood Tests) [1994] 1 FLR 495: Court 
could and would direct testing even if the parent who was 
principal carer of the child made clear her intention not to 
comply with the direction. 
 ?    14th January 1994: Non-Treatment allowed 
Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1994] 1 WLR 601: 
Court should have ultimate power to review doctors’ 
decisions. 
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    ? 
 
23rd May 1994: Blood tests not directed 
Re CB (A Minor)(Blood Tests) [1994] 2 FLR 762: Where 
evidence is cogent that child’s primary carer will not 
comply, there is no point in making the direction. 
  ? 
 
? 
 
 14th June 1994: Treatment allowed 
Re S (A Minor)(Consent to Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 
FLR 1065: 15 year old found not competent by reason of 
illness, failure to understand consequences, and maternal 
pressure (based on religious beliefs, which were 
overridden).  
  ? 
 
  29th November 1994: Treatment allowed 
LB v. Croydon District Health Authority [1995] 1 FCR 
332: 1st inst court found patient had capacity to refuse, but 
Mental Health Act overrode it. CA upheld statutory 
interpretation, but doubted capacity in any event. 
    ? 
 
28th April 1995: 
Re R (A Minor) (unreported) 
 
    ? 
 
4th July 1995: Blood tests refused 
O v. L [1995] 2 FLR 930: Husband had a good relationship 
with child and had applied for contact, which was likely to 
be in child’s interests regardless of biological parentage. 
Mother’s request for tests was motivated by wish to 
prevent contact. 
 
    ? 
 
5th March 1996: Blood tests directed 
Re H (A Minor)(Blood Tests: Parental Rights) [1997] Fam 
89: Intention of primary carer not to comply is not 
determinative of application for a direction for testing. 
Welfare does not dominate the decision. 
 ?    26th April 1996: Non-treatment allowed 
Re R (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 FLR 99: Wide 
view of best interests – no need to ‘strive officiously to 
keep alive’. 
 ?    14th June 1996: Treatment allowed 
Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) 
[1997] 2 FCR 172: Bone marrow donation by severely 
handicapped 25 year old was in her best interests because it 
would save the life of her sister and therefore maintain 
supportive family links.   
  ? 
 
  3rd July 1996: Treatment allowed 
Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v. C [1997] 1 FCR 274: 
patient in labour lacked capacity on basis of inability to 
weigh information. 
  ? 
 
  3rd July 1996: Treatment allowed 
Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare Trust v. W [1996] 2 FLR 
613: patient in labour lacked capacity on basis of inability 
to weigh information. 
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 ?    24th October 1996: Non-treatment allowed  
Re T(A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 
All ER 906: best interests viewed ‘on much broader 
grounds’ than clinical assessment. 
  ? 
 
  13th December 1996: Treatment allowed 
Re L (Patient: Non-consensual Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 
837: patient in labour lacked capacity by reason of needle 
phobia. 
  ? 
 
  18th February 1997: Treatment allowed 
Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426: patient in 
labour lacked capacity by reason of needle phobia. 
    ? 
 
1st May 1997: Blood tests directed 
Re R (A Minor)(Blood Test: Constraint) [1998] 1 FLR 
745:  
 
   ? 
 
 18th November 1997: Non-treatment allowed 
Re C (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384: Doctors’ 
view of baby’s medical interests prevailed over parents’ 
desire to pursue all possible treatment. 
? 
 
    29th January 1998: Treatment refused 
Re S (Adult: Sterilisation) [1999] 1 FCR 277: The better 
carers protect the patient, the less reason for the court to 
sanction sterilisation. 
  ? 
 
? 
 
 10th June 1998: Treatment allowed 
Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 
FLR 810: 14 year old found not competent by reason of 
insufficient information to make proper decision (and 
religious motivation? Religious views overridden) 
?     19th June 1998: Treatment allowed 
Re X (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [1999] 3 FCR 426: 
Court must consider risk of pregnancy without treatment; 
risk of harm in pregnancy; and range of alternative 
treatments, with associated risks. 
  ? 
 
  30th July 1998: Treatment first allowed but later found to 
be unlawful  
St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1999] Fam 26: 
After medical crisis had been resolved, it was found that 
patient had at all times been competent. 
  ? 
 
  15th July 1999: Treatment allowed 
Re M (Child: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1999] 2 FCR 
577: 15 year old patient found not competent by reason of 
‘overwhelming’ illness. 
? 
 
    10th November 1999: Treatment allowed 
Re ZM & OS (Sterilisation: Patient’s Best Interests) 
[2001] 1 FLR 523: Burden on carers easily inferred but not 
presented as a factor to be taken into account. 
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   ? 
 
 25th November 1999: Treatment not allowed 
Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child’s Religious Upbringing 
and Circumcision) [2000] 1 FLR 571: where parents were 
not in agreement, circumcision was not in the best interests 
of 5 year old boy. 
? 
 
    20th December 1999: sterilisation refused 
Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549: male patient. 
Interests of third parties, such as women he may potentially 
impregnate, left as an open question. 
    ? 
 
24th January 2000: Remitted for consideration on the merits 
of directions. 
Re O & J (Paternity: Blood Tests) [2000] 1 FLR 418: The 
court had no jurisdiction to compel the parent with care of 
a child to give consent to blood testing.  
? 
 
    18th May 2000: sterilisation refused 
Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15: CA 
criticised judge for giving too much weight to family 
concerns over strictly medical considerations. 
 ?    5th July 2000: Non-treatment allowed 
A NHS Trust v. D [2000] 2 FLR 677: Four principles apply 
– best interests of child are paramount, preservation of life 
save in exceptional circumstances, not prolonging life 
distinguished from terminating life, and courts cannot 
direct doctors top provide treatment against their 
professional judgment. 
 ?    22nd September 2000: Treatment allowed 
Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) 
[2001] Fam 147: Best interests can deal with competing 
interests. 
    ? 
 
10th May 2001: Blood tests  
Re T (A Child)(DNA Tests: Paternity) [2001] All ER 82: It 
was in the child’s best interests that the truth about 
paternity was known. 
    ? 
 
21st March 2002: Blood tests ordered on appeal. 
Re H & A [2002] EWCA Civ 383: Trial judge gave 
insufficient weight to the importance of certainty. 
  ? 
 
  22nd March 2002: Non-treatment allowed 
Re B (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [2002] 2 FCR 1: in 
non-emergency conditions, paralysed patient found to be 
competent to make her own treatment decisions.  
  ? 
 
? 
 
 15th August 2003: Treatment allowed 
Re P (Minor) [2003] EWHC 2327: 16 year old found not 
competent, with no clear explanation (religious 
motivation? Religious objections to treatment overridden) 
   ? 
 
 30th March 2004: Treatment not allowed. 
Re S (Specific Issue Order: Religion: Circumcision) 
[2005] 1 FLR 236: where parents were not in agreement, 
circumcision was not in the interests of 8 year old boy. 
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 ?    17th September 2004: Reinstatement of treatment allowed 
W Healthcare NHS Trust v. H [2005] 1 WLR 834: Court 
decision must be based on assessment of best interests, not 
substituted judgment. 
 ?    28th July 2005: Declaration refused 
R (Burke) v. GMC [2005] QB 424: ‘Touchstone of 
intolerability’ rejected. Retreat from broad view of best 
interests. 
 ?  ? 
 
 1st September 2005: Withdrawal of treatment allowed 
An NHS Trust v. X [2005] EWCA Civ 1145: Court 
determination of best interests can assess differences of 
medical opinion. Religious views of patient and family 
overridden. 
 ?    12th October 2005: Non-treatment allowed 
Portsmouth NHS Trust v. Wyatt [2005] EWCA Civ 1181: 
Intolerability is a valuable guide for judges. Intellectual 
milestones set out. 
  ? 
 
  23rd January 2006: Treatment allowed 
R (Axon) v. Sed. St. for Health [2006] EWHC 37: Gillick 
affirmed for all types of treatment. 
 ?    15th March 2006: treatment withdrawal refused, non-
escalation allowed  
An NHS Trust v. MB [2006] EWHC 507: Involvement of 
unimpeachable parents significant. 
 ?    9th May 2006: Treatment withdrawal allowed 
Re K (A Child)(Medical Treatment: Declaration) [2006] 
EWHC 1007: parents supported withdrawal and only 
distantly involved in care. 
   ? 
 
 28th July 2006: Treatment allowed 
Ahsan v. University Hospitals Leicester NHS Trust 
[2006]EWHC 2624: damages to be assessed at the higher 
level necessary to cover costs of treating pvs patient at 
home, in accordance with religious views.  
 
 
 
 
 321 
Appendix 2 
 
Best Interests: List of Cases (by order of last date of judgment) 
 
 
I. Sterilisation 
 
Re D [1976] Fam 185 17/09/1976 
Re B (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199 30/04/1987 
Re M (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] 2 FLR 497 01/12/1987 
Re P(A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1989] 1 FLR 182 29/06/1988 
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 24/05/1989 
Re GF (Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 293 09/04/1991 
Re W (An adult: Sterilisation) [1993] 2 FCR 187 24/06/1992 
Re LC (Medical treatment: Sterilisation) [1997] 2 FLR 258 29/10/1993 
Re S (Adult: Sterilisation) [1999] 1 FCR 277 29/01/1998 
Re X (Adult patient: Sterilisation) [1999] 3 FCR 426 19/06/1998 
Re ZM & OS (Sterilisation: Patient’s Best Interests)  
[2001] 1 FLR 523  10/11/1999 
Re A (Male sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 20/12/1999 
Re S (Adult patient: Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15 18/05/2000 
 
II. Life-saving Treatment 
 
Re B (A Minor)(Wardship:Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421 07/08/1981 
Re C  (A Minor)(Wardship:Medical Treatment) [1990] Fam 26 20/04/1989 
Re J (A Minor)(Wardship:Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 19/10/1990 
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 04/02/1993 
Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1994] 1 WLR 601 14/01/1994 
Re R (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 FLR 99 26/04/1996 
Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant)  
[1997] 2 FCR 172 14/06/1996 
Re T (A Minor)(Wardship:Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 All ER 906 24/10/1996 
A NHS Trust v. D [2000] 2 FLR 677 05/07/2000 
Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation)  
[2001] Fam 147 22/09/2000 
W Healthcare NHS Trust v. H [2005] 1 WLR 834 17/09/2004 
R (on the application of Burke) v. GMC [2005] QB 424 28/07/2005 
An NHS Trust v. X [2005] EWCA Civ 1145 01/09/2005 
Portsmouth NHS Trust v. Wyatt [2005] EWCA Civ 1181 12/10/2005 
An NHS Trust v. MB [2006] EWHC 507 15/03/2006 
Re K (A Child)(Medical Treatment: Declaration)  
[2006] EWHC 1007 09/05/2006 
Re B (A Child)(Medical Treatment)[2008] EWHC 1996 10/06/2008 
Re OT [2009] EWHC 633 19/03/2009
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III. Borderline Capacity 
 
Adults: 
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 30/07/1992 
Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 14/10/1993 
LB v. Croydon District Health Authority [1995] 1 FCR 332 29/11/1994 
Tameside & Glossop Acute Services Trust v. CH [1996] 1 FLR 762 12/01/1996 
Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v. C [1997] 1 FCR 274 03/07/1996 
Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare Trust v. W [1996] 2 FLR 613 03/07/1996 
Re L (Patient: Non-consensual treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 837 13/12/1996 
Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 18/02/1997 
St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1999] Fam 26 30/07/1998 
Re B (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [2002] 2 FCR 1 22/03/2002 
 
Children: 
Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112 17/10/1985 
Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 21/09/1990 
Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to Treatment) 
[1991] 3 WLR 592 24/07/1991 
Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction)  
[1992] 3 WLR 758 10/07/1992 
South Glamorgan CC v. W & B [1993] 1 FLR 574 27/10/1992 
Re S (A Minor)(Consent to Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065 14/06/1994 
Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810 10/06/1998 
Re M (Child: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1999] 2 FCR 577 15/07/1999 
Re P (Minor) [2003] EWHC 2327 15/08/2003 
R(Axon) v. Sec. St. or Health [2006] EWHC 37 23/01/2006
  
 
 
IV. Religious Beliefs 
 
Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)[1993] 1 FLR 386 21/09/1990 
Re S (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376 28/07/1992 
Re S (Adult: Surgical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 26 12/10/1992 
Re O (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149 15/03/1993 
Re R (A Minor)(Blood Transfusion) [1993] 2 FLR 757 24/05/1993 
Re S (A Minor)(Consent to Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065 14/06/1994 
Re C (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384 18/11/1997 
Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810 10/06/1998 
Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child’s Religious Upbringing and Circumcision) 
 [2000] 1 FLR 571 25/11/1999 
Re P (Minor) [2003] EWHC 2327 15/08/2003 
Re S (Specific Issue Order: Religion: Circumcision)  
[2005] 1 FLR 236 30/03/2004 
An NHS Trust v. X [2005] EWCA Civ 1145 01/09/2005 
Ahsan v. University Hospitals Leicester NHS Trust  
[2006] EWHC 2624 28/07/2006 
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V. Immunisation and Paternity Testing 
 
S v. S; W v. Official Solicitor [1970] 3 All ER 107 23/07/1970 
Re T (A Minor)(Blood Tests) [1992] 2 FCR 663 22/07/1992 
Re F (A Minor)(Blood Tests: parental Rights) [1993] 3 WLR 369 05/02/1993 
Re G (A Minor)(Blood Tests) [1994] 1 FLR 495 07/12/1993 
Re CB (A Minor)(Blood Tests) [1994] 2 FLR 762 23/05/1994 
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Appendix 3: 
 
Chronology of Legislative and Litigation Progress 
 
 
 
    February 1995 Law Commission publishes its report on ‘Mental Incapacity’ 
 
 9 October 1997 Bournewood at First Instance 
 
 2 December 1997 Bournewood in the Court of Appeal 
 
    December 1997 Government publishes its consultation paper, ‘Who 
Decides?’ 
 
25 June 1998 Bournewood in the House of Lords 
 
    October 1999 Government publishes its proposals, ‘Making Decisions’ 
 
    June 2002 Government publishes draft Mental Health Bill and 
consultation paper 
 
    June 2004 Mental Capacity Bill introduced in the Commons 
 
   October 2004 Bournewood in the European Court  
 
    March 2005 Government commenced consultation on response to 
Bournewood 
 
 7 April 2005  Mental Capacity Act received Royal Assent 
 
29 June 2006 Government publishes ‘Protecting the Vulnerable’, a report 
of the consultation on the proposed response to Bournewood 
 
19 July 2007  Mental Health Act received Royal Assent 
 
 1 April 2009 Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (amendments to MCA by 
MHA) into effect 
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Appendix  4 
 
Excerpt From Mental Capacity Act 2005 
 
s4  Best interests 
 
(1)     In determining for the purposes of this Act what is in a person's best 
interests, the person making the determination must not make it merely on the 
basis of— 
 (a)     the person's age or appearance, or 
 (b)     a condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead 
others to make unjustified assumptions about what might be in his best 
interests. 
 
(2)     The person making the determination must consider all the relevant 
circumstances and, in particular, take the following steps. 
 
(3)     He must consider— 
 (a)     whether it is likely that the person will at some time have capacity 
in relation to the matter in question, and 
 (b)     if it appears likely that he will, when that is likely to be. 
 
(4)     He must, so far as reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person 
to participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as fully as possible in any 
act done for him and any decision affecting him. 
 
(5)     Where the determination relates to life-sustaining treatment he must not, in 
considering whether the treatment is in the best interests of the person concerned, 
be motivated by a desire to bring about his death. 
 
(6)     He must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable— 
 (a)     the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, 
any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity), 
 (b)     the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision 
if he had capacity, and 
 (c)     the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able 
to do so. 
 
(7)     He must take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult 
them, the views of— 
 (a)     anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the 
matter in question or on matters of that kind, 
 (b)     anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, 
 (c)     any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and 
 (d)     any deputy appointed for the person by the court, as to what would 
be in the person's best interests and, in particular, as to the matters 
mentioned in subsection (6). 
 
(8)     The duties imposed by subsections (1) to (7) also apply in relation to the 
exercise of any powers which— 
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 (a)     are exercisable under a lasting power of attorney, or 
 (b)     are exercisable by a person under this Act where he reasonably 
believes that another person lacks capacity. 
 
(9)     In the case of an act done, or a decision made, by a person other than the 
court, there is sufficient compliance with this section if (having complied with 
the requirements of subsections (1) to (7)) he reasonably believes that what he 
does or decides is in the best interests of the person concerned. 
 
(10)     “Life-sustaining treatment” means treatment which in the view of a 
person providing health care for the person concerned is necessary to sustain life. 
 
(11)     “Relevant circumstances” are those— 
 (a)     of which the person making the determination is aware, and 
 (b)     which it would be reasonable to regard as relevant. 
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